'mm^ 









•c'lr-.'^r.,! 



,.i J., .-i.'-.r.-;-' ,f,,, 

•'r.;W:;Wijir"'" 



I.;, '.,,' 



V "•' "liT^'r, -;',-' ■:";;'J.i.'f.- ■"■^■.•:..v ,■ ■ 













I k.,^.Vl -It'.' >v - . ■- r- 

■'l'.' ' ft'"-' 



'•;•'■•»'.' 



■t.^.'.' 



W{;pey,r^'-^.:'- ■■■:■■■■■:,■■ 

ItWi-.Tt -Tl' " ••"!'• '-A Vr V.'. .' ' -• ' <■ 

IjV^'SO:,':;:,' • '• '^ -Jit' iiTi'-: ■'' - , ' ' ■ •■• . • • , :: 









'■-''fffj '■!.';'' 



> f f'" •.' 

















\^^^' 



% % 



"^^0^ 

^o^ 









<^^ 



". <i 













: '^Ao^ 



^°^- " -- - - . 






:^^ 















V. ^ 






% 



>^ 00"^,-^^%% oo^.-iy^^^ cP'^,-^'-"'-^^ 



<i^ Q^ -,^ii^.«> <>!; Q^ > ,^ lil^ ;^ ^o> cj. 



" ^Si> ^ ".Bill^:'' .sj^<?^ -„ 







■^ 



^ 

•"-o^ % 










%. 



rO^ <!- 



•< * . V 



<. 









OV' -^ ^' 



<* " -f ft ft s ' ^v 



.^^ ^- 



^cP< 



:^ 



.^ 









'^tt.O^ 



■?a\ V > 






cS ^^ 













^^ '^TTftS^ A^^ <.- 




^^o. 



yi^ 



""if 







». ^ C » '-'-A , ;- <3 & » Y 




9? '''/T.s^ ,^ 



V 



^T^^s^^G^ ^ ^/7, s^ A*^ 





.. ^ 










■^.o"^ 






.<i>°^ 



:^^ 



S^ /^lA^^ \..^^ 



\<^' 






"- %,*^ . 




FRENCH 
FOREIGN POLICY 



FRENCH 
FOREIGN POLICY 

FROM FASHODA TO SERAJEVO 
(1898-1914) 



BY 



GRAHAM H. STUART, Ph.D. 

Ancien Eleve de I'Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques 

Instructor in Political Science, University 

of "Wisconsin 




NEW YORK 

THE CENTURY CO, 

1921 



^c 



3A\ 



.5^ 



Copyright ,1921 ,by 
THE CENTURY GO. 



JAN 24 1921 
©CI,A608148 



/ sr^ 



>o 



TO 
MADAME L. de HUPPY NEUVILLE 



FOREWOKD 

As the United States is slowly being brought to the 
realization that an American policy of isolation is no 
longer possible, the fact that European diplomacy has 
a fundamental effect upon our own foreign policy is 
becoming correspondingly evident. The result has 
been a greater interest in foreign politics, and a keener 
desire to solve the problem of international relation- 
ships. The best hope that we have of avoiding world 
conflicts in the future seems to be in a League of Na- 
tions, which would not only offer the means of settling 
disputes by other methods than that of war, but would 
possess the power to compel the employment of these 
peaceful methods. But even with a League of Nations, 
we must have an intelligent appreciation of the under- 
lying causes of national antagonisms, with a view to 
remedying them before an acute situation arises, if we 
are to have an enduring peace. 

When Bismarck imposed the unjust and humiliat- 
ing Treaty of Frankfort upon France, the spirit of the 
revanche was born. Instead of trying to come to an 
agreement with the neighbor whom she had despoiled, 
thereby making a reconciliation possible, Germany de- 
pended upon the secret treaties of the Triple Alliance 
to overawe France and to maintain her own dominant 
position. But France could also make secret treaties. 
The Dual Alliance and the Triple Entente were her an- 
swer. This created the famous balance of power upon 

yii 



viil FOEEWORD 

which the peace of Europe was nicely adjusted. We 
now realize that neither secret treaties nor a balance of 
power are of any value in maintaining the world's 
peace. A close study of the European situation pre- 
ceding the World War makes us wonder that the bitter 
rivalries could have been held in leash so long. 

To all Americans, the role that France played in 
this critical period of the world's history is of par- 
ticular interest. In the following study I have at- 
tempted to portray impartially the policy of the French 
foreign office, from the crisis of Fashoda to the crime 
of Serajevo. Before 1898, French foreign policy 
seemed for the most part to be merged in her colonial 
policy; after the murder of the Archduke Ferdinand, 
the foreign policy of France was inextricably mingled 
with the foreign policy of her allies. In the critical 
intervening period the policy of the Quai d'Orsay 
stands forth in clear outline against the cloudy back- 
ground of European diplomacy. 

The revolutions brought about by the World War 
have aided materially in such a survey by bringing 
to light secret documents which ordinarily would have 
remained hidden in the state archives for generations. 
The governments of the leading states of Europe have 
also found it to their advantage to break the custo- 
mary veil of silence and publish many of their secret 
communications. 

It has been of considerable advantage to me in mak- 
ing a study of this period that I was presf^nt in Paris 
throughout the critical Agadir Affair of 19ii, and also 
during the year preceding the outbreak of the World 
War. 



FOEEWORD 



IX 



I am particularly indebted to Professor F. A. Ogg 
whose assistance has been invaluable to me at every 
point in the preparation of the manuscript, and to my 
wife for her helpful suggestions and careful reading 
of the proof. 

Gbaham H. Stitakt. 
University of Wisconsin, 
September, 1920. 



,lv> 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 

CSAPTER PAGE 

I France and the International, Situation in 
1898 

1. The Dual and Triple Alliances .... 3 

2. Franco-British Relations 12 

II Fashoda 

1. The Franco-British Agreement of March 21, 

1899 19 

2. The First Peace Conference at The Hague . 33 

3. France, Grermany, and the Boer War . . 37 

III French Diplomacy in the Orient 

1- The Cretan Affair 44 

2. France Settles with Turkey 46 

3. France and the Boxer Rebellion .... 52 

4. Franco-Siamese Relations 71 

IV Diplomatic Relations with Italy and the Pope 

1. The Franco-Italian Rapprochement ... 77 

2. French Relations with, the Vatican ... 89 



@ 



yj The Entente Cordials 

1. France and the Bagdad Railway .... 98 

2. Franco-British Accord of April 8, 1904 . . 107 

3. The Ratification of the Franco-British Ac- 

cord 127 

. 4. The Russo-Japanese War . . . . . . 132 

VI European Rivalry in Morocco 

1. The Internal Condition of Morocco . . . 137 

2. The Franco-Spanish Arrangement of October 

3, 1904 145 

3. German Attitude Towards the French Policy 

in Morocco 156 

xi 



xii CONTENTS 

CHAFTEB PAGE 

VII The Fall of M. Delcass^ 

1. Preparations for the Kaiser's Visit to Tan- 

gier 170 

2. Germany Forces the Issue 179 

3. M. Rouvier at the Quai d'Orsay .... 192 

, VIII \ The Conference of Algecieas 
"^"-^ 1. The Drafting and Signing of the Act . . 206 

2. The Significance and Ratification of the Gen- 

eral Act 220 

3. The Application of the Act ..... 227 

IX Franco-German Rivalry in Morocco, 1907-1909 
/ 1, TJie Second Hague Conference and the 

' Franco-Japanese Accord 240 

2^ The Two Sultans of Morocco 246 

3* The Deserters of Casablanca 253 

4. The Franco-German Accord of 1909 . . . 261 

X Results of the Accord op 1909 

1. The Bosnian Crisis and the Triple Entente . 267 

2. The Fall of Clemenceau and Further Diffi- 

culties in Morocco 274 

3. Failure of the Accord of 1909 . . . .283 

4. The Fez Expedition 292 

^iv Agadir 

1. The German Demands 301 

2. French Offers and the Final Settlement . . 316 
8. The Settlement with Spain 327 

XII Towards the World War 

1. The Ministry of M. Poincare 332 

2. The Awakening 343 

3. Radicalism vs. Patriotism 358 

4. Conclusion 373 

Bibliography . . . . 377 

Index 385 



FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 



FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 



CHAPTER I 

FRANCE AND THE INTERNATIONAL 
SITUATION IN 1898 

1. THE DUAL AND TRIPLE ALLIANCES 

SPEAKING of the position of minister of foreign 
affairs, an old diplomat once remarked, ''II ne 
suffit pas d' avoir de genie, Vessentiel c'est de durer." 
In the Third French Republic, where there have been 
fifty changes of ministry from the promulgation of the 
present constitution in 1875 up to the outbreak of the 
World War, it would seem that there would be little 
chance for a successful minister of foreign affairs, if 
durability constitutes success. Therefore the regime 
of M. Delcasse, which commenced on June 28, 1898, 
and which was destined to endure practically seven 
years, would be noteworthy if for no other reason 
than that it holds the record by a wide margin for its 
sojourn at the Quai d 'Or say. But still more remark- 
able is the fact that, though ministries rose and fell, 
the guidance of foreign affairs was kept in the hands 
of the same man until he was able to carry out the policy 
that he had laid out for himself upon taking the posi- 
tion — a policy of rapprochement with Great Britain. 
During the four preceding years the foreign policy 



4 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

of France had for the most part been under the direc- 
tion of Mr. Gabriel Hanotaux, a very able diplomat, 
but an Anglophobe in his tendencies. When, on June 
28, 1898, M. Brisson formed a new Radical cabinet, and 
at the suggestion of M. Joseph Reinach chose M. Theo- 
phile Delcasse as minister of foreign affairs, it would 
have been only natural to expect that the new foreign 
minister, inexperienced and following a minister of 
exceptional ability, would attempt to carry out the 
policy of his predecessor. Instead M. Delcasse elected 
to blaze a new trail, to make a complete volte-face in 
the foreign policy of France. While maintaining the 
existing alliance with Russia, he was determined to 
seek new friendships, and from the day he entered the 
foreign office he was resolved that perfide Albion must 
be changed into the fidus Achates of France. The 
Entente Cordiale of April 8, 1904, which finally re- 
solved itself into the Triple Entente, an understand- 
ing strong enough to resist the shock of a world war, 
will ever remain a monument to the success of his 
endeavors. 

While a young man, M. Delcasse had been a member 
of a group of journalists associated with the *'Repub- 
lique Francaise," and, like other members of the staff, 
was an ardent disciple of that grand old man of Repub- 
lican France, Leon Gambetta. In such an entourage it 
would have been just as impossible for the young 
enthusiast from the Midi to avoid being drawn into 
politics as to avoid becoming impregnated with the 
doctrines and beliefs of the great tribune. Perhaps 
it was then that he first came to consider seriously 
Gambetta 's views on French foreign policy; but there 



THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION 5 

is no doubt that lie knew that Gambetta believed that 
France would only recover the position that she lost 
in 1871, by obtaining the friendship of Eussia and 
Great Britain. The first part of this program had 
been completed several years before M, Delcasse took 
charge of the foreign office ; the second and more diffi- 
cult part was to be his task, and it is not likely that 
France will ever forget that the glorious victory won 
at such cost in 1918 was due in great part to the policy 
which led to the Entente Cordiale, whose cornerstone 
was laid by M. Theophile Delcasse. 

In order fully to appreciate the magnitude of the 
task to which M. Delcasse set himself when he took the 
office of foreign minister, it is essential that we take 
note of the situation in which France found herself at 
the close of the nineteenth century. In as much as the 
Eussian Alliance was the key-note to which the whole 
foreign policy of France was attuned, let us first con- 
sider her position in regard to Eussia. 

When M. Eibot, on June 10, 1895, formally announced 
the Franco-Eussian Alliance, he was merely giving 
official sanction to an arrangement which was either 
known or suspected in all the chancellories of Europe. 
The acclamation with which the French squadron was 
received on its visit to Cronstadt in 1891, the equally 
enthusiastic reception given to the Grand Duke Con- 
stantine upon his visit to France to pay his respects 
to President Carnot in 1892, the ovation given to the 
Eussian squadron at Toulon in 1893, were such clear 
indications of a rapprochement, that the announcement 
of the fait accompli caused scarcely a ripple of surprise. 
From its inception the alliance was popular in France, 



6 FEENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

and there is little question that the French nation as a 
whole looked upon it as ' * an understanding which war- 
ranted great hopes." In plainer terms, it was the 
means to an end, and the end was the revanche — for 
never since the debacle of 1870 was the hope absent 
from the hearts of the French that some day, somehow, 
the Treaty of Frankfort would be torn up and Alsace- 
Lorraine restored. The feeling that the alliance was 
the "dawn of a policy of reparation," that it was offen- 
sive as well as defensive in its nature, persisted until 
1898, when the French gradually began to perceive 
that a mariage de raison between an autocracy and a 
democracy was not conducive to the vigorous progeny 
of a warlike spirit. In fact now that France no longer 
felt isolated, there was a tendency to relax, to forget 
the crisis of 1875, to indulge in intemationalistic ideal- 
ism, to banish the thought of the perpetual menace 
which had long lain like a black, ominous cloud athwart 
the eastern frontier. Socialism became rampant, the 
army became honeycombed with intrigue, a "Dreyfus 
-Case" was rendered possible, the glorious soul of 
France itself became enervated. M. Emile Faguet de- 
clared that the Russian Alliance was the beginning of 
the moral and patriotic degradation of France; M. 
Millerand, who later was to prove himself one of the 
greatest ministers of war that the Third Republic has 
produced, arose in the Chamber and asked if France 
had not made '^un marche de dupes." ^ M. Jean 
Jaures summed up the sentiment of a large group when 
he declared that it was "a sort of seal placed upon the 
misfortunes of France." 

1 Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 54i, p. 574. 



THE INTEENATIONAL SITUATION 7 

When in 1898 the Czar announced his intention of 
issuing a call for an international conference for the 
limitation of armament and for the purpose of the 
maintenance of peace upon the basis of the status quo, 
France felt as though the keystone of her arch of hope 
had been withdrawn. Yet even with the feeling of 
disillusionment came the realization that the appeal 
for disarmament and peace must be made upon the 
basis of the status quo, if made at all, and for the great 
ideal of world peace France was willing to make the 
sacrifice of her lost provinces. As a * ' Times ' ' corre- 
spondent aptly expressed it, *'The Czar has sown in 
the teeth of a driving Gallic wind the germs of pacifism 
in France. ' ' ^ Yet even if the Kussian Alliance had 
drawn in its wake a feeling of disillusionment, it was 
realized that without it France would not have been 
free to follow her policy of colonial expansion, which 
was now more than ever essential to maintain her posi- 
tion in the ranks of the great powers. Furthermore, 
by providing a counterweight to the Triple Alliance, 
France was enabled to draw closer to Italy, who was 
not entirely content with her position in the Triplice. 

It was a matter of common knowledge that Italy 
had joined the Triple Alliance as much through fear 
of Austria as through hostility towards France, al- 
though France, by taking Tunis in 1881, had aroused 
the passionate jealousy of the Italians, who still saw 
the Carthage of Hannibal in the Tunis of to-day, and 
looked forward to a renaissance of the imperial city 
in all its ancient glory. With the disaster of Adowa 
in 1896, which brought about the final fall of Crispi, 

2 FuUerton, "Problems of Power," p. 31. 



8 FEENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

the principal trouble-fete between the two Latin 
nations, an opportunity was made for a Franco-Italian 
rapprochement. Three months before he became min- 
ister of foreign affairs, M. Delcasse visited Rome, and 
in addition to consulting with M. Barrere, French am- 
bassador to Italy, he had interviews with the Marquis 
di Rudini and with the Marquis Visconti-Venosta, min- 
ister of foreign affairs, and both showed a willingness 
to discuss a Mediterranean policy which should be more 
favorable to the two countries. 

*' There is plenty of room for our two countries on 
the Mediterranean," declared M. Delcasse; ''the same 
thing which has separated us is able to reunite us. " * 
The seed did not fall upon barren soil. One of the 
first acts of M. Delcasse after becoming foreign minis- 
ter was to bring about a treaty of commerce between 
France and Italy.* This was to prove a veritable god- 
send to Italy financially, and was destined to pave the 
way to a political arrangement a few years later. So 
although sixty years before M. Delcasse came into office, 
Mazzini had declared northern Africa to be Italy's 
inheritance, the Pyrenaean was enabled to outline and 
carry through a Mediterranean policy which recog- 
nized the interests of France in both Tunis and Mo- 
rocco. 

To understand Franco-German relations at this same 
period, it is necessary to go back to the Franco-Russian 
alliance. This alliance, coming so soon after Kaiser 

8 Reynald, "L'Oeuvre de M. Delcasse," p. 30. 

4 Arrangement announced by letters exchanged between M, Delcass6 
and the Italian ambassador M. Tornielli Nov. 21, ratified by France Feb. 
2, 1899, and by Italy Feb. 11, 1899. Archives Diplomatiques, Vol. 68, 
p. 333. 



THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION 9 

"William II had dropped his great pilot, Bismarck, 
necessitated very careful diplomacy on the part of the 
Emperor. He quickly determined to enter into more 
friendly relations with France, as the most feasible way 
to neutralize the new force which might counterbalance 
the weight of the Triplice. In 1891 he arranged the 
voyage of the Empress Frederica to Paris, but this 
visit was ill-advised, and failed completely to promote 
more friendly relations between the two powers. Nev- 
ertheless the Kaiser in a personal way continued to 
show his neighborly intentions. In 1893 it was a letter 
of condolence to the widow of ex-President McMahon 
who had fought against Germany in 1870, the follow- 
ing year a similar telegram of sympathy to Madame 
Carnot, and thereafter every year he found occasion 
to impress upon the minds of the French his personal 
good will.^ At one time it seemed as though the 
Dreyfus Affair might embitter the relations between 
the two countries, but the French wisely decided 
to circumscribe this scandal within the borders of 
France.^ 

The German government also sought various oppor- 
tunities to enter into political relations with France. 
On March 15, 1894, there was signed a convention of 
delimitation of territory between the Congo and Came- 
roons and a mapping out of spheres of influence in the 
region of Lake Chad."^ The following year Germany 
induced France to join with her and with Russia to 
force a revision of the Shimoneseki Treaty in favor of 

B "Kaiserreden," Klausman (ed.), PP- 37-62. 

sDebidour, "Histoire Diplomatique de I'Europe (1878-1904)," p. 205. 

7 Text in British and Foreign State Papers (1894), p. 974. 



10 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

China, though it was made to appear in this case as 
though the initiative came from Russia.^ In January, 
189.6, Baron Marschall von Bieberstein suggested to M. 
Herbette, French ambassador in Berlin, the possibility 
of a Franco-German entente against Great Britain to 
save the independence of the South African Republics, 
which seemed about to be swallowed up in the maw 
of the British lion. Incidentally it was pointed out 
to France how detrimental British ambitions were to 
the reciprocal interests of the two powers in Africa. 
This conference was followed two days later by the 
famous Kruger telegram from the Kaiser, which pro- 
voked such hostility towards Germany throughout 
England that the German government, realizing that 
France might prove undependable in case of serious 
difficulties, quickly steered the imperial ship of state 
back into the haven of strict neutrality.^ 

The final effort made by Germany to reach a friendly 
understanding with France brings us to the appoint- 
ment of M. Delcasse as French foreign minister. 
Early in 1898 it was rumored that Great Britain 
wished to make a loan to Portugal, with a lien upon 
the Portuguese colonies in Africa as security. Portu- 
gal, being in dire financial straits and fearing a quarrel 
with Great Britain over the award of the arbitral tri- 
bunal in the Delagoa Bay Affair, asked Germany for 
her protection, suggesting as compensation that she 
might have the right of preemption over the African 
colonies of Portugal. The German government auth- 
orized Count Miinster, German ambassador to Paris, 

sM^vil, "De la Paix de Frankfort a Algesiras," p. 4. 
« M6vil, op. cit., p. 8. 



THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION 11 

to solicit the cooperation of the French. On June 19, 
Count Miinster handed a note to M. Hanotaux calling 
his attention to the danger of allowing Portugal to 
compromise her sovereign rights in order to procure 
money from Great Britain, and urged economic re- 
prisals, or at least financial pressure. As the Meline 
ministry had already fallen, the whole question was 
turned over to M. Brisson and M. Delcasse. M. Andre 
Mevil, whose authority can hardly be questioned, says 
that M. Delcasse investigated, and finding the fears of 
Germany wholly without foundation, let the matter 
drop.^" However, three years later, March 20, 1902, 
when M. Gotteron interpolated M. Delcasse in the Sen- 
ate on this subject, the Minister of Foreign Affairs de- 
nied the whole affair categorically, declaring : 

''No proposition from Germany concerning the 
Portuguese colonies and for a decision about them 
with France was addressed to my predecessor in June, 
1898. I add that as far as I am concerned it has been 
absolutely impossible for me to decline the proposals 
for the peremptory reason that no proposals were made 
to me." ^^ 

Whether definite proposals were made or not, the 
question did come up in some form or other,^^ and if 
M. Delcasse had nothing to do with it, the inference 
is that from the very beginning of his term of office, 
he was determined not to be a party to any arrange- 
ment with Germany which might tend in any way to 
increase the tension in the already strained relations 

loM^vil, op. cit., p. 19. 

11 Annales du S^nat, Vol. 61, p. 598. 

12 See L^monon, "L'Europe et la Politique Britannique," pp. 152-3 ; 
also Fortnightly Review, March 1, 1902. 



12 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

between France and Great Britain.^^ His sails were 
trimmed to the steady winds from across the Channel 
rather than to the fitful gusts from across the Vosges. 

2. FEANCO-BRITISH RELATIONS 

When M. Delcasse entered upon his duties as minis- 
ter of foreign affairs at the Quai d'Orsay, he is said 
to have remarked: ''I do not wish to leave here, I 
do not wish to leave this armchair, until I have re- 
established a friendly understanding with England." ^* 
Inasmuch as he made this purpose the framework of 
his whole foreign policy, it is necessary to resume 
briefly the relations between the two powers just be- 
fore he became foreign minister. Such a summary will 
show the magnitude of the task which the new incum- 
bent of the French foreign office had mapped out for 
himself. 

Ever since M. Waddington, the French representa- 
tive, had returned from the Congress of Berlin in 
1878 with Tunis in his pocket, as he phrased it, Great 
Britain, who had been the first to suggest this as com- 
pensation, began to look askance at the colonial am- 
bitions of France. But with men like Gambetta and 
Jules Ferry leading the way, the Third Republic 
marched steadily ahead in its colonial enterprises, and 
at the beginning of 1898 it had practically doubled the 

13 Directly after this an arrangement was concluded between Great 
Britain and Germany regarding the Portuguese colonies (see Lemonon, 
op. cit., p. 186), hut according to Prince Radziwell, representing the 
German emperor at the funeral of Felix Faure, "Nothing in this ar- 
rangement is in opposition to a rapprochement between my country 
and yours." Liberte, Feb. 26, 1899, quoted by Fullerton, op. cit., p. 55 
note. 

14 B^rard, "La Politique Francaise," Revue de Paris, July 1, 1905. 



THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION 13 

territories of France. During the period when M. 
Hanotaux was in charge of the French foreign office — 
a period when the colonial ambitions of France were 
especially conspicuous — Great Britain and France 
found themselves at odds in every part of the globe 
where their colonial interests were neighboring. 

In Tunis, awarded to France by the kindness of 
Beaconsfield and Salisbury, the treaty of Kassar-Said, 
which established the French protectorate in 1881, 
recognized the validity of previous treaties entered 
into with European countries. Such capitulations 
giving these countries jurisdiction over their nationals, 
and granting them the most favored nation clause 
in all their commercial arrangements, interfered seri- 
ously with the policy of the French Colonial Office, 
M. Hanotaux took upon himself the task of trying to 
obtain the renunciation by the powers of these capitula- 
tions, and a revision of the commercial treaties to the 
advantage of France. By his astute and delicate 
handling of the situation, M. Hanotaux obtained new 
and satisfactory arrangements with all the powers ; but 
Great Britain was the last to give her consent, and 
then only after imposing irksome conditions. 

The situation was even less satisfactory in Morocco, 
which, owing to its long frontier bordering upon 
Algeria, the French have always considered a natural 
prolongation of their sphere of influence in northern 
Africa. At the court of the Sultan we find two English- 
men in high esteem, a Mr. MacLean, formerly an 
officer of the garrison at Gibraltar, and a Mr. W. B. H. 
Harris, correspondent of the London ''Times," both 
of whom had been conducting a campaign of British 



14 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

propaganda based upon jealousy and hatred of France. 
France, although not strongly desirous at this time of 
destroying the power of the Sultan and of annexing 
Morocco, could not permit any other power to obtain 
preponderant interests there. For if, as Jules Ferry 
declared, with France possessing Algeria, Tunis is the 
key of her house, so with France possessing both Tunis 
and Algeria, Morocco is a most convenient and exposed 
back-door entrance. Nor was Great Britain ignorant 
of the special interests which France could with justice 
claim in Morocco. A report from Sir Henry Johnston, 
Consul-General at Tunis, who was exceptionally well 
posted on North African affairs, had in summing up 
the situation stated that ' * England ought not to oppose 
the extension of French interests in Morocco." 

In Madagascar also we find the two powers at odds 
with each other. In 1896, when France wished to 
change her protectorate into full sovereignty, it was 
only after numerous arguments that she succeeded in 
persuading the British government to put into writing 
an acknowledgment of her position made orally ten 
years before. Even then she might have failed if she 
had not been able to point out her acceptance of Great 
Britain's high-handed action in Zanzibar in making a 
treaty with Germany in utter disregard of a previous 
treaty made with France.^^ There were also disputes 
in the region of the Congo, in the basin of the Niger, 
in Ethiopia, in the Egyptian Soudan, and in the valley 
of the Upper Nile — ^in this last a dispute which was to 
bring the two nations to the very brink of war. 

15 See E. Lavisse, "France et Angleterre," Eevue de Paris, Feb. 1, 
1899, 



THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION 15 

In the Orient we find the same antagonism. Dnring 
the period of 1897-1898 France was carrying on a very 
active policy in the Far East, gathering in the fruits 
of her support of China against dismemberment by 
Japan — railway concessions, mining concessions, 
treaties of commerce, a ninety-nine year lease on the 
bay of Kwang-Chou-Wan. But it was only against the 
constant opposition of Great Britain, who was already 
looking with favor upon Japan as a potential ally to 
arrest the steady progress of Russia, the ally of France, 
towards the warm open seas of the east. Proceeding 
south to Indo-China, where France possessed a great 
colonial area comprising Tonkin, Annam, Cochin-China, 
Cambodia and Laos, we again find the two nations with 
rival interests. Great Britain possessed Burma and 
was determined that Siam, which bordered on French 
Indo-China, should not fall under French influence. By 
the Convention of London, signed in 1896, both nations 
agreed to respect the independence of the valley of 
the Menam and of Bangkok, the capital of Siam; yet 
in the years which followed a constant struggle went 
on in which each side attempted to increase its power 
in this region at the other's expense, especially over 
Yunnan, which as the only route to the upper Yangtse 
must be kept open to both. 

Nor could the French forget their interests in Egypt, 
where Napoleon had raised his victorious standards, 
where de Lesseps had made the shorter route to India 
possible, and where France had shared the power with 
Great Britain, only to withdraw ignominiously through 
the inexcusable vacillation of a weak-kneed foreign 
minister. But even if France had withdrawn of her 



16 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

'own free will, she would not let Great Britain forget 
that she, too, had given many assurances that she had 
no intention of maintaining a permanent position there. 

Finally there was the century-old conflict over the 
[fishing rights granted on what was called the French 
shore in Newfoundland. Here the French had to con- 
tend not only with Great Britain, but also with a 
colonial government which was not always willing to 
carry out arrangements made by the mother country.^^ 
But whether the question raised was, ''Is a lobster a 
fish under the Treaty of Utrecht ? " or whether the 
dispute was over a Chinese pagoda and a cemetery, 
the two powers were mutually engaged in a policy of 
"pin-pricks" that might at any moment bring them 
into active conflict. The Fashoda incident only too 
clearly showed the danger: — ''France and England 
were face to face like birds in a cock-pit, while Europe 
under German leadership, was fastening their spurs, 
and impatient to see them fight to the death." ^'^ Be- 
fore taking up the Fashoda affair, with which our nar- 
rative proper begins — for although the roots of the 
affair go back to the regime of M. Hanotaux, it was M. 
Delcasse who was given the disagreeable task of finding 
a solution — a brief glance at French internal politics is 
essential. 

Ever since 1894, when Captain Dreyfus was con- 
victed of treason in a trial which left much to be desired 
from the point of view of justice, the Dreyfus affair 
hovered like a bird of ill omen over successive minis- 

16 See L6monon, "L'Europe et la Politique Britannique," pp. 136-169, 
for a very excellent discussion. 

17 Fullerton, "Problems of Powers," p. 57. 



THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION 17 

tries, refusing to be driven away until the whole rotten 
carcass should be dragged forth and exposed to the 
light of publicity. Four successive ministers of war, 
after examining the famous dossier, upon whose con- 
tents Captain Dreyfus was convicted, had declared him 
guilty, and had opposed revision of the case. M. 
Meline, premier of the government preceding that of 
M. Brisson, swore on his honor that Dreyfus was guilty. 
M. Cavaignac, minister of war in the Brisson cabinet, 
declared in his speech announcing the policy of the 
government (July 7) that the door was closed upon 
the Dreyfus question. The murder or suicide of Col. 
Henry, chief witness against Dreyfus in 1894, and self 
confessed forger, coming at this time (August 1898), 
made it evident that a revision must take place in the 
near future, and that for some time to come the minis- 
ter of foreign affairs had to count upon a war depart- 
ment weak and disorganized, unrespected either at 
home or abroad. Even in discussions on foreign af- 
fairs in the Chamber the ''affair" was dragged in. M. 
Jules Guesde, the Socialist, declared that the Quai 
d'Orsay was subject to occult influences, ''that the 
French Republic has a king who is named Rothschild," 
and M. Firmin Faure asserted that the government of 
M. Brisson was established with one purpose, — namely 
to obtain the acquittal of Dreyfus, a traitor, and recom- 
mended a French policy instead of a Jewish policy.^^ 
The Franco-Russian alliance itself was being under- 
mined, and Russia could rightly question whether 
France with the Dreyfus incubus attached to its war 
department was a very valuable partner. 

18 Aanales de la Chambre, Vol, 59iv, p. 167. 



18 FRENCH FOEEION POLICY 

So it was with the Dual Alliance weakening, with 
Italy jealous and disgruntled, with Germany dubiously 
friendly, and with Great Britain openly hostile, that 
France put her foreign policy into the hands of M. 
Delcasse, who for seven years was to guide her destinies 
and finally lead her into a friendly entente with Great 
Britain, the one power which for centuries had been her 
open and avowed enemy. 



CHAPTER II 
FASHODA 

1. THE TRANCO-BRITISH AGREEMENT OF MARCH 21. 1899 

THE Spanish- American War was in progress when 
M. Delcasse entered upon his duties as minister 
of foreign affairs, and he immediately conceived the 
idea that France as a sincere friend of both powers 
might be able to bring about an understanding between 
them. Admirals Schley and Sampson, at Santiago, 
had completed the destruction of Spanish sea power 
which Admiral Dewey had begun in Manila. Spain 
unable to continue the struggle, solicited the good 
offices of M. Jules Cambon, French ambassador at 
Washington, to ask for terms of peace. The United 
States was willing to offer reasonable terms, and on 
August 12, a protocol was signed by William R. Day, 
Secretary of State of the United States, and M. Cam- 
bon, representing Spain. As a mark of appreciation of 
M. Delcasse 's position as mediator and M. Cambon 's 
valuable services towards ending the war, Paris was 
chosen as th^ plac^ where the peace, terms were ar- 
ranged and signed.^ Although M. Delcasse had thus 
earned the right to the blessing conferred by the beati- 
tudes upon the peacemaker, he was now to embark 
upon a dangerous course in which he would need all 
possible benedictions to escape the reefs of disaster. 

1 Johnson, "America's Foreign Kelations," Vol. II, p. 264. 

19 



20 FEENCH FOEEIGN POLICY 

Ever since Lord Beaconsfield, in 1877, had given to 
the world that clever exhibition of haute finance worthy 
of the best traditions of his race, by purchasing on his 
own authority, for four million pounds, the hundred 
and seventy-seven thousand shares of the Suez Canal 
held by the Khedive, Great Britain had found herself 
unable to withdraw from Egypt. In the early eighties 
France, who had gone in as an equal partner, allowed 
herself to be forced out by the pusillanimity of a 
foreign minister. Great Britain gave notice on several 
occasions of her intention to withdraw, and in 1885, 
after the fall of Khartoum, did withdraw from the 
Egyptian Soudan. But from 1891 to 1894 she gave 
new impetus to her expansion both on the Upper Nile 
and in the territory between Lakes Albert Nyanza and 
Victoria. France countered with a treaty with the 
Congo Free State, August 14, 1894, opening to her influ- 
ence territory north of the Bornu to the Nile.^ To- 
wards the close of 1895 the French government was 
apprised of the fact that Great Britain intended to 
crush the Mahdi and retake the Soudan.^ The dream 
of Cecil Ehodes for a Cape to Cairo Eailroad was ap- 
proaching the possibility of fulfillment. This scheme 
conflicted with a plan that the French had long cherished 
of extending their territory across the continent, and 
instructions to this effect had been given as far back 
as 1893 to M. Liotard by M. Delcasse, who was at that 
time Colonial Secretary. M. Liotard had been ordered 

2 Doc. Dip., "Afrique, Arrangements, Actes et Conventions, 1881- 
1898," No. 16. In reference to this convention M. Deloncle in the Cham- 
ber, Feb. 28, 1895, declared that "to-day the English dream of possess- 
ing all the upper Nile is, I believe, forever disturbed." Annales de la 
Chambre, Dgbats Pari., Vol. 451, p. 761. 

3 Tardieu, "France and the Alliances," p. 43. 



FASHODA 21 

to seek, by the Upper Ubanghi, an outlet upon the Nile 
for the French possessions in Central Africa.* The 
instructions for the Marchand expedition proper were 
not signed till February 24, 1896, more than two years 
later, an inexcusable fault in an expedition of this 
sort.^ The expedition left France in June of the same 
year, ** charged with relieving those troops which had 
completed their term of service and with assuring 
under the high direction of the government's commis- 
sioner, M. Liotard, the occupation and the defence 
of the regions that the Franco-Congo Convention had 
recognized as ours. ' ' " The instructions further or- 
dered Captain Marchand to avoid all hostilities; in 
fact his expedition was purposely made small in order 
to avoid even the appearance of aggression. 

Before continuing with Captain Marchand to his 
encounter with General Kitchener at Fashoda, we must 
take note of the diplomatic sparring between the two 
governments. Between the time when M. Liotard first 
received orders to seek an outlet upon the Nile in 1893, 
and the setting out of the Marchand expedition in 1896, 
both governments gave clear expressions of their views. 
On March 28, 1895, Sir Edward Grey, Under Secretary 
for Foreign Affairs, stated in the House of Commons : 
''We have no reason to suppose that any French ex- 
pedition has instructions to enter, or the intention of 
entering, the Nile Valley . . . because the advance of a 
French expedition under secret instructions right from 

■* Lebon, "La Mission Marchand et le Cabinet Meline," Kevue de 
Deux Mondes, March 15, 1900. 

5 See Darcy, "Cent Annies de Rivalite Coloniale," Chap X, for an 
excellent discussion of the mistakes which led to the ultimate failure 
of the expedition. 

8 Doc. Dip., Haut Nil et Bahr-el-Ghazal, Nob. 3 to 7. 



22 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

the other side of Africa into a territory over which 
our claims have been known for so long would be not 
merely an inconsistent and unexpected act, but it must 
be perfectly well known to the French government that 
it would be an unfriendly act and would be so viewed by 
England."^ 

Neither did France allow Sir Edward Grey's state- 
ment to pass unchallenged. On April 5, M. Hanotaux, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared in the Senate: 
. . . "the position taken by France is the following — 
the regions under discussion are under the complete 
sovereignty of the Sultan. They have a legitimate 
master, it is the Khedive. Therefore we say to the 
English government : 

*' 'You declare that by virtue of the convention of 
1890 England has placed a part of these territories in 
its sphere of influence. Very well, let us know at least 
to what territories your claims apply; tell us how far 
this sphere of influence extends, which according to you 
commences on the left bank of the Nile and extends 
northward indefinitely . . . ' " » 

Great Britain made no reply to this request for a 

7 Pari. Debates, Vol. 32, p. 405. That all English opinion was not 
identical with that expressed by Sir Edward Grey is shown by the 
speech made by Mr. H. Labouchere in the same debate. . . . "Why 
must France be ordered to keep her hands off a territory extending 
some thousand miles along the banks of the Nile between the lakes and 
the southern frontier of Egypt ... he would like the Honorable Gentle- 
man to tell the Committee whether in any diplomatic document it had 
ever been stated to France that we had any more right to this long 
stretch of the valley of the Nile than France herself. ... It was per- 
fectly true that we made some arrangement between Germany and 
Italy, telling Germany they might go to one part and telling Italy they 
might go to another part; but towards third powers, France or Russia, 
for instance, that did not give us any right." Ibid., p. 416. 

8 Annales du Senat, Vol. 42i, p. 469. 



FASHODA - 23 

definite delimitation of territory, for the very good 
reason that she could hardly claim at this time terri- 
tory which still remained to be conquered. But she did 
better — she sent the Sirdar Kitchener to resume opera- 
tions against the Mahdists and to wipe out once and 
for all the stain of the Gordon massacre and England's 
subsequest loss of the Soudan. 

General Kitchener carried out his mission in a most 
brilliant fashion, completely annihilating the power of 
the Mahdi at Omdurman. Thereupon proceeding 
southward, he arrived with his army at Fashoda, Sep- 
tember 19, 1898, and found Captain Marchand en- 
camped there with his little force of eight officers and 
one hundred fifty Sudanese tirailleurs. Captain 
Marchand had arrived two months earlier, July 10, 
after a heroic journey of two years, a desperate effort 
rivaling the expeditions of Livingstone and Stanley. 
An expedition under M. de Bonchamps, which had set 
out from Abyssinia to meet the Marchand expedition 
at Fashoda, was forced to turn back owing to the in- 
explicable failure of M. Lagarde, French ambassador 
to Abyssinia, to provide it with the necessary equip- 
ment.® The meeting was courteous on both sides, 
and the two soldiers wisely turned the question over 
to the Quai d'Orsay and Downing Street for settle- 
rnent.^^ 

It was the task of M. Delcasse to settle a difficult 
situation into which he had been brought by the pre- 

9 See Darcy, op. cit., p. 432. 

10 M. Delcasse writing to M. Geoffray, French representative at 
London, agreed: "II n'appartient ni au capitaine Marchand, ni au Gen. 
Kitchener de tirer les consequences politiques des expeditions qu'ils ont 
eu a diriger." Doc. Dip., Haut Nil et Bahr-el-Gahzal, No. 3. 



24 FEENCH FOEEIGN POLICY 

ceding administration. As soon as he learned that 
Kitchener had taken Khartoum and that an English 
fleet was proceeding up the Nile (September 8) he noti- 
fied England of the existence of the Marchand expedi- 
tion, although even at that time he did not know its exact 
position, declaring that it was merely an expedition 
of penetration, affirming no exclusive right nor preju- 
dicing in any way respective delimitations that the 
governments alone could settle after an examination.^^ 
His fixed determination to maintain friendly relations 
is shown by the conciliatory tone of his note of Sep- 
tember 8, to M. Geoffray : 

''Whatever questions divide us in the case of Egypt, 
we cannot help associating ourselves in the eulogies 
excited by the able manner with which the Sirdar has 
conducted his expedition . . . and I do not doubt that 
the English government will look with like sentiments 
upon the efforts of certain of our compatriots with 
equal profit to the cause of civilization. ' ' ^^ 

Summarizing the arguments pro and con as put 
forth by the Yellow and Blue Books issued by the re- 
spective governments, we find them running something 
like this: 

Great Britain asserted that France had no right in 
the Bahr-el-Ghazal regions, because these regions be- 

11 Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 7, or Pari. Papers, "Egypt, Upper Nile, 
1899," Vol. 112 (c9054) No. 7; in his speech before the Chamber of 
Deputies Jan. 23, 1899, M. Delcasse declared that the Marchand mission 
was only a continuation of plans outlined in 1893 whereby Gen. Liotard 
was to finish occupying territory granted to France by the Franco- 
Congo Convention of Aug. 14, 1894, and at all times the expedition was 
under Gen. Liotard's control. Thus these plans were prepared before 
Grey's speech and at time when the Egyptian Soudan had been wholly 
abandoned by England. Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 57i, p. 146. 

12 Ibid., No. 3. 



FASHODA 25 

longed theoretically to the Khedive (although in fact 
he had lost them by the revolt of the Mahdi), and she 
was assisting the Khedive to recover them. 

France asked by what right Great Britain spoke in 
the name of Egypt, and especially of the unconquered 
Egyptian Soudan. 

Great Britain claimed that she had occupied the 
Equatorial Province only to defend Uganda against 
the Mahdist peril. 

France countered by claiming possession of the Bahr- 
el-Gahzal to protect French possessions of Ubanghi 
against the same peril. 

Great Britain then declared that in 1895 Sir Edward 
Grey had warned France that England considered the 
whole valley of the Nile within her sphere of influence. 

To this France opposed M. Hanotaux's answer in 
the Senate. Furthermore she asserted that the princi- 
ple of the ''first occupant" established by the Act of 
Berlin would be nullified if a country could designate 
lands as belonging to it which it had not yet reached. 

Great Britain then found a better argument — this 
country belonged to the Khalif — but Omdurman by 
right of conquest had given her possession of the 
Khalif 's territory. 

The French conceded this willingly, but argued that 
if conquest settled this point, by England's own argu- 
ment France should hold the Bahr-el-Gahzal, since they 
had taken it from the Khalif before the battle of Om- 
durman. ^^ 

13 Doc. Dip., ibid., especially Nos. 7 and 13; Pari. Papers "Egypt, 
Upper Nile, and Fashodu, 1899," Vol. 112 (c905S) Nos. 1 and 3; Sea 
Ebray, Rev. Pol. et Pari., Nov. 1808, for excellent summary of the 
official document^ 



26 FEENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

Then M. Delcasse demanded a delimitation of the 
respective territories before Captain Marchand should 
leave, declaring that "to ask France to evacuate 
Fashoda preliminary to all discussion, would be in sub- 
stance to formulate an ultimatum, and who then, know- 
ing France, could have any doubt of her reply." ^* 

This rejoinder was especially criticised in France on 
the ground that M. Delcasse was preparing his own 
humiliation by allowing any idea of an ultimatum to 
creep into the discussion.^^ However, the reply was 
made early in October, when M. Delcasse was still at- 
tempting to win out for France. Had not M. Honotaux 
demanded precisely the same thing in 1895 in his Senate 
speech? When Great Britain finally declared that in 
her eyes the rights of Egypt to Fashoda were above all 
discussion, and that she was prepared to maintain her 
stand, M. Delcasse realized that France either had to 
withdraw or fight. As we have shown before, the 
ravages of the Dreyfus Affair upon the War Depart- 
ment precluded all possibility of the latter. Even 
Russia could not be depended upon in this crisis, if 
we may put full credence in the statement of Sir 
Thomas Barclay. He declared that when Count Mura- 
vietf first communicated the Czar's proposal for an 
international peace conference about a month after 
Marchand 's arrival at Fashoda, those on the inside of 
French politics were inclined to believe that France 
was being left in the lurch. In fact Count Muravieff 
stated plainly to M. Delcasse that ''Russia could not 

14 Doc'. Dip., op. cit., No. 22. 

15 Millet "Quatre Ans de Politique Ext^rieure," Rev. Pol. et Pari., 
Oct. 1902. 



FASHODA 27 

be counted npon to support an attitude on the part of 
France which might endanger peace." ^^ 

With humiliation on one side and disaster on the 
other, M. Delcasse saw a means to turn a temporary 
defeat into a permanent victory — reculer pour mieux 
sauter. Just as a general may retreat in order to ob- 
tain a better position to face about, M. Delcasse con- 
ceded that Fashoda was not worth a war; it could 
only be reached from the Congo during the rainy sea- 
son, and, with Great Britain holding Egypt and the 
Soudan, the Bahr-el-Gahzal was of little value to 
France. Captain Marchand, having done all that a 
brave man could to uphold the honor of France, was 
ordered to withdraw.^'^ 

M. Delcasse realized that even if France were in a 
position to wage a successful war to retain this terri- 
tory it would not be the victor who would profit most 
by the victory.^* But more important than this was 
his idea that France might use this temporary humilia- 
tion as a stepping-stone to an understanding with 
Great Britain. This was the occasion for the two 
great powers to find a common ground and to meet 
upon it loyally and fair-mindedly, to sink the question 
of a trading-post in central Africa into the greater one 
of a delimitation of the frontiers of their respective 
territories. Taking the Anglo-French Convention con- 
cerning the Niger, signed by M. Hanotaux, June 14, 

16 Barclay, "Thirty Years Anglo-French Reminiscences," p. 150. 

iTDebidour, "Histoire Diplomatique" (1878-1904), p. 248, says: "the 
little force withdrew by way of Abyssinia pour sauver la face by not 
taking the same route by which it had entered." 

18 Speech of April 3, 1900, Annales du S6nat, Vol. 56i, p. 364. 



28 FEENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

1898/^ as a basis, the whole question of central Africa 
might be brought up for settlement. 

M. Delcasse's position was rendered the more diffi- 
cult by the irreconcilable attitude assumed by a num- 
ber of English statesmen. Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, 
Colonial Secretary, and very influential in the Salis- 
bury cabinet, had ever maintained a bellicose attitude 
towards France. Speaking at Wakefield, December 8, 
1898, he declaimed that a friendship between the two 
nations was impossible so long as France continued 
her policy of twisting the lion's tail.^° An even more 
provocative speech had been delivered two days before 
by Sir Edward Monson, British ambassador at Paris, 
upon the occasion of the fete organized by the English 
Chamber of Commerce in Paris. He urged the French 
government to refrain from continuing ''that policy of. 
pin-pricks which while it can only procure an ephem- 
eral gratification to a short-lived ministry, must in- 
evitably perpetuate across the channel an irritation 
which a high-spirited nation must eventually feel to be 
intolerable." 2^ 

Fortunately for M. Delcasse's policy the Liberal 
opposition was now in the hands of Sir Henry Camp- 
bell-Bannerman, who was outspoken in his opposition 
to Mr. Chamberlain's bellicosity. Speaking in the 
House of Commons February 7, 1899, he declared : '*We 
should regard the establishment of a hostile and sus- 
picious spirit between the two countries as an unmiti- 
gated calamity." ^^ Mr. Balfour replying for the gov- 

19 Doc. Dip., rel. a la Convention Franco- Anglais du 14 Juin, 1898. 

20 London Times, Dec. 9, 1898. 

21 Annual Register, 1898, p. [189 ff. 

22 Pari. Debates, Vol. 66, p. 91; Speaking at Hull, March 8, he was 



FASHODA 29 

eminent, could see no reason why the various questions 
between England and France should not be settled in a 
manner satisfactory to both nations, as every govern- 
ment had felt the great inconvenience of these outstand- 
ing questions. ^^ 

In France, sentiment for the most part backed M. 
Deloasse in withdrawing from Fashoda, even before it 
was evident that he was following a do ut des policy. 
There was some hostile criticism in the press, but the 
prevailing sentiment seemed to be that he had made the 
best of a bad bargain. The popular view was aptly 
summed up by the expression of an artisan: ''Que ga 
nous fait, Egypt? Anglais c'est pas prussien." ^^ 
When the question was raised in the Chamber, M. 
d'Estournelles de Constant urged that the government 
put an end to the misunderstandings which divided the 
two countries *'not by a partial, ephemeral, local, miser- 
ably geographical arrangement, but by a general ac- 
cord, durable as far as possible, honorable for the two 
countries. " ^^ M. Eibot, former minister of foreign 
affairs, spoke in the same vein : 

''Two great countries like France and England, 
united by so many souvenirs and interests, ought to be 
in accord, not only for the benefit of each other but for 
the good of the whole world. Both Thiers and Gam- 
much more violent in his denunciation of Chamberlain's imperialism: 
"We adjure this vulgar and bastard imperialism made of irritation, 
of provocation and aggression, this imperialism which consists in per- 
mitting ourselves tricks and clever manoeuvers against our neighbors 
and grabbing everything even if we have no need of it ourselves." 
London Times, March 9, 1899. 

23 Pari. Debates, Vol. 66, p. 91. 

24 Annual Register, 1898, p. [189 ff. 

25 Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 67i, p. 134. 



30 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

betta defended such an accord on this side of the Chan- 
nel and Gladstone on the other. The policy of France 
was not a policy of pin-pricks . . . the effort made 
during the past fifteen years has sufficed for her colo- 
nial ambition and she is now ready to be satisfied by 
working laboriously to exploit this vast domain.'^ ^^ 

Fortified by this backing, and by a vote of confidence 
in his own explanation,^"^ M. Delcasse proceeded to 
make a general settlement. By the Convention of 
March 21, 1899, a complement of Article 4 of Anglo- 
French Convention of June 14, 1898, Great Britain was 
given the territory of the Upper Nile, including Da,rfur 
and the disputed Bahr-el-Gahzal region; in fact her 
influence was to extend to the 15th parallel. In return, 
France was given the basin of Lake Chad, including 
Wadai, Baghirmi, and Kanem, making a homogeneous 
whole of Algeria, Tunis, Senegal, Dahomey and Central 
Soudan. Both parties were given equal commercial 
treatment in these regions.^^ The question of Egypt 
proper was not raised in this arrangement and was still 
to provide a fertile field for diplomatic cultivation. 

Considering all the circumstances in the case, it must 
be conceded that France fared very well. But when 
the Convention came up for discussion in the Senate, 
M. de Lamarzelle objected to the arrangement on the 
ground that France was ceding the Bahr-el-Gahzal, in 
which they had established several posts at great ex- 
pense and in accord with the regulations of the Treaty 
of Berlin of 1885, in return for unknown and unoccu- 

26 Ibid., p. 141. 

27 Ibid., p. 146. 

28 For text see Doc. Dip. rel. a la Convention Franco- Anglais du 
14 Juin, 1898, et La Declaration Additionelle du 21 mars, 1899. 



FASHODA 31 

pied territories. Furthermore, this cession was made 
to bring to an end difficulties with England, yet the 
principal causes for dispute with England still re- 
mained unsettled.2^ 

The reply of M. Delcasse was a brilliant example of 
his ability both to persuade and to convince. He 
agreed that in the case of the Niger, important conces- 
sions had been made by France, but pointed out that 
in return the unity of the French Soudan had been ob- 
tained. Furthermore, even if there was a great deal 
of sand where the Gallic cock could scratch at his ease, 
the Bahr-el-Gahzal offered immense marshes where 
the British duck could rejoice in full liberty. Finally, 
to bring the realities of the case before the Senators 
he demanded: ''after M. Cecil Rhodes had pushed the 
British flag to the southern shores of Lake Tanganika, 
when in the north, successively Dongola, Berber, and 
Klhartoum had been snatched from the Mahdists, what 
statesman who had not completely lost the sense of 
reality, what minister knowing that from Cairo in 
twenty days thousands of soldiers could be brought to 
Bahr-el-Gahzal by the Nile, whilst it would have taken 
the French a year to bring up a few hundred exhausted 
soldiers — knowing this, who would have dared to ask 
of the country the useless sacrifice of the blood and 
treasure by which one might have been able merely to 
try to dispute this territory?" ^^ The Convention 
passed. 

29 Annales du S^nat, Vol. 54, p. 828. 

30 Annales du Sgnat, Vol. 54, p. 830. At this time even M. Delcassfi 
would hardly have believed it possible that this forced agreement would 
later be regarded by Frenchmen as the "Open Sesame of the Future," 
"la porte du magnifique palais de la Revanche." 



32 FEENCH FOEEIGN POLICY 

Even before M. Delcasse was able to settle the 
Fashoda Affair another little difficulty had risen be- 
tween the two powers in Arabia. Early in 1899 the 
Sultan granted to France the right to lease a coaling 
station at Bandar-Jisseh, a short distance from Muscat. 
The English resident at Bender-Bouchir, being ap- 
prised of the situation, demanded of the Sultan that he 
withdraw this concession from France. The Sultan 
was forced to comply, and when France refused to give 
it up, the Sultan declared it annulled. According to 
M. Delcasse, France was only asking a privilege that 
Great Britain already possessed, and to which France 
had an equal right,, since both nations were bound by 
the same treaty of 1862. When he took up the ques- 
tion with the Queen's Government, it agreed, and re- 
gretted that perhaps its agents had been over zealous.^* 
According to the English version. Great Britain was 
perfectly willing that France should have a coaling sta- 
tion, but she objected to the cession of the port of 
Bandar-Jisseh to France, since it was capable of being 
made into a strong naval port in clear contradiction of 
the convention of 1862. Under these circumstances the 
Queen's Government upheld its agents in demanding 
the cancelation of this lease. ^^ Whatever the first in- 
tention of M. Delcasse may have been, he was not will- 
ing to allow it to interfere with more important plans, 
and France contented herself with a coal depot. 

Great Britain also complained that since France had 
formally annexed the island of Madagascar she had 

81 Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 511i, p. 840. 

32 See statement of Mr. Brodrick, Under-Secretary of Sate for For. 
Affairs, in House of Commons, March 8, 1899; also editorial London 
Times, March 7, 1899. 



FASHODA 33 

imposed higher duties upon English goods than was 
justified, that she tried to dissuade the natives from 
buying English merchandise, and that she imposed 
restrictions upon the commerce of Indian subjects. 
When in June, 1898, France issued a decree increasing 
the import duties upon the principal articles of British 
manufacture. Lord Salisbury in a note to Sir Edward 
Monson, July 9, 1898, made a formal protest to M. 
Delcasse.^3 Inasmuch as France now claimed Mada- 
gascar as a colonial possession, Great Britain rested 
her case upon very weak grounds. When Lord Salis- 
bury protested again, in November, 1898, at the French 
intention of restricting coasting trade between Mada- 
gascar and the French ports to vessels flying the 
French flag, M. Delcasse was able to announce that the 
decree had been revoked by reason of the insuflSciency 
of French vessels in number and tonnage for the needs 
of commerce.^* The other questions were to lie dorm- 
ant until the entente of 1904. 

2. THE PEACE CONFERENCE AT THE HAGUE 

Considering the military condition of France at the 
close of the Nineteenth Century, it was to be expected 
that she would welcome any concerted effect on the part 
of the Powers which might lead to disarmament and 
world peace. We have already noted that when Russia 
first broached the idea of a peace conference it came 
as a cruel awakening to those in France who saw in 
the Dual Alliance a means towards the revanche. To 
the great majority of the French, however, world peace 

33 Pari. Papers, "Madagascar," 1899, Vol. 109 (c9091) No. 12. 
S4lbid., Nos. 30 and 32. 



34 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY ' 

was an ideal towards which the Third Republic would 
struggle with as great enthusiasm as Louis IX entered 
upon the Crusades. Had not Michelet prophesied that 
in the Twentieth Century ' ' la France declarera la Paix 
au monde"% Had not Henry IV, Sully, the Abbe de 
St. Pierre, and Jean Jacques Rousseau formulated 
plans for a league of nations with world peace as its 
object? Had not Victor Hugo spoken in impassioned 
eloquence on the same subject? It is not surprising 
then that France was the first to accept the proposal 
set forth in the circular of Count Mouravieff. The 
Third Republic could be expected to maintain the 
French tradition. In the words of M. Delcasse: 

''The sympathy of France was acquired for the 
proposition of Czar Nicholas, first, because the idea 
recommended itself, and it can only be hoped that an 
end may be put to this perfecting of armaments which, 
adopted by one power, forces the others either to imi- 
tate them or surpass them. France also supported the 
proposal because the Sovereign who submits it to the 
world is the head of a great nation, an ally and a 
friend with whom never has the accord been more com- 
plete nor the relations more confident. Finally, 
France is favorably disposed towards it because at 
diverse periods of her history, and up to the day before 
the war from which she emerged mutilated, she con- 
ceived and wished to execute the same magnanimous 
design." ^^ 

Although the Conference did not accomplish all that 
was originally hoped, and although it was scorned by 
some and ridiculed by others — a favorite epithet 

85 Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 57i, p. 146. 



FASHODA 35 

directed at it was ''le monde ou Von s'ennuie" — it did 
make a beginning towards the amelioration of the con- 
duct of war on the one hand, and towards a means of 
settling international disputes without recourse to war 
on the other. To facilitate the work, three commis- 
sions were formed, the first on rules of warfare, the 
second on applying to maritime warfare the rules es- 
tablished by the Conference of Geneva, and the third 
on arbitration. The third and most important com- 
mission was under the presidency of M. Leon Bour- 
geois, the first French delegate, and both MM. d'Es- 
tournelles de Constant and Louis Renault were also 
members. The results of this commission were the 
most tangible, for they established the right of third 
powers to offer mediation or good offices without its 
being considered an unfriendly act, and they instituted 
a permanent court of arbitration sitting at the Hague 
accessible to all at all times. If this first Hague Con- 
ference did nothing more than open a way for a set- 
tlement of the Dogger Bank incident, which not only 
prevented war between Eussia and Great Britain but 
ultimately led to the formation of the Triple Entente, 
Czar Nicholas might well feel that he was amply repaid 
for this bread cast upon the waters. 

Even the German war lord felt the effect of the peace 
waves in the air, and while cruising on his yacht off 
Norway he met the French training-ship Iphigenie and, 
after a short visit on board, invited the officers on board 
the Hohensollern. The Kaiser could be most amiable 
when it served his purpose, and to make his friendly 
disposition the more noticeable, he telegraphed to Pres- 
ident Loubet, telling him how much his heart of a sailor 



36 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

and a comrade was rejoiced by the gracious reception 
which had been accorded him.^^ 

M. Delcasse decided that the time was propitious for 
strengthening the Russian alliance, and hardly had the 
Hague Conference come to an end before he hastened 
to pay a visit to St. Petersburg. There is little doubt 
that he also wished to acquaint Count Mouravieff of 
his new policy towards Great Britain, though he could 
hardly have hoped at this early date to bring the Brit- 
ish lion and Russian bear into the same ark of peace 
and friendship. He may also have attempted to mini- 
mize the effects of the reappearance of the Dreyfus 
Affair upon the military power of France, for it was 
realized only too well that Russia was beginning to 
lose patience at her ally's long continued washing of 
her soiled linen in public.^'^ However, the toasts were, 
as usual, very cordial in tone, and when in October 
Count Mouravieff returned the visit the official note 
communicated to the Russian press declared: . . . 
'Hhe friendship and intimacy already established be- 
tween Count Mouravieff and M. Delcasse had been in- 
creased and will greatly facilitate common action in 
the interest of the two countries." ^^ 

The hands of M. Delcasse were much strengthened at 

36 Rev. Pol. et Pari., Aug. 1899. 

ST The following editorial from Novie Vremia quoted in Ques. Dip. 
et Col., Jan. 1, 1901, is extremely pertinent: "Until these recent times 
the French army has been, and has been considered by the most power- 
ful European armies as an equal, an organization formed according 
to all the rules of military science, possessing with excellent equipment 
an admirable spirit and perfect discipline. At the present time it 
appears to be changing its way and its destination; it seems to be 
turning into a political army, feeble for the enemies abroad and both 
tyrannical and vexatious for its own country." 

38 Rev. Pol. et Pari., Nov. 1899. 



FASHODA 37 

this time through the fact that he was now a member of 
the Waldeck-Rousseau ministry established for ** De- 
fence of the Eepublic, ' ' with a real soldier, General de 
Gallif et, at the head of the war department. This min- 
istry, the beginning of the Eepublican bloc, was re- 
solved to give justice to Dreyfus at whatever cost and 
to stamp out the clericalism and royalism which had 
become so closely interwoven with the ''Affair." The 
Waldeck-Eousseau ministry proved to be one of the 
ablest and longest-lived ministries of the Third Repub- 
lic, but the task which it had outlined was beyond its 
ability, and it was forced ultimately to resign with its 
work unfinished. Throughout the three years of its 
duration (June 22, 1899- June 7, 1902) the pressure of 
internal affairs was so great that M. Delcasse was al- 
lowed to proceed carte blanche with his foreign policy 
and he made the most of his opportunity. 

3. FRANCE, GERMANY AND THE BOER WAR 

With the Fashoda Affair settled, with Italy again 
brought into friendly commercial relations, with the 
Russian Alliance revamped, and with the great nations 
of the world having for the first time in the world's 
history come together to establish more peaceable in- 
ternational relations, it loooked as though the year 
1899 was going to bring the century to an end with the 
world at peace and with France well started upon her 
new policy of friendly understandings. It was merely 
the calm before the storm. With the outbreak of the 
Boer War Great Britain found herself still in ' * splen- 
did isolation," but in an isolation such as is usually 
allotted to outcasts and pariahs. Public opinion 



38 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

throughout Europe seemed to rise with a unanimous 
voice to protest against Great Britain's imperialistic 
policy in South Africa. M. Lavisse expressed the feel- 
ing of France when he declared ''England would like 
to keep the benefits of having been the country of Glad- 
stone when she has become the country of Mr. Cham- 
berlain. ' ' ^® Whether her policy was defensible or not 
made little difference. The mere fact that two small 
states in South Africa would dare to take up arms 
against the great British Empire was bound to make 
their cause sympathetic. M. Delcasse saw his care- 
fully cherished plans sinking in the quicksands of pop- 
ular prejudice. French public opinion, already 
aroused by the outbreak of the war, was inflamed still 
further by reports of a possible entente between Ger- 
many and Great Britain. The London correspondent 
of the * * Echo de Paris ' ' declared that Herr von Biilow, 
while on his visit to London in November, 1899, had 
paid a confidential visit to Mr. Chamberlain, and in the 
course of his interview asked whether Great Britain 
could be induced to enter the Triple Alliance. Being 
informed that this was out of the question, he urged an 
entente between Germany and England. Mr. Cham- 
berlain conceded that such an arrangement might be 
possible and promised to consider it.^° Three days 
later, in a speech at Leicester, he added fuel to the 
flames. After declaring that in character the Teutonic 
race differs very slightly from the Anglo-Saxon, and 

39 Revue de Paris, Jan, 1, 1900. 

4oL6monon, "L'Europe et la Politique BritaJinique," p. 190; Von 
Biilow in the revised edition of his "Imperial Germany," p. 37, states 
that Chamberlain made the overtures but that they were not endorsed 
by Lord Salisbury and intimates that even if the overtures had been 
ofladal Germany could not have afforded at that time to accept them. 



FASHODA 39 

that the same sentiments which brought Great Britain 
into close sympathy with the United States might also 
be invoked to bring her into closer sympathy and alli- 
ance with Germany, he said that ''if the union between 
.England and America is a powerful factor in the cause 
of peace, a new triple alliance between the Teutonic 
race and the two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon 
race will be a still more potent influence in the history 
of the world. . . ."" 

The speech was not favorably received in Great Brit- 
ain, Germany, or the United States; and in France it 
provoked a veritable outburst of condemnation — not 
so much for its far-fetched international readjustments, 
but because in the first part of his speech Mr. Chamber- 
lain referred to a gross caricature of the Queen which 
had appeared in a French comic paper and declared 
that ''these attacks upon her Majesty . . . have pro- 
voked in this country a natural indignation which will 
have serious consequences if our neighbors do not mind 
their manners." 

Strong pressure was immediately brought to bear 
upon M. Delcasse by both politicians and the press, 
urging intervention or at least demanding of Great 
Britain that she arbitrate the case. In reply to a ques- 
tion raised by M. Chaumie in the Senate on March 15, 
1900, M. Delcasse replied that France could not even 
suggest arbitration, since Lord Salisbury had already 
declared that the dispute did not lend itself to arbitra- 
tion.^2 Even though the President of the South 

41 Annual Register, 1899, p. 226. 

42 Lord Salisbury in his Mansion House speech Nov. 9, 1899, de- 
Hslared that no government would interfere in the Boer War "in the 
first place because we should not accept such an interference gladly; 



40 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

African Republics had addressed the Powers to obtain 
a satisfactory peace for both parties, such action would 
mean recognition of their independence. When Great 
Britain had learned of this manoeuvre, had she not 
publicly declared that she would not recognize their 
independence, thus rendering further intervention 
superfluous? Realizing the French tendencies to quix- 
otic endeavors, he ended with a strong plea that they 
recognize the fact that ''France had not ceased to be 
the generous nation that the world had known, admired 
and sometimes abandoned, but after so many harsh ex- 
periences, France could not longer admit that her 
duties towards the world should make her forget her 
obligations towards herself."*^ 

Although M. Delcasse was publicly proclaiming a 
course of absolute neutrality — and there is no ques- 
tion that he earnestly favored such a^ policy — ^he could 
not show himself averse to a proposal to bring about 
peace if there seemed any chance of success. The 
Queen of Holland, imbued with the sentiments so re- 
cently promulgated at the Hague, and sympathizing 
keenly with the cause of the Boers, suggested to her 
kinsman, the Czar, that he approach the other powers 
and that they intervene collectively with an offer of 
their good offices.** As Count Mouravieff happened to 
be in Paris at that time, it was but natural that he 

in the second place because I am convinced tliat no such idea is present 
in the minds of any government in the world." Annual Register, 1899, 
p. [222. 

43Annales du S6nat, Vol. 56i, p. 172; M. Paul Deschanel in a speech 
at Nogent-le-Rotrou echoed these sentiments: "Quand on ne secoure 
pas les faibles, fussent-ils admirables et heroiques, il est a la fois pueril 
et imprudent de harceler les forts et surtout de les outrager. . . ." 
Kev. Pol. et Pari., Mai, 1900. 

44 Vizetelly, "Republican France," p. 458. 



FASHODA 41 

should suggest to M. Delcasse that Kussia, France, 
and Germany ought to use their good offices in the 
cause of peace. M. Delcasse approved the project, see- 
ing that it was in accordance with the traditions of the 
French policy to assist in every effort making for peace. 
According to the authority of M. Andre Mevil, in an 
article appearing in the ''Echo de Paris," Count 
Mouravieff went directly from Paris to Berlin intend- 
ing to sound Count von Biilow on the subject, but no 
suitable opportunity arose. However in February, 
1900, the Eussian ambassador in Paris, again asked 
the cooperation of France *'to intervene to prevent fur- 
ther shedding of blood," with the understanding that 
Germany should take the initiative. Again M. Del- 
casse gave his consent, stipulating that Eussia alone 
should make the proposition to Germany, but with the 
assurance that France was ready to join in any effort 
at mediation. After considering several days, the 
Kaiser replied that *'the intervention of the three 
powers in English aifairs appeared to him a grave act, 
an act of long breath, and consequently he demanded 
that Germany, Eussia and France take in advance the 
mutual engagement of guaranteeing the integrity of 
each other's territories."^^ As Eussia immediately 
recognized that any such proposal, which postulated a 
recognition of the status quo as imposed by the Treaty 
of Frankfort as a basis, would be wholly unacceptable 
to her ally and would completely nullify the Franco- 
Eussian Alliance, the idea was. dropped. Although this 
version does not coincide with the explanation given by 
the Kaiser in his famous declarations published in the 

45M6vil quoted in L^monon, op. cit., p. 199. 



42 FEENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

*' Daily Telegraph/' October 28, 1908, in which he de- 
clared that Germany would have nothing to do with any 
enterprise which might be destined to hasten the down- 
fall of England,*^ we have only to contrast these senti- 
ments with those which he expressed to President 
Kruger in 1896 after the Jameson raid, to feel a little 
dubious over Germany's friendship towards England. 
If further evidence is needed, Prince von Biilow gives 
it. He declares that although to many it seemed that 
the European situation was favorable to a momentary 
success against England and that French assistance was 
assured, he realized that the deeply rooted national 
hatred against the German Empire among the French 
would have quickly ousted the momentary ill-feeling 
against England — Fashoda had not effaced the memory 
of Sedan. **Our neutral attitude during the Boer 
War," he says, ''had its origin in weighty considera- 
tions of the national interests of the German 
Empire. "4^ 

Prince von Biilow had correctly interpreted French 
sentiment — Fashoda had not effaced Sedan. And al- 
though such a conservative historian as M. Lavisse, 
writing at the close of 1899, feared that the possibility 
of a war between France and England seemed ''the 
most redoubtable of those which threaten the peace of 
the world," *^ M. Delcasse did not seem to entertain 
the same fears, and at a private dinner party at which 
the Eussian correspondent of the "Eossia" was pres- 

46 Laloy, "La Diplomatic de Guillamne II," p. 70. 

47 Von Biilow, "Imperial Germany," p. 30. 

48 Lavisse, "Precautions centre I'Angleterre," Revue de Paris, Jan. 1, 
1900. 



FASHODA ^3 

ent, M. Delcasse thus expressed his views to a French 
deputy who brought up the question : 

** . . . You say that after finishing with the Trans- 
vaal the English will turn against us. Very frankly, 
I do not think so . . . the English know very well that 
we have no reason to make war upon them, since there 
is nothing we should care to take from them. My 
policy is neither one of menace, nor of excitement — 
blustering is repugnant to me. It is not worthy of a 
great nation which wishes to play a great role in the 
world. On the contrary I wish to put the whole world 
in good humor. . . . " ^^ 

Speaking in the Senate on April 3, 1900, in reply to 
a question of the Count d'Aunay, M. Delcasse summed 
up in a clear and statesmanlike manner his policy dur- 
ing this trying period : 

''If the points of contact between France and Eng- 
land are numerous, and numerous consequently the 
subjects of litigation, much more numerous and much 
stronger are the reasons for forestalling or regulating 
them in accordance with the mutual respect of the 
rights, interests and dignity of each, and among these 
reasons the most decisive in my eyes is that if hy mis- 
chance a conflict should break out between these two 
powers, it is not to the conqueror, whichever it might 
be, that would go to the principal benefits of the vic- 
tory." ^^ 

•*9 Article of M. Pavlovsky in la Rossia, quoted Ques. Dip. et Col. 
Jan. 1, 1900. 

60 Annales du S6nat, Vol. 56i, p. 364. 



CHAPTEE III 
FRENCH DIPLOMACY IN THE OEIENT 

1. THE CRETAN AFFAIR 

WHEN M. Delcasse entered upon his duties at the 
Foreign Office, one of the first problems 
brought to his attention was that of Crete. This, like 
most of the questions arising between the Ottoman 
Empire and the European powers, was one in which 
the desire to find a speedy and satisfactory solution 
lay wholly on the side of Europe. The long-cherished 
aspiration of Crete to be annexed to Greece had seemed 
at the dawn of fulfillment in February, 1897, when 
Greece seized the island in defiance of the Powers. 
But the Powers were relentless, and the quick defeat 
of the Greeks at the hands of the Turks, in the short 
and disastrous Greco-Turkish War, threw a pall for a 
time over the hopes of the Cretans. 

As a temporary solution, it was decided by the four 
powers, France, Great Britain, Kussia and Italy, whose 
squadrons had been blockading the island, to give the 
long-suffering ''Island of Liars" provisional auton- 
omy, based upon a plan submitted May 27, 1897, by M. 
Hanotaux.^ In accordance with this plan, Russia, early 
in 1898, proposed Prince George of Greece as Governor 
of Crete under the sovereignty of the Sultan. France 
and the other Powers agreed. But, as is often the case 

iDoc. Dip., Aflfaires d'Orient (Mai-Decembre, 1897), Nos. 1 and 8. 

44 



DIPLOMACY IN THE OEIENT 45 

in dealings with Sublime Porte, obstructions constantly 
arose, and when M. Delcasse became foreign minister, 
in June, 1898, the affair was still under discussion. 
At length a commission of consuls of the four Powers, 
working with an executive committee of the Cretan 
Assembly, succeeded in drawing up a constitution for 
the provisional regime.^ Before it could be put into 
effect a Mussulman uprising took place in Candia re- 
sulting in a massacre in which the British vice-consul, 
a British officer, and several soldiers were killed.^ 
Italy now took the lead and backed by the other three 
Powers (Germany and Austria refused to participate) 
demanded the complete withdrawal of Turkish forces.* 
This time the Sultan realized that he must pay the 
piper, and after one final vain objection he met their 
demands in full. With the Turkish forces withdrawn, 
the Powers established their regime of autonomous 
government with Prince George as High Commissioner 
— ''they had succeeded in reestablishing peace but only 
by a bastard solution which in reality terminated noth- 
ing. " ^ In reality it was the last trench in the Cretans ' 
long struggle for unification with their mother, Hellas. 
Let the Powers henceforth look upon their hope with 
hienveillance or not, one of their own flesh and blood, 
Eleutherios Venizelos, was to make it a living reality 
in spite of the European powers if not with their assist- 
ance.^ 

2 Doc. Dip., "Affaires d'Orient, Autonomic Cr6toise, Janvier-Octobre," 
1898, No. 159 annexe. 

3 Ibid., No. 168. 

4 Ibid., No. 219. 

sDebidour, "Histoire Diplomatique de TEurope (1878-1904)," p. 238. 
6 See Gibbons, "The New Map of Europe," Chap. XII, for an excellent 
sketch of the Cretan question. 



46 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

2. FRANCE SETTLES WITH TURKEY 

In the Cretan affair France had played only a 
secondary role, but this was suflficient to give M. Del- 
casse experience which proved very valuable when it 
came time for France to deal individually with Abdul 
Hamid. It must be remembered that France, in addi- 
tion to her right as cosignatory of the Treaty of Berlin, 
to exercise a guardianship over Christians in the Otto- 
man Empire in concert with the other powers, pos- 
sessed a special prerogative obtained by secular usage 
to protect all Catholics in the Sultan 's dominions. 
In both of these categories the actions of the Turkish 
government had been anything but satisfactory. The 
Armenian vilayets were the constantly recurring 
scenes of new outrages, the Porte had been delaying 
endlessly in vesting with, authority recently founded 
schools and hospitals, it had resisted the customs im- 
munities established by the capitulations, and it had 
refused the berat of investiture to the Patriarch of the 
United Chaldeans. To these moral grounds for com- 
plaint were now added more material ones. A French 
company, which had constructed certain wharves in 
Constantinople through a concession officially granted 
before work was started, was now refused possession. 
The alleged grounds were that the Government in- 
tended to purchase the wharves, although it was no- 
torious that the Ottoman Treasury was wholly unable 
to buy them back. Another French subject was by 
force dispossessed of lands which he had drained and 
made possible of cultivation. Finally two bankers, 
MM. Tubini and Lorando, one a son, and the other a 



DIPLOMACY IN THE OEIENT 47 

grandson, of naturalized Frenchmen, could not obtain 
reimbursements of loans long overdue which had been 
made to the Porte."^ 

The case of the wharves was a violation of a contract 
pure and simple, and if permitted to go unchallenged 
the Sultan might do the same with the concessions 
granted to the Syrian and Libyian Eailways, with the 
quais in Smyrna and Salonika, with the Ottoman Bank, 
in fact with all the contracts signed with French con- 
cessionaires.^ Furthermore, as M. Delcasse indicated 
in his dispatch of July 17, 1900, to M. Constans, French 
ambassador at Constantinople, the selling back of the 
concession would be a serious blow to French prestige 
on the Bosphorus, and should only be consented to upon 
condition that the administration and exploitation be 
given to a French company.^ The Sultan finally agreed 
to buying the concession back under these conditions, 
but after haggling for six months over the price with 
no prospect of reaching a decision, M. Constans again 
demanded that the company be allowed to exercise the 
rights granted by the concession (March, 1901). He 
reiterated the French demands in a more forceful 
despatch to Tewfic Pasha, Turkish minister of foreign 
affairs, three months later (June 22).^^ 

About this same time, M. Constans learned that the 
Ottoman government intended to refuse to pay the 
judgment rendered against it by the regular tribunals 
of the country in the Lorando-Tubini claims, and that 

7 See Henri de Peyerimhoff, "Le Conflit Franco- Turc," Ques. Dip. et 
Col., 15 Nov., 1901. 

8 See speech of M. Delcassg in Chambre Nov. 4, 1901. Annales de la 
Cham'bre, Vol. 65iv, p. 152. 

9 Doc. Dip., "Affaires de Turquie," 1900-1901, No. 4. 

10 Ibid., No. 6. 



48 FEENCH FOEEIGN POLICY 

the Sultan had issued a secret irade to this effect to his 
minister of finance.^ ^ France now decided upon more 
forcible measures, but before she found it necessary to 
employ them the Sultan suddenly became amenable 
and a satisfactory settlement was effected on all three 
questions.^^ However, the settlement proved to be 
merely a two days ' intermission, until the Sultan could 
catch his breath. This time France was weary of the 
game, and although Turkey once more promised to con- 
cede all points, M. Constans returned to Paris. 

M. Delcasse now showed that he had mastered the 
finesse of the Oriental methods of diplomacy. Al- 
though after the severance of diplomatic relations the 
Sultan hastened to settle the question of the wharves 
and the claims of Tubini with the parties concerned, 
hoping thus to get an opportunity to bargain concern- 
ing the Lorando claims, France refused to abate her 
demands in the slightest degree. On the contrary it 
was decided to settle all the difficulties at once. A 
new note was despatched October 26, which covered 
not only the original demands, but all the other out- 
standing questions which had long awaited solution, 
and a squadron was sent to obtain its endorsement.^* 
The additional demands were as follows: 

1. Official recognition and authorization must be af- 
forded to all schools, hospitals, and religious estab- 
lishments under French protection. 

2. Immediate firmans authorizing necessary con- 
struction and repairs upon institutions damaged in 
recent troubles. 

11 Ibid., No. 5. 

12 Doc. Dip., op. cit.. No. 13. 

13 Ibid., No. 52. 



DIPLOMACY IN THE OEIENT 49 

3. Berat of recognition of the Chaldean Patriarch to 
be delivered in terms acceptable to the Holy See. 

A joint note was then dispatched to the Powers indi- 
cating the reasons for sending a squadron to Mitylene, 
and outlining the claims as just indicated ''not doubt- 
ing that all the European governments appreciate the 
moderation of our demands and the obligation in which 
we have found ourselves to enforce them by the means 
indicated. . . ." ^* 

The squadron under Admiral Caillard arrived at 
Mitylene on November 5, 1901. The same day final 
arrangements were made for meeting the Lorando and 
Tubini claims, the following day the Council of Minis- 
ters approved the other French demands and sent a 
note of acceptance in fuU.^^ Upon being informed 
that immediate action was being taken to carry out the 
conditions, M. Delcasse ordered the fleet to withdraw 
and notified the Powers to this effect. 

This whole incident seems in itself trivial enough 

i*Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 53. A much more elaborate explanation 
to the powers was sent out through the press than appears in the 
Yellow Book, in which it was declared that "France sought no con- 
quest; the mea,sures taken were rendered necessary by the attitude of 
the Porte which took the patience and moderation of the cabinet for 
weakness, and which constantly avoided promising unreservedly the 
execution of the French demands, France was positively obliged to 
convince the Turkish government by a naval demonstration that the 
recognition of its claims was an unavoidable necessity. If the French 
minister seized the occasion for demanding at the same time that the 
Porte fulfill its obligations towards France especially in that which 
concerns the religious institutions in the Orient, that cannot be con- 
sidered truly as the fact of arbitrarily making use of the situation, but 
rather as an act of political wisdom, because the repetition of difficult 
explanations with the Porte may thus be avoided in the future. Finally 
the government gives the clearest assurances of regarding itself as 
bound by the Treaty of Berlin." Vienna Corr. of Daily Telegraph, 
quoted Rev. Pol. et Pari., December, 1901. 

16 Doc. Dip., op. cit.. No. 65 (annex). 



50 FEENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

and would be, if it were detached from its surround- 
ings. But to see its vital importance to France at this 
time, it is only necessary to balance it against the rapid 
extension of German influence in Turkey as shown by 
the granting of the concession to continue the Bagdad 
Eailway from Konia to the Persian Gulf the year be- 
fore. The ''sick man" of the East was failing rapidly 
and the German eagle was ready to swoop and carry 
off the whole of Mesopotamia if the field were clear. 
Great Britain was clever enough to seize Koweit, the 
only feasible outlet for the railway on the Persian 
Gulf ; it was imperative that France take advantage of 
the occasion to strengthen her position in the Near 
East. By increasing her prestige among the Moham- 
medans, France had added one more girder to the 
bridge which she was building across the Channel. 
The English respect strength above all other qualities 
in both individuals and in nations, and M. Delcasse in- 
tended to strengthen France. ^'Ne troubles pas 
Vagonie de la France'* was forever discarded. 

When the affair came up in the Chamber, M. Delcasse 
was criticised by the Socialists on the ground that 
France had not interfered in the Armenian massacres, 
yet had sent a squadron to collect some private debts. 
M. Denys Cochin declared that the Sultan should ren- 
der an account of inundating the quais of Constanti- 
nople with blood before accounting for his arrange- 
ments with the masons who constructed them.^® 

16 See speeches of MM. Marcel Sembat and Denys Cochin, Nov. 4, 
1901, Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 6.5iv, p. 148; on Jan. 20, 1902, the 
question was again raised, and M. Gustave Rouet scathingly denounced 
M. DelcassS's handling of the .Turkish question, declaring the French 
navy could be sent to enforce monetary claims while it would lie at 



DIPLOMACY IN THE OEIENT 51 

In reply M. Delcasse pointed out that France could 
intervene in Turkey only in a question essentially 
French. The question of Armenia was an interna- 
tional one and could not be settled by France alone, 
and to join it with questions essentially French would 
have brought about delays, increased the difficulties, 
and in no way improved the situation of the Armenians. 
As soon as the powers signatory of the Treaty of 
Berlin were willing to take up the question, France 
would join with them only too gladly. Then abandon- 
ing specific instances, he indicated forcefully his ideas 
on French foreign policy in its broader aspects: 

''In the question of foreign policy there are two 
schools, one which considers France as the means to 
pursue a chivalric ideal abroad; the other as an end 
which should suffice in itself. The first declare that 
the rupture was caused hj^'une question de gros sous." 
Yet if France permitted the Porte to disregard the 
interests upon which the conflict directly bore, a pre- 
cedent would be created for the future which would 
permit the same treatment to be accorded to all French 
enterprises. France is ready to do her part liberally, 
very liberally, in every way which international soli- 
darity and humanity demands, but she cannot forget, 
and you will not ask her to forget the superior duty 
which she owes to herself. " ^'^ 

anchor while a whole people were being exterminated. Annales de la 
Chambre, Vol. 66i, p. 75. 

17 Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 65iv, p. 152. See also speech of 
Jan. 20, 1902, ibid., Vol. 66i, p. 75; the eleventh Peace Congress meet- 
ing the following summer "considering that the recovery of the debts 
Tubini-Lorando which had served as pretext for armed intervention by 
France was a matter incontestably of judicial character . . . regrets 
exceedingly that appeal was not made to the Arbitration Court of the 
Hague." Kev. Pol. et Pari., Sept. 1902. 



52 FEENCH FOEEIGN POLICY 



3. FRANCE AND THE BOXER REBELLION 

SimultaneoTisly with the difficulties arising in rela- 
tion to the Ottoman Empire M. Delcasse found himself 
involved in even more serious troubles in the Far East, 
for "the sick man who sits yonder at Pekin upon the 
tottering throne of the Manchu princes, preoccupies the 
European chancellories just as much as he who agon- 
izes at Constantinople upon the worm-eaten throne of 
the autocratic and bloody sultans. " ^^ In fact after 
Eussia, Germany and France had forced Japan to re- 
vise the Shimonoseki Treaty to protect the integrity of 
China, the Powers seem to be agreed, that in order to 
continue their protection, it would be well for each of 
them to have as large a sphere of influence as possible 
to protect. This imperialistic banquet at the expense 
of China finally developed into a gluttonous orgy. In 
the year 1898, Germany by the treaty of March 6 ob- 
tained a ninety-nine year lease of the port of Kiao- 
.Chau, the inalienability of Shantung, and the right of 
constructing and exploiting mines and railways in this 
province; Eussia by the treaty of March 27 received 
a twenty-five year lease of Port Arthur and the Liao- 
Tung Peninsula — the very territory she had refused to 
Japan in 1895 — and also the right of connecting Port 
Arthur to the Trans-Manchurian Eailway, thus giving 
her an outlet upon open water, the dream of centuries ; 
France by the treaty of April 5 had obtained confirma- 
tion of the concession of the Yunnan railway, the in- 
alienability of the three provinces bordering Tonkin, 

18 Augier, "La France et I'Angleterre eu Extreme Orient," Kev. Pol. 
et Pari., April 1, 1904. 



DIPLOMACY IN THE OEIENT 53 

namely: Yunnan, Kwang-Si and Kwang-Tung, a lease 
on the Bay of Kwang-Chou-Wan, the promise not to 
cede Hainan — another protection of Tonkin — and 
promise to employ a Frenchman as director-general 
of the posts. Two months later she obtained the right 
to construct a railroad ending at Pakhoi.^^ Finally 
Great Britain who had long looked with hostile and 
jealous eyes at French and Eussian expansion which 
menaced India, by the arrangement of April 4 obtained 
a lease on the port of Wei-hai-Wei, the right to navigate 
on all the rivers of the Empire, exclusion of foreign 
interests in the basin of the Yangste-Kiang, the open- 
ing of another port in Hun-nan, and the reservation of 
the position of inspector-general of Chinese customs 
to an Englishman.^*' Even Italy tried to crowd in for 
a place at the feast by claiming the Bay of San Mun, 
but in vain. 

As has already been indicated France found Great 
Britain to be her chief opponent in the Far East as 
well as elsewhere. With her chief interests in Indo- 
China she encountered British interests in Siam, in 
Yunnan and even in Hong-Kong — for in order to com- 
pete with the French railway from Yunnan to Hanoi, 
which afforded an outlet for the entire middle Yangste 
Valley, Great Britain could offer the three routes to 
Shang-hai, Hong-Kong or Eangoon.^^. Furthermore, 
by the Treaty of January 15, 1896, Great Britain had 
cleverly excluded France from monopolizing the direct 
route to the Yangtse through Yunnan. ''When sup- 
ping with the French, it was best to use a long spoon. ' ' 

isDebidour, "Histoire Diplomatique de I'Europe (1878-1904)," p. 267. 

20 Debidour, op. cit., p. 2G9. 

21 E. Augier, op. cit., supra. 



54 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

With the constant play and interplay of these various 
foreign interests in the very heart of her empire, every 
one of which aimed ultimately at the destruction of her 
sovereignty, it is not surprising that the long dormant 
China began to be aroused from her lethargy. France 
found that although she had the concession of Kwang- 
Chou-Wan on paper, there would be difficulty in carry- 
ing out the provisions. The Viceroy of Canton 
showed himself especially hostile, and after a long 
period of negotiations the French Commander-in- 
Chief of the Naval Division of the Far East on June 
24, 1899, seized three ports and proclaimed the cession 
made.^^ The Tsong-li-Yamen, or Chinese foreign 
office, continued to resist, and at length M. Stephen 
Pichon, the French minister,^^ declared that he would 
ask for his recall if a more conciliatory attitude were 
not shown. The Viceroy replied by threatening to or- 
ganize a rebellion to prevent the French from taking 
possession.^'^ If France was to maintain her position 
in the Orient she could not recede, and M. Delcasse 
ordered two battalions from Indo-China to Kwang- 
Chou-Wan. Affairs were brought to a climax by the 
murder of two French officers at Men-tao. Demands 
were now made for the immediate adoption of the con- 
vention, the recall of the Viceroy, the punishment of 
all those implicated in the murder and reparation to 
the families. At length on December 25, M. Pichon 

22 Doc. Dip, "Chine" (1898-99), No. 18. 

23 This is the same M. Pichon who was to serve so ably as Minister 
of Foreign Affairs during the Clemenceau ministry (1906-1909) and 
also during the recent Clemenceau ministry (1917-1920) which brought 
France from the gloom of internal dissentions and the fear of defeat 
to the most glorious victory of her history. 

24 Doe. Dip., op. cit., Nos. 22 and 27. 



DIPLOMACY IN THE ORIENT 55 

was able to declare that the demands would be met in 
full.2« 

Another source of difficulty to France was her posi- 
tion as protector of all Catholics in the Orient, for as 
sentiment grew against the ''foreign devils," the mis- 
sionaries were the first to suffer. She had taken it 
upon herself to bring to justice the murderers of the 
Belgian missionary, M. Delbrouck, who had been 
butchered in an unspeakable manner, when in October 
came the news of the murder of M. Chanes of the 
Canton mission with several other Catholics at Pak- 
tong.2^ Settlement was obtained for these outrages 
at the same time as the ratification of the French con- 
cessions, but they gave very clear indications of a 
deadly hatred towards the growing influence of the 
foreigners. 

At Shanghai, the French found themselves at odds 
with both the Chinese and the English. The conces- 
sion of Shang-hai included an ancient Chinese cemetery 
surrounding the Pagoda of Ning-po. The French had 
refused to allow further burials there, and had given 
the Association of the Pagoda of Ning-po six months' 
time to exhume the bodies already buried. No action 
was taken, however, and when the French, in order to 
put through some streets, were forced to exhume some 
of these bodies a violent outbreak occurred. To settle 
the difficulty the Chinese authorities offered an exten- 
sion of the French concession in another direction in 
return for the lands of the Pagoda of Ning-po. The 
French were willing to treat upon this basis but the 
British now interfered, and at the behest of Lord Salis- 

28 Ibid., No. 48. 

26 Doc. Dip., op. cit., No8. 72-90. 



56 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

bury, the English minister at Pekin protested against 
any extension of the French concession (December 14, 
1898).^'^ The Chinese now broke off negotiations. M. 
Delcasse thereupon sent a long dispatch to M. Paul 
Cambon, French ambassador at London, outlining the 
whole affair, and pointing out to the English govern- 
ment that in 1896 plans had been formulated and ap- 
proved for the enlargement of both the French con- 
cession and the International Concession, and as Great 
Britain was especially interested in the latter, he could 
not understand English interference at this time.^^ 

Mr. Chamberlain took up the cudgels in behalf of 
Great Britain and in a speech made at Wolverhampton, 
January 18, he asserted that English action was based 
upon the accords of the 9th and 24th of February, 
1898, between the Chinese government and the British 
minister, wherein assurance had been given that no 
further cession of territory to any foreign power would 
be made in any part of the Yang-tse region.^^ M. Del- 
casse thereupon called attention to the fact that the 
open-door policy was included in terms of the French 
concession, and by notes to the Chinese government of 
April 4 and 9 France had extended this policy to the 
two Kwangs and to Yunnan. He also politely pointed 
out that when Great Britain had wished to enlarge 
her possessions at Kao-Lon, opposite Hong-Kong, the 
French government had not protested, though it was 
in violation of the French entente with China.^® Great 
Britain gave no immediate indication that she appreci- 

27 Ibid., especially Nos. 103, 105 and 115. 

28 Ibid., No. 122. 

29 London Times, Jan. 19, 1S99; also quoted in note of M. Delcassfi 
?o Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 123, 



DIPLOMACY IN THE ORIENT 57 

ated the conciliatory attitude of France, but when in 
the following month the question arose concerning an 
extension of the International Concession, France used 
it as an effective means of barter. Lord Salisbury was 
now led to see the justice of the French demands and a 
reciprocal adjustment to the mutual advantage of the 
two powers was finally effected.^^ 

While Europe was thus engrossed in opening up 
China to the advantages of Western civilization in 
return for certain nominal economic advantages, the 
current of hostility towards everything foreign was 
running stronger than ever. The young Emperor 
Kuang-Su who had lent himself to a program of re- 
forms, was unseated by the xenophobe Empress- 
Dowager in September, 1898. She instituted a ruth- 
less crusade against all who had shown any leanings 
towards reform and made open hostility to the 
foreigner the key-note of her policy.^^ She found an 
excellent tool at her hand in the "Righteous Harmony 
Fists," a secret society originating in the Province 
of Shantung, whose avowed intent was extermination 
of the foreigners. The earliest indication that we have 
that the European powers were beginning to realize 
the danger of their position occurs in an identic note 
sent by France, the United States, Great Britain, and 
Germany, January 27, 1900, to the Tsong-li-Yamen 
demanding an imperial edict pronouncing the dissolu- 
tion and prohibition of all secret societies.^^ They 

31 Ibid., Nos. 124-148 inc. 

32 This sentence is found in one of her decrees : "Let no one think 
of making peace, but let each strive to preserve from destruction and 
spoilation by the ruthless hand of the invader his ancestral home and 
graves." Pott, "A Sketch of Chinese History," p. 204. 

88 Doc. Dip., "Chine," 1899-1900, No. 5. 



58 FEENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

were met with evasive answers and at length the rep- 
resentatives of the Powers considered staging a naval 
demonstration. Both the United States and Great 
Britain refused to associate themselves in any such 
undertaking although both decided to send warships 
to protect their interests.^ ^ While the Powers debated 
over what measures should be taken, the rebels in- 
creased in numbers and boldness, nor was it evident 
that the government was making much effort to repress 
them. In the words of M. Pichon: "... the blind 
hostility of the government of the Empress against all 
strangers is manifest. She is surrounded by man- 
darins who are for the most part quite ignorant regard- 
ing things outside and most passionate against all that 
departs from Chinese traditions. Her favor is 
acquired by those who wish to refuse everything to 
the representatives of the Powers . . . the secret so- 
cieties are not ignorant of this attitude and are ready 
to profit by it. ' ' ^^ 

On May 20, M. Pichon proposed to the diplomatic 
corps that a despatch be sent to the Chinese govern- 
ment demanding immediate repression of the disorders, 
and unless complied with to have forces disembarked 
from the war-ships.*^ A very interesting side-light is 
thrown upon the diplomatic situation at Pekin from the 
narrative of a rather frank eye-witness. It is the 24th 

s*Ibid., No8. 11-16; the United States played a generous role 
throughout this most difficult period of Chinese history, commencing 
with Secretary Hay's famous memorandum of Sept. 6, 1899, concerning 
the open door, to which all nations interested had subscribed by March 
20, 1900, and ending with the voluntary return of that part of the 
indemnity left over after the legitimate claims had been settled. See 
"Foreign Relations of the United States," 1899, p. 128. 

35 Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 22. 

86 Ibid., No. 29. 



DIPLOMACY IN THE ORIENT 59 

of May and the British legation is en fete in honor of 
Queen Victoria 's birthday, * * . . . the eleven Legations 
and the nondescripts have forgotten their cares for a 
brief space and have been enjoying the evening air 
. . . where the devil is the protocol and the political 
situation you will say? Not quite forgotten since 
the French minister attracted the attention of many 
all the evening by his vehement manner . . . 'les 
Boxeurs,' he says, and what the French minister says 
is always worth listening to since he has the best intel- 
ligence corps in the world — the Catholic priests of 
China — at his disposal. It is Monseigneur Favier's 
letter (Vicar Apostolic of the Manchu capital) written 
but five days ago that was the subject of his impromptu 
oration. Monseigneur Favier wrote and demanded a 
force of marines for his cathedral, his people and his 
chattels . . . and his request has been cruelly refused 
by the Council of Ministers on the ground that it is 
absurd . . . 

"The French Minister was irate . . . took a dis- 
creet look around him and then hinted that it was 
this legation, the British legation, which stopped the 
marines from coming. ... So the Boxers, with half 
the governments of Europe, led by England as we know 
by our telegrams, seeking to minimize their importance, 
have already moved from their particular habitat 
which is Shantung into the metropolitan province of 
Chihli."3T 

Fortunately for the safety of the legations, about 
450 men from the foreign war-ships were sent forward 
and arrived in Pekin before it was cut off from the 

«x Weale, "Indiscreet Letters from Peking," p. 13. 



60 FEENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

world. By June 10, even America was aroused, and 
M. Jules Cambon, French ambassador at Washington, 
was able to telegraph his government that the United 
States which had hitherto consistently refused to par- 
ticipate with the European powers in any military or 
naval demonstration now realized the gravity of the 
situation, and that if a military action became neces- 
sary the American troops would join with the Euro- 
pean forces, and would serve under the same command. 
The same day a relief expedition under Admiral Sey- 
mour of the British fleet started for Tientsin, but was 
unable to fight its way through the hosts of rebels op- 
posing it. The Powers now realized that the legations 
could be saved only by quick and concerted action. In 
reply to a question raised in the Chamber, M. Del- 
casse declared that M. Pichon had been authorized to 
act with the representatives of the other powers; the 
whole force of the naval division had been placed at his 
orders, and other forces if necessary. The Chinese 
government also had been notified that it would be held 
responsible for all French subjects within its jurisdic- 
tion.^^ 

It is not essential to our purpose to pursue the tortu- 
ous efforts of the Chinese government to settle the 
affair by diplomacy, while its troops were aiding the 
rebels to exterminate the official representatives of the 
Powers in Pekin. Neither have we space to describe 
the heroic defence made by the legations for two whole 
months, day and night, against an intrepid and fero- 

38 Speech, June 11, 1900. Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 6Uii, p. 158; 
on June 21, M. Delcass^ declared that France would have 2500 men 
in China by the end of the month. Ibid., p. 339. 



DIPLOMACY IN THE ORIENT 61 

cious foe.^® The Powers for the time forgot their 
wrangling and jealousy and agreed to concerted action 
upon this basis: (1) the safety of their representatives 
and citizens in Pekin and other parts of the Empire ; 
(2) the maintenance of the status quo; (3) guarantees 
against future outbreaks of this kind.^*^ However, 
when the question came up as to who should be placed 
in command of the allied forces, there was considerable 
jockeying for position. Since her ambassador, Baron 
von Kettler, had been murdered, Germany resolved to 
obtain the position, and went about securing it in a 
very clever manner. The Kaiser first communicated 
privately with the Czar on the subject ^^ and then in- 
formed the British ambassador at Berlin that both 
Russia and Japan thought that a German supreme 
command would be of advantage inasmuch as the Ger- 
man interests in the Far East were not so extensive as 
those of certain other powers.^ ^ Lord Salisbury im- 
mediately replied that ''Her Majesty's government 
will view with great satisfaction an arrangement by 
which so distinguished a soldier is placed at the head 
of the international forces. " ^^ 

This prompt acquiescence of Great Britain following 
that of Russia made it very difficult for the French 
government to find a valid excuse for refusal. The 
Quai d'Orsay thereupon informed the German govern- 
ment that as soon as Marshal von Waldersee arrived 

39 For a vivid and interesting account, see the narrative of M. Pichon 
as published in the French Yellow Book. Doc. Dip., "Chine, 1899-1900," 
Rapport de M. Pichon. 

40 Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 107. 

•*i Reventlovsr, "Deutsch lands auswartige Politique," p. 161. 

42 Pari. Papers, 1901, Vol. 91 (c436). No. 128. 

43 Ibid., No. 143. 



62 FEENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

in China "and shall have taken the eminent position 
due to his superior rank, General Voyron, commander 
of the French forces will not fail to place his relations 
with the Marshal upon a proper footing {ne manquera 
pas d' assurer ses relations avec le MarecJial)." ** The 
United States, the only other power that was unwilling 
to have its troops serve under a German commander-in- 
chief, side-stepped the difficulty in a very neat fashion. 
She gave her consent if there should he further need of 
joint action after his arrival^^ When Count von Wal- 
dersee did reach Pekin, two months after the siege was 
raised, General Chaffee, in command of the American 
expeditionary forces, refused to participate in opera- 
tions ordered by the German commander-in-chief, on 
the ground that his instructions did not permit him to 
engage in offensive work tending to promote rather 
than allay hostilities.*^ 

As was to be expected, the news that the French 
forces in China were to serve under a German general 
provoked an outburst of indignation in France. M. 
Marcel Sembat protested strenuously in the Chamber : 
''when the Chinese see the troops of Europe under the 
command of a general from the State which has shown 
itself most brutally aggressive towards them, will they 

44 Pari. Papers, 1901, Vol. 91 (c436) No. 215. This correspondence 
concerning the supreme command is not to be found in the French 
Yellow Books on China. 

45 "Foreign Pvelations of the United States," 1900, No. 1338. 

46 Carter, "Life of Lieut. Gen. Chaffee," p. 210; a little later when the 
Germans commenced to introduce Hun methods in the administration 
of that part of Pekin entrusted to them — stripping the Chinese Astro- 
nomical Observatory and sending the instruments to Germany — Gen. 
Chaffee so frankly enunciated his opinion of these acts that friendly 
relations between the two generals were seriously threatened. Ibid., 
p. 215. 



DIPLOMACY IN THE ORIENT 63 

not feel that Europe is making war upon them with the 
purpose of continuing the policy shown at Kiao-Chau? 
Furthermore, knowing in advance the directions given 
to the German troops ^'' — which unfortunately were 
being carried out only too well — why should the 
other troops, despatched in the name of civilization, 
be placed under the control of a nation which con- 
sidered the Chinese beyond the pale of international 
lawr'^8 

Now that all danger was passed many fruitful causes 
of conflict came up between the powers. Russia sug- 
gested as a preliminary to the negotiations that the 
Powers evacuate Pekin, and she was backed by the 
United States. Great Britain and Germany opposed 
this stoutly, France remaining non-committal. Ger- 
many then suggested that before negotiations be en- 
tered into with China, a demand should be made for 
the surrender of all officials connected with the up- 
rising, and they should be punished by the powers in 
accordance with their crimes. The United States re- 
fused to consider this program. Neither of these views 
obtaining much success, France now took the lead, and 
M. Delcasse, after first obtaining the adhesion of 

*7 The Kaiser on saying good-bye to his troops at Bremerhaven, 
addressed them as follows: "You know you will have to fight with a 
cunning, brave, well-armed savage foe. When you come to close quarters 
with him remember pardon must not be given, prisoners must not be 
taken, whoever falls in your hands is doomed. As a thousand years 
ago the Huns under King Etzel made a name for themselves which still 
renders them terrible in tradition and story, in like manner may the 
name 'Grerman' in China through you be so famed that for a thousand 
years to come no Chinaman will dare to look askance at a German." 
Of. this version found in D. J. Hill, "Impressions of the Kaiser," p. 175, 
with the oificial mutilated version given in Klausman "Kaiserreden," 
p. 357. 

*» Annales die la Chambr«, Vol. 62iv, p. 27&. 



,64 FEENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

Eussia, outlined the following six points as a basis of 
their collective negotiations: 

I. Punishment by the Chinese government of the 
principal officials considered guilty; these to be desig- 
nated by the representatives of the Powers at Pekin. 

II. Maintenance of the embargo in the importation 
of arms. (M. Delcasse had made this suggestion at 
the beginning of the trouble and the Powers had 
agreed.) 

III. Payment by China of equitable indemnities. 

IV. Constitution at Pekin of a permanent guard for 
the legations. 

V. Dismantling of the fortifications of Taku. 

VI. The military occupation of two or three points 
on the route from Tientsin to Pekin, thus keeping a 
free route open to the sea.^^ 

Italy was the first to give her adherence (October 5, 
1900) followed three days later by Austria. Great 
Britain and Japan followed with slight reservations — 
Great Britain thought there should be as many points 
as powers in the sixth proposal. The United States 
agreed tentatively until she had further information, 
and Germany came in last. 

Hardly had the governments come to an agreement 
upon this basis than they were astounded to learn that 
Great Britain and Germany had signed a separate dual 
agreement on the 16th of October in London upon a 
threefold basis: (1) maintenance of the open door pol- 
icy in China; (2) maintenance of the territorial integ- 
rity of China; (3) in case another power should make 
use of the complications in China to obtain territorial 

49 Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 327. 



DIPLOMACY IN THE ORIENT 65 

advantages, ''the two contracting parties reserve to 
themselves to come to a preliminary understanding as 
to the eventual steps to be taken for the protection of 
their own interests in China." ^^ 

At first glance the accord seemed to be aimed clearly 
at France and Russia. In an analysis of the accord 
given by M. Rene Henry, he asserted that the third 
article directly menaced Russia, who possessed both 
railroads and strategic points in Manchuria, while for 
France ''a new Fashoda was possible between the hint- 
erland of Tonkin and the English pretensions upon the 
Yangtse-Kiang, the Asiatic Nile."^^ Great Britain, 
however, hastened to disclaim any such imperialistic 
designs and the foreign office on October 22 issued a 
note to that effect.^^ France could not help feeling 
somewhat wounded in her amour-propre by this unex- 
pected thrust of Salisbury, and in his reply M. Del- 
casse instead of adhering to the sentiments laid down 
simply ''took notice" of the arrangement. He then 
declared that France "has long since manifested its 
desire of seeing China open to the economic activity 
of the whole world. The quick adhesion which it gave 
last December to a proposal of the government of the 

50 Pari. Papers, "China," 1900, Vol, 105 (Cd365) ; also in Yellow 
Book, No. 361. 

51 Ren6 Henry, "Accord Anglo- Allemand," Rev. Pol. et Pari., Jan. 1901. 

52 "It is perfectly exact that the Anglo-German Accord is directed 
in no fashion against Russia, and that it will effect in no manner 
the Russian railway concessions in Manchuria, where Russia has 
already obtained the right to construct railroads. The accord in ques- 
tion, to the principles of which it is hoped that all the powers will 
subscribe, has for its object the maintenance of the integrity of China, 
and has no relation to the arrangements that the powers may take 
among themselves to construct railroads in China." Rev. Pol. et 
Pari., Nov., 1900, p. 435. 



66 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

United States was dictated by the same feelings. Its 
sentiment in this regard has not changed. 

'*As to the integrity of China the government of the 
Republican affirms so much the more willingly this 
principle that it has made it the base, as it has said sev- 
eral times, of its policy in the crisis in which the com- 
mon efforts of the Powers tend to find a satisfactory 
solution. The universal assent to this principle ap- 
pears to the French government a sure guarantee of its 
respect. If contrary to all expectation it should fail 
to be maintained, France would act as circumstances 
required to safe-guard its interests and its treaty 
rights. ' ' ^^ 

Very soon France began to realize that Great Britain 
had been innocent of any ulterior motives in making 
the arrangement, that it was Germany who was follow- 
ing a poudre aux yeux policy at the expense of her 
Anglo-Saxon cousin. Just as Italy had joined with 
Austria in the Triple Alliance as a measure of self- 
protection against her ally, so Germany who had much 
larger interests in the Yangtse region, the British 
sphere of influence, than Great Britain had in Shan- 
tung, the German sphere of influence, found it very 
much to her interest to sign up her rival in a self- 
denying agreement.^* 

53 Doe. Dip., op. cit., No. 362. 

5* Jolin Hay in a private letter to Henry Adams shows that he was 
wide-awake to the situation: "What a business this has been in China! 
So far we have got on by being honest and naif ... at least we are 
spared the infamy of an alliance with Germany. I would rather, I 
tliink be the dupe of China that the chum of the Kaiser. . . . 

"My heart is heavy about John Bull. Do you twig his attitude to 
Germany ? When the Anglo-German pact came out, I took a day or two 
to find out what it meant. I soon learned from Berlin that it meant 
a horrible, practical joke on England. From London I found out what 



DIPLOMACY IN THE OEIENT 67 

While the diplomats were staging this little entre 
acte in Europe, the diplomatic corps at Pekin, taking 
M. Pichon 's six points as a basis, drew up and adopted 
the conditions to be imposed upon the Chinese govern- 
ment. In addition to the six points which were kept 
almost intact, it was demanded that the Chinese gov- 
ernment send expiatory missions to Germany and 
Japan, and to raise expiatory monuments in the Chris- 
tian cemeteries in which tombs had been profaned. 
It was also demanded that a ministry of foreign affairs 
take the place of the Tsong-li-Yamen. The indemnity 
was set at 450 million taels (about 337 million dollars) 
and France was to receive 2861^ million francs (about 
57 million dollars). China had neither the means nor 
the desire to resist, and the final protocol embodying 
the terms was signed by her plenipotentiaries Septem- 
ber 7, 1901.^= 

Although with the signing of the protocol, the storm 
raised by the Boxers had subsided, still a few echoes of 
thunder could be heard in the chancellories of Europe. 
In order that there might be a concerted and simultane- 
ous evacuation of Shanghai there were required two 
and a half years ' time, and fifty-four notes on the part 
of the Quai d'Orsay, Lord Lansdowne, the new head 
of the British foreign office, was to learn that according 
to the Wilhelmstrasse, the famous arrangement of 
October 16, 1900, did not include Manchuria, no matter 
what the opinion of Downing Street might be on the 
subject. Count von Bulow was new in the Chancellor- 

I had suspected, but what it astounded me after all to be assured of — 
that they did not know! Germany proposed it, they saw no harm in 
it and signed." Thayer, "Life and Letters of John Hay," Vol. II, p. 248, 
85 Doc. Dip. (June-October, 1901), "Protocol Final." 



68 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

ship, but he was old in foreign affairs, and he made a 
very clear distinction between China and the Chinese 
Empire. Lord Lansdowne did not argue, he acted, 
and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of January 30, 1902, 
was the result. Germany was caught between the 
upper and nether millstone — '* jealous of England and 
afraid of Russia she accidentally treads on British toes 
while blacking Russia 's boots. ' ' ^^ 

This alliance which put a sudden end to Great Brit- 
ain's policy of ''splendid isolation," purposed to main- 
tain the two principles of the status quo and the open 
door, already subscribed to on several occasions by 
all the powers interested in China; and in addition it 
declared that if either country should be attacked by a 
single power while maintaining the alliance, the other 
would remain neutral; but if a coalition were formed 
the casus foederis intervenes and both would make 
war.^^ To France acting solely in her own interests, 
the alliance was wholly harmless — had not M. Delcasse 
as far back as November, 1899, before he had sub- 
scribed to the note of the United States regarding the 
open door, declared in the Chamber: "we must try to 
maintain China open to the free struggle of the intelli- 
gence and capital of the whole world." ^^ For France 
as the ally of Russia, the answer was not so simple, for 
both Great Britain and Japan considered Manchuria as 
an integral part of the Chinese Empire, no matter what 
the Russian or German theories might be. The ques- 

66 An excellent summary of the causes leading up to the Anglo- 
Japanese Treaty is found in an article by Bushby, "The Anglo-Japanese 
Treaty," Nineteenth Century, March, 1902. 

57 Pari. Papers, Agreement between the United Kingdom and Japan, 
1902, Vol. 130 (Cd914). 

58 Annales du Senat, Vol. 61, p. 605. 



DIPLOMACY IN THE OEIENT 69 

tion in reality was — how closely was France willing 
to bind herself to Eussia in the latter 's imperialistic 
enterprises in Manchuria? Russia, in the eyes of 
Britain, was '' creeping over Manchuria behind a foggy 
cloud of assurances, secretly backed by Germany, 
openly backed by France, and posing all the time as a 
friend of China. ' ' ^® 

M. Sembat raised the question in the Chamber (Feb- 
ruary 3, 1902), of the danger of maintaining the Rus- 
sian Alliance, declaring that no longer was it possible 
to marry ^'le grand Turk avec la Republique de V en- 
is e" ; for a true alliance there must be a community of 
interests and directing principles.^^ This was a week 
before the publication of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance ; 
after its publication the Socialists were not alone in 
believing that France was playing a dangerous game 
in the Far East in sustaining Russian schemes. How- 
ever, the Government was in no position to desert 
Eussia at this time even if it so desired ; its only safety 
lay in a bold statement of its position. On March 20, 
the diplomatic representatives of France and Russia 
communicated the following declaration to the minis- 
ters of foreign affairs of the powers signatory of the 
Protocol of Pekin : 

**The allied governments of France and Eussia, hav- 
ing received communication of the Anglo- Japanese con- 
vention of January 30, 1902 . . . are fully satisfied at 
finding there the affirmation of the essential principles 
which they have themselves on several occasions de- 
clared to constitute and which remain the base of their 

69 H. N. G. Bushby, op. cit., supra. 
eoAnnales de la Chambre, Vol. 66i, p. 491. 



70 FEENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

policy. The two governments esteem that the respect 
of these principles is at the same time a guarantee of 
their special interests in the Far East. However, they 
too, being obliged to envisage the case when either the 
aggressive action of third powers, or new troubles in 
China . . . might become a menace to their interest, 
the two allied governments reserve the right to take 
measures to assure their protection." ®^ 

Once more France found herself face to face with 
Great Britain in a situation which at first glance held 
possibilities just as sinister as those of Fashoda. For- 
tunately for the long cherished purpose of M. Delcasse 
the danger was not as great as it appeared. With 
Edward VII on the throne, and Lord Lansdowne in 
the Foreign Office, it soon became evident that the 
desire for an understanding was mutual. The Boer 
"War had surfeited the English people with wars of 
conquest, and at last it began to dawn upon even the 
most ardent f rancophobe, that the real enemy of Great 
Britain was Germany. The phenomenal commercial 
expansion of Germany, the great naval bill of 1900, 
the Bagdad Railway scheme, with the domination of 
Asia Minor as its corollary, cast no uncertain shadow 
of coming events. Therefore when M. Denys Cochin 
arose in the Chambre, and declared that the Yalu River 
would be a second Rubicon, and that the Franco- 
Russian note was a defiance to the Anglo- Japanese 
challenge, M. Delcasse confidently replied that the new 
declaration meant simply that there was a '' concours 
de forces" towards a similar object, the maintenance 

61 Text may be found in "Chronologie francaise," Rev. Pol. et Pari., 
April, 1902, p. 208. 



DIPLOMACY IN THE OEIENT 71 

of the status quo and the common peace, a condition 
which is equally precious to all — ' ' a house well guarded 
and known to be well guarded discourages tempta- 
tion. "«2 

4. FRANCO-SIAMESE RELATIONS 

Before leaving the Far East we must touch briefly 
upon French relations with Siam, the land of the White 
Elephant, which borders upon French Indo-China and 
whose productive rice fields and magnificent forests of 
teak had long been a temptation to French governors 
of Indo-China. Great Britain, established in Burma 
and the Malay Peninsula, again acted as a check upon 
the aspirations of the French colonial party when they 
tended to overreach themselves. As a consequence, 
Siam found herself in the unfortunate position of a 
weak buffer state between two powerful imperialistic 
nations — her only safety in the equal balance of their 
jealous rivalry. France had signed a treaty of de- 
limitation of frontiers with Siam, October 3, 1893, 
which it had been hoped would put an end to disputes 
between the two countries. Instead, by the main- 
tenance of a neutral zone twenty-five kilometers wide 
on the right bank of the Mekong Eiver, which became 
a rendezvous for bandits, and by holding possession 
of Chantabun, in the heart of Siamese territory as a 
g-uarantee, the hostility of the Siamese against the 
French was increased rather than diminished. The 
French soon found themselves completely eliminated 
from participation with other nations in the political, 
economic, or administrative life of the little kingdom. 

62 Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 66ii, p. 1898. 



72 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

An arrangement had been concluded in 1896 with Great 
Britain, in which a satisfactory delimitation of terri- 
tories and of spheres of influence between France and 
Great Britain had been established. It remained to 
make a satisfactory settlement with Siam. Immedi- 
ately upon coming into office M. Delcasse had taken the 
matter up, and in April, 1899, M. Doumer, Governor 
General of French Indo-China, after visiting the King 
of Siam at Bangkok, was enabled to make an arrange- 
ment satisfactory to both parties. The agreement 
settled the four outstanding questions of dispute : 

1. In regard to French proteges Siam was to recog- 
nize those at present enrolled, also the Annamites, 
Laotians and Cambodians to the second generation, 
and Chinese if they wished. 

2. The twenty-five kilometer zone on the right bank 
of the Mekong was to be considered under the civil 
administration of Siam, but not under its military con- 
trol. 

3. Siam to cede to France the provinces on the right 
boundary of the realm Luang-Prabang. 

4. France to withdraw her garrison from Chanta- 
bun.^* 

Hardly had M. Doumer left Bangkok before the King 
repudiated the whole arrangment, and when after a 
series of unsuccessful negotiations it was evident that 
no satisfactory arrangement could be arrived at, M. 
Delcasse broke off the pour parlers. Nothing further 
was attempted during the Boxer Rebellion, but in July, 
1901, M. Delcasse despatched a new envoy, M. Klobu- 
kowski, to see if a new basis of settlement might be 

63 Doc. Kp., "Affaires de Siam," 1893-1902, No. 37 annexe. 



DIPLOMACY IN THE OEIENT 73 

reached. After another year of intermittent negotia- 
tions a new treaty was signed October 7, 1902. This 
treaty gave France fishing rights on the Great Lake, 
two provinces formerly belonging to Cambodia, 
namely Meluprey and Bassac, and a small piece of 
land north of Great Lake; in return France gave up 
Chantabun, took away the twenty-five kilometer zone 
of neutrality, and cut down considerably on the num- 
ber of her proteges.®* In explaining the treaty before 
the Chamber M. Delcasse declared that in signing the 
accord the government had been guided by two 
thoughts : first, to bring about more friendly relations 
with the Siamese; secondly, to obtain new elements 
of strength and new guarantees for the safety of Indo- 
China. No friendly relations would ever be possible 
so long as the French remained at Chantabun — this 
occupation the Siamese considered as a humiliation 
and a menace. Nor could the French demand that the 
zone of twenty-five kilometers, where the troops of 
neither might penetrate, should be left as the abode 
of brigands and malefactors of all sorts. The conces- 
sions made secured the safety of Cambodia and gave 
important new fishing rights on Great Lake. Already 
to show its friendly intentions, the Siamese govern- 
ment had promised to install a department of sanita- 
tion under French engineers, a bacteriological institu- 
tion under French physicians, and to allow teaching of 
French in their schools and colleges.®^ 

Unfortunately for the success of the treaty, **M. Del- 
casse was about the only one who found the diplomatic 

64 Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 79 annexe. 

65 Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 63, p. 1228. 



74 FRENCH FOEEIGN POLICY 

instrument which had come from his hands satisfac- 
tory."^^ The colonial group of the Senate rose in 
arms against it, its organ ''Questions Diplomatiques 
et Coloniales" conducted what it called an impartial 
inquest on the subject but in which most of the opinions 
expressed were exceedingly hostile.®^ M. Rene Millet, 
a brilliant and authoritative critic of foreign affairs, 
called M. Delcasse's policy *'une politique d' aban- 
don." ^^ 

Realizing the futility of trying to carry through the 
treaty opposed so strenuously by public opinion, M. 
Delcasse let the matter drop until 1904, when on Febru- 
ary 13, a new convention was announced. It main- 
tained those advantages gained by the other, namely 
the cession of Bassac and Meluprey, and also reestab- 
lished the rights of France over that part of the realm 
of Luang-Prabang situated on the right bank of the 
Mekong. It also accorded to France the maritime dis- 
trict of Korat, made her participant in the large public 
works, and reestablished to a great extent her power 
of exterritoriality over former inhabitants of Annam 
and Laos now established in Siam. In return France 
gave up the twenty-five kilometer zone on the west bank 
of the Mekong and withdrew from Chantabun. Appar- 
ently this treaty was more satisfactory, or at least it 
was good in comparison with the other, and when it 
came up for vote November 12, it passed without fur- 
ther discussion.®^ , 

66 "Histoire des Relations de la France et du Siam." Thfese par 
Gabriel Mauriel, p. 41. 

67 Ques. Dip. et Col., Dec. 1, 1902. 

68 Ren6 Millet, "L' Affaire du Siam," Rev. Pol. et Pari., Dec. 1902. 

69 Text may be found in Ques. Dip. et Col., Feb. 16, 1904. For further 



DIPLOMACY IN THE ORIENT 75 

When the mixed commission of delimitation made its 
report regarding the boundaries established by this 
treaty it was found that France had obtained a narrow 
stretch of territory, that of Dan-Sai, of little use to her 
but *'a thorn in the side of Siam." Also with Siam's 
rapid progress in adapting herself to western civiliza- 
tion the extraterritoriality rights of the nations became 
more and more irksome. So it was that on March 23, 
1907, the French government and the King of Siam 
** desirous of assuring the final regulation of all ques- 
tions relative to the common frontiers of Indo-China 
and Siam . . . and desirous of facilitating the rela- 
tions between the two countries . . . have decided to 
conclude a new treaty." In the articles of the treaty 
which followed Siam ceded to France or to the French 
protectorate of Cambodia, the three provinces of Bat- 
tambong, Siem-rap and Sisophon, in return for which 
France retroceded to Siam the territories of Dan-sai 
and of Korat. Furthermore France modified con- 
siderably the extraterritorial rights which she formerly 
enjoyed in return for which Siam guaranteed that 
French Asiatic subjects and proteges should enjoy the 
same rights in the kingdom as her own nationals.'^** 

This treaty, although France received appreciable 
advantage, was drawn upon a basis of more generous 
compromise, and has proved more satisfactory to all 
concerned. It enabled the rich little kingdom in the 
basin of the Menam, with its American general adviser, 

discussion see Francis Mury, "Nouvelle Traite avec le Siam," ibid., 1 
Apr., 1904; "Nouvelle Convention franco-siamois," Rev. Pol. et Pari., 
March, 1904; also Gabriel Maurel, op. cit., supra. 

70 An analysis of the terms of this treaty may be found in Ques. 
Dip. et Col., Apr. 16, 1907; an excellent discussion of its terms by 
Robert de Caix, ibid., May 16, 1907. 



76 FRENCH FOEEIGN POLICY 

its British departmental directors, its French and Eng- 
lish judicial advisers, its German railway managers, its 
French and Italian engineers, its Danish naval officers, 
all under a Siamese minister to pursue its cosmopolitan 
existence in peace. 



CHAPTER IV 

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ITALY AND 
THE POPE 

1. THE FRANCO-ITALIAN BAPPBOCHEMENT 

WHEN a great nation risks a war with another 
great nation, to bring to fruition the dreams of 
freedom of an ardently patriotic but weak and op- 
pressed neighbor, such action will surely be attributed 
to selfish motives. Acts inspired by such sentiments 
as ''greater love hath no man ..." are not the ordi- 
nary basis of international relations. Consequently 
it is safe to say that Napoleon III had a selfish motive 
in aiding Cavour. His throne needed the luster which 
a popular and successful war would bring, and Savoy 
and Nice were pearls worthy of any crown. Further- 
more the sacrifice of the young and beautiful Princess 
Clotilde to the jaded appetite of Prince Napoleon gave 
evidence enough that he was not wholly a knight-errant 
in his motives. But whatever ulterior purposes Na- 
poleon may have had, Villa franca assured the unity of 
Italy, and Magenta and Solf erina sealed it with French 
blood. ^ Yet from that time, France found to her sor- 
row that she had aided in the birth of a new enemy. 

1 Cavour himself confessed that the political and military campaign 
following Villa franca was more advantageous to Italy than that pre- 
ceding it — "how many times in the solitude of Leri did I cry out, 
'Blessed be the peace of Villa franca!'" Quoted by Charles de Saint- 
Cyr, "Pourquoi I'ltalie est notre alli§e ?" p. 204. 

77 



78 FEENCH FOEEIGN POLICY 

; Thiers' declaration, *'the gratitude of Italy will endure 
in proportion to its feebleness" did not become famous 
without grounds. Nor was Bismarck wrong when he 
declared that the Mediterranean could not be divided 
between kindred nations ; especially so long as he was 
there and ready to play upon the strings of their mutual 
jealousy. Even after Bismarck had fallen, Crispi re- 
mained; ''he had listened too long to the Mephistoph- 
eles of Berlin" ^ to change the direction of his course 
even if he wished. "When he came to realize that Italy 
was merely a lever for Germany and Austria to obtain 
advantages for themselves, it was too late. We have 
clear evidences of his disillusionment just before his 
downfall in March, 1896. We find this note in his 
diary upon occasion of a visit from Von Biilow: 
" ... he declared that Germany would always be on 
our side. I expressed some doubt of this. I said that 
I had indeed perceived the advantages of the alliance 
in Bismarck's day, but not afterwards with his suc- 
cessors."^ A little later, in a note to Germany, he 
declared: "... The Italian people are not yet dis- 
illusioned with regard to the alliance with Germany, 
but who can guarantee that they may not be so to- 
morrow, if things continue as they are. ' ' * His words 
were prophetic. The disaster of Adowa dragged him 
down in its wake and a new era in Franco-Italian rela- 
tions began. 

Before the year was over the new foreign minister, 
the Marquis Visconti-Venosta, signed two conventions 
with France which did away with the regime of capitu- 

2 Jacques Bainville, "Italy and the War," p. 163. 
8 "Memoirs of Francesco Crispi," Vol. Ill, p. 335. 
4 Ibid., p. 347. 



ITALY AND THE POPE 79 

lations in Tunis by which France had bound herself in 
the Treaty of Kassar-Said,^ and also a Maritime Con- 
vention for the one which had expired in 1886. How- 
ever, in order to bring the nations back into satisfactory 
commercial relations, it was essential to obtain a new 
treaty of commerce for the one which Crispi had so 
rashly allowed to lapse. France was willing to receive 
her wayward sister back into the commercial fold, and 
the treaty drawn up by MM. Hanotaux and Billot, was 
signed by MM. Delcasse and Barrere February 2, 
1899. ** Italy could breathe again; the cord which was 
choking and threatening to strangle her, was loosed." ^ 
A wedge had been driven into the Triple Entente, 
and M. Delcasse was determined that the fissure should 
be widened. The rapprochement begun on a com- 
mercial basis, must be carried on to a political basis. 
What were the differences still outstanding? The 
question of Tunis had been settled by the arrange- 
ment of 1896. There still remained the fear that ever 
haunted the Italians that France might attempt to 
restore the Pope; also the question of Tripoli, which 
had now taken the place of Tunis as a field for Italian 
expansion. The attitude of the Waldeck-Eousseau 
ministry towards the Church, as evidenced by the Law 
of Associations introduced in 1899, was most reassur- 
ing to the Quirinal ; we shall show later how the Combes 
ministry laid the ghost forever. Let us first consider 
the question of Tripoli. 

5 Rene Pinon, "L'Empire de la Mediterrange," p. 39 ; see also A. 
Billot, "La France et I'ltalie," Vol. II, p. 372. 

6 Ren6 Pinon, op. cit., p. 40; the letters exchanged by M. Delcass6 
and Count Tornielli and the terms of the arrangement in full may be 
found in Archives Diplomatiques, Vol. 68, p. 333. 



80 FEENCH FOEEIGN POLICY 

Once more we are brought back to the relations be- 
tween the two powers and Great Britain. Although 
since 1882 Italy had been a member in good standing 
of the Triple Alliance, she was none the less closely 
bound by ties of friendship to Great Britain. In fact, 
in her struggle to uphold her interests in the Mediter- 
ranean, Italy found her friendship with Great Britain 
far more useful than her alliance with Germany and 
Austria. In 1887, the Marquis de Eudini, Italian Min- 
ister of Foreign Affairs, had said : 

"... Italy tenaciously wishes for the maintenance 
of the balance of power in Europe, and the preserva- 
tion of the status quo in the Mediterranean espe- 
cially. . . . 

''An exchange of opinions took place only a few 
years ago with England, followed by declarations on 
the part of Sir James Fergusson in the English parlia- 
ment; his language was strictly conformable to the 
facts of the case. Both Italy and England purpose to 
maintain peace while preserving the status quo. I may 
say, moreover, that I perceive no questions, respecting 
which, the views of Italy are not in accordance with 
those of England, seeing that their interests are iden- 
tical."^ 

In his speech at Guild Hall Lord Salisbury, Novem- 
ber 9, 1887, was more non-committal but declared that 
the speech of the minister of Italy — a state with which 
England's sympathies were deeply bound up — indi- 
cated that its aims were identical with those of Eng- 
land, and its hopes to have England's sympathies on 
its side were not groundless. The unsatisfactory part 

7 Quoted from Tardieu, "France and the Alliances," p. 92. 



ITALY AND THE POPE 81 

of the reply for Italy came in the fact that Lord Salis- 
bury associated Austria's name with Italy's — attribut- 
ing to both the same ideals of peace.^ 

With Italy thus closely joined to Great Britain in 
ties of friendship, it is not surprising that the Treaty 
of March 21, 1899, between France and Great Britain, 
establishing a delimitation of their boundaries in Cen- 
tral Africa aroused both interest and fear in Italy. A 
mere glance at the map will show that by this arrange- 
ment the greater part of the hinterland of Tripoli thus 
came under French influence, the only other outlet 
being through the Libyan Desert, which was under 
British influence. The danger to Tripoli in the rapid 
expansion of French influence in this hinterland is 
clearly pointed out in a memorandum sent to Crispi by 
the Colonial Department in 1894: *' ... As Tripoli's 
prosperity depends entirely upon trade, deprived of 
her caravan ways which lead into Sokoto, Bomu, 
Baghirmi, and Wadai, Tripoli might well be compared 

8 A complete report of the speech may be found in London Times, 
Nov. 10, 1887. In his book, "From Triple to Quadruple Entente" 
(London, 1915), Dr. E. J. Dillon says that Lord Salisbury in this 
speech "told his hearers that the traditional fraternity between England 
and Italy was about to assume more concrete forms and that England 
would see that the status quo in the Mediterranean was not upset to 
the prejudice of the Italian nation," but this is contradicted by the 
report appearing in the Times. In fact as late as 1896 Italy called her 
relations with England "her alliance of friendship," and Lord Lans- 
downe, speaking in the House of Lords, July 18, 1902, declared that 
there never had been an Anglo-Italian alliance. However when early 
in 1920 the secret treaties of Austria-Hungary were published, it was 
found that Great Britain had made secret agreements with both Italy 
and Austria in regard to the maintenance of the status quo in the 
Mediterranean, Adriatic, Aegean and Black Sea. The first Mediter- 
ranean Agreement was signed February 12, 1887, and the second, De- 
cember 12 of the same year. For the text of these agreements seo 
Pribram, "The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary," pp. 96 and 128. 



82 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

to an empty jewel-case. ' ' ^ Italy's only hope, now that 
she could no longer count on English support against 
the French — her own allies being quite uninterested in 
her Mediterranean aspirations — lay in making some 
sort of an agreement with France. 

It is to the credit of M. Delcasse that he did not try 
to make Italy pay for the French set-back in the Sudan. 
He was playing for larger stakes than one or two extra 
oases in the Sahara Desert. Like Bismarck, after 
Sadowa, he realized that sometimes it pays to make a 
generous bargain. He had most excellent instruments 
at his hand to accomplish his task. M. Barrere, the 
French ambassador, a most energetic and able man, 
was eager to carry out his chief's wishes, and his work 
was rendered easier by his popularity in Rome. 
Among the Italians both the Marquis de Rudini and 
the Marquis Visconti-Venosta were equally anxious to 
make '^lafraternite latine" more than an empty phrase. 
Finally the new king, Victor Emmanuel III, who in 
1896, had made a love-match with Princess Helen of 
Montenegro, thus drawing more closely to Russia, now 
cast his influence on the side of France, and ^'les 
miasmes deposes par Crispi au fond vaseux du tonneau 
triplicien se sont evanouis sous le clair et loyal regard 
du souverain." ^^ 

The first tangible results were seen early in 1900. 
On January 24, a protocol was signed at Rome by MM. 
Visconti-Venosta and Barrere fixing delimitations of 
the French and Italian possessions on the Red Sea and 
the Gulf of Aden.^^ This was completed by another 

9 "Memoirs of Francesco Crispi," III, 70. 

10 Charles de Saint Cyr, op. cit., supra, p. 203. 

11 Archives Diplomatiques, Vol. 76, p. 44. 



ITALY AND THE POPE 83 

protocol signed July 10, 1901, in which the special com- 
mission provided for in the former arrangement gave 
a definite delimitation to the frontiers.^^ There still 
remained the more important question of Tripoli. As 
an evidence of increasing friendliness between the two 
countries, on April 10, 1901, an Italian squadron under 
the command of the king's uncle, anchored in the port 
of Toulon as a mark of respect to President Loubet, 
who was en voyage accompanied by the French fleet. 
The telegrams and toasts exchanged were more than 
cordial. In the course of the year confidential notes 
were exchanged between the two powers and on De- 
cember 14, M. Prinetti, the Italian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, speaking in the Chamber, referred to "the 
mutual confidence which had become the rule in the 
relations between the two countries." Continuing, he 
declared that : 

* * . . . This confidence is so much the better founded 
on our part since already some time ago, the govern- 
ment of the Republic has taken care to inform us that 
the Franco-English Convention of March 21, 1899, 
marked for France in regard to the countries and 
regions touching on the eastern frontier of her African 
possessions, notably the vilayet of Tripoli, a limit that 
she had no intention of passing, adding that neither 
did she have any intention of cutting the caravan 
routes from Tripoli to Central Africa. 

''Since then the friendly relations of the two coun- 
tries have become such that they have permitted the 
two governments to exchange explanations both clear 

12 Ibid., Vol. 84, p. 42. The text of both of these protocols may also 
found in British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. 94, pp. 588-589. 



84 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

and satisfactory upon their interests in the Mediter- 
ranean, and these explanations have led them to state 
the perfect agreement of their views upon that which 
is of a nature to interest their respective situations." ^^ 
This speech indicated that an understanding had 
been reached and pointed out clearly enough the ad- 
vantages to Italy. What M. Prinetti omitted to indi- 
cate was what France should receive in return. The 
French were just as anxious to know this as were the 
Italians; and M. Delcasse did not keep them long in 
suspense. On January 3, 1902, ''le Giornale d 'Italia" 
published a lengthy interview of its Paris correspond- 
ent, M. Ugo Ojetti, with M. Delcasse. The French 
Foreign Minister informed him that the idea of such 
an accord had come to him in 1898 — three months be- 
fore becoming minister — upon the occasion of a visit 
to Rome. Meeting a number of eminent Italian states- 
men, among others the Marquis di Rudini and the Mar- 
quis Visconti-Venosta, he pointed out to them that of 
all the nations of Europe France and Italy had the 
fewest real causes of conflict. He then went on to 
show how the agreement with England had made an 
arrangement with Italy possible. But as every accord 
in politics is a bilateral contract, a do ut des arrange- 

13 Text of this speech in full may be found in Ques. Dip. et Col., 
Jan. 15, 1902. On January 1, 1902, M. Barrere, the French ambassador, 
alluding to this speech, said: "... It indicates with an eloquent pre- 
cision that the era of Franco-Italian misunderstandings upon a ground 
where their vital interests are at stake belongs henceforth to the past, 
and there now exists between the two governments a perfect concord- 
ance of views. There is no longer between France and Italy a Mediter- 
ranean question; and that is the surest guarantee that the future re- 
serves to the two great Latin nations a long and fecund period of 
fraternal friendship and peace." Ibid.; also to be found in Eev. Pol, 
et. Pari. Feb., 1902. 



ITALY AND THE POPE 85 

ment, and since Italy's interests were in the east and 
those of France in the west, the balance upon the whole 
northern coast of the Mediterranean was easy to strike. 
In reply to a query of the correspondent if he meant 
Morocco, he replied, *' Precisely, including Morocco." ^* 

In order that all doubts as to a rapprochement might 
be set at rest M. Delcasse followed this up by a state- 
ment in the Chamber (January 21, 1902). He declared 
that political relations had become so friendly that 
''they have permitted the two countries to exchange 
directly to their equal satisfaction complete expla- 
nations regarding all their interests in the Mediter- 
ranean. . . ."^^ In a subsequent statement to the 
Senate (March 20, 1902), he pointed out that ''France 
and Italy realize how much they have gained in security 
and in liberty of moving, each in the sphere which is 
proper to it, and everything strengthens them in this 
precious conviction, that to assure to their new rela- 
tions a long and fecund future, they have only to per- 
severe in a way whereby their general policy will be 
put more and more in harmony with the spirit which 
has presided at their rapprochement." ^^ 

The arrangement did not wholly escape criticism in 
France, even though it was everywhere realized that 
two very satisfactory results had been accomplished — 
the Triple Alliance had been weakened, and the ap- 
proach to Great Britain had been made easier. The 

14 Ques. Dip. et Col., Jan. 15, 1902. 

isAnnales de la Chambre, Vol. 66i, p. 130. 

10 Annales du S6nat, Vol. 61, p. 605. M. Barrere speaking at Rome 
on Jan. 1, 1920, declared that the Franco-Italian agreement of 1902 
established, that in case of an aggressive war either country would 
maintain strict neutrality, even in case one of them was obliged to 
declare war to defend her honor and safety. N, Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1920. 



86 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

colonial party were by no means willing to consider 
Tripoli forever alienated from their sphere of influ- 
ence. They refused to subscribe to M. Decrais' state- 
ment: **Our colonial empire is completely consti- 
tuted."^'^ M. Etienne, one of the leaders of the co- 
lonial group, wanted to know what Italy could give in 
Morocco corresponding to the renunciation which 
France was making in regard to Tripoli.^^ M. Rene 
Pinon, who is usually very sound and clear-sighted in 
his judgment, asked if France was not walking ''like 
the astrologist of the fable, her eyes fixed upon her 
ideal of justice and peace while her rivals were dig- 
ging before her steps the well in which she was to 
fall." Perhaps even M. Delcasse himself ''builded 
wiser than he knew." 

What did Germany think of an arrangement which 
was aptly called "Voraison funehre de la Triple Al- 
liance"? On January 8, 1902, Chancellor von Biilow 
speaking in the Reichstag regretted that a certain part 
of the German press seemed uneasy over the Franco- 
Italian arrangement. "A husband does not take of- 
fense if his wife dances a waltz innocently with an- 
other. The essential thing is that she return to him, 
and she will do it if she is best off with him . . . the 
Franco-Italian arrangements upon certain Mediter- 
ranean questions are in no way opposed to the Triple 

17 On December 11, 1899, M. Decrais, Minister of the Colonies, out- 
lined the future colonial policy of France stating that in his belief 
"to the period of conquest and territorial expansion . . . must succeed 
the still more difficult period of pacification, organization and ex- 
ploitation." Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 59iv, p. 382. 

18 Eug. Etienne, "L'Accord franco-italien et le Maroc," Ques. Dip. 
et Col., Jan. 15, 1902. 



ITALY AND THE POPE 87 

Alliance. ' ' ^° The only fault with the metaphor was 
that Italy was not so sure that she was well off in what 
had only been at best a mariage de convenance. On 
the whole it was rather a dark day for the Chancellor, 
for not only did he have to explain the harmless flirta- 
tion of a member of the Triplice, but he was also forced 
to criticize M. Chamberlain publicly for a lack of diplo- 
matic courtesy.^** The same forces that were drawing 
France towards Italy were apparently drawing Eng- 
land away from Germany. Nor did Great Britain ap- 
pear to regret that the two Latin states were becoming 
more friendly. When Sir Charles Dilke pointed out 
that the Anglo-Italian understanding for the mainte- 
nance of the status quo had been replaced by the 
Franco-Italian understanding,^^ Lord Lansdo^vne re- 
plied: ''We regard it as natural considering her geo- 
graphical position and her commercial requirements 
that she should wish to be on terms of friendship with 
her French neighbor ... we should be the last to com- 
plain if by means of such an arrangement as she has 
arrived at, she has improved and strengthened her in- 
ternational position." 2^ 

However, when in June, 1902, Italy did renew her 
allegiance to the Triple Alliance and the question was 
raised as to the effect of this return ''after the ball was 
over," M. Delcasse was able to state publicly in the 

19 J. Penzler, "Fiirst Billows Reden," I, 241. 

20 Mr. Chamberlain, angered at the German press criticisms of the 
Boer War, had in his speech at Edinburgh, Oct. 25, 1901, invited the 
Germans to recall their own acts when marching on Paris. In reply 
Prince von Bfilow said: "Wlien a minister is obliged to justify his 
policy he would do well not to drag in foreign countries." 

21 Pari. Debates, Vol. 110, p. 703. 

22 Ibid., Vol. Ill, p. 662. 



88 FEENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

Chamber: ''The declarations made by the Italian 
government have permitted us to be certain that Italy's 
policy through its alliances is directed neither directly 
nor indirectly against France, in no way does it 
threaten us either in diplomatic form or by interna- 
tional military protocols and in no fashion can Italy 
become either the instrument or auxiliary of an aggres- 
sion against our country. ' ' ^^ 

If M. Delcasse had been able to read Articles IX and 
X of the Fourth Treaty of the Triple Alliance, which 
Italy signed June 28, 1902, he would not have been so 
confident that Italy's policy was not directed against 
France. The Revolution of November, 1918, in Aus- 
tria, which opened up the national archives, has made 
it possible for Professor Pribam of the University of 
Vienna to give to the world the texts of the various 
secret treaties to which Austria-Hungary was a party. 

Article X of the Triple Alliance Treaty of 1902 
states that ''if France should make a move to extend 
her occupation, protectorate, or sovereignty, under any 
form whatsoever, in the North African territories, and 
that in consequence thereof Italy, in order to safeguard 
her position in the Mediterranean, should feel that she 
must herself undertake action in the said North Afri- 
can territories, or even have recourse to extreme meas- 
ures in French territory in Europe, the state of war 
which would thereby ensue between Italy and France 
would constitute ipso facto, on the demand of Italy, 
and at the common charge of Germany and Italy the 
casus foederis ..." The protocol attached to this 
treaty declares that the signatory powers would exert 

23 Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 67, p. 455. 



ITALY AND THE POPE 89 

themselves to obtain the accession of England to 
the program established by Articles IX and X. 
If any further proof were needed of the remarkable 
diplomatic insight of M. Delcasse, this evidence of 
Italy's real attitude gives it. If England could be 
drawn into the Triple Alliance, Italy's agreement with 
France would have been another ''scrap of paper." 
But if France could bring England to her support, 
Italy would find it contrary to her interests to oppose 
France, and it would then become necessary to find 
means of releasing herself from the inconvenient bonds 
of the Triple Alliance. "Whether M. Delcasse sus- 
pected Italy or not, if the secret treaties of the Triple 
Alliance were before his eyes, he could not have acted 
more wisely to safeguard the interests of France than 
by pushing forward rapidly his plan to bring about a 
rapprochement with England. 

2. FRENCH RELATIONS WITH THE VATICAN 

At last the two Latin nations had settled their co- 
lonial ditferences, and had come to a definite agree- 
ment in regard to their general foreign policy. There 
remained the more delicate question of the Third Ee- 
public's relations to the Vatican. As the ''eldest 
daughter of the Church," as the avowed protector of 
Catholics in the Orient, how could France consistently 
enter into cordial relations with the government of 
Italy, still regarded by the Vatican as the despoiler 
of the papacy? To answer this question intelligently 
we must consider the internal politics of this period. 

Ever since the Third Republic was established, the 
Eepublicans, especially those with radical tendencies, 



90 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

believed that the Concordat had served its purpose.'^* 
The clarion call of Gambetta, ^'le clericalism, voild 
I'etinemi/' rang ever in their ears, and the Boulanger 
Affair only brought matters to a head. The life of 
the Republic itself was being threatened by a small 
group of Royalists aided by a larger group of Clericals. 
After the utter collapse of the Boulanger movement, 
and the impeachment of its leader, Leo XIII, ^'le 
Fahius Cunctator de la nouvelle Rome assiegee," as M. 
Hanotaux aptly designated him, diplomatically decided 
to accept the Third Republic as really established. His 
famous encyclical letter of 1892 called the attention of 
his adherents to this fact. From then on till the Drey- 
fus Affair, there was a lull in the attempts to under- 
mine the Republic, but before this long and bitter 
struggle was ended, it was realized that the snake had 
only been scotched; now it must be killed. The Wal- 
deck-Rousseau ministry bad saved the state; it re- 
mained to safeguard it for the future. The Associa- 
tions Bill of 1899, aimed especially at the Jesuits and 
Assumptionists, as finally promulgated in July, 1901, 
allowed no religious association to be formed without 
express authorization of the government, and also 
made it possible to dissolve a religious order by min- 
isterial degree. In the hands of a broad-minded states- 
man like M. Waldeck-Rousseau, it safeguarded the 
state ; in the hands of his successor, M. Combes, a vin- 
dictive anti-clerical, it meant destruction to the re- 
ligious orders. The Pope protested against its pro- 
mulgation as an unjust law of reprisals in opposition 

24 It has been said that Napoleon at St. Helena regarded the Con- 
cordat as the greatest mistake of his life. 



ITALY AND THE POPE 91 

to the principles of natural law, and pregnant with de- 
plorable consequences, but the anti-clericals would not 
be called off.^^ 

Nevertheless while the government was stamping 
out clericalism at home, it did not forget that Gambetta, 
who saw the enemy in clericalism, had also maintained 
that clericalism was not an object of exportation. So 
that although M. Marcel Sembat violently arraigned 
the policy of the government as being absolutely in- 
coherent — atheistic in France and clerical in China — 
it still maintained its policy of protecting Catholic 
missionaries and associations in the Orient.^^ Upon 
another occasion when M. Cassagnac cynically re- 
marked that it was much better to be a Chinese than a 
French Christian, M. Waldeck-Eousseau replied that 
the government's attitude was that if it did not ex- 
tend its protection to religious orders which had gone 
there at its request and relying upon its treaties, it 
would be renouncing its protectorate. The real in- 
terest of France demanded that not one of its hospitals, 
schools, or dispensaries should be abandoned.^'^ 

The question of discontinuing the embassy at the 
Vatican was also raised by the Socialists, on the ground 
that France ought not strengthen the forces of an ad- 
versary which it was combatting. M. Delcasse came 

25 Doc. Dip., "Saint Sikge," (1899-1903), No. 15 Annexe. A very 
excellent discussion of the attitude of the clerical party in France may 
be found in Mr. Fullerton's "Problems of Power," pp. 75-95. 

26 Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 64iii, p. 803. The Pope had already 
made it clear that he would not sustain the historic rights of France 
to the Catholic protectorate of the world the day when these vexatory 
measures should be approved by the government. Doc. Dip., op. cit„ 
No. 3. 

27 Annaleg de la Chambre, Vol, 65iT., p. 461. 



92 FEENOH FOEEIGN POLICY 

out strongly against any such policy. He pointed out 
that even if the Church and State should separate, it 
was necessary to remain in communication with the 
head of the Church. Any other policy might weaken 
the Vatican, but it most certainly would not strengthen 
France.^^ The government seemed determined to con- 
fine its anti-clericalism within the borders of France. 
Perhaps it might have succeeded in doing so indefi- 
nitely, if the far-seeing opportunist, Leo XIII had con- 
tinued to direct the policies of the Holy See. His 
death in July, 1903, after twenty-five years of able 
service in his high office was the death blow to the 
Clerical Party in France.^® His successor. Cardinal 
Sarto, who entered the Vatican in August, taking the 
name of Pius X, was a man of different type. He 
visioned a renaissance of the ultramontane movement, 
and he was supported enthusiastically by his Franco- 
phobe Secretary of State, the Cardinal Merry del Val. 
Opportunity was not lacking to show his intentions. 

Almost simultaneously with the publication of the 
first encyclical of the new Pope, Victor Emmanuel 
III and Queen Helen were setting out for France. 
Their reception was encouraging in the extreme. At 
the reception given in their honor at the Elysee, Presi- 
dent Loubet saw in their visit ''a striking manifesta- 
tion of the close relationship, which answering equally 
to the sentiments and interests of the Italian people 

28 Ibid., Vol. 69i, p. 368. 

29 M. Gabriel Hanotaux thus characterized him the day after his 
death : "He had neither passion, nor stubbornness, nor rancor ; attached 
to principles, he was the slave of no formula, he lent himself to com- 
binations. He saluted nascent Republics, he listened to the complaints 
of uneasy democracies, he held his own with the powerful, but never 
eringed and never despaired." Le Journal, July 21, 1903, 



ITALY AND THE POPE 93 

and the French people, has been established between 
their governments. ^° The king's reply was equally 
cordial: "Rightly does France consider my presence 
in Paris as the natural result of the work of the rap- 
prochement happily accomplished between our two 
countries. . . ." ^^ The Czar also in a personal letter 
to President Loubet complimented him upon the 
friendly relations which France had established with 
Italy and Great Britain, and saw in it a new guarantee 
for the maintenance of the world's peace.^^ Only the 
adherents of the Royalist and Clerical factions were 
pessimistic. Count de Castellane writing in the 
''Gaulois" asked whether "nos vivats salueront-ils 
d'avance en Victor-Emmanuel HI I'heritier de la 
grandeur francaise en Orient.'^ ^^ But France had no 
intention of turning back, and in the same month M. 
Briand introduced his bill for the separation of the 
Church and State. 

It was well understood that diplomatic usage de- 
manded that President Loubet should return Victor 
Emmanuel's visit. It was equally understood that 
"an inflexible protocol has regulated once for all ques- 
tions of this sort and has closed the entrance of the 
Vatican to every head of a Catholic state who comes 
to salute the representative of the dynasty, despoiler 
of the papacy. " ^* As the Count de Castellane pointed 
out, not even his Apostolic Majesty, the Emperor of 

80 Ques. Dip. et Col., Oct. 15, 1903. 

31 Ibid. 

82 Rev. Pol. et Pari., Nov. 1903. 

38 Le Gaulois, Oct. 11, 1903. 

34 From the speech of Count Boni de Castellane explaining his reasons 
for refusing to vote the funds necessary for the return visit of President 
Loubet. Ajmales de la Chambre, Vol. 72ii, p. 1179. 



94 ' FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

Austria, although bound in the ties of a close alliance, 
had ever been able to visit his ally, the King of Italy, 
at Rome. Therefore, even if President Loubet had 
any intention of visiting the Vatican as well as the 
Quirinal, he would not have been received, and the 
debate on the subject showed clearly enough that the 
French Government had no intention of attempting 
to conciliate the Pope. The fact that the credits for 
the visit were voted 502 to 12, indicated the over- 
whelming sentiment of the Chamber. 

As soon as the idea of a return visit was mentioned 
in the press, the nuncio at Paris protested on behalf 
of the pope, but M. Delcasse refused even to discuss 
the question, on the ground that any such doctrine was 
manifestly contrary to the inalienable independence 
of French policy.^^ On the 23d of April, President 
Loubet, accompanied by M. Delcasse, set out for Rome ; 
and for the first time since the end of the fifteenth cen- 
tury the head of the French government entered the 
Holy City as a friend. The cardinal fact in the eyes 
of the Italians was that the President of France had 
visited the Quirinal without making any attempt to 
see the Pope. His reception became an ovation. 
"The two sisters have ceased pouting" said the editor 
of the 'Messagero.' " "The general enthusiasm 
marking the festivities at Rome and Naples, and the 
manifestations of all Italy in honor of the French Re- 
public, and the great reconciliation, seemed like a fault 
repaired, like the joy of seeing the dawn after the night- 
mare of a long night," wrote a French eye witness.^® 

35 Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 73i, p. 103. 

38Gustave Rivet, 'TLa France et I'ltalie," Rer. Pol. et Pari., June, 
1&04. 



ITALY AND THE POPE 95 

The Pope could no longer repress his indignation. 
On April 28, while the President was still on Italian 
soil, a note was sent to the French ambassador ac- 
credited to the Vatican, protesting formally and ex- 
plicitly against the visit, and pointing out that the of- 
fense was the greater in that the President of France 
was the head of a great Catholic nation towards which 
the Holy See had always shown the greatest considera- 
tion. At the same time a note was despatched to the 
other Catholic powers couched in the same language, 
but including in addition a sentence which did not ap- 
pear in the communication to France. The sentence, 
which was nothing less than a threat, stated that if in 
spite of the act of France, the apostolic nuncio was al- 
lowed to remain in Paris, it was due to very grave mo- 
tives of a special nature. M. Delcasse who had con- 
stantly endeavored to prevent a complete rupture, 
even in the teeth of strong Eadical opposition, did not 
publish the note, but contented himself with a reply 
in which *'he repulsed both the considerations devel- 
oped and the form under which they were pre- 
sented."^^ 

The incident might have been considered closed had 
not M. Jaures published in his paper, *'L'Humanite," 
May 17, the version which had been received by the 
other governments. When the French government 
compared its copy with this new version, and noted 
the difference in text, explanations were immediately 
demanded of the Vatican; and when the Secretary of 

37 A brief but comprehensive statement of the whole affair is found 
in the speech by M. Delcass6 in the Chamber, May 27, 1904, in which 
he replies to several interpellations, Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 73i, 
p. 103. 



96 FRENCH FOEEIGN POLICY 

State to the Pope attempted to escape replying, by 
demanding the question in writing, M. Delcasse or- 
dered the French ambassador to return to Paris. The 
Pope had thrown down the gage of battle to the death, 
and France had picked it up without hesitation. 
Separation, which Thiers had declared would be a 
"saut dans les tenebres/' was at hand. The Con- 
cordat after a century's service was doomed. M. 
Combes did not intend that there should be any linger- 
ing doubts, for after the explanation of M. Delcasse, 
the President du Conseil declared : 

"... the immediate recall of our ambassador . . . 
indicates that we have been unwilling to tolerate the 
interference of the Pontifical Court in our international 
relations, also that we wished to finish once for all 
with the outworn fiction of a temporal power which 
has disappeared more than thirty years ago.'^*^ 

Two months later the last attache remaining at the 
Vatican was withdrawn and diplomatic relations were 
officially severed. The Clerical party made one final 
effort to stem the tide by attempting to play upon the 
fears of the Colonial party. Again they used as a 
stalking-horse the argument that France was bound 
to lose her protectorate over the Catholics in the 
Orient.^^ It was a vain hope. M. Combes found this 
protectorate as embarrassing as it was glorious, and 
in a much commented upon interview given to the 
Parisian correspondent of the Neue Freie Presse of 
Vienna, he declared that France drew so little advan- 

38 Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 73i, p. 109. 

39 The speech of the Count de Castellane in the Chamber, Oct. 21, 
1904, upon the religious protectorates is an example. Annales de la 
Chambre, Vol. 74i, p. 55. 



ITALY AND THE POPE 97 

ta^e from it that he advised Austria not to allow her- 
self to be drawn into the same adventure.*" To con- 
tinue the story would lead us far afield. The belief 
had become fixed that "religions organized in the 
service of the state was an idea of the past. ' ' *^ But 
even if a slight loss of French prestige should ensue 
in the Orient, was it not more than counterbalanced 
by the firm foundations of friendship laid on the shores 
of the Mediterranean? The Humpty-Dumpty policy 
of Napoleon III, and the chari-vari policy of Signor 
Crispi were both cast into the discard. Republican 
France was rapidly mending her diplomatic fences 

with no Bismarck on the ground to interfere with the 
work.*2 

40 Quest. Dip. et Col., Sept. 1, 1904. 

41 M. Paul Deschanel speaking in the Chamber, Oct. 21, 1904, gave 
a dispassionate and unbiased presentation of the subject as viewed by 
the majority. Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 74i, p. 65. 

42 An amusing incident is told by "L'Agence Information" in regard 
to the Kaiser's method of showing his displeasure at the reception 
given by Victor Emmanuel III to President Loubet. The Franco- 
Italian League had planned to present a statue of Victor Hugo to the 
city of Rome in connection with the visit of President Loubet, and the 
King and Queen of Italy were to be present at the ceremony. When 
the Kaiser learned of the plan he informed the Italian government 
through his ambassador, that the statue of Goethe which he had pre- 
sented to Rome three years before had not yet been unveiled. Under 
these circumstances he was much surprised that his ally, the King of 
Italy, should assist oflficially at the unveiling of the statue of Victor 
Hugo. M. Giolitti informed the King that under the circumstances he 
had best not participate. As a result the ceremony took place with 
only President Loubet present at the Villa Medicis. 



CHAPTER V. 
THE ENTENTE CORDIALE 

1. FRANCE AND THE BAGDAD RAILWAY 

THE rapprochement with Italy was a very impor- 
tant link in the chain of friendships that M. Del- 
casse was forging to strengthen France against the 
ever-increasing might of the Teuton, but it was of 
secondary importance as compared with a rapproche- 
ment with Great Britain. So long as Italy remained 
a member of the Triple Alliance, her value as a friend 
must be of a negative sort. The Triplice, it is true, 
was rendered less dangerous as an instrument of ag- 
gression, but in a time of emergency, France still had 
only Russia to depend upon, and Russia's interests 
were in the East. Great Britain had renounced her 
policy of isolation when she allied herself with Japan. 
If she was willing to join in an alliance with a nation 
at the other side of the globe, whose racial character- 
istics, government, and aspirations were wholly at 
variance with her own, just because she feared that 
Russia was becoming too dangerous as a rival in the 
Far East, could she not see the advanage of joining 
with a nation at her very doorstep, whose interests 
were identical with hers, if she once realized that Ger- 
many had already become a most dangerous rival in 
all the seaports of the world? Colonial aspirations 
and ventures had ever been the bone of contention be- 
tween France and England, but now France considered 

98 



THE ENTENTE CORDIALE 99 

her colonial empire as established, while Germany was 
still seeking a place in the sun. In commerce, France 
and England had become natural allies, while Ger- 
many had become England's most bitter rival. France 
had long since given up any thoughts of challenging 
Britain's naval supremacy; the Kaiser had declared 
Germany's future was on the water. That England 
needed France just as badly as France needed Eng- 
land was almost self-evident; the only question was 
whether the advantages to be gained were sufficient 
to bring about a settlement of the outstanding differ- 
ences. 

Although France considered her colonial empire 
practically established, its exact boundaries, and the 
delimitations of spheres of influence were in many 
places exceedingly vague. This was especially true 
in the various regions where it came in contact with 
the British Empire. Fashoda bad shown that a settle- 
ment could be reached even under the most difficult 
conditions, but no government in France could live 
through a second Fashoda. In fact any arrangement 
of the future must be of such a sort that it would en- 
tirely blot out the humiliation of 1898 — it must be a 
quid pro quo arrangement in which each side would 
make concessions of approximately equal value, so 
that when a basis should be finally reached, it would 
stand firmly upon the foundations of a fair and just 
compromise. Was it possible to make any such ar- 
rangement between two nations who found their fields 
of conflict in almost every part of the world, from New- 
foundland to Morocco, from Siam to Madagascar, from 
Egypt to the New Hebrides? 



100 FEENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

In order to answer this question it is not necessary 
to consider the individual difficulties in each one of 
these places. As far back as 1891 M. Delcasse had 
with rare intuition found the real secret of a success- 
ful foreign and colonial policy, and this was his 
formula: "It is in Europe that you will most surely 
defend your colonies." ^ So that in order to estimate 
the possibilities of a rapprochement it is necessary to 
note the changes which had taken place in Europe since 
1900, when we left France still nursing her resentment 
at her policy of abasement, and Great Britain suspi- 
ciously watching her, mistrustful of every move. 

The gradually growing hostility between Germany 
and Great Britain, as evidenced by the differences in 
the interpretation of the Anglo-German Accord of 
1900 in regard to Manchuria, by the violence of Mr. 
Chamberlain's Edinburgh speech of October 25, 1901, 
and Herr von BiiloW's sarcastic reply in the Eeichs- 
tag, have already been shown. The Boer War was 
unpopular throughout Europe, but nowhere had there 
been such outspoken and virulent denunciation of the 
British policy as in the German Press.^ But over- 
shadowing these was the fear that Germany seemed 
about ready to strike another blow at British commer- 
cial supremacy, and in a vital spot — the short route 
to India. 

The Bagdad Eailway scheme, which had been matur- 

1 Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 35i, p. 598. 

2 The Kolnische Zeitung said : "Instead of spending milliards in 
crushing the freedom of the Boer Republics, England should rescue the 
hundreds of thousands of human lives in India . . . but she has money 
only for the war of oppression and not for the relief of himger and 
misery in India — a terrible reproach but unfortunately a true one." 
Quoted London Times, May 14, 1900. 



THE ENTENTE CORDIALE 101 

ing in the Kaiser's brain long before his famous visit 
to Jerusalem in 1898, was with good reason a cause of 
jealousy between the two countries. As far back as 
1835, the English government had undertaken a sur- 
vey of Mesopotamia under Colonel Chesney, who sub- 
sequently suggested a railway through the Euphrates 
Valley to connect the Mediterranean with the Persian 
Gulf. On various other occasions official reports re- 
garding a similar project were submitted by English 
commissioners, but the Suez Canal destroyed their 
interest. However, when in 1888 the Anatolian Rail- 
way Company, a German enterprise, obtained the con- 
cession to build a railway from Haidar-Pasha to An- 
gora, Great Britain again becam,e interested. In 1895 
Major Law was sent to survey the whole railway situa- 
tion in Asia Minor. His report was not flattering to 
British pride. He found that although in the beginning 
the railway enterprise was almost completely in Eng- 
lish hands, only one road remained under their man- 
agement, the Smyma-Aidin line. Although he found 
no immediate prospect of a railway through the Eu- 
phrates Valley, he thought it would be built ultimately, 
and would be the inevitable mail route between the 
Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf.^ Germany's 
policy here as elsewhere was to exceed expectations. 
On November 27, 1899 the Sultan gave to Germany the 
right to extend the railway from Konia to the Persian 
Gulf by way of Bagdad (this was confirmed by an 
irade more specific in its terms dated January 16, 
1902) and Great Britain realized the time for action 
had come. Quietly and unostentatiously, she placed 

3 Pari. Papers, 1896, Vol. 96 (c8019). 



102 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

under her control Koweit, the best port on the Persian 
Gnlf, and practically the only satisfactory terminus 
for the Bagdad Railway. She was then ready to talk 
business with Germany regarding financial coopera- 
tion when the proposition should be made.* 

France was even more interested in the scheme than 
Great Britain. Not only was she expected to con- 
tribute mainly in financing the project, but it crossed 
or connected with several lines already under the con- 
trol of French interests. As Germany realized that 
the whole plan was impossible without French coopera- 
tion, a most attractive proposition was made to the 
French financial interests, with a veiled threat that 
if it were not accepted, both the Smyrna-Cassaba and 
the Mersina-Adana lines would be forced to the wall 
by the stronger German concern. The accord signed 
by the French and German financial interests in Ber- 
lin, May 6, 1899, gave each party equal shares in both 
stock and direction, separated the Bagdad Railway 
Company from the Anatolian Company, and provided 
that France should not oppose any negotiations be- 
tween the Anatolian Company and the Sultan.^ 

All these preliminary plans were made strictly sub 
rosa, and we find scarcely a mention of the project in 
the press of either France or England until late in 
1901. In October the London '^Times'' quoted an in- 
teresting and enlightening statement from the Cologne 
** Gazette," to the effect that both French and German 
capital and engineers were interested in the Bagdad 

* One of the best documented treatises on the Bagdad Railway is "Le 
Chemin de Fer de Bagdad," by Abel Muratet, a thesis presented in 
June, 1914, and published at Aurillac (Imprimerie Moderne). 

• Abel Muratet, op. cit., p. 56. 



THE ENTENTE COEDIALE 103 

Eailway, and that Eussia was to be permitted to take 
some shares. As for Turkey, she would reap the great- 
est benefit, and it was very important that the excel- 
lent harbor of Koweit should not be alienated from her 
immediate sovereignty. In conclusion it was noted 
that English atlases show Koweit to be the property 
of Turkey, so it was hardly likely that the Sultan would 
divest himself of his rights.^ At approximately the 
same time we have a leading French review quoting 
from the same German newspaper as follows : 

'*. . . German and French capitalists and en- 
gineers with the cooperation of Eussians, they say, have 
formed the plan of joining the Persian Gulf with the 
Mediterranean by railway. The Deutsche Bank repre- 
senting French and German groups has obtained the 
concession of the construction. . . . Neither Turkey 
nor the railway enterprise can admit that the terminus 
be anywhere but at Koweit, recognized as Turkish ter- 
ritory. ' ' "^ 

The question was now up to the governments con- 
cerned. France, as a government, could hardly co- 
operate without consulting her ally, Eussia, and M. 
Delcasse, on his visit to Eussia in April, 1901, was 
probably not left uncertain as to Eussian feelings on 
the subject. The ''Novoie Vremia" pointed out that, 
not only would this railroad offer serious competition 
to the Trans-Siberian, but also touch vitally upon Eus- 
sia 's economic interests and political preponderance 
in Central Asia. Eussia 's neighbors should under- 
stand that she would never tolerate any interference 

6 London Times, Oct. 20, 1901. 

7 Ques. Dip. et Col., Nov. 1, 1901. 



104 FEENCH FOEEIGN POLICY 

with the status quo in Asia Minor or Mesopotamia.^ 
French public opinion was almost equally hostile to 
strengthening German interests at the expense of Eus- 
sia. Furthermore it was feared that instead of Ger- 
many and France each contributing forty per cent, of 
the capital, other powers contributing the remaining 
twenty per cent., France would have to do much more 
than her share financially while Germany would still 
be on an equality with France in the control.^ The 
question was brought to a head by M. Firmin Faure 
proposing a law, not to allow the sale of stocks or 
bonds for the Bagdad Eailway upon French territory 
without passage of a special law permitting it by Par- 
liament.^® M. Delcasse demanded to be heard, and de- 
clared that neither directly nor indirectly, had French 
diplomacy interfered in the affair. The Anatolian 
Company had got into touch with French interests and 
he for one thought if suitable arrangements could be 
made, it would be preferable for French interests to 
participate. However the only conditions possible 
would be if Eussia should have full rights of entry, and 
if the French element would have both in construction 
and direction of the enterprise, rights equal to the 
most favored foreign element.^^ 

Even if Eussia should participate, which was doubt- 
ful, there still remained the question of Great Britain 

8 Quoted by Andr6 ChSradame, "Douze ans de Propagande" ; see also 
the views of M. Witte, Minister of Finances, appearing in the Messenger 
des Finances, quoted in London Times, Jan, 15, 1902. 

9M. Etienne speaking in the Chamber Jan. 21, 1902, declared that 
France would be furnishing 80 per cent, of the capital before the road 
was constructed. Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 66i, p. 123. 

10 Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 66ii, p. 1855. 

11 Ibid,, p. 1857. 



I 
1 



THE ENTENTE COEDIALE 105 

and Koweit. France with M. Delcasse in the saddle, 
would, have been only too glad to welcome English 
participation, and early in 1903 an offer was made 
granting thirty per cent, each to Germany, France and 
Great Britain, and to various other nations the other 
ten per cent.^^ An arrangement on this basis was al- 
most reached,^^ but with the ''Times," ''Westminster 
Gazette," "Daily Mail" and other influential organs 
opposing strenuously, M. Balfour, on April 23, 1903, 
declared that the enterprise as shown by the Conven- 
tion of March 5, which divided shares among the three 
powers but reserved the directorship in German hands, 
placed the enterprise under German control, and "to 
such a convention we have never been asked to assist 
and we could not in any case be a party to it. ' ' ^* The 
following month, Lord Lansdowne made it clear that 
Great Britain never had any idea of allowing a Ger- 
man railroad from Konia to the Persian Gulf but 
rather to substitute a line of international character, 
constructed under guarantees which would have se- 
cured for the commerce of all nations absolutely free 
and equal treatment from sea to sea.^^ 

If Germany had been willing to guarantee France 
an equal share in the management, an arrangement 
might yet have been made, for M. Eouvier, the new 
Minister of Finances, had been heartily in favor of 
the project as a banker, and in his new position, his 
influence was alm,ost decisive. Throughout the affair 

12 Abel Muratet, op. cit., p. 135. 

13 A. von Gwinner, "The Bagdad Railway and the Question of British 
Cooperation," Nineteenth Century, June, 1909. 

14 Pari. Debates, Vol, 121, p, 221. 

15 Ibid., p. 1345. 



106 FRENCH FOEEIGN POLICY 

Germany had also been able to count upon the coopera- 
tion of M. Constans, French ambassador at Constan- 
tinople.^' Relying upon the support of M. Rouvier, 
Berlin demanded both the positions of president and 
director of the company. This gave M. Delcasse his 
opportunity to withdraw all support of the govern- 
ment from the enterprise, for with Russia still hostile 
to it, and Great Britain now eyeing it askance, France 
could no longer afford to participate. The rapproche- 
ment with Great Britain was of more importance than 
a venture in high finance. If M. Rouvier ''held the 
golden key which could open the paradise of Bagdad," 
M. Delcasse was powerful enough to prevent its use. 
In October the Conseil des Ministres refused to allow 
the sale of the Bagdad Railway stock on the Parisian 
market,^'' and November 19, 1903, replying to an ac- 
cusation made by M. Deschanel that French money 
was being engaged, M. Delcasse publicly affirmed that 
the government could not advise the participation of 
French capital, unless guarantees of full equality in 
direction, construction and exploitation of the line 
should be previously secured.^^ As a matter of fact 
French capital did enter, but it was contrary to the 
expressed wishes of the government.^^ 

16 M. Cheradame, op. cit., pp. 55-559, declares that M. Constans aided 
in obtaining the concession, while M. Rouvier was considered by all 
whom he met in the Orient as the "agent of the Deutsche Bank, and 
the very efficacious collaborator of the German policy in the East." 

17 Victor B6rard, "Le Discours du Chancelier," Revue de Paris, Dec. 
15, 1906. 

18 Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 71i, p. 605. 

19 For an illuminating discussion of the diplomatic side of the ques- 
tion bringing it up to 1914, see A. Geraud, "The Story of the Bagdad 
Railway," Nineteenth Century, May-June, 1914. 



THE ENTENTE CORDIALE 107 

2. THE FRANCO-BRITISH ACCORD OF APRIL 8, 1904 

Once more France and Great Britain found them- 
selves on common ground in their distrust of Germany, 
and with their paths leading in the same direction. 
Not yet was it possible to assert that they would soon 
meet, but powerful influences were being brought to 
bear, which were at least making them converge. One 
of the most important of these factors was the acces- 
sion of Edward VII to the throne of England. Try as 
we may to belittle the power of the English sovereign, 
he does have a potent influence over foreign affairs if 
he proves himself to possess ability and a strong per- 
sonality. His influence is to a certain extent intan- 
gible but it is there. He can advise even though his 
advice is not sought; he can warn, even though his 
warnings pass unheeded. But it is only reasonable to 
suppose that a ministry, whose tenure of office is often 
short, would be only too willing to regard the advice 
of one, whose interest in the country 's welfare is equal 
to their own, and whose stable position gives him a 
viewpoint of vantage, as deserving of the most care- 
ful consideration. 

Queen Victoria died in January, 1901, and both M. 
Delcasse in the Senate, and M. Waldeck-Rousseau in 
the Chamber, voiced the regret of the French nation. 
France remembered that Louis Philippe had been an 
honored guest of the deceased queen, and that the 
friendship between the two countries under his reign 
had become an alliance under his successors. France 
also remembered that in the dark period following the 
Franco-German War Queen Victoria had joined her in- 



108 FEENCH FOBEIGN POLICYi 

fluence witli Alexander II to foil the plans of Bismark 
to crush France again. Yet in her later years, Victoria 
had unquestionably leaned towards Germany rather 
than towards France; and to those who were looking 
towards an era of better feeling between the two coun- 
tries, the advent of King Edward gave promise of a 
realization of their hopes. As the Prince of Wales, 
he had always been very popular on the continent ; and 
in France, even when the tide of hostility towards Eng- 
land was at flood, an exception was made of Prince 
Edward.2« 

Another equally important factor was the change 
which took place in January, 1902, in the British cab- 
inet, bringing Lord Lansdowne into Lord Salisbury's 
place as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Although Lord 
Salisbury was not exactly antagonistic to France, like 
M. Hanotaux he played the game of Germany uncon- 
sciously, and he was ever pessimistic regarding an un- 
derstanding. His attitude was clearly expressed by 
his own phrase: "C'est de Vutopie." ^^ With the 
advent of Lord Lansdowne, a change of attitude be- 
came noticeable almost immediately, and Sir Thomas 
Barclay declares that two months before Lord Salis- 
bury's resignation. Lord Lansdowne had written him 
expressing hearty concurrence in his efforts to bring 
about an arbitration treaty between the two countries.^^ 
In this connection the untiring efforts of Sir Thomas 
Barclay himself must not be overlooked. At a time 

20 Mr. E. A. Vizetelly thus characterizes the French attitude towards 
the Prince of Wales: "Le Prince de Galles? Oh, lui, c'est bien differ- 
ent. II nous aime. Mais vous autres, vous ne nous aimez pas." 
Republican France, p. 462. 

21 Barclay, "Thirty Years Anglo-French Reminiscences," p. 210. 

22 Barclay, op. cit., p. 212. 



THE ENTENTE CORDIALE 109 

when the hostility between France and Great Britain 
was like a black cloud that no friendly sunbeam of 
mutual appreciation could pierce, Mr. Barclay em- 
ployed the argumentum ad hominem method, and as 
one of the leaders of the British Chamber of Commerce 
in Paris, urged the advantages which the Paris Exposi- 
tion gave for holding the annual meeting of the Asso- 
ciated Chambers of Commerce of Great Britain in 
Paris that year (1900). It proved to be a record meet- 
ing, and also seemed to act as an entering wedge for a 
steady influx of visitors from across the channel. ^^ 

Nor was M. Delcasse the only champion of a rap- 
prochement across the Channel. M. Paul Cambon, who 
entered upon his duties as ambassador at the Court 
of St. James in November, 1898, when the Fashoda 
Affair, although it had passed its most dangerous 
phase, rendered the relations between the two nations 
exceedingly bitter, deserves little less credit than his 
chief. ''If M. Delcasse and after him M. Pichon have 
turned the ensemble of French policy in the direction 
of England, it is M. Paul Cambon, who has arranged 
the details of the relations between London and Paris 
with a cleverness and a skill to which one cannot give 
too much credit. ' ' ^* An able coadjutor of Sir Thomas 

23 Ibid., Chap XVI ; also Jaray, "La Politique Franco- Anglaise," pp. 
24-25. 

24 Lgmonon, "L'Europe et la Politique Britannique," p. 348 ; the 
London Times thus expressed its views editorially: "M. Delcasse's whole 
conduct of French foreign affairs has been conspicuous, at once for en- 
lightened perception of the true interests of his own country and for 
moderate and courteous treatment of the claims of others. . . . He has 
been ably seconded by M. Cambon, whose interpretation of French 
policy has undoubtedly been a potent factor in bringing about that in- 
creased cordiality of relations in which all lovers of peace now rejoice." 
July 8, 1903. 



110 FEENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

Barclay in his efforts towards better relations, and an 
ardent believer in arbitration as the means of accom- 
plishing it, was M. d'Estournelles de Constant. 
Finally there were men like M. Jaures, who favored 
a union between democratic powers such as England, 
France, and Italy, because they considered ''this triple 
union as the three first stones of the hearth of uni- 
versal democracy and universal peace " ; ^^ and others 
like M. de Pressense, who considered that "the equilib- 
rium of the world was supremely unstable so long as 
a great system of alliances — that of the Triplice — ex- 
isted, and the balance would only be obtained the day 
that a second should be organized, " ^^ and in the 
opinion of M. Pressense the Russian Alliance did not 
meet the demand. 

At last the stage was set, and the players were both 
able and willing to play their roles. The two great 
nations, both democratic and liberal in their tenden- 
cies and in their government, inspired by a mutual dis- 
like and fear of Germany, attracted by ever improving 
commercial relations, could not be kept longer apart. 
The progress was rapid and in many directions. On 
April 3, 1901 a convention was signed submitting to 
arbitration both the Waima Affair, a quarrel on the 
Sierra Leone frontier in which officers and soldiers on 
both sides had been killed,^^ and the Sergeant Mala- 
mine incident, the loss of a French steamboat in a trip 
up the Niger. In July, 1902 a satisfactory award was 

25 Jaray, op. cit., p. 35. 

26 Report on Budget of Foreign Affairs, Annales de la Chambre, Doc. 
Pari., Vol. 64ii, p. 1520, Annexe No. 1196. 

27 Lavisse, "France et Angleterre," Eevue d© Paris, Feb. 1, 189&. 



THE ENTENTE CORDIALE 111 

made. 2® Immediately following the meeting of the As- 
sociation of British Chambers of Commerce in Paris, 
Sir Thomas Barclay commenced an intensive campaign 
to bring about a general arbitration treaty between 
the two countries, and on September 14, 1901 resolu- 
tions to this effect were passed by the British organ- 
izations.^^ In January, 1902, the modus vivendi in 
regard to New Foundland was renewed, and in the 
same month M. Delcasse refused to interfere in the 
Boer War by an offer of mediation although urged 
by a deputy in the Chamber to do so.^*' Nothing was to 
be allowed to jeopardize his policy of conciliation. 

In February, 1903, we have the first public indica- 
tion of the rapid trend towards a definite agreement. 
The ''London Times" declared that towards the end 
of the preceding summer, M. Delcasse presented to 
Lord Lansdowne certain complete and business-like 
proposals which would have had not merely North 
African, but European consequences. The essential 
part of these proposals was that France and England 
should settle the Moroccan question in connection with 
Egypt. In compensation for French recognition of 
British occupation of Egypt, France was to be allowed 
a free hand in dealing with Moroccan territory save 
on the North African coast line.^^ The governments 
were not yet ready, however, to concede that matters 
had proceeded thus far, and on March 11, in reply to a 
definite question on the subject by M. Deloncle, M. 

28 L^monon, "L'Europe et la Politique Britannique," p. 350. 

29 Andre Tardieu, "France and the Alliances," p. 59; also Barclay, 
op. cit., Chap. XVII. 

30 Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 66i, p. 80. 

31 London Times, Feb. 2, 1903. 



112 FEENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

Delcasse replied that if he had made any such arrange- 
ment it must have been in his sleep — '' ce serait en dor- 
mant." M. Ribot wittily intervened with a quotation: 
"Nous Vavons, en dormant, madame echappe helle!" 
and M. Delcasse allowed the matter to rest.^^ 

In the meantime other indications of better feeling 
were noted. On March 4, 1903, M. Paul Cambon was 
invited to speak at the annual meeting of the British 
Chamber of Commerce in London, and he declared that 
he looked in vain for any essential question which 
could divide England and France ; on the contrary he 
saw great interests which could and should unite them, 
and it was not only to their interests to be on good 
terms, but to the interests of the whole world.^^ 

The movement suddenly received great impetus by 
the unexpected visit of King Edward to Paris. The 
king seemed to have undertaken this visit, not only 
against the wishes of his advisers, but even contrary to 
the judgment of those most anxious to bring about bet- 
ter relations. M. Barclay declared that he had misgiv- 
ings on the expediency of the visit, and in France 
** embarrassments and anxiety weighed upon the pub- 
lic. ' ' ^^ However, King Edward knew his Paris and his 
confidence was not misplaced.^^ If his reception was 

32 Annales de la Cliambre, Vol. 69ii, p. 1350, A little later in the 
same speecli M. Deloncle maintained that it did appear as though 
M. Delcass6 had conceived the idea of flirting with England. M. Del- 
cassg's retort was immediate: "ce n'est plus de mon &ge." 

33 London Times, March 5, 1903. 

34 Tardieu, "France and the Alliances," p. 61. 

35 When to entertain him it was proposed that he be taken to the 
Opgra he is said to have remarked in a manner quite Parisian : "Donnez- 
moi seulement une piece au Theatre Francais, voyons, je ne suis pas le 
schah de Perse." 



THE ENTENTE CORDIALE 113 

not enthusiastic, neither were there any signs of hos- 
tility. Even the ardent Paul Deroulede, now cooling 
his heels in exile at San Sebastian, seemed satisfied 
that France should accept the friendship of Edward 
VII, and he strongly discountenanced any hostile 
demonstrations on the part of his Nationalist follow- 
ers.^^ The toasts between the King and President 
Loubet were courteous but formal, since the King 
wished to indicate that the visit was one of a private 
nature. However, when the King spoke to the mem- 
bers of the English Chamber of Commerce in Paris he 
was able to voice his true sentiments : 

*'. . . The days of conflict between the two coun- 
tries are, I trust, happily over, and I hope that future 
historians in alluding to Anglo-French relations in 
the present century, may be able to record only a 
friendly rivalry in the commercial and industrial do- 
main ; I hope that in the future as in the past, France 
and England may be regarded as the champions and 
the pioneers of civilization and peaceful progress. . . . 
I trust that the friendship and admiration which we all 
feel for the French nation and their glorious traditions 
may in the near future develop into a sentiment of 
the warmest affection and attachment between the peo- 
ples of the two countries. ' ' ^'^ 

36 Although the Patrie and a few other Nationalist journals recalled 
Fashoda, the Transvaal, and even Joan of Arc, the Petit Journal, their 
most influential newspaper pointed out that at least no lost provinces 
constituted a barrier between France and England. The Petit Parisien, 
the journal of the working classes, and the more conservative news- 
papers such as the Temps, Figaro, and Journal des Debats, all welcomed 
the king in a most cordial manner. 

37 London Times, May 2, 1903. 



114 FEENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

The king's wishes were to be fulfilled in a most 
speedy and satisfactory manner, and well did he de- 
serve the epithet of ''le roi pacificateur" which the 
French bestov/ed upon him.^^ President Loubet re- 
turned the visit two m,onths later, and his reception 
was even more cordial. This time while King Edward 
and President Loubet were publicly giving utterance 
to affectionate greetings and friendly toasts, Lord 
Lansdowne and M. Delcasse were privately engaged 
in some very important conversations. As the 
''Times" put it: ''M. Loubet 's visit must not be re- 
garded as an isolated phenomenon, a mere compli- 
mentary effort standing alone and liable to pass as a 
simple incident of the hour. It is on the contrary 
the logical outcome of much that has gone on before, 
and the crown of efforts continuously made by states- 
men on both sides to sweep away the differences be- 
tween two great powers whose common task is to carry 

38 Mr. Sydney Lee in his article on King Edward VII in the Diction- 
ary of National Biography (second supplement), is inclined to question 
the influence which the French attribute to King Edward in bringing 
about the rapprochement. Let M. Andre Tardieu, whose word may be 
considered final in France, state the French view: "The English King 
was the initiator of the rapprochement. He it was who both con- 
ceived and facilitated it. . . ." Op. cit., p. 60. But we can find 
authority just as eminent across the Channel. Sir Charles Dilke de- 
clared : "The great and sudden improvement in the relations between 
the English speaking world and France is largely due to the wisdom 
and courtesy with which the King made clear to France that there 
was no ground for the suspicions which prevailed." Life of Sir. Chas. 
Dilke, Vol. II, p. 501. Mr. Balfour is even more emphatic: "King 
Edward was a great monarch. He did that which no minister, no 
cabinet, no ambassadors, neither treaties, nor protocols, nor under- 
standings, which no debates, no banquets, no speeches were able to 
perform. He by his personality alone brought home to the minds of 
millions on the Continent, as nothing we could have done could have 
brought it home to them, the friendly feelings of the country over which 
King Edward ruled." Pari, Debates, Vol. 17, p. 799 (5th series). 



THE ENTENTE CORDIALE 115 

forward civilization, and to uphold the banner of con- 
stitutional liberties. ' ' ^^ 

In fact almost inrmediately after King Edward's 
visit M. Cambon brought up the question of an arbi- 
tration treaty between the two countries, using as a 
basis M. Delcasse's formula that arbitration should be 
used in settling differences based upon the judicial 
interpretation of conventions already existing between 
the two nations. Lord Lansdowne agreed that this 
might be a satisfactory basis for an agreement. 
Shortly afterwards M. Delcasse submitted a definite 
proposal that differences falling under the application 
of Article 16 of the Hague convention for the peaceful 
settlement of international disputes, i. e., differences 
of a justiciable character, and particularly those re- 
lating to difficulties in the interpretation of existing 
conventions, providing they did not concern the vital 
interest or honor of either party, should be submitted 
to the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The British 
government was willing to accept this formula and on 
October 14, 1903, the Treaty of Arbitration was 
signed.*® 

Although it was recognized that such a treaty was 
worthless as a means of avoiding war if either side 
wished for an excuse, still it clearly indicated the 
changed attitude of the two powers, and it was note- 
worthy as being the first treaty of its kind among the 
great European nations, the only other such pact be- 
ing the one between Holland and Portugal signed July 
5, 1894. As M. Paul Deschanel phrased it, in the mag- 

39 London Times, July 8, 1903. 

*o Doc. Dip., Convention d' Arbitrage avec L'Angleterre, 1903. 



116 FRENCH FOEEIGN POLICY 

nificent speech whicli he made in favor of the treaty 
when it came before the Chamber for ratification: 
' ' The recent treaty of arbitration indicates the mutual 
dispositions of the two countries. Thinking people 
of both nations are agreed that a hostile policy between 
the two great liberal nations, between the country of 
the Habeas Corpus and the country of the Declaration 
of the Rights of Man would be a crime against civiliza- 
tion. '^^^ 

This was but the prologue of the piece which was to 
follow. So long as the various colonial questions re- 
mained unsettled there could be no agreement worthy 
of the name. Now it was that M. Delcasse showed his 
greatest statesmanship. His opportunity had come 
and he was ready for it. He had played the game care- 
fully, for he realized very well that the future of 
France was the stake. The time had come to show his 
cards and he laid them all on the table. It had taken 
almost six long years to accomplish his purpose, but 
the success which crowned his efforts was complete. 
The Accord signed on April 8, 1904, made a complete 
and final settlement of all the important outstanding 
differences between the two nations, and they had at 
last joined hands in the Entente Cordiale^^ 

The Anglo-French agreement was composed of three 
distinct instruments, viz., a declaration concerning 
Egypt and Morocco, a declaration concerning Siam, 
Madagascar and the New Hebrides, and a convention 
concerning Newfoundland and Africa. The first was, 

4iAnnales de la Chambre, Vol. 71i, p. 600. 

42 For a complete account of Franco-British relations from the six- 
teenth century down to the present, see J. L. de Lanessan, "Histoire 
de I'Entente Cordiale," Paris, 1916. 



THE ENTENTE CORDIALE 117 

from a diplomatic standpoint, of greatest interest. In 
his Depeche aux Ambassadeurs, a commentary on and 
detailed explanation of the agreement, sent to the vari- 
ous ambassadors of the Republic,^' M. Delcasse said: 
' * The principal part of the arrangement just concluded 
relates to Morocco. Of all the questions in which the 
interests of France are engaged, none has an impor- 
tance comparable to the Moroccan question; it is evi- 
dent that from its solution depends the solidity and 
development of our African empire, and the future it- 
self of our situation in the Mediterranean." 

The declaration concerning Egypt and Morocco con- 
sisted of nine articles, the sum and substance of which 
was a recognition of the paramount interests of France 
in Morocco by Great Britain, in return for a like recog- 
nition by France of the preponderant interests of 
Great Britain in Egypt.^* As regards Egypt, Great 
Britain declared that she had no intention of altering 
its political status, and France engaged herself neither 
to demand any time limit to British occupation nor to 
interfere in any other way. In regard to the public 
debt a substantial change was made in giving greater 
flexibility in its administration, and in the employment 
of the surplus remaining after the interest to the cred- 
itors had been paid. This concession was of real value 
to both Great Britain and Egypt, and was in no way 
prejudicial to the financial interests of the French and 
Russian investors. In other respects the conditions 

43 Doe. Dip., "Accords entre la France et TAngleterre," No. 1. 

44 For text of the entire agreement see Doc. Dip., "Accords entre 
la France et I'Angleterre," No. 2; or Pari. Papers 1905, Vol. 103 
(cd2384) ; for detailed discussion see Ren6 Moulin, "Une Ann6e de 
Politique Exterieure," Paris, 1905, Chap. I; ailso Victor B^rard, 
"L'Affaire Morocaine," Paris, Chap. III. 



118 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

remained tlie same — a French savant continued to ex- 
ercise direction of the Egyptian antiquities, the French 
schools continued to enjoy the same liberty as formerly, 
all rights enjoyed by the French through treaties, con- 
ventions, and customs, including the privilege of en- 
gaging in the coasting trade between Egyptian ports, 
were to be respected, liberty of commerce was guaran- 
teed for thirty years with privilege of renewal, and 
finally. Great Britain promised to adhere to the stipula- 
tions of the Treaty of 1888 relative to the neutrahty of 
the Suez Canal. 

In return, Great Britain agreed not to interfere with 
the action of France in Morocco, recognizing that it 
belonged to France as a nation whose dominions are 
coterminous for a great distance with those of Mo- 
rocco to keep the peace there, and to lend its assistance 
in bringing about such administrative, economic, finan- 
cial, and military reforms as should prove necessary. 
France also declared she had no intention of changing 
the political status of the country, and the clause in- 
suring commercial liberty for thirty years was in- 
serted. In order to assure the free passage of the 
Straits of Gibraltar, it was agreed not to erect forti- 
fications on the coast of Morocco between Melilla and 
the heights of dominating the right bank of the Sebu, 
although this clause should not apply to the points ac- 
tually held by Spain on the Moroccan shore of the Med- 
iterranean. Provision was also made, considering the 
geographical position of Spain and its interests on 
the Moroccan coast of the Mediterranean, that France 
should come to an understanding with Spain and com- 
municate this accord when made to Great Britain. The 



THE ENTENTE CORDIALE 119 

last article provided that the two governments should 
afford each other their diplomatic support to secure 
the execution of this declaration relative to Egypt and 
Morocco. 

This was the declaration as published, but in reality 
there were five more articles which were kept secret 
until 1911, when the crisis of Agadir brought about 
their publication. The first of these secret articles 
provided that in case either government found them- 
selves constrained to modify their policy in respect 
to Egypt or Morocco, the economic, commercial, and 
strategical engagements as provided for in the open 
declaration should remain intact. The second de- 
clared that Great Britain had no present intention of 
making any changes in the capitulations or judicial 
organization of Egypt, but provided that if it should 
be considered desirable, France would not refuse to 
entertain such proposals, on the understanding that 
Great Britain would entertain similar proposals on 
the part of France regarding Morocco. The third 
article definitely specified that part of Morocco which 
should come under Spanish influence if the Sultan 
should cease to exercise authority over it. This ces- 
sion was to include the territory adjacent to Melilla, 
Ceuta, and other presidios as far as, but not including, 
the bank of the Sebu. Spain however must undertake 
not to alienate the whole or a part of the territories 
placed under her jurisdiction. The next article pro- 
vided that even if Spain declined to enter into the ar- 
rangement, it was none the less binding upon Great 
Britain and France; and the last was merely a refer- 
ence to the terms of the repayment of the Egyptian 



120 FEENCH FOKEIGN POLICY 

debt in case the other powers refused to accept the ar- 
rangements. In other words, Great Britain was will- 
ing that France should exercise a protectorate over 
Morocco upon three conditions: the principle of com- 
mercial liberty must be guaranteed; Spain, a weak 
power must control all the territory facing the Straits 
of Gibraltar, thus protecting Great Britain's entrance 
to the Mediterranean; and finally France must permit a 
British protectorate over Egypt whenever Great Brit- 
ain deemed such a change desirable. A perfectly fair 
arrangement as far as Great Britain and France were 
concerned and even Spain's legitimate interests were 
safeguarded. However, Spain might prefer to be con- 
sulted in advance, the Sultan might object to even the 
possibility of a protectorate, and Germany might 
imagine that her interests were being jeopardized; so 
it was decided inexpedient to publish these articles 
with the rest of the declaration.*^ 

The published declaration was subject to consider- 
able criticism in France, on the ground that although 
Great Britain by the arrangement practically came into 
possession of Egypt, France still had Morocco to ac- 
quire. As M. Paul Doumer, Chairman of the Budget 
Committee of the Chamber put it : ''France has given 
a draft payable at sight and has received one which 
cannot be cashed till it matures."*® Neither could 
France give up without regret the historic land of 
the Pharaoh. ''Egypt! How many glorious souv- 
enirs this name evokes in us, from Saint Louis to Riche- 
lieu, from Eichelieu to Bonaparte, from Bonaparte to 

*5Text of Secret Articles: Pari. Papers, 1911, Vol. 103 (cd5969). 
46 "The Ajiglo-French Agreejnent," National Review, June, 1904. 



THE ENTENTE COEDIALE 121 

Ferdinand de Lesseps ! Egypt, this ancestress of na- 
tions which the great Mehemet Ali called 'the little 
sister of France' . . ."^"^ But as another writer put 
it: ''a policy is not determined by sentiments and 
souvenirs, but by material and brutal facts. " ^^ Great 
Britain had fought one war to obtain her claim, and 
had shown herself ready, if need be, to fight another 
to maintain it. Even M. Bene Millet, a consistent critic 
of the policy of M. Delcasse, conceded that it was not 
the fault of a general, if mistakes made twenty-five 
years 'ago made a retreat inevitable — ''there only re- 
mained to us on the banks of the Nile a broken sword, 
or to be more exact a magnificent saber of wood, since 
it has never been of any use. ... In exchanging this 
outworn object for freedom of action in Morocco we 
have made a good bargain. . . . " ^^ 

The second declaration, relative to Siam, Madagas- 
car, and the New Hebrides, was the least important of 
the three arrangements, and provoked the least dis- 
cussion, but it was to the advantage of both nations to 
minister to those sore places which were so likely to 
produce serious troubles if they were not given treat- 
ment. The agreement concerning Siam was simply a 
continuation and a completion of the Declaration of 
January 15, 1896. France conceded to Great Britain 
freedom of action to the west of the valley of the 
Menam, and received like freedom of action in the east, 
thus creating the Menam Valley as a sort of buffer state 

47 Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 74i, p. 242. 

48 Rene Goblet, "L' Arrangement Franco- Anglais," Rev. Pol. et Pari., 
May, 1904, 

49 Ren6 Millet, "La Lutte Pacifique entre la France et I'Angleterre," 
Eevue de Deux Mondes, June 15, 1904; also appears as Chap. V in his 
volume, "Notre Politique Exterieure, 1898-1805," 



122 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

between the two spheres of influence. Both parties 
while putting aside any idea of annexing Siamese ter- 
ritory or violating existing treaties, reserved for them- 
selves complete freedom of action in the two spheres 
of influence thus defined. This clause was especially 
timely for France, as it gave her additional leverage 
to force execution by Siam of the Treaty of February 
14, 1904, now that Siam could count no longer upon 
English support. "We have already shown the results 
of this ^'freedom of action" clause for France in the 
treaty of March 23, 1907. Great Britain profited by it 
later to gain a substantial rectification of frontiers to 
her advantage in the Malay Peninsula.^*^ 

In regard to Madagascar, Great Britain conceded 
to France the right of maintaining the customs duties 
imposed after annexing the island in 1896, an arrange- 
ment which she had hitherto opposed. In return, 
France made similar concessions to Great Britain in 
Zanzibar. In the New Hebrides both countries agreed 
to prepare an arrangement to settle the difificulties 
arising from the lack of jurisdiction over the natives, 
and through the acquisition of land by French and 
English nationals. These islands, which had been 
colonized by French from New Caledonia, and by Eng- 
lish from Australia, had been under the general con- 
trol of a mixed naval commission since 1887 with very 
unsatisfactory results. Although the accord in this 
case was merely a promise to try to solve the question, 
it at least gave promise of better things. An arrange- 
so Mr. H. A. Gibbons in his "New Map of Asia," Chap. V, gives a 
very clear picture of the dealings of the foreign powers with Siam, 
and the case which he presents is a severe but just arraignment of their 
methods. 



THE ENTENTE CORDIALE 123 

ment was finally arrived at in February, 1906, which 
provided for a carefully worked out condominium giv- 
ing each nation equal rights, and confirming the status 
quo in regard to all property rights definitely estab- 
lished in accordance with the rules laid down. The 
government was to consist of two high commissioners, 
one French, the other English, who were to have a 
force of police of two equal sections to carry out their 
orders. The mixed naval commission was retained, to 
be called upon in case of need to cooperate in the 
maintenance of order. A mixed tribunal of three 
judges was also provided for, each government naming 
one, and the King of Spain the third.^^ The experi- 
ment although interesting, was not wholly successful, 
and came up again for readjustment in May, 1914, but 
was pushed into the background by the outbreak of 
the war. ^2 

The convention concerning Newfoundland and 
Africa was the one which provoked the greatest hos- 
tility in France, because by this convention France 
was surrendering very definite valuable rights, dating 
back to the Treaty of Utrecht, over a long stretch of 
coast, valuable both as a fishing ground, and as a train- 
ing school for future entrance into the French navy 
and merchant marine, for certain territories in Africa 
whose value seemed of a very problematical sort. This 
question had long been a thorny one. The Treaty of 

51 For a detailed description of the condominium see the article by 
H. Berthel^my, "Convention Franeo-Anglaise relative aux Nouvelles 
Hebrides," Eev. Pol. et Pari., Feb. 1907. 

52 M. Robt. de Caix brings the subject up to this point in his article 
appearing in Ques. Dip. et Col., June 16, 1914, entitled "Question dea 
Nouvelles Hebrides," 



124 FEENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

Utrecht, 1713, confirmed by the Treaty of Paris, 1763, 
recognized British possession of Newfoundland, but in 
both cases res'^rvation was made granting French fish- 
ermen the right to catch and dry fish along a limited 
stretch of coast known as the French Shore. The 
Treaty of Versailles, 1783, defined this territory as ex- 
tending from Cape St. John to Cape Eay, and stipu- 
lated that British subjects should neither interfere 
with the French fishing here by their competition, nor 
establish drying places on the shore. After a long 
period of bitterness and ill-feeling between French and 
Canadian fishermen, a convention in 1857 gave the ex- 
clusive right to fish to the French. Ne^vfoundland, 
now enjoying self-government, refused to execute the 
convention, and a new convention in 1885 suffered a 
similar fate. Two years later the Newfoundland gov- 
ernment passed the Bait Bill prohibiting the sale of 
bait to foreigners. Although this was aimed at the 
French fishermen, it was equally destructive to the 
Newfoundland bait-sellers, and was repealed in 1890. 
The same year, since the French fishermen were now 
also taking lobsters, the Canadians decided that lob- 
sters were not fish, and the French could not catch 
them even on the French shore. A modus vivendi was 
with difficulty arranged, and it was this temporary and 
unsatisfactory solution which still held.^^ 

The Convention of April 8, 1904, settled the difficulty 
decisively by taking away the exclusive privileges 
which the French possessed on the French shore, and 
putting the French fishermen upon an equality with the 

53 A very clear outline of this whole controversy is given by "A Dip- 
lomat" in the Rev. Pol. et Pari., April, 1899, under the title, "La Ques- 
tion de Terre Neuve." 



THE ENTENTE COEDIALE 125 

British, both in taking fish and crustaceous animals. 
Thus although France gave up the right of drying 
fish, their fishing rights in the territorial waters re- 
mained intact, and the right included the catching of 
lobsters as well as fish. They were also guaranteed 
the right to obtain supplies or bait on the same condi- 
tions as the inhabitants of Newfoundland. Article III 
provided that any French citizens obliged either to 
abandon their establishments on the French shore, or 
to give up their occupation because of this convention, 
should be awarded a pecuniary indemnity. ''Thus," 
as M. Delcasse explained in his Depeche aux amhas- 
sadeurs, *'in order to avoid the risk of conflicts which 
threatened to become serious, we only abandon in New- 
foundland privileges defended with difficulty, and in 
no way necessary, since we preserve the essential thing, 
that is the right to fish in the territorial waters, and 
in addition we guarantee for the future the precious 
right of either fishing for bait or buying it freely 
throughout the whole extent of the French shore. ' ' 

As additional compensation for the surrender of her 
privilege on the French shore, France received cer- 
tain territorial concessions in Africa. In French West 
Africa the frontier between Senegambia and the Brit- 
ish colony of Gambia, was so modified as to give to 
France Yarbutenda, thus allowing France an approach 
by water to her territories drained by the Upper Gam- 
bia which is not navigable. This concession was of 
considerable economic importance in the future de- 
velopment of Southern Senegal. Great Britain also 
ceded to France the group known as the lies de Los 
commanding the city of Konakry, the flourishing capi- 



126 FRENCH FOEEIGN POLICY 

tal of French Guinea. These islands although very 
small,''* and worthless from a commercial viewpoint, 
possessed considerable strategic importance, since they 
provided all the necessary requirements for a strong 
naval base. With these islands in the hands of a for- 
eign power, Konakry was utterly defenseless. Finally, 
and this arrangement was of the utmost importance 
to France, a rectification was made in the frontier be- 
tween Nigeria and the Sudan, giving France a prac- 
ticable route from the Niger to Lake Chad. The 
Declaration of August 5, 1890, had limited the South- 
ern border of the French sphere of influence to a line 
between Say on the Niger, and Barroua on Lake Chad. 
The Convention of June 14, 1898, which aimed to give 
France a route between the two points with Linder as 
the central point was disastrous for France. After 
two years spent in exploring all possible roads between 
Say and Linder on the one side, and Linder and Bar- 
roua on the other, France realized that Great Britain 
had indeed given her *'the sand and the bush and the 
Waterless wastes." France must either obtain a rec- 
tification of the frontier or give up Linder and all hopes 
of a road connecting the Niger with Lake Chad.^^ The 
Convention of 1904, in addition to giving France a 
considerable increase in territory at the expense of 
Nigeria, gave her a practicable route between the Niger 

54 In the discussion in the Chamber, Nov. 7, 1904, M. Suchetet ob- 
served for the benefit of his colleagues, lest they might think that M. 
Delcass6 was speaking of small continents, that the largest of the 
islands was less than two miles square. Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 
74i, p. 325. 

55 M. Eugene Etienne exposes the French side of these questions 
in a very able fashion in his article: "Colonial Litigations Between 
France and England," National Review, July 1, 1903. 



THE ENTENTE COBDIALE 127 

and Lake Chad which had already been explored and 
proved entirely satisfactory. ''Thus thanks to a mu- 
tual good will we have succeeded in settling the various 
questions which too long have weighed upon the rela- 
tions between France and England. "^^ M. Delcasse 
had successfully completed his great work; the Entente 
Cordiale had taken its place beside the Dual Alliance, 
and the weakened Triple Alliance could with diflSculty 
maintain the European balance of power. 

3. THE BATIPIOATION OF THE FKANCO-BaiTISH ACCOBD 

On the whole the arrangement was received with 
greater cordiality and less criticism in England than 
in France. When it came up for a vote in the House 
of Commons it passed unanimously, and Mr. Balfour 
voiced the general opinion when he declared that ' * this 
great instrument will be looked back upon as the be- 
ginning of a new and happier era in our international 
relations. "^"^ Sir Edward Grey declared that the im- 
portant part of the agreement was the spirit of good 
will upon which it reposed. He also pointed out that 
Article 9 of the Declaration regarding Egypt and 
Morocco, in which the two governments agreed to af- 
ford one another their diplomatic support, in order to 
obtain the execution of the present declaration, was so 
vaguely worded that great opportunities were given 
to the two countries of drawing closer to each other. 
In conclusion, he declared that the agreement arrived 
at was so simple that the question might naturally be 
asked — ^why has it not been arrived at before ? ^^ The 

56 M. Delcassg in "Dgpgche aux Ambassadors," op. cit., supra. 

57 Pari. Debates, Vol. 135 (fourth series), p. 575. 

58 Ibid., p. 516. Mr. Gibson Bowles who also believed it well that 



128 FEENCH FOEEIGN POLICY 

opinion of the Press was well expressed by Dr. E. J. 
Dillon : ''All friends of peace and civilization will hail 
with joy the Anglo-French Convention which has 
drawn the sponge over some of the most irritating sub- 
jects of dispute between the two nations of Europe 
whose desire for peaceful progress is strongest and 
most sincere." ^^ 

Across the Channel, although the prevailing note 
was one of approval, yet some voices were raised in bit- 
ter opposition. M. Eene Millet saw in the arrange- 
ment the last lap of what one might call the policy of 
liquidation, and although France might be cutting a 
fine figure in Europe it was at the expense of her 
patrimony. He preferred a policy of a Gambetta or 
a Ferry to that of a Delcasse.^* The political enemies 
of M. Delcasse were still more harsh. In a little vol- 
ume entitled '*Le conflit Franco-Allemand, " two mem- 
bers of the Chamber were almost abusive in their de- 
nunciations: "M. d'Estournelles de Constant is not 
the most dangerous of the pacifists. The most danger- 
ous is M. Delcasse with his policy of culpable credulity, 
foolish illusions, and vain mirages."®^ However, it 
remained for M. Archdeacon in the Chamber, to give 
the arrangement its most bitter characterization: 
**this is the worst treaty that France has signed since 

England and France should stand together, waxed somewhat sarcastic 
at the provisions of the agreement: "The dispute between England and 
France was not how little they could concede to one another; no, it 
was how much belonging to somebody else they could concede to one 
another." Ibid., p. 524. 

59 "Our Friends, Our Allies, Our Rivals," Contemporary Review, 
May, 1904. 

60 "La Politique de Liquidation," Rev. Pol. et Pari., Nov. 1904. 

ei Guibert et Ferrette, "Le Conflit Franco-allemand en 1905," p. 50. 



THE ENTENTE CORDIALE 129 

the one by which Louis XV consecrated the abandon- 
ment of India and of Canada to the English." ^^ 

Happily these voices were in the minority. M. le 
comte de Castellane in the ' ' Gaulois, " M. de Coubertin 
in the *' Figaro, " M. Humbert in the ''Eclair," M. Rene 
Henry in the ''Republique Francaise," M. Andre Tar- 
dieu in ''le Temps," all were able to echo the sentiment 
of M. Ebray in the "Journal des Debats," in declaring 
that "France surrenders nothing of importance but ob- 
tains most momentous concessions. ' ' ®^ When the Con- 
vention came up for discussion in the Chamber, al- 
though strong criticism was directed at some parts, 
especially that part of the agreement relating to New- 
foundland, the sentiment was for the most part friendly. 
M. Deloncle, who regretted so keenly the loss of Egypt, 
conceded that the happy results were of such a nature 
as to make one forget the bitterness of the painful sac- 
rifices necessary to their attainment.®* M. Etienne, 
whose authority on colonial matters was unquestioned 
in the Chamber, discussed the arrangements at great 
length, and pointing out that Egypt had been lost for 
twenty-two years, he declared that not a single French 
statesman would be willing to ask of England that she 
withdraw from there. He considered the cession of 
the islands of Los a real advantage to France, and de- 
clared that the right of landing on the Gambia River, 
and the new delimitation of frontiers between Senegal 
and Nigeria, both gave great satisfaction. In conclu- 

62 Annales de la Cliambre, Vol. 741, p. 242. 

63 M. G. L. Jaray gives a full summary of the sentiments expressed 
in England and France in his article, "L' Accord entre la France et 
I'Angleterre," Ques. Dip. et Col., Nov. 16, 1904. 

64 Aanales de la Chambre, Vol. 741, p. 242. 



130 FEENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

sion, he asserted that the arrangement procured France 
very appreciable advantages for the present, but even 
greater might be hoped for the future.^^ M. de Pres- 
sense pointed out that although France had very defi- 
nite rights in Newfoundland conceded by former 
treaties, the population had increased from some five 
or six thousand inhabitants to over two hundred thou- 
sand, and it was hardly possible to keep such a number 
"pressed in the strait jacket of the diplomacy of former 
centuries." As for Egypt, no magic wand would 
bring back the conditions of 1879, and it was hardly 
fitting for a great nation like France to remain in an 
attitude of pouting.®^ M. Denys Cochin considered it 
"a treaty made for peace, a rapprochement in which 
we renounce what has been called a 'policy of pin 
pricks' although all the pin pricks didn't come from 
this side of the Channel. ' ' ®'^ Even before M. Delcasse 
arose to speak in behalf of the arrangement, it was 
clear that it would have little difficulty in passing. His 
presentation of the real advantages that France would 
gain was clear and convincing. As the Convention 
concerning Newfoundland seemed to be the principal 
stumbling block, he was especially careful to make it 
clear that France still retained the right to fish there, 
all that she surrendered was the drying privilege on 
the shore, and as a matter of fact most of that in recent 
years had been carried on at St, Pierre and Miquelon, 
or in France. In 1903 only five fishing stations out of 
two hundred and eight had been in use on the French 
shore; while the population of Newfoundland had in- 

65 Ibid., p. 346. 

66 Ibid., p. 388. 

67 Ibid., p. 393. 



THE ENTENTE CORDIALE 131 

creased forty-two times, the French fisherman had 
almost deserted this coast. In Egypt he showed that 
bond holders' interests had been carefully guarded, 
commercial liberty guaranteed, French schools and in- 
stitutions protected, and in return for an attitude hien- 
veillante in Egypt, England had given way to France 
in Morocco, the keystone of the French African em- 
pire. In conclusion he declared: *'the convention is 
equally advantageous to the two nations, in that each 
one of them obtains satisfaction upon the points which 
concern them most. And it is very fortunate that it 
should be thus, since this arrangement instead of being 
a nest for quarrels, has had for its object the intent to 
wipe away everything which might counterbalance the 
superior reasons and powerful interests which com- 
mand England and France to live in confidence and in 
good understanding. ' ' ^^ 

M. Delcasse had won his case, the Convention con- 
cerning Newfoundland and Africa passed 443 to 105, 
the agreement as a whole passing 436 to 94, although 
M. Delcasse accepted the ordre du jour of M. Paul 
Deschanel which looked to early negotiations with the 
British government regarding certain changes to be 
made in the clauses relating to Newfoundland. The 
two great democratic nations of Europe had joined 
hands across the Channel, the hatchet of colonial riv- 
alry had been buried, and France was given free hand 
to proceed in Morocco with no further interference 
from Great Britain. There still remained a settle- 
ment to be made with Spain, and although France did 
not yet seem to realize it, a still more serious one with 

68 Ibid., p. 404. 



132 FEENCH FOEEIGN POLICY 

Germany. However, these were problems for the fu- 
ture, a more urgent one of the present had already 
forced itself upon the attention of the two powers. 

4. THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 

Dark clouds had long been gathering in the Eastern 
sky betokening a storm in the Orient. The Slavic 
Goliath was already girding up his loins to conquer the 
Mongolian David, when his smaller opponent had 
struck and had struck hard. The important question 
was whether the struggle would remain a duel between 
the two, or whether the allies of each would be drawn 
in. The rapprochement between Great Britain and 
France had already advanced so far, that it was evi- 
dent that neither would find a casus foederis unless it 
was forced upon their attention. Besides, the en- 
trance of one would be followed immediately by the 
entrance of the other, thus neutralizing their respective 
efforts. Another factor which tended to keep France 
neutral was the influence of M. Jaures and the Socialist 
party, whose attitude had been consistently hostile to 
the Dual Alliance, in so far as it necessitated involving 
France in the imperialistic schemes of her ally in the 
Far East. M. Jaures had made his sentiments known 
all over Europe in the famous letter which he wrote to 
M. Andrea Costa, President of the Italian Socialist 
Congress, in which he expressed his approval of the 
Triple Alliance as a " contre-poids necessaire a notre 
chauvinisme et aux fantaisies franco-russes." ^^ In 
order that it might be kno"svn that his opinions had 
not changed, directly upon the outbreak of the Eusso- 

69 Rev. Pol. et Pari., Oct. 1902. 



THE ENTENTE CORDIALE 133 

Japanese War, he published an article in the "Eevue 
Socialiste, ' ' urging France to do nothing which might 
provoke either England or Japan, and as soon as the 
trouble should be over, ''to relax the bonds of an ex- 
clusive and imprudent alliance which has ceased to be 
a safeguard, if it ever has been one, and has now be- 
come a danger and a menace. ' ' '^^ 

Under these circumstances France which as a whole 
still stood firmly by the alliance was somewhat dubious 
over the reception which Russian public opinion would 
give to the news of the entente with England. As 
might have been expected it did not provoke any en- 
thusiasm. The "Novoie Vremia," one of the most 
influential organs, declared that a glacial breath had 
crossed the atmosphere of the Franco-Russian rela- 
tions.'^^ However, it was very soon evident that 
officially Russia intended to accept the agreement. In 
a long interview given to M. Tardieu, as a representa- 
tive of ''Le Temps," M. Nelidof, Russian ambassador 
at Paris, declared that the happy outcome of the 
negotiations would provoke keen satisfaction in St. 

70 Je veux bien que la diplomatie francaise ne se d6gage pas brutale- 
ment d'une politique oil elle est 6tourdiment engagSe. Je veux bien 
qu'elle continue a preter a la Eussie pour le reglement du conflit sea 
bons offices, mais du moins ne faisons rien qui provoque le Japon, ne 
faisons rien que provoque I'Angleterre, et lorsque cette tourmente sera 
passee nous pourrons peu a peu relflcher les liens d'une alliance 
exclusive et imprudente, qui a cesse d'entre une sauvegarde, si elle 
I'a jamais 6t6, pour devenir un danger et un menace." Kev. Socialiste, 
March, 1904. 

M. Allard went even further. Speaking in the Chamber, January 27, 
1905, he declared: "I have been astonished that any one has dared 
to speak again before a French parliament of an alliance or any sort 
of relations with a government of assassins." He was supported by 
M. Jaur&s and other members of his party and M. Delcass6 was barely 
able to make his protests heard. Annales de la Chambre, Vol- 75i, p. 91. 

71 Kev. Pol. et Pari., June, 1904. 



134 FEENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

Petersburg. They rejoiced first because the arrange- 
ment freed France from certain difficulties, ''and, 
then," added the ambassador smiling, ''is there not 
a proverb which says: 'The friends of our friends 
become our friends ' ? Who knows if once more it may 
not be verified?"'''^ 

Three years later his joking inference became an 
established reality, but not before the two countries 
came to the very brink of war over the Dogger Bank 
affair ; and they were only saved from this catastrophe 
by the prompt intervention of France, who urged that 
the facts be determined by a Commission of Inquest 
in accordance with the rules of the Hague Conference. 
An agreement was finally signed, November 25, by 
Count Lamsdorft and Sir Charles Hardinge, stating 
that comformably to Articles IX to XIV of the Hague 
Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International 
Disputes, a commission of five should be entrusted with 
elucidating the facts connected with the incident by 
means of an impartial and conscientious investiga- 
tion.'^^ 

A very interesting example of the tortuous ways of 
secret diplomacy may be cited in connection with the 
choosing of the commission. In accordance with 
Article I of the formal agreement, two of the members 
of the commission were to be officers of high rank in 
the British and Russian navies, France and the United 
States were each to designate one of their high naval 
officers, and these four together to decide upon the 

72 Andre Tardieu, "Questions Diplomatiques de I'Annge, 1904," p. 31. 

73 A clear and comprehensive account of the Dogger Bank Affair may 
be found in Stowell and Munro, "International Cases," Vol. I, pp. 98- 
106. 



THE ENTENTE CORDIALE 135 

fifth member, but failing to agree, the choice was to 
be made by the Emperor of Austria. The Kaiser 
was very anxious that a German naval officer should 
be chosen for the fifth member. As such an arrange- 
ment would have been very satisfactory to Russia, and 
the United States would have no reason to object, it 
would only be necessary to secure the adhesion of 
France. The Kaiser, thereupon, became very prodigal 
of his favors towards France, but in vain, for in the 
very first meeting of the admirals, they decided to ask 
the Emperor of Austria to make a choice as was pro- 
vided for in the agreement. Vice-Admiral Fournier 
attributes to this incident the beginning of the hostility 
which the Kaiser came to feel towards M. Delcasse, 
attributing to him the failure of his little scheme.'^* 

The report of the International Commission showed 
that Admiral Rodjestvensky was wholly unjustified in 
firing upon the English fishing boats, and as Russia had 

74 Vice- Admiral Fournier, who was the French member of the com- 
mission, recounts this incident in his book, "La Politique Navale," pp. 
42-46. In the Willy-Nicky Correspondence further light is thrown 
upon the Kaiser's diplomacy during the Russo-Japanese war. In No. 
13, Oct. 27, the Kaiser suggests that Germany and Russia join against 
England if she refuses to allow Germany to coal Russian ships. They 
could force France in with them because even "though Delcass6 is an 
Anglophile enrage he will be wise enough to understand that the British 
fleet is utterly unable to save Paris. In this way a powerful combina- 
tion of three of the strongest Continent Powers would be formed, to 
attack whom the Anglo-Japanese group would think twice before act- 
ing." In No. 14 dated Oct. 28, the Czar, after expressing his indigna- 
tion at England's conduct, declares that "the only way, as you say, 
would be that Germany, Russia and France should at once unite upon 
an arrangement to abolish Anglo-Japanese arrogance and insolence. 
Would you like to lay doAvn and frame the outlines of such a treaty 
and let me know it? As soon as accepted by us, France is bound to 
join her ally." The Kaiser was only too willing to proceed, but when 
he found that Nicholas was determined to inform France before going 
ahead, William decided to let the matter drop for the moment. 



136 FEENCH FOKEIGN POLICY 

already expressed her regrets, it was decided that 
upon the payment by Eussia of a suitable indemnity 
(£65,000) the incident might be considered closed. It 
can hardly be doubted that if it had not been possible 
for France, under the guidance of M. Delcasse, to use 
her influence as the true friend of both nations, a 
European war might have resulted, by which both 
Eussia and France would have been crippled, and 
Great Britain terribly weakened. Who could under- 
stand better than Kaiser Wilhelm II the advantages 
of such a possibility to Germany ! The rapprochement 
of France with Italy had weakened the Triple Alliance, 
the entente with Great Britain had strengthened both 
France and Great Britain, Germany's two greatest 
potential enemies, and within six months after its pro- 
mulgation it had borne fruit in the settlement of the 
Dogger Bank Affair. It is hardly surprising that the 
Kaiser decided that he must strike at France, and he 
could best strike, through M. Delcasse.'^^ Alea jacta 
est, and the results were Tangier, Algeciras, Agadir 
and Serajevo. 

75 It was told about Berlin after the signing of the Anglo-French 
Convention that M. Delcass6 had remarked to a group of intimate 
friends: "Je viens de rouler Badolin, il ne me reste plus qu'a rouler 
I'empereur d'AUemangne." When the Kaiser heard of the remark he 
replied : "Lc marechal Soult wvait donne a M. Thiers, qui par la stature, 
mais par la stature seulement etait Vegal de M. Delcasse, le plaisant, 
sumom de Foutriquet, ef il avait coutume de dire: Foutriquet ne mourra 
que d'un coup de pied . . . J'en dis autant de M. Delcasse, et soyez 
tranquille, avant un an, de coup de pied sera donne." Guibert et Fer- 
rette, op. cit., p. 83. 



^ CHAPTER VI 
EUROPEAN RIVALRY IN MOROCCO 

1. THE INTERNAL CONDITION OF MOROCCO 

T will be remembered that in the convention signed 
with Great Britain April 8, 1904, relating to Egypt 
and Morocco, it had been agreed that Prance should 
come to an understanding with the Spanish Govern- 
ment, and then communicate the arrangement to Great 
Britain. It was recognized that "the interests which 
that country derives from her geographical position, 
and from her territorial possessions on the Moorish 
coast of the Mediterranean," entitled her to special 
consideration.^ In order to understand clearly the 
agreement entered into by France and Spain regard- 
ing Morocco, as well as the events which followed it, 
it seems advisable at this point to give a brief con- 
sideration of Morocco in its relation to the great 
Powers. 

As one writer has put it, "Although but two days' 
journey by sea from the coast of Provence, a few hours 
from Gibraltar and from Cadiz, Morocco remains at 
the beginning of the twentieth century a political 
anachronism, a remnant of the Moslem middle ages." ^ 
Its government was that of a feudal state, the Sultan 
possessing a nominal authority over the people of the 

1 Doc. Dip., "Accords entre la France et I'Angleterre," No. 2, Art. VIII. 

2 Henri Lorin, "La Question du Maroc," Kev. Pol. et Pari., July, 1901. 

137 



138 FEENCH FOEEIGN POLICY 

cities, towns, and plains through the kaids appointed 
by him, while the mountain tribes were practically free. 
As the Sultan's revenues depended upon the amount 
of taxes raised in the districts under control, his repu- 
tation as a ruler depended to a great degree upon 
the success with which he protected these districts 
already under his sovereignty and increased their 
extent. An additional incentive for him to try and 
keep the border tribes in order was the knowledge that 
if he was unable to do it, the Powers were always ready 
to assist him in his task. 

The Powers that were most interested in preserving 
the independence of the Shereefian Empire — through 
mutual jealousy rather than through any desire to 
respect the authority of the Sultan — ^were France, 
/ Great Britain, Spain, and Germany. Of these, Spain 
had the oldest and least dangerous claims. After four 
centuries of struggle she held merely a few presidios 
along the Mediterranean coast, the two principal ones 
being Ceuta and Melilla. France could date her inter- 
ests back to 1533, when the Sultan of Fez granted to 
Francis I the right to navigate freely upon the shores 
of his states, and during the seventeenth century the 
influence of France in Morocco was supreme. Her su- 
premacy in the Moorish Empire ended in 1713, when 
the Treaty of Utrecht gave Gibraltar to the English. 
Great Britain also could claim an ancient lineage in her 
Moroccan interests, as Charles II by his marriage to 
Catherine of Braganza, inherited Tangier from Portu- 
gal in 1662. It was found to be a dower of doubtful 
value and after twenty years ^ sojourn there, the Eng- 
lish found that they would be better oif without it. 



EUROPEAN RIVALRY IN MOROCCO 139 

Napoleon succeeded in reestablishing French influence 
in Morocco for a short time, but after Waterloo, 
English influence at the court of the Sultan reigned 
supreme. The French conquest of Algeria, definitely 
completed in 1848, only made the Sultan the more 
wary of his unwelcome neighbors. Last of all came 
the Germans, their explorers Lenz and Rohlfs in the 
van, ready and eager to substitute their trade mark 
for that, of the English. The Conference of Madrid 
in 1880 internationalized Morocco, and with the able 
Sultan, Mouley Hassan on the throne, the Powers had 
no further excuse to intervene. 

Mouley Hassan's successor, Abdul Aziz, who came 
to the throne in 1894, was a well meaning and intelli- 
gent youth, but wholly inexperienced, and all too ready 
to follow any advice offered him. During the first six 
years of his reign, his Grand Vizier, Si Ahmed, who 
put him on the throne as being more docile than his 
elder brother, ruled both the country and the young 
Shereef with a rod of iron. At the death of his Vizier 
in 1900, Abdul Aziz, then only twenty-two years of age, 
came into absolute power. Si Ahmed, in order to con- 
trol more easily the political situation, had taught the 
young Sultan that his only mission in life was to amuse 
himself. Now that he was ruler in fact as well as 
name, Abdul Aziz proceeded to carry out this program 
in the latest European fashion. Telephones, automo- 
biles, moving pictures, were soon commonplaces at his 
capital, to the great disgust of the zealous Moham- 
medans, who resented keenly his apparent yielding to 
the cursed inventions of the Christans. The greater 
the innovation the more anxious he was to procure it, 



140 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

and always in large quantities. Miniature railways, 
captive balloons, Steinway grands cost money, and 
while the Berbers and Moors were paying the bills, a 
hated Scottish adventurer, MacLean, who had become 
the young Sultan's chief adviser, was becoming rich 
and powerful.^ 

Even these innovations and costly luxuries might 
have provoked no serious difficulties if the Sultan had 
respected the religious fanaticism of his subjects. As a 
direct descendant from Mohammed, through his daugh- 
ter Fatima, one of his chief duties was to compel observ- 
ance of the religious laws. In fact all the tribes accept 
the Sultan's spiritual authority even when they disre- 
gard his temporal rule. They will pay taxes only if he is 
strong enough to make them, but they will rally to his 
call as Commander of the Faithful to carry on a djehad, 
or Holy War, with a zeal and ardor which leaves noth- 
ing to be desired.^ But the young Sultan seemed 
wholly oblivious of the hostility he was provoking 
among the fanatical Berbers. His first fundamental 
.mistake was in attempting to make a change in the 
levy and collection of the taxes — a much needed reform 
it is true — ^but going counter to the ancient customs of 

3 Keng Pinon in his "L'Empire de la Mediterran6e," Chap. Ill, gives 
a vivid picture of the young Sultan and his surroundings. A pathetic 
touch is given by the young Sultan's excuse for his extravagance when 
it had cost him his throne. "They have accused me of buying hundreds 
of objects of which I had no need but how did I know . . . when I 
wished a piano tliey told me that pianos sold by the dozen and I got a 
dozen. Automobiles, according to my informers, were also sold by the 
dozen and bicycles by the hundred. The merchants leagued with my 
ministers have exploited me shamelessly. . . ." Interview with Abdul 
Aziz, quoted in Ques. Dip. et Col., Aug. 1, 1908. 

4 For an excellent account of the religious question in Morocco see 
Edmond Doutte, "Le Sultanat Marocain," Rev, Pol. et Pari., Sept., 1909. 



EUEOPEAN RIVALEY IN MOEOCCO 141 

Morocco, and in direct violation of the Koran. His 
second was to allow English troops to seize a true 
believer who had taken refuge in the inviolable sanctu- 
ary of the most holy mosque of Fez, after having shot 
down a dog of an unbeliever, a mere Christian mis- 
sionary. In a state like Morocco, where three fourths 
of the country is practically independent of the sove- 
reign, and where a leader is found for every passing 
discontent, it was to be expected that in a case like 
the present, some sort of an uprising would follow. 
All that was needed was a leader and he quickly ap- 
peared. A certain Bu-Hamara, a false prophet claim- 
ing to be the older brother who had been dispossessed 
of his kingdom, started a revolt against Abdul Aziz 
in the autumn of 1902, an insurrection which finally pro- 
voked European intervention and came little short of 
starting a European conflagration. 

Of the four countries particularly interested in Mo- 
rocco, France had the strongest reason to desire its 
tranquillity. With her possessions and spheres of 
influence completely surrounding it, with almost a 
thousand miles of her Algerian frontier exposed to 
the depredations of its lawless tribes, well might she 
look with anxiety upon a serious insurrection. Ac- 
cording to Article IV of the Treaty of Lalla-Mamia, 
signed in 1845, and delimiting the boundaries between 
Algeria and Morocco, it was recognized that no terri- 
torial limits could be established between the two 
countri'cs in the desert, so a delimitation was made on a 
tribal, rather than a geographical basis. The unfortu- 
nate part of this method was that certain tribes handed 
over to the Sultan of Morocco were Algerian, and had 



142 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

their abodes in territory definitely named as Algerian. 
Nor was there much hope of fixing a definite frontier 
in a country where the tribes were nomad, and as the 
treaty put it "la terre ne se lab our e pas.'' ^ On vari- 
ous occasions attempts were made to trace an exact 
frontier, the policing was difficult, and the French felt 
that certain spots like the oasis of Figuig rightfully 
belonged within their sphere of influence. But noth- 
ing came of them, and M. Etienne could truthfully say : 
'*Our policy as regards our Moroccan frontier exhibits 
one remarkable character — it furnishes the rare ex- 
ample of a common frontier between a powerful Eu- 
ropean state and a feeble Mussulman state remaining 
unchanged after sixty years of voisinage." ^ 

In point of fact, a slight change had occurred in 
1900, when the French after repulsing an attack made 
upon a scientific expedition took possession of the 
oasis of Twat.''' To prevent or anticipate further 
changes, on March 18, 1901, M. Eevoil, French minister 
at Tangier, had at the request of M. Delcasse, given a 
warning to the Shereefian government because of cer- 
tain other attacks which had been made on French 
caravans in the vicinity of the Sahara oases.^ Less 
than a month later, a Frenchman, M. Pouzet of Oran, 
was assassinated on the Riff coast. On this occasion 
M. Delcasse sent an ultimatum to the Sultan and two 
war-ships to enforce it.^ This seemed to be rather 
strong action for the death of a single citizen, espe- 

B Reii6 Pinon, op. cit., Chap. IV, pt. 1. 

6 "Notre Politique Africaine-Algerie et Maroc," Ques. Dip. et Col., 
June 15, '03. 

7 Ren6 Pinon, op. cit., Chap. V. 

8 Doc. Dip., "Affaires du Maroc" (1901-1905), No. 2 aimexe, 
8 Doc. Dip., op, cit., Nos. 6, 7, 



EUROPEAN RIVALRY IN MOROCCO 143 

cially since the Sultan had given no indication that 
he would refuse reparation. Perhaps the underlying 
cause was the information that the Shereefian Govern- 
ment intended to send a mission to London, and then 
have it proceed to Berlin.^^ At any rate at the arrival 
of the war-ship, the Sultan acceded to all the demands 
made by the French Government, and also authorized 
a mission to proceed to Paris. The result of the mis- 
sion to London was a memorandum of no political im- 
portance, while the one to Paris produced a protocol 
pertaining to the application and execution of the 
Treaty of 1845. 

Taking as a base the maintenance of the integrity 
of the Shereefian Empire, and an improvement in the 
neighborly relations, the two governments decided to 
settle some of the difficulties arising from the untrace- 
able frontier. The protocol even went so far as to 
allow the Sultan to establish frontier posts at the 
extremity of the territory of the tribes belonging to his 
empire, giving the tribes on the border the right to 
choose the government under whose authority they 
preferred to roam.^^ Commissions were to be sent by 
both governments to inform the tribes of the new 
arrangement, and in the future commissioners were to 
be appointed annually by each government to remain 
on the ground and settle the disputes which might 
arise.^^ In his letter explanatory of the protocol to 

10 Ibid., No. 5. 

11 M. Victor Bgrard thus characterizes this attempt : "Imagine that 
in a difficulty between Norway and Great Britain in regard to the 
North Sea, fished in by the fishermen of both countries, it was decided 
to establish a fixed frontier at the extremity of the waves frequented 
by the herrings claimed by each. . . ." "L'Affaire Marocaine," p. 74. 

12 For text see Doc. Dip., op. cit.. No. 20 annexe. 



144 FEENCH FOEEIGN POLICY 

M. Saint Eene Taillandier, the new minister at Tangier, 
M. Delcasse declared that by this treaty France had 
obtained the Algerian boulevard which she had long 
needed.^^ He was to learn that a boulevard of sand 
made a very shifting frontier. 

Early in 1902 the two commissions set out to estab- 
lish the frontier and to give notice to the tribes of the 
new arrangement. The very day the commission ar- 
rived, two French captains who happened to ride out 
without an escort, were shot down and stripped by 
mountain marauders. The Moroccan government ex- 
pressed regret for the act, but confessed itself power- 
less. It was soon perceived that if any satisfactory 
solution was to be reached, French authority backed by 
French troops must be added to the very nominal 
authority exercised by the Sultan. Thereupon two 
new accords were signed, April 20, and May 7, 1902, 
at Algiers, by the chiefs of the two missions, outlining 
a complete program of political, economic, and military 
collaboration between France and Morocco,^* Unfor- 
tunately this policy of peaceful penetration, whereby 
France by clearly recognizing the sovereignty of the 
Sultan and reinforcing his authority, — the policy out- 
lined by M. Eevoil and supported by M. Delcasse — 
jWas never to be put into effect. The assassination of 
Hhe English missionary, Mr. Cooper, followed by the 
summary execution of his murderers, aroused such 
excitement in the Moroccan capital that the Sultan felt 
it best to quit Fez. Almost immediately came news of 
the insurrection near Taza, under the leadership of 

13 Doc. Dip., "Affaires du Maroc" (1901-1905), No. 21. 

14 Ibid., No. 27 annexe and No. 28 annexe. 



EUROPEAN EIVALRY IN MOROCCO 145 

Bu-Hamara, ''he who makes a Holy War in the name 
of God," and was known by the title ''Father of the 
She-Ass. ' ' ^^ Morocco had drawn the attention of 
Europe. 

2. THE FRANCO- SPANISH ARRANGEMENT OF OCTOBER 3, 1904 

Even now if France had come out openly before the 
Powers, giving notice of her intention to respect the 
independence of Morocco while cooperating effectively 
with the Sultan to put down the revolt, all might have 
been well. But M. Delcasse realized well enough that 
the real solution of the question of Morocco lay first 
of all in Europe. Since the Conference of Madrid in j 
1880 had given the Maghreb an international status, I 
only the European Powers could make a final settle- \ 
ment. Yet a settlement by the Powers was the one 
method which France was unwilling to bring about, at 
any rate until she had strengthened her position in 
Morocco economically and strategically to such an ex- 
tent that her interests would be overwhelmingly 
superior to those of any other nation, or until she had 
strengthened her position in Europe by a series of 
understandings . 

M. Delcasse attempted to pursue both of these 
methods simultaneously. After the arrangement made 
with Italy, giving France a free hand in Morocco in 
return for similar treatment for Italy in Tripoli, M. 
Delcasse turned towards Spain. Although the official 
documents regarding their proposals have never been 
published, it is not difficult to outline the negotiations. 
Realizing that Spain, both through her geographical 

15 Ibid., No. 33. 



146 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

situation and her possession of the presidios, had the 
first right to consideration, if a change were to be made 
in the status quo of Morocco, M. Delcasse suggested a 
partition of their respective spheres of influence, Spain 
taking the northern part, the ancient realm of Fez, 
while France should have the ancient realm of Mar- 
rakech. The negotiations started in 1901, continued 
throughout 1902, and then fell through. The reasons 
given were that the Spanish government feared lest 
Great Britain take umbrage at an arrangement con- 
cluded without her participation. M. Paul Cambon, 
French ambassador at London, shared in her misgiv- 
ings.^^ That very cordial relations still existed be- 
tween the two governments after the definite rupture 
of negotiations (February 1, 1903) is shown by the 
speech in the Cortes, July 17, 1903, of Senor Silvela, 
whose government had been responsible for breaking 
off the negotiations. He declared that *^ an. intimate 
union attaches us to our neighbor, the French Republic, 
and the union of our interests and our aspirations for 
the conservation of the status quo in Morocco, as long 
as it can materially endure, urges us to maintain a 
complete friendship and a harmony of thoughts with 
this country, our brother by race and united by so 
many bonds of interest and association."^^ This 
speech further makes it clear that Spain realized that 
the status quo would not always endure, and that Spain 

16 The nearest approach to an oiScial account of the negotiations is 
in the article by M. Andre Tardieu, "France et Espagne," Revue de 
Deux Mondes, Dee. 1, 1912. See also: Ren6 Millet, "L'Aceord Franco- 
Espagnol," Rev. Pol. et Pari., Nov. 1904; "Notre Politique au Maroc," 
ibid., July, 1904; E. D. Morel, "Morocco in Diplomacy," Chap. IX. 

17 Quoted Rev. Pol. et Pari., Aug. 1903. 



EUEOPEAN BIVALEY IN MOROCCO 147 

must come to an agreement with France when a change 
was made. 

Spain had been given her opportunity, there still 
remained Great Britain and Germany. There is no 
question that France would have attempted to settle 
the question of Morocco with Great Britain, whether 
an arrangement was concluded with Spain or not. It 
is hardly conceivable that M. Delcasse could have ever 
entertained the idea that the power which controlled 
Gibraltar, and whose trade with Morocco was consider- 
ably greater than any other power, would sit by and 
see any change in the status quo without her consent. 
But to treat with Spain was a far easier proposition 
than to treat with Great Britain, so it seems perfectly 
logical on his part to have attempted first to make a 
settlement with Spain, and to follow that by one with 
Great Britain. Finding that to be impossible, he 
turned towards Great Britain, and we have already 
seen with what success. 

As for Germany, who also had been a signatory of 
the Treaty of Madrid in 1880, her sole interest in 
Morocco seemed to be commercial, and even in that 
respect her interests were far inferior to those of 
France and Great Britain. We have already indicated 
Herr von Billow's attitude with regard to the Italian 
tour de valse, and his statement that Germany's only 
interest in Morocco was the maintenance of the open 
door. Early in 1902 in an interview with a corre- 
spondent of the ''Figaro" he was even more explicit: 

''Morocco touches us even less than China because 
our interests there are even smaller. . . . We rejoice 
that France and Italy, who have large and important 



148 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

interests in the Mediterranean, have come to an under- 
standing in regard to them. We do not pursue an 
active policy in that sea." ^^ 

Prince Radolin, German ambassador to Paris, on the 
occasion of the arrival of the Moroccan embassy at 
Paris in June, 1901, had informed M. Delcasse that 
everyone recognized that France had a situation apart 
in Morocco.^^ Although this may have represented 
the feelings of the German government at the time, 
it did not fairly represent German public opinion. In 
September, 1902, a leading German newspaper asked: 
"Why does not Germany associate herself in the work 
of opening Morocco to economic exploitation? . . . 
Seeing that quite recently Count Biilow has known how 
to protect in a just measure the German interests in 
China, we hope that in the question of Morocco Ger- 
many has not yet said her last word. ' ' ^^ 

Thus it was that the insurrection started by Bu- 
Hamara in the autumn of 1902, came at a most inoppor- 
tune time for France. No satisfactory arrangement 
had been reached with Spain, an arrangement with 
Great Britain remained still in the offing, and Germany 
might be expected to look upon any interference in 
Moroccan affairs by a single nation as detrimental to 
her commercial rights. Under these circumstances it 
is not surprising that the Moroccan policy of France 
throughout 1903 was vacillating in the extreme. 
Starting with the apparent intention of supporting the 
Sultan in putting down the rebellion and of helping 
him out of his financial difficulties, the French govem- 

18 Laloy, "La Politique de Guillaume II," p. 121. 

19 Doc. Dip., "Affaires du Maroc" (1901-1905), No. 18. 

20 Quoted from Post, Ques. Dip. et Col., Sept. 15, 1902. 



a 



EUEOPEAN RIVALRY IN MOROCCO 149 

ment went so far as to arrange for a visit to Algeria by 
President Loubet.^^ Thereupon Sidi Mohammed 
Guebbas, Moroccan commissioner to Algeria, arranged 
to have the French President met at Algiers by a 
special commission. But when Guebbas suggested that 
President Loubet give a formal assurance that France 
intended to guarantee the independence of Morocco, 
and to support the Sultan in accordance with the 
regime prescribed in the accords of 1902, it was found 
inexpedient to comply. As M. Victor Berard sums up 
the situation: *'the two friends, France and Maghzen, 
are not yet bound to each other by definite and public 
words, by engagements taken in the face of Europe 
with the knowledge and in the sight of the Powers ; a 
third when he comes will be able to join in our tete-a- 
tete, and it is William II who will come to proclaim 
himself the friend, the defender and the only faithful 
ally of Morocco." ^^ 

Then followed one mistake after another. M. Revoil, 
whose experience was almost invaluable in the critical 
situation, was allowed to resign. M. Jonnart, the new 
governor-general of Algeria, commemorated his ar- 
rival by ordering General O'Connor to bombard the 
ksour of Figuig, an error from many points of view. 
True enough, melinite was far more persuasive than 
kind words, but any possible advantage gained was 
destroyed by the ill-advised speech of General O'Con- 
nor, when he declared that France was not upholding 
the authority of the Sultan as against the Pretender.^* 

21 Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 50. 

22 Berard, "L'Affaire Marocaine," p. 90. 

23 Ren6 Pinon, "L'Empire de la Mediterranee," p. 75 ; see also 
Berard, op. cit., p. 91. 



150 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY, 

Yet if not upholding the Sultan's authority by what 
right were French forces fighting on Moorish soil? 
Well might an English journalist just returned from 
the Sultan's domains assert that the whole affair was a 
tragi-comedy stage-managed by General O'Connor. 
Then he pertinently inquired how France could explain 
the building of a railway on Moorish territory at Beni- 
Ourif the southernmost oasis of the Figuig group.^* 
Instead of improving conditions, the attack provoked a 
continuous guerilla warfare directed against the French 
by the tribes of the Southwest. While M. Delcasse was 
declaring that **the anarchy which now exists in the 
Shereefian Empire should not be attributed to the 
Shereef, who is in no way responsible for these acts 
committed for the most part by natives wholly outside 
the imperial authority, "^^ M. Jonnart was declaring 
that in his opinion ''the responsibility of the Moroccan 
Government is directly engaged in these recent inci- 
dents."^® That conditions were such that they could 
not possibly continue, is indicated by Mr. W. B. Harris, 
the "Times" correspondent, whose position at the 
Shereefian court rivaled that of the Kaid MacLean. 
After describing the anarchy existing in the country, 
the bankruptcy of the government, Mr. Harris, who 
had always been accused of Franco-phobe tendencies, 
declared that there was no other choice but this: "the 
intervention of France — the only Power who would 
undertake the task — or a state of anarchy impossible 
to imagine, in which the young Sultan, who never ceased 

24Bensusan, "Great Britain, France and the Moorish Empire," Con. 
Rev., Nov. 1903. 

25 Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 132. 
2G Ibid., No. 125. 



EUEOPEAN RIVALEY IN MOROCCO 151 

to desire improvement and reform, would disap- 
pear. ' ' 27 ^ji(j ^jiis ^ag written at least six months be- 
fore the accords between Great Britain and France 
were signed. 

To one other cause, also, must be attributed the lack 
of decision evident in French policy in Morocco, and 
that was the oppositionj)f the Socialist party. While j. 
both the colonial" party and "the'Bociairsts believed in ^„.^ 
a policy of peaceful penetration, their ideas of what 
constituted peaceful penetration were far different. 
While the government wished to support the Maghzen 
in putting down the insurrection, M. Jaures insisted 
upon making agreements with the various tribes sepa- 
rately. He thought that if the tribes could be shown 
that France had no intention of exploiting them, if by 
the construction of schools, hospitals, railways, reserve 
depots of food in case of famine, France would amelio- 
rate their condition, the tribes would quickly appreciate 
the benefits of civilization.^^ M. Sabatier wanted to 
know if peaceful penetration consisted in constructing 
railways and then being forced to send troops to pro- 
tect them and permit their functioning; or did it con- 
sist in constructing markets and hospitals on the 
Algerian frontier, as France had been doing for the 
past sixty years ? Either Morocco would remain a hot- 
bed of anarchy, famine, and typhus, utterly lost to 
humanity, or it must come under the protection of 
France.^^ 

27 W. B. Harris, "England, France and Morocco," Nat. Eev., Nov. 
1903. 

28 For a complete exposition of the views of M. Jaurfes on Moroccan 
policy see Ken6 Moulin, "Une Annge de Politique Exterieure," Chap. II. 

29 Camille Sabatier, "La Penetration Pacifique et le Maroc," Kev. 
Pol. et Pari., Jan. 1904. 



152 FEENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

It is evident that the Moroccan policy was subservi- 
ent to the diplomatic situation in Europe. France 
proposed to allow Morocco to stew in its own juice, 
until the table in Europe had been cleared. But there 
was need of haste, for Europe could not endure for- 
ever a nuisance on her very door-yard. What France 
continued to look upon as an Algerian question, might 
very rapidly develop into a question for Europe. 
But with the signing of the Accords of April 8, 1904, 
with Great Britain, France might well consider that 
the crucial phase of the situation had been passed. 
It still remained to come to an agreement with Spain, 
also to have the Sultan recognize the validity of these 
engagements made without his permission or his cog- 
nizance. But these tasks might well seem insignificant 
compared with the one already achieved. 

Spain had already refused to enter into an agree- 
ment with France regarding Morocco, lest Great 
Britain should take offence. Great Britain had not 
carried her scruples quite so far ; yet as we have seen 
in the secret articles of the Accord of April 8, she had 
taken care to safeguard what she considered Spain's 
legitimate interests, especially since they corresponded 
very closely to her own. In the picturesque phrase of 
a French writer, ''With France excluded from Tan- 
gier, the British Government becomes the only porter 
of the pillars of Hercules as she is already that of the 
Suez Canal. ' ' ^^ The next question was whether Spain 
would be willing to accept an arrangement which had 
apportioned out her sphere of influence without inviting 

30 Rene Millet, "L'Accord Franco-Espagnol," Rev. Pol. et Pari., Nov. 
1904. 



EUEOPEAN BIVALEY IN MOKOCCO 153 

her into the discussion. The Spanish-American war 
had been a terrific blow to the prestige of Spain, and 
the pride of Castille and Aragon must not be trailed in 
the dust. When the question was raised in the Cortez 
strenuous opposition was raised to submitting to any 
such arrangement. Senor Nocedal declared that Spain 
alone possessed rights in Morocco, Senor Villaneuva 
found the Franco-English accord extremely prejudicial 
to Spanish interests in Morocco. Fortunately for the 
success of the negotiations, Senor Maura, President 
of the Council, was not moved by the opposition. In 
a lengthy speech he asserted that the idea, fostered by 
the press, that Spain's interests had been disregarded 
and her prestige lowered by the Franco-English accord 
was contrary to the facts. Spain must realize that 
Charles V. was no longer on the throne, and that the 
country which had performed the arduous task of con- 
quering Algeria, must necessarily have certain inter- 
ests in the country bordering its western frontier. 
''We have a sacred historic right but not the only 
one. The government is maintaining the rights of the 
Spanish nation and taking care to assure its future 
expansion. Our influence in Morocco will perhaps be 
increased by the present negotiations but in no case 
you may be convinced will it be diminished. ' ' ^* 

Senor Maura was not mis-stating his position. 
Spain's rights were to be maintained, and it was only 
after months of difficult negotiations that France was 
able to gain her ends. Spain had the whip-hand and 
she drove a hard bargain. The agreement finally 
reached, October 3, 1904, consisted of a short public 

31 Ques. Dip. et Col., June 16, 1904. See also Moulin, op. cit., p. 72. 



154 FRENCH FOEEIGN POLICY; 

declaration, and a secret convention comprising sixteen 
articles. The terms indicated that France was forced 
to pay dearly for the offers which she had made to 
Spain in 1901 and 1902. The public declaration was as 
enlightening as the utterance of a Delphic oracle. It 
simply stated that the two governments had fixed the 
extent of their rights and the guarantee of their inter- 
ests in Morocco; Spain adhered to the Anglo-French 
Declaration of April 8, 1904; and both again main- 
tained their attachment to the integrity of the Moorish 
Empire under the sovereignty of the Sultan.^^ The 
secret convention was far from being ambiguous. In 
fact it attempted to settle the Moroccan question as 
far as France and Spain were concerned under every 
possible contingency. It is not essential to give in 
detail the clauses of the treaty, but it is very necessary 
to note carefully the contents of certain articles.^^ 

In Article I Spain again stated her adherence to the 
Anglo-French Declaration of April 8, 1904, but the fol- 
lowing articles indicated that this adherence was rather 
to the secret part of the Anglo-French Declaration 
than to the clauses published, for very careful provi- 
sion was made in case the integrity of Morocco under 
the Sultan's sovereignty should be maintained, "owing 
to the weakness of that government and to its con- 
tinued inability to uphold law and order. ..." By 
the secret arrangement Spain not only obtained the 
northern territory of the Eiff, from the Moulouya to 
Larache, but also a long stretch of the Atlantic coast 
and its hinterland in the South, extending from her 

' 82 Doc. Dip., "AflFaires du Maroc" (1901-1905), No. 187. 

33 Text of the secret articles may be found in British and Foreign 
State Papers, Vol. 102, p. 432. 



EUROPEAN RIVALRY IN MOROCCO 155 

Rio de Ora possessions as far as the Wad Sus, just 
south of Agadir. It was further provided that so long 
as the status quo continued, each might have certain 
privileges in its respective zone, but if the Sultan's 
sovereignty should disappear, each nation might con- 
sider the territories delimited as constituting its own 
sphere of influence. It was further complicated by 
Spain engaging herself for the period of fifteen years 
not to exercise her rights of action in her zone of influ- 
ence except with the consent of France, while France 
had full powers to exercise her field of action in the 
zone ascribed to Spain, after first informing the King 
of Spain of the action she intended to take. Thus 
each nation was provided for in case Morocco should 
cease to be independent, and France was given the 
privilege of maintaining the Sultan's power even over 
the Spanish Zone, if she deemed this course of action 
best.^* It would have been well if the declaration had 
ended here, but by Article X it was further provided 
that ''so long as the present political status lasts, 
schemes for public works, railways, roads, and canals 
. . . shall be executed by such companies as may be 
formed by Frenchmen and Spaniards." It was not 
necessar}^ to state that if the status quo changed such 
undertakings would be confined exclusively to the citi- 
zens of their respective countries. This was a clear 
violation of the open door policy. Although both 
France and Spain subscribed to the fourth article of 
the Anglo-French Accord, which maintained the prin- 
ciple of commercial liberty, they now proceeded to 

34 For a comprehensive survey of Franco-Spanish relations, 1902-1912, 
see Andrg Tardieu, "France et Espagne," Rev. de Deux Mondes, Dec. 
1, 1912, 



156 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

place all further economic undertakings entirely in 
their own hands. Great Britain could not object be- 
cause she had been paid her price, but how about other 
nations having commercial or economic interests 
there ? ^^ Evidently they might object. The only solu- 
tion was secrecy, a nation cannot object to what it does 
not know. However, if a secret shared is no longer a 
secret, a secret agreement is paradoxical; better an 
open covenant of fraud than a secret covenant of faith. 
Nemesis trails with ease the devious paths of secret 
diplomacy, but let us not anticipate her vengence. 

3. GERMAN ATTITUDE TO THE FRENCH POLICY IN MOROCCO 

At last France could turn her undivided attention to 
Morocco. The diplomatic preparation had been con- 
cluded. Italy, Great Britain and Spain had been 
brought out, it remained to be seen whether France 
might profit from her investment. Conditions in Mo- 
rocco seemed to be going from bad to worse. Bu- 
Hamara was not to have a clear field in his attempt to 
profit through the chaotic situation. The bandit Rai- 
suli, one fine May morning arrived in the environs of 
Tangier, and stopping at one of the country villas, 
seized one of the notables of the foreign colony, Mr. 
Perdicaris, a naturalized American, and his son-in-law, 
Mr. Varley, a British subject, and held them for ran- 
som.^® The question was immediately raised in France 
whether the United States would recognize the para- 

35 It is essential to note the clear distinction made by France between 
commercial and economic liberty. Note also that these secret articles 
do not violate the Madrid convention if we regard the most favored 
nation clause as referring essentially to commerce. See Oct. 18, Madrid 
Convention. Martens, Recueil, 2d series, Vol. VI, p. 629. 

36 Doc. Dip., op. cit.. No. 16a. 



EUROPEAN EIVALRY IN MOROCCO 157 

mount interest of France in Morocco in accordance with 
the recently announced agreement with Great Britain, 
or would she go directly to the Sultan. The sending 
of a naval squadron under Admiral Chadwick looked 
ominous at first, remembering America's traditional 
method of treating with Barbary states, but at the same 
time the American ambassador, General Porter, asked 
M. Delcasse to have the French Government use its 
good offices in the affair.^'^ The recognition by the 
.United States of the new condition of affairs in Mo- 
rocco was regarded as a diplomatic victory for France, 
but the condition which made it necessary for America 
to ask for her good offices pointed clearly to France 
the necessity for her immediate intervention. In the 
meantime, the Sultan, informed by both Great Britain 
and France that he would be held responsible for the 
captives, met all the demands of the bandit. These not 
only included a large monetary indemnity, but the dis- 
placement of certain officials, the surrender of numer- 
ous prisoners, and as a crowning indignity, the appoint- 
ment of Raisuli as the governor of two villages in the 
vicinity of Tangier.^^ 

Following the Raisuli episode, the European in- 
habitants of Tangier petitioned the diplomatic corps 
that immediate measures be taken to safeguard their 
lives and their interests, and M. Saint-Rene Taillan- 
dier, the French minister at Tangier, informed M. 
Delcasse that all his colleagues, including the German 
representative, wanted to know what measures France 
intended to take to reestablish security.^^ France had 

37 Ibid., No. 164. 

38 Ibid., No. 167. 

39 Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 178. 



158 FEENCH FOEEIGN POLICYi 

already notified the Maghzen of the Franco-British 
agreement concerning Morocco, assuring the Shereef 
of *'the fundamental interest which France had both 
in the independence and sovereignty of the Morrocan 
Empire, which is contiguous to its African posses- 
sions, ' ' and the desire of France to aid the Shereefian 
Government to inaugurate the necessary reforms, 
under conditions favorable to the interests of both 
countries.^*' The Sultan, through his Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, had given an *' implicit acceptance" 
to the agreement.^^ As a temporary measure France 
sent two cruisers to Tangier, and also succeeded in 
securing the permission of the Sultan to put a French 
captain in charge of the garrison at Tangier with a 
view to its reorganization.^^ France had also taken 
up the question of financing the Moroccan Government ; 
for unless this were done, the country would be com- 
pletely bankrupt before reforms could be introduced. 
On June 12, 1904, a group of French banks agreed to 
a loan of sixty-two and one half million francs at a five 
per cent, rate of interest, the bonds maturing in thirty- 
six years.*^ Finally in December, 1904, M. Taillandier 
was authorized to go to Fez, with a definite program of 
the reforms which France considered essential.** He 
had hardly received his instructions before a letter 
from the Shereefian Government informed him that 
the Sultan had given orders for the dismissal of all the 
military missions at Fez and at Eabat, with a view to 

40 Ibid., No. 159 annexe. 

41 Ibid., No. 177. 

42 Ibid., No. 183. 

43 Ibid., No. 170 and annexes, 

44 Ibid., No. 208. 



EUROPEAN RIVALRY IN MOROCCO 159 

curtailing expenses.*^ At the same time it was 
learned that two ministers of the government, regarded 
as being favorable to the French, had been dismissed. 
As the officers of the commissions were especially those 
whom France had placed at the disposal of the Sultan 
for the reorganization of his army, the order to dismiss 
them was an overt act of hostility towards France. 
The French minister immediately threatened a sever- 
ance of diplomatic relations.^^ The threat sufficed, 
and His Shereefian Majesty expressed the most pro- 
found regret that his policy of retrenchment did not 
find favor in the eyes of the French Government, and 
urged that the prospective mission to Fez be des- 
patched without delay, that His Majesty might con- 
vince the French Government of his most favorable 
sentiments towards it.^^ His apologies were accepted, 
and the mission proceeded upon its way, but the first 
indication had been given that sinister forces were at 
work undermining the successful prosecution of the 
new French policy in Morocco. 

If France were unaware both of the extent and char- 
acter of these influences, she was to receive a most 
sudden and rude awakening. On February 11, 1905, 
the French charge d'affaires at Tangier sent the follow- 
ing despatch to M. Delcasse, as being the declarations 
made to him by his German colleague: ''After the 
Franco-English accord," said Herr von Kuhlmann, 
''we supposed that the French Government was wait- 
ing, in order to inform us of a new situation, until the 
Franco-Spanish entente provided for in the arrange- 

45 Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 209. 

46 Ibid., No. 213. 

47 Ibid., No. 216. 



160 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

ment of April 8 should be effected. But to-day every- 
thing being definitely concluded, and the parliamentary 
ratifications having intervened, we perceive that we 
have been systematically held apart. We have conse- 
quently fixed our attitude, nor am I tracing a line of 
conduct on my own initiative. In presence of the con- 
tradictory interpretations of our newspapers, I be- 
lieved it necessary to solicit formal instructions from 
my government. Thereupon Count von Biilow in- 
formed me that the Imperial Government was wholly 
ignorant of the accords intervening on the subject of 
Morocco, and did not recognize itself as bound in any 
manner as regards this question." ^^ 

Was it true that M. Delcasse had left Germany wholly 
ignorant of these accords, which were to give France 
the opportunity so long desired, of completing her 
North African empire? Was it possible that a man as 
skilled in diplomacy as M. Delcasse, would have worked 
so long and so patiently to gain the adherence of Italy, 
Spain, and Great Britain to the colonial projects of 
France, and deliberately ignore the one power which 
was ever watching, ever waiting, across the Eastern 
frontier, to finish the work begun at Sedan? For it 
was not enough to say that Germany had no political 
interests there, that her interests were only com- 
mercial, and these interests had been safeguarded. As 
a signatory of the Treaty of Madrid in 1880, and as a 
power which did have commercial interests there, she 
surely deserved to receive at least official notice of the 
new situation. This was very well recognized in 
France. As far back as November, 1902, the ''Eclair" 

*8 Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 224. 



EUROPEAN RIVALRY IN MOROCCO 161 

published an interview with a personage closely in 
touch with the foreign and colonial policy of France, 
in which he declared: *' Above all do not forget that 
for the solution of the Moroccan question, we must take 
count of three powers: Great Britain, Germany, and 
Spain. We shall only be able to arrive at a satisfac- 
tory result if we succeed in coming to an agreement 
with all three. To treat with one of the three, to the 
exclusion of the two others, would be the most serious 
fault that we could commit. ' ' ^^ Surely it might be con- 
sidered almost as serious to treat with two of the 
powers and disregard the third, especially if Germany 
should be the third power. Had M. Delcasse made 
such an inexcusable diplomatic faux pas? Had Ger- 
many received no official notification? Let us consider 
the evidence. 

In the Yellow Books on Morocco we find that on 
March 25, 19G4, M. Bihourd, French ambassador at 
Berlin, informed M. Delcasse that on March 20, the 
Wurtemburg Pan-Germans had urged the Imperial 
Government to profit by the occasion to extend its 
economic interests in Morocco, and if the status quo 
should not be maintained, that Germany be ready to 
take the western region and occupy Agadir. In the 
same despatch, however, M. Bihourd quotes the North 
German '* Gazette" to the fact that "by reason of the 
reiterated assurance, and given officially by France, 
that she has in view neither conquest nor occupation, 
we may believe that the German commercial interests 
in Morocco are not threatened, therefore, we have no 
reason to envisage with malevolent eyes the Franco- 
is Quoted in Ques. Dip. et Col., Nov. 15, 1902. 



162 TEENCH T^OEEIGN POLICY 

English entente in preparation."^^ In his reply on 
March 27, M. Delcasse informed M. Bihonrd of a con- 
versation which he had recently had with Prince Kado- 
lin, the German ambassador to Paris. In reply to 
questions concerning the projected arrangement, M. 
Delcasse informed Prince Eadolin that an entente was 
very possible between Great Britain and France in 
regard to Morocco and other questions, but France 
intended to maintain both the political and territorial 
situation unchanged, and commercial liberty would be 
fully respected. M. Delcasse ended with these words : 
*'Tou may in your conversations with the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs make use of this interview." ^^ Thus, 
two weeks before the accord with Britain was signed, 
M. Delcasse had authorized the regularly accredited 
diplomatic representative of the French Government 
at Berlin, to acquaint the German Government of the 
intended arrangement, and to promise guarantees of 
commercial liberty. 

The next mention of the subject in the Yellow Books 
is a despatch from M. Bihourd, dated April 12, 1904, 
and summarizing the attitude of the German press on 
the Accords as published. A few editors thought 
Eussia had reason to object, but from the German 
standpoint there was nothing in the arrangements 
detrimental to German interests. ^^ M. Delcasse in his 
next despatch to Germany wished to know if M. 
Bihourd had found opportunity to utilize his telegram 
of March 27.^^ This would indicate M. Delcasse 's de- 

50 Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 141. 

51 Ibid., No. 142. 

52 Ibid., No. 145. 

53 Ibid., No. 147. 



EUROPEAN RIVALRY IN MOROCCO 163 

sire to be certain that Germany had received official 
notice. That Count von Biilow was not ignorant of the 
arrangements is indicated by his speech in the Reichs- 
tag, April 12, 1904. Replying to a question on the 
subject he declared that Germany had no objection to 
make from the viewpoint of German interests, their 
interests in Morocco were chiefly commercial, and it 
was to their advantage that peace and order reign at 
Morocco.^* Two days later Herr Bebel raised the 
question of Germany's isolation, and Count von Re- 
ventlow wanted to know why Germany allowed other 
powers to take precedence in Morocco. To the first 
the German Chancellor replied that Germany was still 
allied to two great powers, in friendly alliance with 
five others, on friendly terms with France, and in- 
tended to remain so. To von Reventlow he sarcasti- 
cally replied by a simple question. Would the Count 
have a great country like Germany make such a demand 
without being ready to enforce it, and would he be 
willing to plunge the country in such an adventure? 
At a time when the Far East was already engulfed in 
war he thought a policy of calm and reserve most 
fitting.^^ 

On April 18, 1904, M. Delcasse again authorized M. 
Bihourd to repeat to the Foreign Secretary (i. e.. Baron 
von Richthofen) the declarations already made, assur- 
ing him that the arrangements did not interfere with 
the existing interests of any power,^^ and on April 27, 
M. Bihourd assured M. Delcasse that he had done so.^''' 

64 Ibid., No. 150 (annexe) or "Fiirst Biilow^ Reden," Vol. II, p. 74. 

55 "Fiirst Bulows Reden," Vol. II, pp. 80 and 90. 

56 Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 152. 

57 Ibid., No. 155. 



164 FEENCH FOEEIGN POLICY 

Upon the signing of the accord with Spain M. Delcasse 
sent copies of the Declaration to the French ambassa- 
dors accredited at the various capitals including Berlin, 
and the very next day M. Bihourd notified M. Delcasse 
that he had made Baron von Eichthofen acquainted 
with the new situation, and had assured him that com- 
mercial liberty assured by the Franco-English accord 
had been again guaranteed by this.^® However, M. 
Delcasse went even further. On October 12, he wrote 
to M. Bihourd as follows: *'The declarations that I 
have made to Prince Eadolin last March, and of which 
I have informed you, have kept the German govern- 
ment in touch with our intentions in Morocco. It has 
had from that moment the assurance that from the 
point of view of commercial transactions, everyone 
would benefit from the new order to be established, 
and that commercial liberty would be vigorously and 
entirely respected. ... In obtaining the adhesion of 
the Spanish government to the principle of commer- 
cial liberty inscribed in the Declaration of April 8, 
we have again augmented the guarantees which inter- 
national commerce will enjoy in Morocco. You may 
declare this to the Baron von Eichthofen with the 
greatest clearness." ^^ Again M. Bihourd notified the 
German foreign secretary, and again he was assured 
that Germany's interest in Morocco was exclusively 
economic.^" 

It might be well to take note at this point of the ex- 
act phraseology of M. Delcasse 's despatches and the 
German replies. In every case M. Delcasse gave as- 

68 Ibid., Nos. 187 and 189. 

59 Ibid., No. 191. 

60 Ibid., No. 192. 



EUROPEAN RIVALRY IN MOROCCO 165 

siirance that commercial liberty had been guaranteed, 
but in no statement, either in his diplomatic corre- 
spondence or in his speeches in the Chamber, does he 
mention any guarantee of economic liberty. Thus he 
is not contradicting the secret articles of either ar- 
rangement, for both of them guarantee commercial 
liberty, but neither makes any pretense of guarantee- 
ing economic liberty. In fact as we have already in- 
dicated, the secret articles of the Spanish accord baldly 
announce that economic developments are to be con- 
fined to French and Spanish capital. From the French 
point of view this distinction is vital, because of what 
value would Morocco be to France if she took upon 
herself the weighty task of bringing order out of the 
chaos existing there — a program entailing a stupend- 
ous sacrifice of blood and treasure, as she knew to her 
sorrow from her experience with Algeria — unless she 
had as compensation, the privilege of keeping the 
economic development of the country in her own hands. 
In the German utterances the same distinction does 
not seem to be made. Count von Biilow in his speech 
of April 12, 1904, before the Reichstag, does declare 
that Germany's interests are above all commercial 
{vor allem hommerzielle) , but in almost the same 
breath he speaks of their interests in the Mediter- 
ranean, and especially in Morocco, as being for the 
most part economic {im wesentlichen wirtshaftlich) .^^ 
That is, Germany not only wished her commercial in- 
terests of the present guaranteed, but also her economic 
interests of the future. 
We have laid special stress upon the many occasions 

^1 "Furst Billows Eeden," Vol. II, p. 74. 



166 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

and the various means which M. Delcasse employed 
to make sure that the German government was being 
kept in touch with the arrangements France was mak- 
ing in regard to Morocco, because as we shall see later, 
he was accused both in Germany and in France of hav- 
ing kept Germany entirely in the dark, and this seemed 
to be regarded as his principal offense. So as might 
have been expected, when M. Delcasse received the 
startling announcement from the French charge d'af- 
faires at Tangier, that the Imperial government was 
wholly ignorant of any accords concerning Morocco, 
and did not recognize itself bound in any way in this 
question, M. Delcasse immediately telegraphed M. 
Bihourd at Berlin, asking him to refresh the memory 
of the German foreign minister with a detailed enu- 
meration of the facts.^2 When M. Bihourd called at 
the WiUielmstrasse, the foreign secretary was not to 
be seen, but the under secretary, Herr von Miihlberg 
replied that he knew nothing of the statement made by 
the German representative at Tangier, but he won- 
dered if Herr von Kuhlmann's declarations should not 
be interpreted that the German government, being a 
stranger to the two accords, did not consider itself 
bound by them. M. Bihourd was forced to content 
himself with this interpretation ; Germany was not yet 
quite ready to show her hand.^^ 

In the meantime M. Saint Rene Taillandier, the 
French plenipotentiary to Fez, was having great dif- 
ficulty in his atttempt to bring to the Sultan's atten- 
tion the French program of reforms. Arriving in the 

62 Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 225. 

63 Ibid., No. 226. 



EUROPEAN RIVALRY IN MOROCCO 167 

middle of January, 1905, he found the Sultan unex- 
pectedly unwilling to take the responsibility of con- 
senting to his demands without discussing them in 
Council, a most exceptional procedure. Not until Feb- 
ruary 22 was the first conference held, and the sit- 
tings dragged along through the month of March. 
While M. Saint Rene Taillandier was still patiently 
expounding his program of remedies for the evil con- 
dition of affairs into which Morocco had fallen, and 
informing the Sultan that the Powers particularly in- 
terested in Moroccan affairs had not only recognized 
in France the right, but imposed upon her the duty of 
effecting the necessary reforms. Kaiser Wilhelm II, 
cruising on the Mediterranean, disembarked at Tangier 
March 31, 1904 and played the role of a veritable deus 
ex machina. Replying to the address of welcome de- 
livered by the Sultan's uncle, the Kaiser made clear 
to the world the German position on the Moroccan 
question : 

*'It is to the Sultan in his position of an independent 
sovereign that I am paying my visit to-day. I hope 
that under the sovereignty of the Sultan, a free Mo- 
rocco will remain open to the peaceful rivalry of all 
nations, without monopoly or annexation, on the basis 
of absolute equality. My visit to Tangier has had as 
its object, to make it known that I am determined to 
do all that is in my power to safeguard efficaciously the 
interests of Germany in Morocco, since I consider the 
Sultan as an absolutely independent sovereign. It is 
with him that I wish to come to an understanding as 
to the proper means to safeguard these interests. As 
for the reforms which the Sultan intends to make, it 



168 FKENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

seems to me that it is necessary to proceed with great 
precaution, having regard for the religious sentiments 
of the population, that the public order may not be dis- 
turbed. "«* 

France had settled the Moroccan question to the 
satisfaction of Great Britain, Spain and Italy, but not 
to the satisfaction of Germany. Geographically, Ger- 
many could not have the same legitimate interest in 
Morocco, which all three of the other powers possessed 
I who had colonial interests on the northern coast of 
I Africa. Politically, she had repeatedly declared her 
' complete indifference. Commercially, her trade with 
Morocco was less than one-fourth of that of either 
Great Britain or France, and her commercial liberty 
had been guaranteed under the new accords. True 
enough, she had been a signatory of the Treaty of 
Madrid, but so had the United States, Belgium, Por- 
tugal, Austria, and Scandinavian states, and they 
found no complaint with the new Moroccan policy of 
\ France. "Why then had Germany changed her Mo- 
I roccan policy, since Chancellor von Biilow had pub- 
j licly declared that Germany had nothing to object to 
I in these accords 1 Inasmuch as Herr Bebel asked the 
^ same question in the Reichstag just two days before 
the Kaiser's speech at Tangier, we shall let Count von 
Billow answer it: ''Herr Bebel has let it be under- 
stood that our policy towards Morocco has changed 
since a year ago. I must first recall to him that the 
language and attitude of diplomats and policies change 
according to circumstances. I choose the moment 
which I consider favorable for the production of our 

64 Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 234. 



EUROPEAN RIVALRY IN MOROCCO 169 

interests. As a matter of fact nothing has changed 
in the tendencies of the German policy on this point. 
He who looks for a fait nouveau will not find it in the 
German policy. ' ' ®^ 

The Chancellor was only following the trail blazed 
by his predecessors in German diplomacy, in bending 
circumstances to his ends. When Great Britain and 
France had signed the accords, conditions were not 
suitable for a protest from Germany. A year later 
important events had taken place both in Europe and 
in France which gave Germany her opportunity to 
strike. The fait nouveau was not in the German policy, 
but in the fact that the German policy could at last 
come out in the open. Going back once more to Count 
von Billow's speech of April 12, 1904, we can find the 
clue to his whole subsequent action. Replying to the 
complaint of Count von Reventlow that he should not 
let other powers obtain greater influence in Morocco 
than Germany, he replied: "If you wish to create 
surfaces of irritation everywhere you do not cry it 
from the housetops. Frederic the Great has perhaps 
now and then played a game of chess in politics worthy 
of Machiavelli, but not until after he had written 
against Machiavelli. " ^*^ It remains to be seen whether 
von Billow's Moroccan policy proved itself worthy of 
either Machiavelli or Frederic the Great. 

65 "Furst Billows Eeden," Vol. 11, p. 209. 

66 Ibid., II, 91. 



CHAPTER VII 
THE FALL OF DELCASSE 

1. PREPARATIONS FOR THE KAISER'S VISIT TO TANGIER 

VAEIOUS reasons have been given for the 
Kaiser's coup de theatre at Tangier, and also for 
the fact that a year was allowed to elapse between the 
signing of the accords between France and Great Brit- 
ain and the descent at Tangier. Chancellor von 
Billow, who confesses that it was in pursuance of his 
advice that the German Emperor gave the world warn- 
ing that Germany had important interests in Morocco 
and intended to protect them, in a communication to 
Prince Radolin, German ambassador to France, dated 
April 11, 1905, sums up the situation somewhat as fol- 
lows: Since by the Anglo-French convention it was 
provided that the status quo should be maintained, 
Gern],any made no move until the French minister at 
Tangier presented a program of reforms which were 
impossible to put into effect without upsetting the 
status quo. When M. Saint Rene Taillandier declared 
to the Maghzen that he presented this program as 
mandatory of the European Powers, Germany ob- 
jected, since the French ambassador had most cer- 
tainly not received a mandate from Germany. The 
German viewpoint was that this attempt of France in- 
jured the interests of all those states which had par- 
ticipated previously in Moroccan conferences, and 

170 



THE FALL OF DELCASSE 171 

which France had neglected to consult. England and 
Spain could dispose of the rights of their own subjects 
in Morocco if they wished, but they could not pretend 
to dispose of the rights of Germans. Germany inter- 
vened to protect her interests, which were being dis- 
regarded without asking her consent. The importance 
of these interests was secondary ; it was not necessary 
to prove that Germany had important economic inter- 
ests in Morocco. If these minor interests should be 
abandoned without protest the world would think that 
similar action would be permissible where larger in- 
terests were at stake. The German situation was well 
summed up in a French phrase: "Get animal est tres 
mediant, quand on Vattaque il se defend." ^ 

On the following day, in a despatch to the German 
embassies in the various capitals of Europe, von 
Billow made M. Delcasse responsible for the German 
action and indicated that the German plan was for a 
new conference: *'It is false that the Franco-English 
convention concerning Morocco has been brought to the 
knowledge of the German government either verbally 
or hy writing. M. Delcasse, it is true, did give here 
and there to the Imperial ambassador some general al- 
lusions to the untenable situation in Morocco, and to 
the necessity for France to consider the security of 
her Algerian frontier. But when last summer, long- 
after the Anglo-French convention, the German am- 
bassador addressed to M. Delcasse a question in re- 
gard to the tenor of this convention, the foreign min- 
ister merely replied: ' Sie finden das alles im Gelh- 

1 The original text of the Grerman White Book on Morocco, with a 
French translation attached, may be found in the Archives Diplo- 
matiques 1906, Vol. 97, p. 275 et seq. 



172 FEENCH FOEEIGN POLICY: 

buch/ " ^ We have already given a complete enumera- 
tion of the various ways in which M. Delcasse did bring 
the matter to the attention of the German government ; 
hence it is not necessary to point out the false impres- 
sion conveyed by the Chancellor's statement. It may 
be worth while to note, however, that there is no rule 
in international law, nor has it been established by 
diplomatic usage, that a convention between two na- 
tions shall be communicated either in writing or 
verbally to all other nations whose interests may be 
touched by it. All rules established by the comity of 
nations will have been complied with if the communi- 
cation is made in any way recognized by diplomatic 
usage. Surely a verbal communication by a regularly 
accredited ambassador would more than meet these 
requirements. After thus attempting to make M. Del- 
casse responsible for Germany's action, the Chancellor 
concluded by declaring that the German government 
did not expect to obtain special advantages by means 
of a particular treaty, but considered a new confer- 
ence of the contracting states as the best means of 
bringing about a peaceful solution of the conflict of 
interests.^ 

In neither of these explanations do we find that any 
claim is made that France has injured German inter- 
ests ; the one and only reason seemed to be that France 
had dared to conclude conventions which might be 
detrimental to German interests in Morocco. In his 
*' Imperial Germany," written several years later, 
Prince von Btilow gives one reason which may have 

2 Ibid., p. 278. 

3 Arch. Dip., op. cit., p. 279. 



THE FALL OF DELCASSE 173 

had some weight: ** There was a fairly widespread 
belief in Germany that France would meet with diffi- 
culties and hindrances in Morocco which would para- 
lyze her military, financial and political striking power 
in Europe ; but this theory would not hold water. . . . 
It was much more probable that France would in 
course of time considerably reinforce her 'black 
troops,' her army of native Africans, by forming new 
companies and squadrons from the promising material 
offered by Morocco," * 

Unquestionably both of these reasons had some in- 
fluence in bringing about German intervention, but 
it is just as certain that there were many other and 
equally important reasons which do not appear in 
the explanations given by the German Chancellor. 
Looking back over the course of French foreign policy 
since M. Delcasse entered the Quai d'Orsay in 1898, 
we find a continuous series of checks for German di- 
plomacy. First it was the affair of the Portuguese 
colonies, which while M. Hanotaux was foreign min- 
ister had progressed favorably, but which came to a 
sudden halt when M. Delcasse took hold. Germany 
was checkmated again by France during the Boer War, 
when Eussia at Germany's request, suggested that 
France join with them to intervene in favor of the 
Boers, but upon the basis of the status quo. France 
next proceeded to weaken the Triple Alliance by draw- 
ing Italy into friendly relations, and followed that up 
by a rapprochement with England. Germany's posi- 
,tion as arbiter of Europe, which Bismarck had so clev- 
erly planned, was being undermined by the very power 

*Von Billow, "Imperial Germany," p. 95. 



174 FEENCH FOREIGN POLICY; 

against which he had reinsured her so carefully. At 
the same time Germany saw the gap widening between 
herself and Great Britain. The Boer War had made 
the two peoples hostile; the interpretation of the Ac- 
cord of October 14, 1900, in regard to Manchuria, had 
divided the governments. Great Britain by allying 
herself with Japan, neutralized still further the weight 
of the Triplice. The Russo-Japanese War, in which 
Japan, the ally of Great Britain, and Russia, the ally 
of France, might not only destroy each other, but drag 
in their respective allies, had aroused new hopes of a 
situation which might profit Germany. The Kaiser 
did all in his power to encourage the Czar to fight to 
the end.^ The Dogger Bank affair seemed to be the 
spark needed to touch off the powder trains leading to 
France and Great Britain. But the newly formed 
Entente Cordiale proved itself a most vigilant fire 
warden, and the threatened explosion got no further 
than a mere flash in the pan. Germany made one more 
effort to profit through the war in the Far East. 
While urging the Czar to sign an alliance with Ger- 
many against Great Britain and Japan, — vnth a view 
to forcing France to throw over either the Russian 
Alliance or the Entente with England,^ — the Kaiser at 
the same time informed the United States that France, 
Great Britain, and Russia were engineering a great 
plot for the dismemberment of China, declaring that 
he had been invited to join but had refused categor- 
ically.'^ John Hay exploded this bubble very quickly, 

6 See the "Willy-Nicky Correspondence" for a clear side light on 
William's affectionate interest in his friend Nicholas' affairs. 
6 "Willy-Nickv Correspondence," No. 13. 
T W. R. Thayer, "Life of John Hay," Vol. II, 384. 



THE FALL OF DELCASSE 175 

and President Roosevelt interfered further with the 
Kaiser's plan of a guerre a Voutrance for Russia and 
Japan, by bringing the two combatants together. The 
Czar had spoiled the other scheme by suggesting that 
he first communicate the terms of the projected al- 
liance with Germany to France. 

So lorg as M. Delcasse was able to combat the 
diplomatic manoeuvres of the Wilhelmstrasse on fer- 
eign fields he was signally successful, but commencing 
with the year 1905 Germany brought the attack to 
French soil. On January 24, M. Combes worn out by 
his long struggle against the forces of clericalism, re- 
signed, and M. Rouvier was asked to form the new 
cabinet. We have already encountered M. Rouvier 
in connection with the Bagdad Railway. At that time, 
in his anxiety to have France participate in this under- 
taking, he had been drawn into playing Germany's 
game; but as we have already shown, M. Delcasse 
proved himself the more powerful, and the shares of 
the Bagdad Railway did not appear upon the Bourse at 
Paris. According to M. Andre Mevil, even during the 
formation of the Rouvier cabinet the German intrigues 
commenced to penetrate, and M. Delcasse was warned 
concerning them. It was even suggested that he per- 
suade President Loubet to try some other ministerial 
combination. In the newly formed Rouvier cabinet 
M. Delcasse was retained, but his departure from the 
foreign office was merely a question of time; even he 
could not successfully cope with the increasing hostil- 
ity of Germany, without backing at home. One French 
senator, who has acted as secretary of the Commission 
of Foreign Affairs, gives it as his opinion that the 



176 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

secret of Germany's attitude was that she found in 
France a support against the Minister of Foreign Af- 
fairs, in the person of M. Rouvier.^ 

The whole internal condition of France at this time 
was an urgent invitation to Germany to strike. The 
virus of the Dreyfus Affair had destroyed all confi- 
dence in the army; the struggle between the Church 
and the State had exhausted every energy of the gov- 
ernment. Internationalism and anti-militarism were 
rampant. The two years' service law, which reduced 
the length of service in the army from three to two 
years, and which had been under discussion by the gov- 
ernment for three years, passed in its final form just 
a fortnight before the Kaiser's visit to Tangier. Gen- 
eral Andre, in his hostility towards clericalism, had 
made the War Office a branch of the secret service, with 
the Masonic Order as his chief agent for spying and 
making delations. M. Pelletan had completely wrecked 
the morale of the marine. M. Jaures and his Socialist 
followers had become so strong that no government 
could exist without their support; M. Jaures, who as 
M. Pugliesi Conti declared in the Chamber, ''had re- 
cently sullied this tribune by the most abominable sac- 
rilege against our French sentiments, he whose tardy 
and obsequious compliments have gone to awaken in 
his tomb the Gallophobe Crispi, ' ' ^ — M. Jaures, who 

8 Georges Eeynald, "L'Oeuvre de M. Delcasse," p. 39. 

» Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 69, p. 210. In this same session, Jan- 
uary 23, 1903 M. Lasies called the attention of the Chamber to a 
brochure distributed to the new recruits in the army by the Federa- 
tion des bourses de travail, an organization subventioned by the gov- 
ernment and supported by M. Jaures, quoting as follows: "If you 
do not feel yourself able to support the vexations, the insults, the im- 
becilities, the punishment and all the shames which await you at the 



THE FALL OF DELCASSE 177 

wished to found the Republic Indestructible, not merely 
the French Eepublic, but the Republic of Europe, the 
Republic of Humanity. M. Lucien Millevoye, in com- 
batting these theories, asked the Socialists to remem- 
ber that while they were attempting to inscribe on the 
conscience of the universe their law of love and peace, 
others were maintaining graven on the threshold of 
their arsenals and barracks, their law of war and iron ; 
also that neither Attila, nor Ghengis-Khan, nor Ba- 
jazet could throw as many men upon the world as are 
found in a dozen corps of the German army; and that 
this mass of flesh and steel, with the most speedy and 
complete means of invasion at its disposal was at the 
bidding of one will, one order — one flash of lightning 
and there would follow the most frightful tempest that 
had ever devastated the universe.^** 

But such pleas were like voices crying in the wilder- 
ness; it seemed as though France had to be brought 
to the very brink of disaster before she could be made 
to realize the danger of her course. The one and only 
fault that may legitin];ately be found with the policy 
of M. Delcasse was that he did not take into considera- 
tion the internal condition of France in connection with 
its foreign relations. M. Combes in his struggle with 
the forces of clericalism, had no time left for watching 
over the conduct of foreign affairs. He gave M. Del- 
casse a free rein. But M. Delcasse placed too much 
confidence in the strength of his diplomatic props, and 
paid too little attention to the weakness of the military 

barracks, desert! This is far better than to serve as amusement for 
the alcoholic executioners and the mad fools that take care of you in 
the military prisons." 

10 Ibid., Vol. 69ii, p. 1311. 



178 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

and naval support upon which he must depend. He 
could not be entirely excused when he said: ''I do my 
own duty and presume that my colleagues do theirs." 
In the words of M. Andre Tardieu, M. Delcasse ''be- 
lieved that a diplomatic action was self-sufficing" . . . 
being aware that German opposition would be made, 
sooner or later, not to his Moroccan but to his general 
policy, he, however, did not perceive that a France half- 
disarmed both materially and morally was fatally con- 
demned to yield. He willed the end without willing 
the means.^^ On the other hand with the Rouvier 
ministry in control, M. Delcasse did not receive the 
backing that he had a right to expect; his carefully 
planned work was being undermined from within even 
before it was attacked from without. 

The only question in the mind of Chancellor von 
Billow was, when would be the best time to strike? 
Obviously with France's ally undertaking a war in 
the Far East, it would be well to await developments 
in that quarter. The initial disasters to the Russian 
Port Arthur and Vladivostok fleets might well be re- 
trieved. However when General Kuropatkin, early in 
September, lost the important battle of Liao-Yang, and 
was forced back upon Mukden, it was quite evident 
that the Japanese were superior on both land and sea. 
Port Arthur fell to the Japanese on January 2, 1905, 
and in the same month it was reported that Herr Kuhl- 
mann had remarked to a member of the French lega- 
tion at Tangier: **You are making a mistake not to 
come to an agreement with us. The Imperial initia- 

11 "France and the Alliances," p. 181. 



THE FALL OF DELCASSE 179 

tive is going to take a hand.'* ^^ On March 9 Kuroi 
patkin was forced to withdraw from Mukden, the de. 
cisive defeat of the war on land ; on March 25, Emperor 
William embarked for his trip on the Mediterranean, 
and on March 29, Chancellor von Bulow made the an- 
swer to Herr Bebel in regard to the change in German 
policy which we have already quoted, concluding with 
the statement that "if any attempt should be made to 
modify the international situation of Morocco or to es- 
tablish any check on the open door in the country's 
economic development it is our intention to see that 
our economic interests are not endangered. ' ' ^^ The 
Kaiser's visit to Tangier completed the first act of 
the Moroccan drama, with the Kaiser in the role of 
the rescuing hero, preserving the Sultan and his em- 
pire from the deep laid plots of M. Delcasse.^* 

2. GERMANY FORCES THE ISSUE 

Germany had made her move, and it was now the 
turn of France. On the same day that the Kaiser 
spoke at Tangier, the question of the German attitude 
on the Moroccan question was raised in the Senate. 
M. Delcasse was in the more difficult position, in that 

12 Eecouly, "Le Septenat de M. Delcass6," Eev. Pol. et Pari., June, 
1905. 

13 "Fiirst Billows Reden," Vol. II, p. 210. 

1* Tlie Kaiser almost wrecked the whole scheme by a sudden deci- 
sion not to visit Tangier. When his sudden change of mind was made 
known in Berlin veritable consternation reigned for a while. Finally 
the Chancellor telegraphed to Lisbon representing to the Emperor that 
the affair had already gone so far that it was impossible to recede 
withoiit completely disavowing his advisers. The Kaiser hesitated no 
longer and carried out his program. Guibert et Ferrette, "Le Conflict 
Franco-allemand," p. 184. 



180 FEENCH FOEEIGN POLICY 

Germany had made no opposition to the French policy, 
nor was it as yet clear just what she wished. In re- 
ply to the question of M. Decrais concerning the hostile 
attitude of the German press, he replied: ''Nothing 
in our Moroccan policy, nothing in our carrying out of 
the accords of April 8, and October 3, 1904, can ex- 
plain the agitation in the press mentioned by M. De- 
crais.'* He then declared once more that in no way 
whatsoever had the economic interests of any third 
party been injured, nor would they be injured by 
France in putting into effect the administrative, eco- 
nomic, financial, and commercial reforms of which Mo- 
rocco had need.^^ On April 7, 1905, a despatch to the 
French ambassadors in St. Petersburg, Madrid, 
Vienna, London and Eome from M. Delcasse showed 
the falsity of Germany 's claim that she had received no 
official notification.^® Another accusation raised by the 
German press was to the effect that M. Saint Eene 
Taillandier had asserted that France had received a 
mandate from Europe to impose her program of re- 
forms upon Morocco. M. Saint Eene Taillandier has- 
tened to deny this categorically, and informed M. Del- 
casse that he had been extremely careful to state that 
France founded her right to counsel the Shereefian 
Government on her own situation, which had been re- 
cently consecrated by accords concluded with the pow- 
ers bordering on and most interested in the affairs of 
this country.^"^ M. Delcasse thereupon proceeded to 
acquaint Prince Eadolin with this denial, and also 
called his attention to their conversation preceding the 

isAniiales du Senate, Vol. 67i, p. 641. 
16 Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 236. 
IT Ibid., No. 237. 



THE FALL OF DELCASSE 181 

Franco-English Accord, and the official communication 
of the Franco-Spanish Accord to the German govern- 
ment. In conclusion M. Delcasse declared that if in 
spite of his explanations a misunderstanding still 
existed he would be very willing to dissipate it.^^ 

In the meantime on April 7, in reply to several in- 
terpellations in the Chamber, M. Delcasse repeated his 
assertion, that France intended to continue her task in 
Morocco in such a manner as to interfere with the 
rights of no one, and that if after these formal declara- 
tions there still remained any misunderstanding she 
would be only too willing to dissipate it.^^ M. Del- 
casse had offered to discuss the matter directly with 
Germany in his conference with Prince Radolin, he had 
announced his willingness from the rostrum of the 
Chamber, he now authorized M. Bihourd to open the 
discussion in Berlin. It was all in vain. Germany 
was not yet ready to talk, and the debacle of the Rus- 
sian forces in the Far East gave her confidence in her 
position. Chancellor von Biilow had already suggested 
the idea of an international conference in his despatch 
to the German ambassadors,^*' but M. Delcasse al- 
though he suspected that Germany would adopt some 
such attitude, did not feel that France could afford to 
submit to such a conference at the command of Ger- 
many. He therefore acquainted M. Saint Rene Tail- 
landier with his suspicions, and authorized him to 
make it clear to the Sultan that any such plan would 

18 German W'lhite Book No. 6, Arch. Dip., Vol. 97, p. 281; also Doc. 
Dip., op. cit., No. 243. It will be noted that Prince Radolin in hia 
report of this conversation as given in the German White Book makes 
no reference to M. Delcass^'s offer to dissipate the misunderstanding. 

19 Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 75ii, p. 1570. 

20 See p. 172. 



182 FEENCH FOEEIGN POLICY 

be inimical to the friendly relations existing between 
France and the Shereefian Empire.^^ 

The German press continued to grow more threaten- 
ing, and public opinion in France became restive. 
When the question again came up for discussion in 
the Chamber on April 19, a torrent of abuse descended 
upon the head of M. Delcasse for bringing France into 
such an impasse. The Sociahsts led in the attack, but 
all parties and factions joined in with them. Ger- 
cany's accusations, that she had received no notice of 
the accords, were accepted blindly. Some found him 
guilty of changing the entente with Great Britain into 
a weapon of offence, although he had declared its chief 
purpose was to insure peace; others asserted he was 
pulling England's chestnuts out of the fire; some ac- 
cused him of carrying on a personal policy without 
any regard for the Chamber, which was kept wholly 
ignorant until it was too late to interfere; others 
blamed him for ever bringing about the rapproche- 
ment with Great Britain ; all united in censuring him 
for not taking Germany into consideration before at- 
tempting any program of reforms in Morocco. The 
''Journal Ofliciel" reporting this day's seance of the 
Chamber must have been very pleasant reading in 
Germany. Even M. Eouvier, despite his antipathy to 
M. Delcasse, was forced to come to his support and 
take the responsibility for the future policy of the 
government. M. Delcasse attempted no further de- 
fence; he simply reiterated that France was willing 
to dissipate any misunderstanding.^^ He then offered 

21 Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 238. 

22 Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 75ii, p. 1922. 



THE FALL OF DELCASSE 183 

his resignation, but President Loubet refused to ac- 
cept it. It would have been better for all concerned 
if M, Delcasse had insisted, although it was entirely 
to his honor that he was unwilling to retreat under fire, 
even though the fire did not come wholly from the 
enemy's side. But it was now merely a question of 
time, for Germany was determined to force him out 
and M. Kouvier was only too willing to allow her to 
proceed.^^ 

M. Bihourd again attempted to discuss the situation 
with the German Foreign Secretary, going so far as 
to offer the text of the various conversations which M. 
Delcasse had held with Prince Eadolin, but his offers 
were declined as being superfluous.^^ In a despatch to 
M. Delcasse dated April 28, at Berlin, M. Bihourd 
summed up the situation as follows: **The Imperial 
Government is in no haste to reply to the question that 
Your Excellency at Paris, and I at Berlin, have put to 
it. This silence fits in well with the policy which the 
Chancellor has proclaimed at the Eeichstag, and the 
Emperor at Tangier. In adopting this attitude, it 
has attempted first to give abundant satisfaction to the 
national amour-propre, secondly to appease by a de- 
mand for consideration the complaints of representa- 
tives of industry and commerce, who claim to have been 
sacrificed by the recent treaties. . . . Direct negotia- 
tions seem impossible at this time, for the ofiQcial 
declarations repulse them or impose upon our initia- 

23 M, Andrg Mgvil declares: "Our adversaries knew that M. Del- 
casse had many enemies in Parliament and that in a cabinet composed 
exclusively of friends of M. Rouvier he could count on little sympathy." 
"De Frankfort a Algeciras," p. 232. 

24 Doc. Dip., op cit., Nos. 245, 246, 



184 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

tive conditions which could be accepted with difficulty ; 
but the indirect way is not closed to us. 

''The idea of a conference has been launched, it is 
still, in spite of the unfavorable reception which it has 
met mth in the principal cabinets, stubbornly defended 
by the Imperial Chancellory, which, however, recom- 
mends an exchange of views between the Powers sig- 
natory of the Conference of Madrid in 1880. "^^ On 
the very day that M. Bihourd wrote that all avenues of 
direct approach seemed to be closed. Chancellor von 
Biilow was writing the following note to Prince Rado- 
lin in Paris: "Express in my name my thanks to 
the President of the Council (M. Rouvier) for his con- 
ciliatory declarations. I am led to believe that he un- 
derstands the situation in which Germany would be 
placed if third powers disposed of German interests 
without consulting with us. ... / believe that I can 
conclude from the overtures which the President of 
the Council has made to your Highness that the thought 
of a unilateral solution of the question under discus- 
sion or one resting upon force is as far from his mind 
as from that of the Emperor. . . ." ^® 

Thus while M. Delcasse was still Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, and was trying in a legitimate manner to find 
a way out of the difficulty and yet maintain the honor 
of France, M. Rouvier, the Prime Minister, without his 
knowledge, was carrying on secret negotiations with 
the German government. Germany could now pro- 
ceed confidently towards the attainment of the two ob- 
jects which she had set as her goal: the downfall of 

25 Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 248. 
. 26 German White Book No. 8, Arch. Dip., Vol. 97, p. 284. 



THE FALL OF DELCASSE 185 

M. Delcasse, and a conference of the Powers to settle 
the Moroccan question. As instruments she chose 
Prince Henckel von Donnersmarck who was to pro- 
ceed to Paris, and Count von Tattenbach as emissary 
to Fez. The former was to work against M. Delcasse, 
the latter to work upon the Sultan. Both were com- 
pletely successful. 

The mission of Prince Donnersmarck was revealed 
by a confidential statement made by himself during his 
visit to Paris, and published June 17 by the Gaulois. 
A few sentences quoted from his statement will eluci- 
date the plan of the German Foreign Office: ^'If you 
are of the opinion that your Minister of Foreign Af- 
fairs has engaged your country in too adventurous a 
course, acknowledge it by dispensing with his services, 
and especially by giving a new direction to your for- 
eign policy. We are not concerned with M. Delcasse 's 
person ; but his policy is a m-enace to Germany ; and you 
may rest assured that we shall not wait for it to be 
realized. . . . Take the word of a German who has 
always had great sympathies for you. Give up the 
minister whose only aspiration is to trouble the peace 
of Europe ; and adopt with regard to Germany a loyal 
and open policy. . . . " ^'^ The strangest thing of all 
was that not only M. Eouvier and his friends, but all 
France was ready to accept this advice. In the words 
of a leading French publicist, "When a man puts his 
country in an impasse, the best way to get out is to 
throw him overboard and then take stock of the situa- 
tion." 2^ 

^7 Quoted in Ques. Dip. et Col. July 1, '05; also Andrg Tardieu, 
"France and the Alliances," p. 183. 

28 Millet, "Peril National," Rec. Pol. et Pari,, June. 1905. 



186 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

France seemed to have fallen into a blue funk. The 
British government appeared ready to back her in any 
stand she might take; King Edward made a special 
trip to Paris the first week in May to emphasize the 
solidarity of feeling, the British press was loud in its 
denunciation of Germany. But France wanted peace 
and was determined to have it at any price.^^ While 
M. Delcasse continued to refuse a conference and au- 
thorized M. Saint Rene Taillandier to inform the Sultan 
that no Powers could intervene between Morocco and 
France,^^ M. Rouvier continued to negotiate secretly 
with Germany with an entirely different intent. In a 
despatch from Herr von Biilow to Prince Radolin, 
dated May 22, 1905, we have conclusive proof of this 
fact. Replying to the statement made by the French 
minister at Fez that M. Delcasse would consider any 
attempt to communicate proposals of reforms to the 
signatory Powers as detrimental to the interests of 
France, he (von Biilow) was able to assert that declara- 
tions made by M. Rouvier authorized him to admit that 
the President of the Council disapproved of this mode 
of action.^ 1 

29 M. Leghait, the Belgian minister to Paris in a despatch dated 
May 7, 1905 declared: "The presence of the King of England in Paris 
at a time when the atmosphere is still vibrating with the events of 
Tangier has a significance which deserves serious attention ... it is 
evidently for the purpose of giving to France at this moment a new 
proof of friendship and of emphasizing under special circumstances 
the solidarity existing between the signatories to the understanding of 
April 8, 1904. . . . The King has, however, not confined himself to 
expressing his sentiments and views to M. Delcasse and to the French 
politicians, but has taken care that the court at Berlin should be in- 
formed thereof. . . ." Belgian Doc. No. 4. 

30 Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 251. 

31 German White Book-No. 12, Arch. Dip. Vol. 97, p. 361, M. Victor 
B6rard thus characterizes M. Kouvier's policy: "This treason of M. 



THE FALL OF DBLCASSE 187 

In the meantime Count Tattenbach the Imperial 
Envoy to Fez had arrived, and had his first interview 
with the Sultan, May 13. According to his reports, 
the Sultan claimed that he had made no concessions to 
the French, but had been awaiting the arrival of the 
German minister before reaching any decision. ^^ 
Herr Tattenbach hastily seized the opportunity to show 
the falseness of the French position and the advan- 
tage to Morocco of submitting the question to a con- 
ference of the Powers. On May 27, he had won his 
point, and the Sultan despatched a letter to M. Saint 
Bene Taillandier informing him that the Notables, 
whom he had sunnnoned to consult with him regarding 
the program of reforms submitted by France, had ad- 
vised him not to consent to any reform without first 
asjiing for an International Conference of the Powers 
signatory of the Conference of Madrid.^^ Germany 
had gained one of her objectives, it only remained to 
obtain the resignation of M. Deloasse. 

A veritable avalanche of rumors and threats de- 
scended upon Paris. M. Barrere, French ambassador 
at Rome had received from the Italian government an 
alarming communication to the effect that France had 
addressed an ultimatum to the Sultan, and Germany 
had informed her that German troops would cross the 

Eouvier (I should like to find in the French language another word; 
but our people, ticklish upon questions of honor and good faith, desig- 
nate with the same term infidelity to friends, comrades or colleagues, 
and the disregard or abandon of national duty; against M. Delcass6 
and against the policy of France the secret intrigues of M. Rouvier 
were disloyal), then this treason of M. Rouvier was to give to this 
Minister of Finances, President of the Council, the portfolio of Foreign 
Afi"airs." "L' Affaire Morocaine," p. 412. 

32 German White Book, No. 10, p. 359. 

33 Ibid., No. 14, p. 363 ; also Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 262. 



188 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

Vosges at the same time that French troops crossed 
the Moroccan frontier.^* The rumor was false but it 
served its purpose. Paris suddenly learned that Ger- 
many was arming, that movements of troops had been 
reported in Westphalia, in Wurtemberg, on the frontier 
of Baden and in the Rhine provinces, that officers of 
the Royal Prussian Guard had been ordered to hold 
themselves in readiness for immediate service. The 
fluctuations on the Bourse during the fourth and fifth 
of June gave evidences of a financial panic. The 
Chamber experienced the same emotions as during the 
crisis of Fashoda. In the words of one of its mem- 
bers: *'It was no longer England who threatened us, 
but Germany, and our military and maritime situa- 
tion was certainly worse than that of 1898. The army, 
decapitated in its staff by demagogic distrust, the 
corps of officers decimated by the delation of an odious 
and dominating sect, the arsenals in disorder, the sup- 
ply stations empty, insubordination and desertion 
preached openly to our soldiers by agitators, whose 
efforts were encouraged; disorder everywhere, 
strength nowhere. Such was the situation. ' ' ^^ 

On June 5, the German Chancellor brought matters 
to a climax by sending a note to all the signatory 
Powers of the Madrid Conference, in which it was 
stated that, since the Sultan had invited the signatory 
Powers to a conference at Tangier to discuss a system 
of reforms for Morocco, the Imperial Government be- 
lieved that such a conference afforded the best means 
to introduce such reforms, and for this reason it had 

34 Georges Reynald, "Le Diplomatic Francaise," p. 41. 
35Guibert et Ferrette, "Le Conflict Franco- Allemiand," p. 253. 



THE FALL OF DELCASSE 189 

accepted the Sultan's invitation. The note also de- 
clared that the special privileges sought by France 
would result in a violation of the Convention of Madrid, 
since France intended, just as she had in Tunis, to 
take over the administrative machinery of the coun- 
try, thus putting it under her political and economic 
domination.^^ 

M. Eouvier called a meeting of the Council on June 
6, to determine the policy of France. In the stormy 
session which ensued, M. Delcasse urged that France 
refuse to accept the proposal for a conference. He 
showed that Germany's claims that she had not been 
informed were false; that to find in the text of the 
Madrid Convention, which merely related to the status 
of the European consulates in Morocco, the right to 
submit the Shereefian Empire to a European con- 
dominium was a most palpable pretext, — finally that 
Eussia, England, Italy, Spain and the United States 
declared the conference useless and unnecessary, — why 
then, should France accept? The whole proposition 
was bound to fall through. If France did accept the 
conference called by the Sultan at Germany's behest, 
it would give Germany the right to take part in the 
affairs of North Africa, and henceforth France would 
be at the mercy of her bluster and caprice. ''What did 
Germany really wish? She wished to sound the will 
of France, to intervene in the exercise of her rights 
as an independent nation, dictate her conduct, regu- 
late her friendships, and subject her to a humiliating 
vasselage. To cede to-day would be to cede to-mor- 
row, and France emerging from this humiliation 

36 German White Book, No. 16. 



190 FEENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

would be weaker but not less exposed. ' ' ^'^ He assured 
them that Great Britain was behind them in ease of an 
unprovoked aggression,^ ^ but that Germany would not 
attack, it was only a case of bluff. He was pleading 
before a jury which had rendered its decision. M. 
Eouvier insisted that to refuse meant war and they 
did not want war. Germany had won her second point, 
M. Delcasse was forced to resign, and this time it was 
final. "We didn't ask for his head, they offered it 
to us, ' ' said the Princess von Billow, who received her 
new title as a direct result of M. Delcasse 's fall. 

The satisfaction everywhere evident in France at 

37 Georges Reynald, "La Diplomatie Frangaise," p. 45 ; see also 
Debidour, "Histoire Diplomatique de TEurope" (1904-1916), p. 22. 

38 There is still some question, as to the exact extent to which France 
could count upon Great Britain, but vmdoubtedly some promise had 
been made. In fact the Accords of 1904 themselves assured France 
of diplomatic support (Art. 9). According to 2J[. Andr6 Mevil, "Eng- 
land did not hesitate to give us the assurance that the British military 
forces were ready to march with us against Germany if this power 
came to attack us. Better still, the British government, the principle 
of an Anglo-French defensive co-operation once admitted, declared 
herself ready to sign without delay an accord which would establish 
definitely this co-operation. . . ." M. M6vil goes so far as to intimate 
that the very next day Berlin knew of this offer through the intimate 
relations existing between the Rouvier cabinet and Germany. M6vil, 
op. cit., p. 282. 

The Matin published a sensational expose on Oct. 5, 1905, which as- 
serted that England had given verbal notice to France that if France 
should be attacked she was ready to mobolize her fleet, seize the Kiel 
Canal, and disembark 100,000 men in Schleswig-Holstein. She was 
ready furthermore to put this offer in writing if France so desired. 
On October 13 both the Havas and Reuter agencies declared these re- 
ports to be inexact. See London Times Oct. 9, 1905; also Ques. Dip. 
et Col., Oct. 16, 1905. 

Editorially, the Times declared in regard to M. Delcasse's statement 
that England was ready to support France in the event of an unex- 
pected act of oppression directed against France: "With that state- 
ment we have no fault to find. We do not at all doubt that in such 
a contingency the English Government would have supported France 
with the hearty approval of the nation." 



THE FALL OF DELCASSE 191 

the downfall of M. Delcasse is one of the most inex- 
plicable incidents of French politics. It is not at all 
surprising that he was forced out by M. Rouvier, whose 
jealousy and hostility towards him were notorious. 
The surprising part of the affair is that a foreign 
minister who had for seven years, through four dif- 
ferent ministries, carried on the foreign policy of 
France to the satisfaction of the great majority, should 
have been forced out individually, with not even the 
fall of the ministry to save the appearance of the 
situation, and without a single voice of protest being 
raised in his behalf. Germany's hand in the affair 
must have been evident to the veriest tyro in foreign 
politics! As a brilliant English writer has put it: 
*'Any stick was good enough to beat the unfortunate 
M. Delcasse within his own country, any stone served 
for pelting him. None so poor for the time being to 
do reverence to the minister ... of all the Paris 
newspapers, only the 'Debats' had the decency, at 
least, to give him one consolatory pat on the back, 
when he was kicked out — for kicked out he was. 
Every other helped in the kicking with shameless 
gusto. The Paris press has hardly ever before dur- 
ing the Third Republic been so well agreed in any one 
purpose as it was in rending M. Delcasse." ^^ 

Across the Rhine joy was equally great. Chancellor 
von Biilow was immediately made a prince by the 
Kaiser, and the newspapers exulted in the German 
victory. The Chancellor himself, writing some years 
later says that *'the retirement of M. Delcasse proved 
to be no transitory triumph for us. His fall weakened 

39 Laurence Jerrold, "The Eeal France," Chap. VII. 



192 FRENCH FOBEIGN POLICY 

French chauvinism and more prudent and peaceful 
counsels prevailed again, thereby facilitating our 
policy. . . ."^'^ M. Delcasse found some consolation in 
the English press which not only eulogised his record 
but regretted exceedingly his departue. Even 
America seemed to have a far clearer perception of the 
exact situation than was to be found in France. John 
Hay writing to Henry Adams the day following M. Del- 
casse 's resignation very cleverly depicted the situa- 
tion : *'I see your friend, the Kaiser, has at last taken 
the scalp of Delcasse. . . . He has evidently done it 
out of sheer wantonness, to let people know there is a 
God in Israel. Characteristic, his rushing to Billow's 
house and making him a prince on the spot to advertise 
his scare. Spring-Rice turned up in London yester- 
day. He says he does not think the Kaiser means or 
wishes war with France. He merely wants to insult 
her publicly, by way of notifying her that if she does 
not want him to do it again she had better make friends 
with him. The situation is not, as it appears, satisfac- 
tory to any one. France has been profoundly humili- 
ated and does not care to show any resentment. Eng- 
land is not inclined to sympathize with her as she seems 
unconscious of her injury. The Bear is licking his 
own wounds and does not care what happens to the 
Cock and the Lion. It was a good time for the Kaiser 
to tread the stage in the Ercles vein. ' ' ^^ 

3. M. ROUVIER AT THE QUAI D'ORSAY 

If M. Rouvier thought that with M. Delcasse out of 
the way, and the portfolio of foreign affairs as well 

*o Von Biilow, "Imperial Germany," p. 98. 

41 Thayer, "Life and Letters of John Hay," Vol. II, p. 404. 



THE FALL OF DELCASSE 193 

as the premiership in his own hands, Germany would 
be satisfied, he was apprised very quickly of his mis- 
take. On June 10 in a conference with Prince Radolin, 
he showed that he was no more anxious for a confer- 
ence than M. Delcasse had been. He declared that 
France could not consider a conference without a pre- 
liminary agreement with Germany, and if such an 
agreement was reached there would be no further need 
of a conference. In fact under those circumstances 
a conference would be a complication rather than a 
solution. "Therefore," he suggested, *' before con- 
sidering the question further we must know Germany's 
attitude towards the reforms." The brutally frank 
response of the German ambassador showed that per- 
sonal feelings of friendship had no place in German 
diplomacy : "We insist on the Conference. If it does 
not take place, the status quo remains and you must 
know that we are behind Morocco." ^^ 

Prince Eadolin was merely carrying out the orders 
of the Chancellor, and in his notes to the German am- 
bassador, June 12 and June 16, Prince von Biilow in- 
sisted that before any preliminary arrangements 
should be discussed, France must submit first to the 
idea of a conference.^^ M. Eouvier was sure there 
must be some misunderstanding; surely Germany 
would listen to his explanation even though she had 
refused the same request when made by M. Delcasse. 

42 Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 269. M. Andr6 Tardieu declared that M. 
Rouvier told him that the German ambassador added that they were 
back of Morocco "with their entire strength." "France and the Al- 
liances," p. 187. 

43 German White Book, Noa. 18 and 19, Arch. Dip., Vol. 73, p. 383, 
et seq. 



194 FRENCH FOEEIGN POLICY 

Consequently in a long despatch to Prince Radolin, M. 
Ronvier once more pointed out the position of France, 
her intention of maintaining the independence of the 
Sultan and the crying need for reforms. As to a con- 
ference, France still insists that it would be danger- 
ous if not preceded by an entente, and useless if it fol- 
lowed one. However in order that France may show 
her conciliatory spirit she does not categorically refuse 
a conference. Nevertheless she would like to know 
what the Imperial Government regarded as the pre- 
cise points to be treated and the solutions if proposed.** 
That there might be no mistake about its reaching 
the German Chancellor, M. Rouvier sent a copy to M. 
Bihourd asking that he transmit it to the Imperial 
Chancellor. The reply to this note left no further 
room for misunderstandings. Prince von Biilow in- 
formed M. Bihourd that he found M. Rouvier 's note 
"a surprise and a deception," and was wholly unac- 
ceptable. Furthermore, he advised M. Bihourd that 
France ought not to allow this dangerous question to 
drag, nor * ' ought she delay upon a road bordered with 
precipices and even with abysses." *^ Two days later, 
on June 25, upon the occasion of another interview with 
the French ambassador, the German Chancellor again 
warned him that France must hasten, for the Sultan 
was uneasy and was multiplying his offers to Germany, 
and his demands also, and ''an incident might arrive 
which would render the already grave situation 
fatal. "*« 

44 Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 272. 

45 Ibid., No. 276. 

46 Ibid., No. 278; see also German White Book, No. 21, Arch. Dip., 
Vol. 73, p. 390. 



THE FALL OF DELCASSE 195 

M. Rouvier had conceded too much to stop now, and 
on July 8, by a mutual exchange of letters, the two 
governments accepted the principle of an international 
conference upon the following basis: sovereignty and 
independence of the Sultan; integrity of his empire; 
economic liberty without any inequality; need of re- 
forms both financial and in the police, their introduc- 
tion to be regulated by an international agreement; 
and recognition of the special situation of France in 
Morocco through its possession of Algeria.*^ France 
might take such comfort as she could out of the last 
provision. 

Hardly had the two governments come to an agree- 
ment before Germany broke faith. In the discussions 
leading up the exchange of letters of July 8, it was 
agreed that from the moment that a conference was 
accepted both sides would suspend individual nego- 
tiations with the Sultan. Yet on July 12 M. Rouvier 
received a letter from the French minister at Fez, 
stating that the German minister was on the point of 
obtaining certain concessions for a German firm.^^ 
M. Rouvier protested, but later he learned that not 
only had a contract been awarded to a German firm for 
the construction of a mole and other enterprises at 
Tangier, but similar advantages were being sought in 
other ports.^^ Another protest obtained a most eva- 
sive reply.^^ Then reports began to come in that Ger- 
man bankers were negotiating a loan to the Sultan, 
which was not only a direct violation of German 

47 Ibid., No. 287. 

48 Ibid., No. 288. 

49 Ibid., No. 291. 

50 Ibid., No. 297. 



196 FEENCH FOEEIGN POLICYi 

pledges, but a direct violation by the Sultan of the 
clauses of his contract in the last loan which he had 
obtained in France. The German reply to this was 
that the Sultan had demanded a huge loan of from 
two to three million pounds sterling from British 
bankers, who since they were unwilling to advance it 
'turned it over to German bankers. They in order to 
safeguard the general interests of Morocco promised 
the Sultan a small loan of ten million marks, simply to 
relieve his present critical financial situation. In or- 
der to keep faith with France no economic concessions 
had been demanded as security.^^ As for the con- 
structions in the ports of Tangier, the concessions had 
been obtained months before the entente with France.^^ 
At the same time the Sultan relying upon his new al- 
lies, seized one of the Algerian subjects of France, 
violating thereby both his agreements with France and 
the principles embodied in the Conference of Madrid.^^ 
This was more than even the prudent banker Eouvier 
was willing to stand. Apparently Germany was pre- 
paring to make her position strong in Morocco before 
the conference should be called. As for the difficulties 
which France might have over her Algerian subjects, 
Germany as being persona gratissima at the court of 
the Sultan, was unwilling to see force employed at this 
most critical time. Curtly disregarding the German 
interference, M. Eouvier sent an ultimatum to the Sul- 
tan which soon brought that worthy to reason, when 
he found that his German friends were much less in- 
terested in supporting the Sultan's interests in Mo 

51 Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 306, annexe. 
B2 Ibid., No. 310. 
63 Ibid., No. 311. 



THE FALL OF DELCASSE 197 

rocco than they were in supporting their own."* Pro- 
testing again at the lack of faith shown by these opera- 
tions in Morocco, M. Bihourd was informed by Prince 
von Billow that these enterprises were most insigni- 
ficant, in fact that of the port was one of the Sultan's 
gifts which he sought to refuse. *'In your place, I 
should force him to make me a similar concession." 
M. Bihourd replied that the French did not intend to 
disregard their reciprocal engagements.^^ The Ger- 
man Chancellor realizing that France could be brow- 
beaten no further, ordered Dr. Eosen, German minister 
at Tangier to proceed to Paris and come to an agree- 
ment. Now that Germany was really ready to treat, 
little difficulty was found in coming to an accord; it 
was signed September 28, 1905, and merely elaborated 
upon the program adopted in the exchange of letters 
of July 8. It included : organization of the police ; 
regulations for the suppression of contraband in arms ; 
financial reforms, consisting principally in the estab- 
lishment of a State Bank and the study of a better col- 
lection of imposts and the creation of new revenues; 
finally the fixing of certain principles destined to safe- 
guard economic liberty. As to the frontier region be- 
tween Morocco and Algeria, the question of policing 
was to continue exclusively in the hands of France and 
Morocco, as also was the regulation of contraband of 
arms in the same region. Algeciras was chosen as the 
place for the conference if Spain was willing. As re- 
gards the German loan, it was to be regarded simply as 
a short time advance of money, and the French banks 

54 Ibid., No., 341, annexe 2. 
65 Doc. Dip., op. cit.. No. 338. 



198 FBENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

were to share in it. As for the constructions in the 
port of Tangier, France conceded the Sultan's right 
to grant these concessions to German interests, unless 
the French company which had also been asked to 
make a survey, could show titles of value equal to those 
of the German concern.^^ 

On the whole, France could hardly complain of this 
program after having chosen M. Eouvier to draw it 
up. She had promised that the independence of the 
Sultan should be respected, that commercial liberty 
should be guaranteed, and that her sole purpose in 
attempting to put into effect a program of reforms 
was to safeguard her own interests in Algeria. The 
conference had the same purpose, and it was recognized 
in advance that her situation in Algeria gave her the 
right to special consideration. It was her privilege 
to show in the conference the great importance of these 
rights and interests. As M. Rouvier said in his dec- 
laration before the Chamber December 16, 1905, in pre- 
senting the situation: *'the recognition of a special 
situation, resulting from the most evident facts, ad- 
mitted by the Powers most interested, inscribed in 
the last accords that we have concluded with the Im- 
perial Government can be prejudicial to no one. . . . 
From the negotiations which have resulted in the Ac- 
cords of July 8, and September 28, our rights have 
come forth if not entirely recognized, at least entirely 
preserved. . . . We calmly await the results of the 
Conference. ' ' ^'^ 

66 Ibid., Nos. 350, 351. 

57 Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 77ii, p. 1385. It is surprising to note 
that some depiities who were the most bitter in their denunciations of 
M. Delcass6, who wished to resist Germany, now excoriated M. Rouvier 



THE FALL OF DELCASSE 199 

The European situation which had looked so gloomy 
to France at the fall of M. Delca-sse was rapidly bright- 
ening. When on May 27, Admiral Togo completely 
destroyed the fleet of Admiral Eodjestvensky in 
Tsushima Bay, Eussia realized that she had lost the 
war. The Kaiser, taking advantage of the despon- 
dency of the Czar, finally persuaded him to sign a secret 
alliance at Bjorko on July 23.^^ Although the meet- 
ing took place in absolute secrecy, France realized that 
her ally was much less cordial than she had reason to 
expect. When M. Witte was asked to explain it he did 
not mince words : * 'You tell me that they have the im- 
pression of a Eusso-German rapprochement. Why 
shouldn't there be one? The German Emperor 
throughout the whole course of the war has been with 
regard to Eussia more than correct, he has been 
friendly. On all occasions he has affirmed and proved 
his desire of not causing us any embarrassment, of 
aiding us as far as was in his power and keeping us 
out of all complications. However, the essence of the 

as follows : " M. Rouvier has acted not as a diplomat, but as a banker 
who wishes to avoid a complication, an emotion, an ennui in which he 
sees a catastrophe. He has opened his safe saying, 'What do you wish?' 
He has not examined whether the demand was excessive, unreasonable 
or insulting. He has paid with his cash-box open and then returned 
to his desk." Guibert et Ferrette, "Le Conflict Franco-Allemand," 
p. 287. 

58 "Willy-Nicky Correspondence," No. 30, et seq. A further con- 
firmation of the rapprochement between Germany and Russia at this 
time was given by Prof. Schieman in the Kreuzzeitung. He asserted 
that if the Delcass6 system had provoked war over the question of 
Morocco, Russia would have refused to consider the situation a casus 
foederis. He added in conclusion: "In affirming that the German for- 
eign office had been informed concerning this point, and that Emperor 
William had carefully weighed the possible consequences when he dis- 
embarked at Tangier, we make more than a simple supposition." Quea. 
Pip. et Col. Feb. 16, 1906. 



200 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

relations between Russia and France have not 
changed." ^^ With the signing of the Treaty of Ports- 
mouth, September 5, Russia had opportunity to take 
stock of the situation. Germany had been prodigal 
with kind words but France had furnished her funds, 
and Great Britain had cooperated closely with the 
United States in bringing Japan to make very reason- 
able terms. She was also given to understand that the 
London money market which had always remained 
closed to her might be persuaded to open its golden 
doors.^^ The war had been a great drain upon her 
financial resources and it would have been almost sui- 
cidal to turn her back upon France and England. 
Germany did not have funds to loan even if she had 
been willing to loan them. The Czar therefore began 
to wonder whether he had been wise to tie himself up 
too closely with the Kaiser, and towards the close of 
the year became very unwilling to attempt to bring 
France into the secret agreement which he had signed 
with the Kaiser.®^ At any rate it would be well to 

59 Le Temps, Sept. 21, 1905. 

60 Baron Greindl, Belgian minister at Berlin wrote on September 23, 
1905: "In spite of the great difficulties that are in the way of a 
rapprochement between London and St. Petersburg, the possibility 
thereof is no longer excluded . . . the principal cause of the differences 
between England and Russia has been removed for the time being. I 
mean the unhealthy Russian ambition incessantly to extend the boundar- 
ies of an Empire which is already too big. . . . They have been grate- 
ful to Germany at St. Petersburg for her benevolent neutrality which 
permitted Russia to concentrate all the forces at her disposal in the 
Far East; but neither peoples nor governments can pride themselves 
on their gratitude. How long will Russia's gratitude last when the 
danger is over? Russia is always in straits; she has flooded France 
and Germany with her loans; will she be able much longer to resist the 
temptation to open a new financial market for her benefit?" Belgian 
Doc, No. 8. 

61 Writing in November, 1905, the Czar says: "Our alliance with 



THE FALL OF DELCASSE 201 

await the results of the Conference of Algeciras. 
France also, towards the close of 1905, began to 
recover from the nervous tension shown after the resig- 
nation of M. Delcasse. Another secret agreement was 
signed with Spain on September 1, 1905, which clarified 
and strengthened the secret accord of October 3, 1904. 
It provided that the police of Morocco should be of 
native troops, but that the oiSicers in Tetuan and Lar- 
ache should be Spanish, while in the ports of Rabat and 
Casablanca they should be French, and in Tangier 
the police should consist of a Franco-Spanish corps. 
It was also provided that a State Bank should be cre- 
ated with the presidency reserved for France, and 
again reserved future economic concessions to French 
and Spanish groups. Article IV of the accord was 
especially important, for after declaring that both 
Powers would attempt by pacific action with the Sultan 
to insure the loyal accomplishment of its clauses, it 
declared : ' ' Spain, having formally decided to endorse 
fully the action of France in the course of the delibera- 
tions of the projected Conference, and France agree- 
ing to act in like manner with Spain, it is understood 
between the two governments that they will mutually 
assist each other and proceed in accord in the said 
deliberations as regards the stipulations of the Con- 
vention of October 3, 1904, in its broadest and most 
friendly interpretation as in that which concerns the 
different objects of the present accord. . . ." ^^ 

France is a defensive one. Think the declaration I sent you could re- 
main in force until France accepts our new agreement. I will cer- 
tainly do all in my power to bring the Morocco Conference to a general 
understanding." "Willy-Nicky Correspondence," No. 53. 
62 For text see Martens, Recueil, 3d., Vol. 5, p. 670, 



202 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

What was even more important, France now began 
to realize that a nation could not depend wholly upon 
agreements with other nations to keep her out of 
trouble. Nor was it enough to put faith wholly in 
pacifist doctrines and international good-will, when 
one could see on their very threshold ^'the resurrec- 
tion of the Holy Empire of the Germanic nation, no 
longer in phantom state and dragging along in the 
mantle of Charlemagne, but armed with modern sci- 
ence, sustained by victorious legions, enriched by in- 
dustry, resting with one hand upon the Ehine and the 
other upon the Danube and by these two arteries 
master of the commerce of Europe. Compared with 
this formidable power what would be the vacillating 
Empire of a Charles V or even the Continental Block- 
ade of a Napoleon?"®^ The result was that France 
from October to December voted two loans, one for 
fifty million francs, and another for one hundred eleven 
millions, for immediate equipment of arms, stores and 
munitions. It might be after all that Morocco was 
merely an excuse. At any rate a new spirit of confi- 
dence was noticeable both in the press and in the 
Chamber; "ne troubles pas Vagonie de la France/' 

63 Ren6 Millet, "La Conscience Nationale," Eev. Pol. et Pari., March, 
1905. At the same time that M. Millet was thus trying to arouse 
France by showing the danger on her Eastern frontier, Herr Schieman, 
a close friend of the Kaiser and editor of the Kreuzzeitung, in review- 
ing the events of 1905 declared France to be in full social decomposition, 
and profoundly impregnated with the revolutionary spirit. It was 
shown by the development of anti-militarism, internationalism and 
anti-clericalism. He sneeringly pointed out that the Rouvier cabinet, 
the 41st of the Third Republic, contained an ex-salesman of produce, 
an ex-reporter, an ex-broker, a journalist, a physician, psychiatrist and 
a former waiter in a cafe. See article by Henri Lechtenberger, Rev. Pol. 
et Pari., March, 1906. 



THE FALL OF DELCASSE 203 

gave way to "aide-toi et le del t'aidera." Further- 
more the same government which had discounted the 
assistance which Great Britain might give when M. 
Delcasse had promised it, now decided it had best re- 
ceive definite assurances upon this point.^* The ques- 
tion was asked whether if the Moroccan crisis devel- 
oped into war between France and Germany, England 
would give armed support. Sir Edward Grey gave 
it as his opinion that if war was forced upon France 
over the question of Morocco, public opinion in Great 
Britain would rally to the material support of France. 
The French Government then asked: *'If you think 
it possible that public opinion of Great Britain might, 
should a sudden crisis arise, justify you in giving to 
France the armed support which you cannot promise 
in advance, you will not be able to give that support, 
even if you wish to give it, when the time comes, un- 
less some conversations have already taken place be- 
tween naval and military experts. ' ' Sir Edward Grey 
acknowledged the force of the statement and agreed. 
He thereupon authorized these conversations to take 
place, with the distinct understanding that nothing 
which passed between military or naval experts should 
bind either government or restrict in any way their 
freedom to make a decision as to whether or not they 
would give that support when the time came.^^ 

6* At the beginning of June, 1905, when the assurance had come that 
England was prepared to support France in case of aggression, M. 
Rouvier had cried : "Que ma main se seohe plutdt que de signer un papier 
qui d^chainerait I'Allemagne." Now he himself was soliciting the re- 
newal of these accords. Georges Reynald, "La Diplomatic Francaise," 
p. 48. 

65 Speech of Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons, Aug. 3, 
1914, Pari. Debates, Vol. 65, p. 1812, 



204 FEENCH FOEEIGN POLICY 

France had finally awakened to the Ge'rman menace. 
It was not simply M. Delcasse, or the policy of M. Del- 
casse, that Germany found hostile to her interests ; 
it was any policy that threatened the hegemony which 
the German Empire had so long enjoyed, owing to the 
European rivalries which she had carefully fostered. 
But Europe had begun to realize its mistake, and M. 
Delcasse had made it his task to remedy it effectively. 
His success was his undoing. Germany waited pa- 
tiently until the time to strike had come, and M. Del- 
casse was the victim. But the cause was not entirely 
lost. The German policy of bluster and intimidation 
over-reached itself. France felt that perhaps she had 
made a mistake, and was prepared to make reparation. 
She soon found that she had been needlessly humili- 
ated, and she reacted accordingly. France had been 
forced into a conference against her wishes, she soon 
realized that all Europe was in the same position, and 
she hastened to profit by the knowledge. Germany 
might have easily driven a very hard bargain with 
France alone, but she wished to demonstrate that she 
could do equally well in the face of the whole world. 
M. Eouvier had foolishly believed von Billow's pro- 
testations of friendship, and that Germany wanted a 
square deal. His negotiations with von Biilow, and 
von Tattenbach's underhanded operations in Morocco, 
quickly convinced him of his error. It was to his 
credit that he profited by the lesson, and when on De- 
cember 1, 1905, the Sultan sent forth his invitations for 
an international conference to be held in Algeciras, to 
discuss the necessary reforms to be effected in the 



THE FALL OF DELCASSE 205 

Shereefian Empire, M. Rouvier had strengthened 
France sufficiently to be able to say with confidence to 
the Chamber; "We await with calm the results of 
the Conference." 



CHAPTER VIII 
THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS 

1. THE DRAFTING AND SIGNING OF THE ACT 

THE Conference of Algeciras convened on January 
16, 1906, in the little town of Algeciras in Spain, 
with representatives of all of the thirteen Powers sig- 
natory of the Conference of Madrid present, except 
Norway. Furthermore, Russia, which had not par- 
ticipated in the Conference of 1880, sent representa- 
tives to this Congress. The majority of the Powers 
sent two delegates, though strangely enough Great 
Britain whose commercial interests were greatest of 
all sent but one. Sir Arthur Nicolson. The French 
representatives were M. Paul Revoil and M. Eugene 
Regnault. The former was especially well fitted for 
his task both by temperament and by training. He 
had been minister at Tangier and Governor-general 
of Algeria, and had been signally successful in both 
capacities. M. Andre Tardieu thus describes his quali- 
ties: *'a patriotism active and worthy, much abnega- 
tion in an exhausting struggle, a marvelous richness 
of invention and arguments, a meritorious tenacity, in- 
finitely gracious, good humored and of perfect upright- 
ness, the last, a quality which was to gain him in a few 
weeks the confidence of even those who arrived at Al- 

206 



THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS 207 

geciras, the most prejudiced against us."^ His col- 
league, M. Regnault, was also thoroughly familiar with 
Morocco, having served as a delegate of the French in- 
vestors in Morocco. The German delegation consisted 
of Herr von Radowitz, the ambassador at Madrid, and 
Count von Tattenbach, the German emissary to Fez, 
whose operations in Morocco have already been men- 
tioned. Having already triumphed over France once, 
his attitude was one of ''cordial disdain," and he never 
faltered in his belief that by dictatorial and blustering 
tactics, he could ride rough shod over the rights of 
France and any other nation whose interests clashed 
with those of Germany. 

At the opening sitting, the Duke d'Almodovar, the 
first Spanish delegate, was unanimously chosen presi- 
dent of the Conf erence.2 As a precautionary measure, 
the delegates decided to discuss the less important 
projects first, so that from January 16 to February 
20, the Conference debated peacefully enough upon the 
questions of contraband in arms, and reforms in the 
imposts and customs duties. The two most impor- 
tant questions, namely the State Bank and the organ- 
ization of the police were not broached. But while 
the public discussions were proceeding on these non- 
contentious subjects, private conversations were going 
on among the various delegates. Herr von Radowitz 
commenced sounding out the situation on January 23, 

1 Andr6 Tardieu, "La Conference d'Algesiras," p. 84, M. Tardieu as 
first secretary of the "ambassade honoraire" has been enabled to say 
the last word in the Conference of Algeciras. His exhaustive and docu- 
mented treatment of the affair makes hia work the primary source book 
on the subject. 

2 Doc. Dip., "Protpcoles et Comptes Rendus de la Conference d'Al- 
gesiras, No. 3. 



208 FRENCH FOEEIGN POLICY 

when he approached the American delegate, Mr. Henry- 
White, and the Italian delegate, the Marquis Visconti- 
Venosta regarding the organization of the police, but 
without giving any clearer statement of his views than 
that France should not be given this mandate alone or 
in connection with Spain.^ From the beginning M. 
Revoil took the position that since Germany had called 
the conference it was up to her to make definite pro- 
posals. On January 26, Herr von Radowitz had his 
first private conference with M. Revoil, but little came 
of it seeing that Germany was determined that France 
should not have charge of the organization of the 
police, the one prerogative that France was insistent 
upon.* The French delegates were further hampered 
in their stand by the divided sentiment at home, since 
influential personalities like M. Clemenceau in the 
Aurore and M. de Lanessan in the Steele demanded 
that France refuse to take the responsibility for the 
organization of the police,^ in direct opposition to the 
Government's position. 

Neither were M. Regnault and the Count von Tatten- 
bach able to come to an understanding in regard to a 
financial arrangement. The German delegate proposed 
to start with a clean slate, wiping out completely the 
preferential rights already held by French financier^, 
and then divide up the shares of the State Bank equally 
among the various Powers, putting France and Spain 
upon a par with Holland and Sweden. •^ Needless to 
say France refused even to consider such a settlement. 

3 Tardieu, op. cit., p. 138. 

4 Ibid., p. 141. 

5 Recouly, "La Conference d'Algesiras," Rev. Pol. et Pari., Feb., 1906, 

6 Tardieu, op. cit., p. 142. 



THE CONFEKENCE OF ALGECIRAS 209 

Germany's next attempt was to break the bonds be- 
tween France and the nations supporting her, by mak- 
ing them separate offers of various sorts. Spain was 
offered the mandate of policing the ports alone, but she 
refused to consider it. Count von Tattenbach then 
made an attempt to come to a separate understanding 
with the English delegate, but here he met with a more 
chilly reception than in his proposals to Spain.*^ The 
next move was a false report made by the Wolff Agency 
that France sought to police the whole of Morocco, 
and thus under cover of a European mandate, to 
*'Tuiiisify" Morocco. It was for this reason that 
Germany found it necessary to reject the French pro- 
posals. The ''Temps" of February 13, was able to 
issue a categorical denial to this false despatch. In 
fact, throughout this first month France showed such 
willingness to treat upon any reasonable grounds, and 
Germany's attitude remained so uncompromising, 
that gradually the support of the neutral powers be- 
gan to swing towards France. 

In truth, Germany's dilatory tactics seemed to have 
more effect upon the internal situation in France than 
upon the delegates of the various Powers at the Con- 
ference. The situation was complicated by a presi- 
dential election in February, when M. Fallieres was 
chosen to the place which had been held by M. Loubet. 
Although M. Rouvier was asked to continue in office, 
public opinion was aroused by the disquieting rumors 
constantly arriving from the Conference. The ques- 
tion was brought up in the Chamber on February 23, 
and M. Rouvier was very severely criticised by both 

T Ibid., p. 148. 



210 FEENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

M. Jaures and M. Cochin for refusing to discuss the 
situation. The latter went so far as to assert that 
although M. Rouvier had taken charge of the foreign 
office because he wished to save everything, it now 
appeared as though all that he wished was the head of 
his predecessor. M. Delcasse at least had a policy; 
M. Rouvier seemed not to have even that. The condi- 
tion of Morocco also appeared more chaotic than usual. 
Raids across the Algerian frontier were incessant, the 
Pretender was rapidly extending his operations; the 
bandit Raisuli was becoming bolder than ever in his 
exploits. If something were not done soon, an army 
rather than a force of police would be required. 

When it began to look as though an impasse had 
been reached, since Germany seemed to have no delQnite 
program of her own and would not assent to any pro- 
posal acceptable to France, Count von Tattenbach, on 
February 19, produced a complete project for the State 
Bank which he presented as a basis of discussion. M. 
Revoil had another proposal ready; so that when the 
session opened on February 20 for the discussion of 
the State Bank, the delegates had two projects before 
them.^ The German project entirely disregarded the 
rights possessed by the French Syndicate recognized 
by the Act of June 12, 1904. It provided that the capi- 
tal should be divided into as many shares as there were 
Powers represented at the Conference, and as a sop 
to Spain the peseta AVas to constitute the medium of 
exchange. The State Bank was to receive all the 
revenues of the Empire, including the customs duties 
which had already been guaranteed to the French loan. 

8 Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 2D annexe. 



THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS 211 

It was to have a Conseil d' administration of twenty- 
six members chosen by the thirteen Powers represented 
at the Conference, also a Conseil de surveillance, con- 
sisting of the ministers at Tangier of the signatory 
Powers, and finally, a directorate chosen by the Conseil 
d' administration. This unwieldy organization of more 
than forty officials, a political organization rather than 
a financial concern, would have completely destroyed 
that sovereignty of the Sultan that Germany had been 
so intent upon preserving. The French scheme pro- 
posed that the capital should be divided into fifteen 
shares of which four should be allocated to the banks 
which had contracted for the loan of 1904, in return 
for which they would cede to the Bank their prefer- 
ential rights established by the Act of June 12, 1904. 
Instead of a Conseil de surveillance of the diplomatic 
corps, it provided for a Conseil d'escompte, sitting at 
Tangier consisting of representatives from the foreign 
colony, while the Conseil d' administration of twenty- 
five members should be chosen by the stockholders of 
the Bank, and should choose its own director.^ 

The discussion of these two proposals occupied the 
Conference until March 3, and at that time no indica- 
tion of a settlement was visible. Seeing that no imme- 
diate solution was possible in regard to the State Bank, 
M. Revoil asked that the question of the police should 
be brought up in the next discussion. Herr von Rado- 
witz opposed and the question was put to a vote. The 
result was ten votes in favor of the French proposal 
and three against, the Austrian and Moroccan dele- 
gates being the only ones willing to sustain Germany 

» Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 20 annexe. 



212 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

in her efforts to drag out the proceedings. Although 
this was merely a vote on procedure, it showed clearly 
enough that Germany had completely isolated herself 
by her tactics, and the sympathy of the delegates was 
now with France. At the same time, other influences 
were at work for the French cause in Europe. Count 
"Witte, who was passing through Germany on his re- 
turn from America, at the request of France sought 
an interview with the Kaiser, and asked that he show 
his friendly sentiments towards Russia by taking a 
more conciliatory attitude towards her ally, France.^® 
At the same time Baron de Courcel, the French envoy 
to the funeral ceremonies of King Christian IX of 
Denmark, while passing through Berlin on his return, 
was given an audience by Prince von Biilow.^^ Both 
the Kaiser and Prince von Biilow were very conciliatory 
in tone, but the concessions they were willing to make 
would have separated France from both England and 
Spain by tearing up her accords with these two Powers. 
President Roosevelt, who had been so successful in 
bringing Russia and Japan to a basis of compromise, 
now decided to exert his influence here. Learning 
from Mr. White that France was willing to compromise 
upon the organization of the police by accepting a 
Franco-Spanish Police, checked by the Italian legation 
at Tangier, he urged a German acceptance of this pro- 
posal. Emperor William refused to consider this 
compromise, nor did a second telegram from the Presi- 
dent change his attitude.^^ Nevertheless, the fact that 

10 Tardieu, op. cit., p. 247, et seq. n Ibid., p. 241, et seq. 

12 Ibid., p. 249. Mr. J. B. Bishop promises to show in his forthcoming 
life of Roosevelt that the President played a leading part not only in 
arranging the Conference, but also in drawing up the settlement and 
compelling the Kaiser to assent. See Scribner's, April, 1920. 



THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS 213 

Germany had not been able to separate either Spain 
or England from France, that Russia persisted in sus- 
taining her ally, that the United States was clearly 
sympathetic to France, and that even Italy could not 
be counted upon to support her partners, began to 
render Germany more tractable. The vote of March 3 
was a clear portent.^* 

The discussion concerning the police, the most im- 
portant and the most thorny question before the Con- 
ference, opened March 5. M. Bacheracht, after 
pointing out the inequality of the European interests 
in Morocco but the crying need for protection for such 
interests as each had, declared that both France and 
Spain were especially well equipped to organize and 
supervise the police since they both had under-ofiScers, 
Algerian and Riffian, who were of the Mohammedan 
faith. In fact, a French officer, assisted by several 
subordinate officers, had already by express order of 

13 It was just at this time that King Edward VII made another visit 
to Paris, where he not only exchanged visits with President Fallieres 
and M. Rouvier and the Baron de Courcel, who had just returned from 
Berlin, but also received M. Loubet and M. Delcasse at luncheon. M, 
Leghait, the Belgian Minister at Paris writing to Baron de Favereau, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, March 6, 1906, thus characterized this 
incident: "This mark of courtesy towards M. Delcasse at this moment 
is very much discussed. It is generally considered as a very significant 
dem,onstration which is disconcerting on account of the extent and 
gravity of the consequences which it may have. . . . This act of King 
Edward is regarded almost as a return thrust for the landing of Em- 
peror William at Tangier, and all the more importance is attached to 
this step, because it cannot be imagined that a sovereign, the poise of 
whose mind is known could have decided in favor of it without weigh- 
ing all its consequences and without assuming all responsibility for it. 

"The King, so it seems, wanted to show that the policy which caused 
the energetic intervention of Germany has nevertheless, remained the 
same, because England kept firm and immutable the principles which 
the Agreement of April 8, 1904, has imposed on her." Keports of Bel- 
gian Representatives, No. 16. 



214 FEENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

the Sultan begun to organize the police at Tangier.^* 
M. Revoil in outlining the French plan, declared that 
for all the eight ports hardly more than from two thou- 
sand to two thousand five hundred soldiers would be 
required, under the direction of about sixteen officers. 
Furthermore, the Sultan would be consulted in the 
appointment of these officers, and the police would 
remain under the command of the Shereefian authori- 
ties, the officers' role being limited to lending to these 
authorities their technical assistance in the exercise of 
the command and in the maintenance of discipline.^^ 
M. Caballero then showed the weakness of the German 
proposal for an international police, and declared that 
he could not see how the assistance of Spain and France 
in the organization of the police would be a danger to 
economic liberty.^^ The German delegates apparently 
felt that they had no chance of succeeding with their 
project, so on March 7, the Austrian delegate produced 
a proposal which was clearly a bridge for the Germans 
to get back upon. Their scheme provided French in- 
structors for the police at Tangier, Safi, Rabat and 
Tetouan, Spanish at Mogador, Larache, Mazagan, and 
Swiss, Dutch or Belgian at Casablanca; the whole to 
be under supervision of the diplomatic corps.^"^ The 
German representatives were willing to subscribe to 
this, and as this was very close to the proposal which 
the French presented, it at last appeared as though the 
Conference might soon reach a satisfactory agreement 
on all questions at issue. 

14 Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 23, annex No. 1. 

15 Ibid., annexe No. 3. 

16 Ibid., annexe No. 4. 

17 Ibid., No. 25, annexe No. 4. 



THE CONFEEENCE OF ALGECIKAS 215 

While the diplomatic skies were clearing at Alge- 
ciras, a sudden ministerial storm had blown up in 
Paris, and before it calmed down the Rouvier cabinet 
had fallen. The vote of censure was upon a domestic 
question — the harsh method of carrying out the inven- 
tory of church property — but the result might well have 
a strong repercussion upon the foreign policy. The 
situation was made the worse by the difficulty in form- 
ing a new cabinet, and it was almost a week before the 
new Sarrien ministry received a vote of confidence^ 
The opportunity was too good for Germany to let pass. 
Although Herr von Radowitz had publicly asserted 
that the French and the Austrian proposals might 
easily be reconciled,^^ and the French were willing to 
concede inspection of the police, providing the Swiss 
or Dutch officers who should be given this authority 
should make their report to the Sultan rather than to 
the diplomatic corps,^^ on March 11, Herr von Rado- 
witz declared that his government had said its last 
word, — that it was the Austrian project unchanged or 
nothing.-*' Herr Tattenbach became equally unyield- 
ing on the question of the State Bank. The French 
delegates now found themselves in a serious dilemma. 
There was no government at Paris to indicate a policy. 
The representatives of the Powers could not fail to be 
influenced by the fact that by overthrowing M. Rouvier, 
the French Chamber had not shown itself favorable 
to its foreign policy. Otherwise, in the critical situa- 
tion which existed, it would not have allowed a question 
of domestic policy to overturn a ministry whose head 

18 Ibid., No. 27. 
isTardieu, op. cit., p. 309. 
20 Ibid., p. 312. 



216 FRENCH FOEEIGN POLICY 

held the portfolio of foreign affairs. At the same time 
the German press, the Kaiser, and the German dele- 
gates at Algeciras, began a violent campaign to show 
that France was isolated, and to force her to submit 
to an immediate and humiliating settlement. The 
''Lokal Anzeiger" even went so far as to declare that 
*'the resistance of France has isolated her and forced 
the neutral powers, Russia, Italy, America, and even 
England over to the German side. " ^^ On March 12, 
the German ambassadors in various capitals received 
a circular despatch from Berlin declaring that the ma- 
jority of delegates at Algeciras were favorable to 
Germany.^^ On the same day the German Chancellor 
telegraphed to Count Witte: "Thanks to our conces- 
sions everything was going on favorably at the Con- 
ference when, suddenly, M. Revoil created fresh diffi- 
culties, to the surprise of all the other plenipotentiaries, 
who deem his pretensions unwarranted, and who 
even with the English, incline in our favor. We hope 
that M. Witte will make his influential voice heard if 
he desires to avoid a final rupture."-^ Finally the 
Kaiser himself entered the lists and sent three per- 
sonal telegrams to President Roosevelt. The first 
declared that England, Spain, and Russia approved of 
the Austrian proposal and that the United States 
should add their influence ; the second was a denuncia- 
tion of the whole French policy; the third stated that 
the United States was the only power still backing 
France.^* The effect of these telegrams upon the 

21 Quoted in the Temps, March 13, 1906; Tardieu, op. cit., p, 316. 

22 Tardieu, op. cit., p. 318. 

23 Ibid., 319. 

24 Ibid., p. 319 et seq. 



THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS 217 

American Government is indicated by a communication 
from the American Secretary of State, Mr. Root, to 
the German ambassador, March 17, the date of the last 
of the Kaiser's telegrams. The communication was 
in regard to the American view of the Austrian pro- 
posal. M. Root declared: ''We do not approve that 
proposal. We regard it as an essential departure from 
the principle declared by Germany and adhered to by 
the United States, that all commercial nations are en- 
titled to have the door of equal commercial opportunity 
in Morocco kept open. . . . France has yielded to this 
view of international right to the extent of offering 
to become jointly, with Spain, the mandatory of all 
the powers for the purpose of at once maintaining 
order and preserving equal commercial opportunities 
for all of them. . . . This arrangement seemed to ac- 
complish the desired purpose. "^^ Needless to say, 
Germany's misrepresentations and misstatements 
were no more successful in the other countries which 
were behind France than they were in the United 
States,^^ and when the Sarrien ministry was at length 
formed on March 13, with M. Leon Bourgeois in charge 
of the Quai d'Orsay, France found herself in a stronger 
position than ever. The President du Conseil, M. Sar- 
rien, was of rather colorless personality, but his lack 
of forcefulness was immaterial since he had the dyna- 
mic, driving power of M. Georges Clemenceau, the new 
Minister of Interior, behind him. With this tombeur 
de ministeres in the cabinet, the country could be cer- 

25 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1906, Part 2, p. 1481. 
• 26 Great Britain affirmed her intention of standing back of France 
by a circular dated March 13, Russia followed her March 19. See the 
Temps, March 20, 1906 for texts of these documents. 



218 FEENCH FOEEIGN POLICY 

tain that there would be no further truckling to the 
bully across the Ehine. 

In his ministerial declaration read before Parlia- 
ment on March 14, 1906, M. Sarricn made it evident 
that France had fully recovered confidence in the 
justice of her stand. ''Fully conscious of the rights 
and vital interests which our diplomacy must safe- 
guard, we are convinced that the exercise of these 
rights and the normal development of these interests 
can be assured without interfering with those of any 
other power; as our predecessors to whom we must 
fully render justice, we hope that the fairness and the 
clearness of this attitude will permit the early and 
definitive settlement of the outstanding difficulties. ' ' ^'^ 
France had made her last concession and her position 
was clear cut and final. She was willing to allow in- 
spection of the police, but she insisted absolutely that 
Casablanca be included with the other seven ports 
under the Franco-Spanish police. Germany realized 
that she had lost and that any further opposition would 
only weaken her position the more. At the plenary 
session of the Conference on March 26, the Austrian 
delegate conceded that Casablanca should be included 
with the other ports under the Franco-Spanish police, 
and Count von Eadowitz expressed himself as satis- 
fied with his colleague's statement.^^ There still re- 
mained the question of the nationality of the inspector, 
and the subordination of the police to the control of 
the diplomatic corps. Austria had demanded that the 
inspector be Dutch or Swiss ; France insisted upon the 



27 Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 78ii, p. 1634. 

28 Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 28 



THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS 219 

latter, and was finally able to make her views prevail, 
owing to the diplomatic manner in which Sir Arthur 
Nicolson presented the proposition.^^ As to the con- 
trol by the diplomatic corps, it was finally decided that 
the reports of the inspector should be sent both to the 
Maghzen and to the Diplomatic Corps, also that the 
Diplomatic Corps could demand an investigation at 
any time, but only through the Sultan's representative. 
France had been successful in preventing international 
control of the police.^" 

There still remained the question of the apportion- 
ment of the ports between France and Spain. Accord- 
ing to the secret treaty of September 1, 1905, it had 
been arranged that French officers should be in charge 1/ 
of the police in Rabat and Casablanca, while Spain 
should control in Tetuan and Larache, Tangier being 
under a Franco-Spanish corps commanded by a French 
officer.^^ Since the three ports to be newly assigned, 
Mazagan, Safi and Mogador, were within the French ' 
sphere of influence France took it for granted that she 
would receive them. Spain, however, was unwilling 
that French influence should predominate completely, 
and insisted upon the immediate control of Tangier, 
which according to treaty would only be hers after fif- 
teen years, M. Bourgeois did not wish to offend 
Spain ; nor did he feel justified in allowing her to disre- 
gard the treaty which she had so recently ratified. As 
a compromise, he suggested that Spain share the con- 
trol in Casablanca as well as in Tangier. Spain was at 
first inclined to insist upon immediate control of Tan- 

29 Ibid., No. 29. 

30 Doc. Dip., No. 29 annexe. 

31 Martens, "Recueil," 3d Ser., Vol. 5, p. 670. 



220 FEENCH FOEEIGN POLICY 

gier, and it was only after a long struggle that France 
was able to prevail. Her solution was presented by M. 
Bacheracht in the session of March 31.^^ 

At this same session the last problems outstanding 
in the question of the State Bank were also settled. 
The censors, of which there were to be four, were 
divided equally among the banks of France, England, 
Spain and Germany. As for the capital, it was finally 
agreed that an equal portion be attributed to each of 
the Powers represented at the Conference, with two por- 
tions equal to those reserved to each of the subscribing 
groups, assigned to the syndicate of bank signatories 
of the contract of June 12, 1904, as compensation for 
the cession of their rights to the State Bank.^^ With 
these points settled it only remained to draw up the 
General Act and submit it to the delegates for their 
signatures. The final cession took place on April 7, 
and "with the signing of the General Act by the dele- 
gates representing the thirteen Powers, the Conference 
was declared adjourned.^* 

2. SIGNIFICANCE AND RATIFICATION OP THE GENERAL ACT 

The General Act of the International Conference at 
Algeciras, to give it the official title, consisted of one 
hundred twenty-three articles divided into seven sec- 
tions, covering the organization of the police, regula- 
tions for the suppression of the illicit trade in arms, 
the State Bank, the establishment of a better system 
of taxes and revenue, the regulation of customs and the 
suppression of smuggling, the public services and pub- 

32 Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 31. 
83 Doc. Dip., op. cit.. No. 31. 
34 Ibid., No. 36. 



THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS 221 

lie works, and finally the ratification of the act, which 
was to occur not later than December 31, 1906.^^ The 
three vital principles which all the Powers had sub- 
scribed to, namely the independence of the Sultan, the 
integrity of his territory, and commercial liberty, had 
been carefully maintained. The two most pressing 
reforms: an organized police, and a self-supporting 
financial system, had been most elaborately provided 
for. For the first, provision had been made for a force 
of from two thousand to two thousand five hundred, 
to be recruited by the Sultan from among the Moors, 
and under Moorish chiefs, and distributed among the 
eight ports ; from forty-six to sixty French and Span- 
ish officers, approved by the Sultan were to be ap- 
pointed as instructors, under the general control of a 
Swiss Inspector-General who was to report to the 
Maghzen, but who could interfere neither in the com- 
mand nor in the instruction of the force. For the 
second, a Morocco State Bank had been established, 
which was to act as disbursing Treasurer for the Em- 
pire, its capital to be divided into fourteen parts (the 
United States did not subscribe) of which twelve were 
assigned to the Powers participating and two to the 
French Syndicate. The Bank was given the power to 
adopt such measures as it should deem necessary for 
ameliorating the monetary situation in Morocco. 

The majority of the nations of the civilized world 
had participated in a conference to prepare a program 
of reforms which was to put an end to the anarchy 
existing in Morocco, a program which France alone 
was anxious to draw up and put into effect. All the 

35 Ibid., No. 37. 



222 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

world except Germany seemed willing to allow her to 
proceed. Germany, however, wished to make the 
world realize her international importance. When 
questions of world interest were to be decided, Ger- 
many must be called into the discussion, otherwise she 
could and would challenge the settlement. In the Con- 
ference of Algeciras, Germany found to her discom- 
fiture, that it was easier to focus the world 's attention 
upon her, than to force the world to pay attention to 
her claims. The Powers assembled at her behest, they 
listened calmly to her extravagant claims, they were 
somewhat dismayed at the furor Teutonicus, but they 
gave their decision wholly unmoved by her bluster, 
and in direct opposition to her loudly asserted de- 
mands. France had been keenly humiliated by being 
forced to attend the Conference; Germany had suf- 
fered a humiliating diplomatic defeat by the results 
of the Conference. The other nations had little inter- 
est in the whole affair, but had done the best they could 
under the circumstances. It remained to be seen 
whether a conference conceived in jealousy and held 
under protest, could produce an arrangement which 
would function smoothly or obtain results. 

For Germany, the result of the Conference was a 
most disagreeable setback. Instead of isolating 
France, if that was her purpose, she found herself 
ultimately with only Austria to back her. Not only 
did she fail to separate France from her newfound 
friends, but by her reprehensible methods, she even 
forced those nations which wished to be neutral to take 
sides with the French. Spain and Italy remained 
faithful to their pledges of friendship, Russia showed 



THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS 223 

unexpected vigor in her championship of the French 
cause, while one might say of the Entente Cordiale, that 
at Algeciras ''it had passed from the static to the 
dynamic state and that its power had correspondingly 
quickened." Herr Basserman, a Liberal member of 
the Reichstag, thus summed up the situation : ' ' To-day 
the Triple Alliance has no further practical utility. 
The Italian press and population lean more and more 
towards France. Austria has been too much praised 
for this role of 'brilliant second' which she herself de- 
clined. The Franco-Russian Alliance remains intact, 
and the disposition of France towards us is less 
friendly than formerly. . . . We live at an epoch of 
alliances between other nations." ^^ The "Berliner 
Tageblatt" conceded that "neither Birmarck's genius 
nor Talleyrand's subtlety could have obtained more, 
but Bismarck would have never gone to Algeci- 
ras." ^^ 

Prince von Biilow attempted to forestall criticism 
by bringing the question up in the Reichstag on April 
5, two days before the signatures of the delegates were 
affixed to the General Act, and by emphasizing the 
point that Germany had neither direct political inter- 
ests nor political aspirations in Morocco. "We have 
not like Spain a Mauritanian post of several centuries, 
and we have not like France a common frontier of 
several hundreds of kilometres with Morocco ; we have 
no historic rights acquired by all sorts of sacrifices 
as have these two civilizing European nations. ..." 
From the tone of his introduction one might have sup- 

sesten. Ber. v, d. Verhand des Reich, Session 1905-06, Vol. V, 
p. 4238. 

37 Quoted by Tardieu, "France and the Alliances," p. 206. 



224 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

posed that the Chancellor was making excuses for Ger- 
many for not raising the question, rather than giving 
the causes which led her to force the Conference upon 
an unwilling Europe. However, this deprecatory tone 
of his exordium served but to heighten the contrast 
when he came to recount the advantages which had 
accrued to Germany. ''We wished to show that the 
German Empire does not allow itself to be treated as 
a negligible quantity, that the basis of an international 
treaty cannot be displaced without the assent of the 
signatory powers, and that upon a territory so impor- 
tant from the economic point of view, which is inde- 
pendent, and situated upon two great routes of the 
world's commerce, the door must remain open to as- 
sure the liberty of foreign competition." There is no 
doubt that Germany had clearly proved to Europe that 
she could not be treated as a negligible quantity, the 
Anglo-Russian rapprochement whose base was laid at 
the Conference gave evidence of that ; but it remained 
to be seen whether it was either wise or advantageous 
for her to arouse the world to the Teuton menace. 
But of the other two points upon which the Chancellor 
rested his case, the first, regarding the revising of 
international treaties, was wholly irrelevant here, since 
France had no intention of violating any of the clauses 
of the Treaty of Madrid, and as for the second, a direct 
arrangement with France would have been far more 
likely to safeguard German interests than the elaborate 
international arrangement which after all was to be 
put into effect by the very nations which Germany had 
most reason to fear. In concluding, Prince von Biilow 
attempted his most remarkable tour de force: ''One 



THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS 225 

cannot easily refuse to recognize that no country was 
more capable, by reason of its experience, of furnish- 
ing police instructors than Spain and France, countries 
which are neighbors of Morocco. ' ' ^^ Even the mem 
bers of the Reichstag must have smiled at the naivete 
of this statement, when they recalled that it was Ger- 
many's refusal to recognize this fact that had been her 
principal excuse for calling the Conference together. 
Some years later Prince von Biilow expressed far more 
accurately the real advantages of the Conference to 
Germany: "The decisions of the Algeciras Conference 
. . . provided a bell we could ring at any time should 
France show any similar tendencies again. "^^ 

The Chancellor had one more opportunity to defend 
the Act before it came before the Reichstag for ratifica- 
tion. On November 14, 1906, he made a long and com- 
prehensive survey of the foreign policy of the Empire, 
and the relations with France were given special 
prominence. On this occasion his tone was quite pessi- 
mistic. He declared that a closer relationship with 
France could not be hoped for, seeing that past events 
were viewed differently by their neighbors on the west, 
and not a minister or a deputy had defended a closer 
relationship between the two countries. When a voice 
on the left cried: "How about Jaures?" von Biilow 
countered: "One swallow does n't make a summer." ^^ 
When the Act came up for a vote on December 7, some 
of the deputies in the Reichstag very frankly pointed 
out why Franco-German relations were so unsatisfac- 
tory. Herr Wiemer declared that Germany had no 

38 "Furst Bulows Reden," Vol. II, p. 303. 
89 Von Biilow, "Imperial Germany," p. 98. 
40 "FQrst Bulows Reden," Vol II, p. 306. 



226 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

reason to feel satisfied with the Conference of Alge- 
ciras. The hesitating attitude of her foreign policy, 
its useless provocations, its misplaced advances, had 
conducted it to a diminution of its diplomatic pres- 
tige.^^ Herr Blumenthal imagined that the govern- 
ment was about as pleased at the results of the Con- 
ference as the fox of La Fontaine was at the grapes 
which he found too green. There had been too much 
rattling of the saber — too much force to produce such 
an unsatisfactory result. Since the Chancellor had 
said Germans were Russians in Bulgaria, Austrians 
in Servia, why not be French in Morocco I ^^ The Chan- 
cellor did not even deign to appear in defence of the 
Act — the opinion of the Reichstag counted for very 
little in the foreign policy of the Empire. After the 
various deputies had expressed their opinion the Act 
passed by a show of hands. 

In France the sentiment regarding the results of the 
Act was divided. The bitterness at being forced into 
an international conference against her will, the real- 
ization that the payments she had made to Great 
Britain, Spain and Italy for a free hand had gone for 
naught, the knowledge that a series of international 
barriers had been raised against her progress in a 
country which she had long regarded as her legitimate 
sphere of influence — all these factors prevented any 
manifestations of keen satisfaction. On the other 
hand, she had strengthened her alliance and her friend- 
ships, she had been successful in maintaining her posi- 
tion on every point which she considered vital, her pres- 

*iSten. Ber. v. d. Verhand. des Reich. Session 1905-06, Vol. V, p. 
4237. 
42 Ibid., p. 4238. 



THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS 227 

tige had been increased at her rival's expense, and the 
whole world had recognized her position as the pre- 
dominant power in Morocco. In the words of M. Leon 
Bourgeois, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, in pre- 
senting the Act of the Conference to the Chamber, 
April 12, 1906, a result had been obtained ''in terms 
absolutely honorable for all, and without anything, as 
far as our country is concerned, having been aban- 
doned, either the fruit of its past efforts, or the dignity 
of its present situation, or the safeguard of its 
future." ^^ The Act was not voted upon until Decem- 
ber 6, but the discussion then centered upon the methods 
to be employed in putting the Act into effect rather 
than upon the acceptance of the Act. When the vote 
was taken it was found that the Chamber had accepted 
the Act unanimously. 

3. THE APPLICATION OF THE ACT 

If one were to stop with the ratification of the Act, 
the Conference of Algeciras might well be called suc- 
cessful. The Powers had honestly tried to draw up 
a program of reforms which would put an end to the 
impossible conditions existing in Morocco, and to do 
it in such a way that the special interests of the Medi- 
terranean Powers should be recognized, and at the 
same time the general interests of the world safe- 
guarded. If there had been a government in Morocco 
able and willing to cooperate with France and Spain 
to put an end to anarchy, if France and Spain had 
been ready to provide the necessary officers to drill 
the police directly after the Act was signed, the Confer- 

43 Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 78ii, p. 2182. 



228 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

ence might still have been called successful. But inter- 
national machines move slowly and the road in Mo- 
rocco was exceedingly rough. The Sultan was not 
particularly anxious to provide the necessary soldiers 
to police the ports, where European interests were for 
the most part at stake, and allow the rest of his empire 
to fall apart because Europe had few interests there. 
The whole Conference had given clear evidence to the 
Sultan that Europe's interests in Morocco were wholly 
selfish. Why then should he exert himself to co- 
operate with Europe to reduce his own power? The 
situation was rendered the more difiScult by a series of 
unfortunate incidents. 

On May 29 a well known resident of Tangier, a 
French citizen, M. Charbonnier, was shot down in 
broad daylight. The local authorities offered no ex- 
cuses and made no efforts to apprehend the assassins ; 
and the European colony, aroused by the affair, de- 
manded that an immediate end be put to such condi- 
tions.** The bandit Raisuli had become more power- 
ful than ever, and the Shereefian troops were never sent 
against him. It was even suspected that the Moroccan 
Government was using him as a means to stir up 
trouble, and thus check to some extent the advance of 
the Europeans. Hardly had France obtained the 
apologies and indemnity demanded from the Sultan 
and a promise to apprehend the murderers, before 
there was a new outbreak in Tangier, in which half 
a dozen Moors were killed.*^ French marines landing 
to obtain fresh water were fired upon; an outbreak 

44 Doc. Dip., "Affaires du Maroc," 1906-07, No. 10. 

45 Ibid., No. 37. 



THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIBAS 229 

against the Jews was staged at Mogador; and the 
French government was constantly in receipt of re- 
ports concerning the unchecked hostilities of the Mo- 
roccan tribes along the Algerian frontier. By the first 
of November, the Act had not yet been ratified by all 
the Powers; France, Spain and Switzerland had not 
yet decided upon their ofiQcers for the police ; the bandit 
Raisuli had complete control of the village of Arzila 
in the vicinity of Tangier, after having killed some of 
the guards and chased out the others;*^ the false 
prophet Bu-Iiamara was as powerful as ever, and a 
new contestant for the throne had come forth in the 
person of Hafid, the brother of Abdul Aziz. M. Eeg- 
nault, French Minister at Tangier, thus summed up 
the situation to M. Georges Villiers of the '* Temps": 
**At the present time and especially at Tangier, the 
Maghzen's authority does not exist. The total impo- 
tence and abdication of power has profited Raisuli, 
who has become a functionary but kept his habits of a 
brigand. Since no government exists, the police estab- 
lished by the Conference should be put in charge as 
quickly as possible, and as the State Bank must pay 
the police it should be established immediately. There 
is need for vigilance and vigor on the frontier, prompt 
organization of the police in the ports, surveillance and 
precaution everywhere. ' ' ^'^ 

These conditions could not continue much longer, 
and when in the middle of October M. Sarrien was 
forced to resign because of ill health, and M. Georges 
Clemenceau was asked to form the new cabinet, more 

46 Ibid., No. 69. 

47 Temps, Nov. 10, 1906. 



230 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

vigorous action was looked for. The portfolio of 
Foreign Affairs was given to M. Stephen Pichon, who 
had creditably won his spurs in the Boxer Rebellion. 
In his ministerial declaration made before the Cham- 
ber November 5, 1906, M. Ciemenceau promised to 
maintain a policy of peace, but it must be a peace of 
dignity, and since the peace of the civilized world was 
based upon the strength of arms it could not be ex- 
pected that France would disarm and destroy with her 
own hands the supreme guarantee of her independ- 
ence."*^ Neither Morocco, nor Franco-German rela- 
tions were mentioned, but in an interview which he 
gave to Herr Wolff of the "Berliner Tageblatt" the 
new Premier was not so reticent. *'The Germans have 
one fault," he declared, ''that of treating us for a cer- 
tain time with an exquisite amiability and then soon 
after with an exaggerated bruskness. . . . War I do 
not wish ; when one does n 't wish war he wishes good 
relations, that is my state of mind, and if I am given 
opportunity to act in this fashion I shall rejoice. But 
naturally it is necessary to be strong and it is necessary 
to be ready. . . ."*^ The new government's attitude 
regarding Morocco was plainly stated by M. Pichon in 
the Chamber, November 29, in reply to an interpella- 
tion by M. Jaures: ''Since the Act of Algeciras has 
intervened it has regulated from the international 
point of view, the respective status of all the Powers 
in Morocco. It is by virtue of this Act that we con- 
sider ourselves as obliged to-day to take the measures 
I have just indicated to you. It is absolutely impos- 
es Annaies de la Chambre, Vol. 80i, p. 5. 
49 Ques. Dip. et Col. Dec. 1, 1906. 



THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS 231 

sible for us to leave the lives of our citizens at the 
mercy of the outlaws who threaten to become masters 
in the city of Tangier. It is impossible for us to allow 
another power the opportunity of profiting by these 
circumstances, to substitute itself for us in the defence 
and safeguard of French citizens. ' ' ^^ 

The measures which M. Pichon had taken was the 
sending of a naval expedition to Tangier, after notify- 
ing Spain and asking her cooperation. Since by the 
terms of the Act, Tangier was to be policed by France 
and Spain jointly, M. Pichon felt that the responsibility 
was already theirs, and the situation was such as to 
demand urgent action.^^ Notice was also sent to the 
Powers that the expedition was being sent with no 
intention of disembarking unless such troubles should 
arise as would render an immediate policing impera- 
tive.^^ This was followed on December 4 by a con- 
certed note drawn up by France and Spain, declaring 
that **the recent events in the region of Tangier and 
the repeated incidents which have taken place in that 
city are of a nature to make it feared that strangers 
no longer find there sufficient guarantees for their 
security. If the situation should give rise to more 
serious disorders, the institution of the police provided 
in the Act of Algeciras would appear with a character 
of urgent necessity, and both France and Spain would 
have to take measures to hasten the organization on 
the conditions accepted by the Powers who have par- 
ticipated in the Conference. It is in this spirit that the 
two governments have decided to send to Tangier naval 

BO Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 80i, p. 491. 
BiDoc. Dip., op. cit., No. 102. 
52 Ibid., No. 113. 



232 FEENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

forces capable of coping with any eventuality."^^ 
The arrival of the naval expedition finally aroused 
the Sultan to action, and he forthwith despatched his 
minister of war in personal command of an improvised 
army, with orders to place the city of Tangier under 
"the shadow of security," and to permit the execution 
of the reforms of Algeciras.^* Eaisuli seemed little 
disturbed, and even attempted to arrest a Frenchman 
while the Sultan's troops were on the march. Arriv- 
ing late in December, El Guebbas, Minister of War, 
took charge of the town 's protection, read a decree cen- 
suring Eaisuli and depriving him of his rank as Kaid, 
while the populace applauded vigorously. In the 
meantime Eaisuli had left Tangier and fortified him- 
self at Linat. The Sultan's troops decided to follow 
him, but when they arrived Eaisuli had departed.^^ 
As evidence had now been given that the Sultan could 
police Tangier, there seemed no further reason to main- 
tain the squadron there, and it withdrew without dis- 
embarking a man or firing a gun. Neither Eaisuli nor 
his band had been taken, the murderers of M. Char- 
bonnier were still at large, but M. Jaures and his fol- 
lowers were determined that the letter and spirit of the 
Act should be carried out by France with absolute 
fidelity. Germany was not to be given another oppor- 
tunity to cry "Wolf !" 

At the same time that France was honestly trying to 
carry out the provisions of the Act of Algeciras, — 
while M. Paul Deschanel, President of the Commission 
of Foreign Affairs, was stating publicly in the Cham- 

63 Ibid., No. 123. 

64 Ibid., No. 142. 
es Ibid., No. 164. 



THE CONFEEENCE OF ALGECIEAS 233 

ber that **we wish neither adventures, nor expedition, 
nor conquest, we wish to fill loyally the mandate that 
Europe, all Europe, has confided to us at Algeciras," ^* 
— Germany was already conniving with the Sultan to 
obtain special privileges and to interfere with the 
policing. Lieutenant Wolff, a German officer and also 
a representative of Krupps, was engaged as an in- 
structor for the Moroccan cavalry ; Captain von Tshudi 
of the German Corps was given the post of Chief 
Engineer to the Sultan,^ ^ Although by the Act, arms 
and munitions were contraband, German steamships 
were being employed regularly to carry on this trade.^^ 
The construction work of the German firms at Tangier 
was proceeding rapidly and they were preparing to 
begin that of Larache. France began to realize that 
Germany was playing the game of the fait accompli 
behind the smoke-screen of the Act of Algeciras, and 
already it was becoming evident that France would 
have to come to some agreement with Germany before 
the Act would be effective. 

The Sultan, relying upon the lack of unity visible 
in the international action, became indifferent to 
French demands. Although both French and Spanish 
had submitted the lists of officers designated for the 
police by the end of January, 1907,^^ by the middle of 
March no action had yet been taken.^^ As Abdul Aziz 
became more dilatory, his subjects became more openly 
hostile. On March 8, at Fez, the capital of Morocco, 

56 Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 80i, p. 729. 

57 Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 172, 

58 Ibid., Nos. 196, 204. 

59 Ibid., No. 191. 

60 Ibid., No. 209. 



234 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

a French engineer was attacked by the populace and 
very seriously injured before he succeeded in making 
his escape.®^ On March 19, Dr. Mauchamp, an eminent 
French surgeon, in charge of the French dispensary 
in Marrakesh, was murdered by a mob in a most revolt- 
ing manner.^^ If such outrages were to continue, 
France would forever lose her prestige among the 
bloody, fanatical Berbers, who attributed inaction to 
fear. M. Pichon had to act immediately and effec- 
tively. A cruiser was despatched to Tangier, and on 
March 25, the Council of Ministers decided that Al- 
gerian troops should occupy Oudja on the Moroccan 
frontier, until suitable reparation had been made.^^ 
When it was learned that the Governor of Marrakesh 
had made no attempt either to send assistance to Dr. 
Mauchamp, although he had warning of the excitement 
of the populace, or to apprehend those guilty of the 
outrage when the murder was reported, France de- 
manded his dismissal and imprisonment, in addition 
to an indemnity to the victim 's family. 

The excellent record that Dr. Mauchamp had 
achieved, and the unselfish nature of his work, made 
his murder seem the more outrageous. The subject 
was brought up in the Chamber, and some of his friends 
excoriated the government for permitting such condi- 
tions to continue in Morocco. M. Ribot, although not 
of the government, came to its defense in a remarkably 

61 Ibid., No. 212. 

62 Ibid., No. 214. Dr. Mauchamp had served with great distinction 
for five years in the Holy Land at a time when epidemics of typhoid 
and cholera were devastating Syria and Palestine, and it was because 
of this enviable record that he had been given this most difficult post 
in the interior of Morocco. 

63 Ibid., No. 220. 



THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS 235 

convincing speech :**... We are at the present hour 
in the presence of an aroused excited fanaticism, and 
we are also in the presence of all that has happened 
during the last two years. Europe has given to the 
Mussulman world the spectacle of its divisions, and 
of the struggles which it pursues in the shadows. It is 
not worthy of European civilization, that the great 
Powers — jealous certainly of their interests, jealous to 
defend their rights, having legitimate ambitions — in- 
stead of coming to an understanding, instead of con- 
ferring, try to strike each other down in the darkness. 
These are blows aimed at civilization. This policy of 
ambushes must cease. We must confer. I know well 
enough that to confer there must be two. It must be 
understood that we seek no adventures and are faithful 
to our word. . . ."^* But Germany was not yet ready 
to confer, nor was the Moroccan Government ready 
to establish order; the fishing was still good in the 
troubled waters. The German firm, Renschhausen, had 
just signed a contract for the construction of the sewers 
of Tangier, and a boulevard along the sea ; the German 
firm of Haessner was expecting new concessions in the 
port of Larache, which would raise the value of its 
work there to five million marks.^^ Two months after 
the murder of Dr. Mauchamp, the Sultan was still 
debating whether he would have to make reparation, 
and whether he would really have to permit the organ- 
ization of the police. M. Pichon might well remark: 
*'Nous restons done exposes a de nouvelles sur- 
prises." 

64 Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 81, p. 1029. 

65 Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 253. 



236 FEENCH FOEEIGN POLICY 

A bit of humor was brought into the situation when 
the Sultan sent his Scottish adviser, MacLean, to bring 
the bandit, Eaisuli, to terms. The canny Scot more 
than met his match in the wily Moor. Instead of treat- 
ing with MacLean, Eaisuli seized him as a hostage, and 
declared that he would only release him on condition 
that the Sultan should reinstate him (Eaisuli) in his 
former position of authority. All thought of the pre- 
dicament of Scottish Kaid was obliterated by the news 
of an outbreak in Casablanca July 31, in which nine 
Europeans were massacred, three French, three 
Italians, two Spaniards, and one unidentified.^^ Again 
France was forced to send a squadron, and this time it 
was accompanied by a landing force under General 
Drude, with orders to seize the city and its suburbs, 
reestablish order and remain until the police should 
be organized. Spain was asked to cooperate with an 
equal contingent.®^ When the forces attempted to land 
they were treacherously attacked and six were 
wounded, one an ofiScer. The war-ships in the harbor 
thereupon bombarded the town, sparing as far as pos- 
sible, the European houses.®^ Before the town was 
completely invested the French troops suffered four- 
teen casualties. The French then turned their atten- 
tion to the organization of the police, but when assur- 
ances were demanded from the Moroccan Minister of 
War that these officers would be safe from assassina- 
tion at the hands of their own soldiers, he would not 
give it. Thereupon the two governments decided that 
a temporary police must be organized from their own 

68 Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 334. 

67 Ibid., No. 351. 

68 Ibid., No. 368. 



THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS 237 

effectives, and the Powers signatory of the Act were 
notified to this effect.^^ 

To complicate the situation, Mouley-Hafid, the elder 
brother of the Sultan, now raised the banner of a Holy 
"War and some of the western tribes immediately en- 
rolled under his banner. Before the end of August he 
was proclaimed Sultan in Marrakesh, the ancient capi- 
tal of Morocco, thus giving him an excellent strategical 
position to work from. Abdul Aziz, becoming worried 
at the progress of the revolt, removed his court to 
Rabat, where he might be able to call upon the war- 
ships of the Powers in case of an emergency. Condi- 
tions in Morocco had become so impossible that even 
Germany conceded the right of France to intervene. 
The ''Berliner Tageblatt" declared that ''the bloody 
episode of Casablanca is only the prelude of other acts 
of the Moroccan tragedy which are going to follow. 
We Germans have committed many faults ; for example, 
only the obtuse hatred of Herr von Holstein and his 
systematic stubborness would have repulsed the treaty 
which M. Rouvier formerly offered to Germany after 
the fall of M. Delcasse. J'rance has occupied Oudja, 
she now occupies Casablanca and she has the right to 
do so. . . . " '^^ Chancellor von Biilow, speaking in the 
Reichstag November 29, 1907, seemed to reproach 
France by intimating that the sad events of Casablanca 
might never have occurred if the police provided by 
the Act of Algeciras had been established. But since 
it was not, France could not do otherwise than enforce 
justice herself .'^^ 

69 Doc. Dip., op. cit., Fo. 437. 

70 Quoted Ques. Dip. et Col. Aug. 16, 1907. 
7x "Flirst Billows Eeden," Vol. Ill, p. 71. 



238 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

Thus at the close of 1907, a year and a half after the 
Act of Algeciras was signed, the work of the Powers 
was seen to be a failure. This diplomatic effort of 
Europe to establish order had only created confusion 
and tumult; this attempt to bring peace had brought 
anarchy and war. The odious role of policeman which 
the Act had imposed upon France without providing 
the means to carry it out properly had made France 
the object of a blind and bitter hatred on the part of 
the Moors. At the same time, it gave the Kaiser the 
opportunity to pose as the champion of Islamism, to 
the corresponding advantage of German interests.*^^ 
As for the reforms : the police existed only on paper, 
trade in contraband of war was flourishing, the State 
Bank could not even provide for the Sultan's needs, 
the reforms in the revenue had not been attempted, the 
collection of the customs was being carried out because 
that was the easiest way to obtain money, and as for 
the public works, only those were being undertaken 
which were not provided for by the Conference. The 
results were just what the French had forseen. As a 
French diplomat summed up the situation: ''This ad- 
mirable chart, the Act of Algeciras, provided for every- 
thing except that which happened. The architects of 
Algeciras have built upon quicksands and have 
stretched their surveyor's chains over chaos. They 
have disturbed everything without accomplishing any- 
thing, alarmed the Mussulmans who live in disorder, 
without imposing order, excited their spirits without 
mastering their wills, and there is nothing more dan- 

72 See an excellent article by Camille Sabatier "L'Erreur d'Algeciras," 
Eev. Pol. et Pari., Nov., 1907. 



THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS 239 

gerous in the Orient than to make oneself detested 
without making oneself feared. ' ' ''^ 

If France had been able to carry out a definite policy 
of reorganization in Morocco at this time, the Moroccan 
question might have been settled once for all. The 
Sultan, once installed in Rabat, turned to France to 
help him against his brother; General Drude with 
reinforcements and assisted by Spain, could have put 
the whole coast region in order, while General Lyautey 
was victoriously proceeding against the tribes trou- 
bling the Algerian frontier. All Europe seemed will- 
ing that France should put an end to the chaotic con- 
dition, and Germany seemed to expect it. But once 
more the internal condition of France interfered with 
her foreign policy. From its very inception the 
Clemenceau government had to cope with a number of 
very serious strikes. The manifestations during the 
summer of 1907 in various parts of the South, often 
resulted in bloody clashes. Many of the regiments 
stationed in the Midi mutinied, the entire administra- 
tion of several towns resigned, and the government was 
hard pressed to avert a civil war. Under these cir- 
cumstances the government's foreign policy was bound 
to suffer, and its policy in Morocco was vacillating in 
the extreme. The Act of Algeciras had been pre- 
scribed as the proper medicine for the Moroccan sick- 
ness, therefore the Act must be applied. But as to the 
means of application, no decision could be reached, 
and the Moroccan question was destined to drag along 
— the hete noire of the French Foreign Office. 

73 Rene Millet, "Maroc devant I'Eiirope," Kev. Pol. et Pari. Nov., 
1907. 



CHAPTER IX 

FRANCO-GERMAN RIVALRY IN MOROCCO,. 
1907-1909 

1. THE SECOND HAGUE CONFERENCE AND THE FRANCO- 
JAPANESE ACCORD 

THE idea of world peace has ever been dear to the 
hearts of the French. The Grrand Design of 
Henri IV published by his minister, Sully, the Project 
put forth by the Abbe Castel de St. Pierre, and the 
judgment upon it by Jean Jacques Eousseau, rank 
high in the early literature of the subject. Documen- 
tary evidence has even been produced to show that 
Napoleon was only conquering the world in order ulti- 
mately to give it perpetual peace. Some of the earliest 
peace congresses also made a strong appeal to the 
French, and it would be difficult to find a more impas- 
sioned appeal in favor of world peace than the oration 
delivered by Victor Hugo in 1849 at such a congress.^ 

1 A short quotation will show the eloquence of the poet-orator : "A 
day will come when you France, you Kussia, you Italy, you England, 
you Germany, you, nations of the continent, without losing your dis- 
tinct qualities and your glorious individuality, will blend yourselves 
closely into a superior unity, and you will constitute the European 
fraternity, absolutely as Normandy, Brittany, Burgundy, Alsace, Lor- 
raine, all our provinces, are blended into France. A day will come 
when there will be no other battlefields than market-places opening to 
commerce and minds opening to ideas, A day will come when the bullets 
and the bombs will be replaced by votes, by the universal suffrage of 
peoples, by the venerable arbitration of a great sovereign senate which 
will be to Europe what Parliament is to Great Britain, what the Diet 
is to Germany, what the Legislative Assembly is to France. . . ." 

240 



EIVALRY IN MOROCCO 1907-1909 241 

But the Treaty of Frankfort intervened between 
Hugo's eloquent plea for world peace and the calling 
of the first Hague Conference. Alsace and Lorraine 
were no longer provinces of France and the phrase: 
''¥ penser tou jours, n'en parler jamais/' had become 
a parole celebre. Tangier and Algeciras came between 
the first and second Hague Conferences; and almost 
simultaneously with the Czar's second call, the Kaiser 
in congratulating the Colonial party upon its victory 
over the Social Democrats, had declared: ''What do we 
care for the rules according to which the enemy fights 
if he is beaten in the fighting? We have now learned 
the art of conquering him and are filled with the desire 
to practice it further. ' ' ^ Under these circumstances it 
could hardly be expected that France would go into the 
second Hague Conference, called by her ally, with the 
idea that international peace and friendship were soon 
to be achieved. Even if M. Jaures or M. d'Estour- 
nelles de Constant so thought, M. Clemenceau assuredly 
did not. 

When the question came before the Chambre, June 
7, 1907, M. Francis de Pressense made a long and elo- 
quent appeal in favor of the reduction of armaments, 
■and urged that the French delegation should be author- 
ized to support such a proposal. In his reply M. 
Pichon showed that since Germany had already given 
a categorical refusal to discuss any such proposition, 
France was hardly in a position to insist. However, 
he declared that France was willing to discuss the ques- 
tion with those Powers that understood the utility and 
necessity of such a debate, and that France was send- 

2 Gauss, "The German Emperor," p. 258, 



242 FEENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

ing her delegates with the hope that they might succeed 
* ' in strengthening the idea of conciliation, of solidarity, 
of justice, in diminishing uncertainty and arbitrary 
methods, in weakening as far as possible the idea that 
force is the generatrix of right, and if they accom- 
phshed the task set for them they would render a sig- 
nal service to humanity. ' ' ^ 

But while the Clemenceau government was willing 
that M. Leon Bourgeois, M. d'Estournelles de Constant, 
and M, Louis Renault should work for peace at the 
Hague, both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secre- 
tary were unwilling to let any opportunity slip whereby 
they might accomplish the same result by strengthen- 
ing France. The Conference of Algeciras, by showing 
clearly to the world the blustering, quarrelsome, brag- 
gadocio spirit of the young German nation, tended to 
draw the other nations into closer relations as a mere 
matter of self protection. France and Great Britain, 
who were most threatened by this bellicose attitude of 
Germany, profited by the situation to strengthen them- 
selves by further accords and agreements. On Decem- 
ber 13, 1906, a convention was signed between France, 
England and Italy in regard to Abyssinia. The polit- 
ical and territorial status quo of Ethiopia was guar- 
anteed and the neighboring territorial interests of the 
three Powers were set forth and mutually recognized. 
The economic sphere of influence allotted to France was 
the hinterland of her protectorate over the Coast of 
Somalis including the zone necessary for the construc- 
tion of a railway from Djibouti to Adis Abeba; Italy 

^ aAnnales de la Chambre, Vol. 82i, p. 410. 



EIVALRY IN MOROCCO 1907-1909 243 

obtained Eritrea and Somaliland ; while Great Britain 
was to have the Nile Basin.* 

On May 16, 1907, declarations were signed at Paris 
between France and Spain, and on the same day notes 
were exchanged between Spain and Great Britain, in 
regard to the maintenance of the status quo in the 
Mediterranean. The three governments expressed 
their intention of following a policy having for its 
object the maintenance of the territorial status quo. 
In case circumstances should arise modifying the pres- 
ent situation the governments were to communicate 
with each other and determine what measures to take 
in common.^ At first glance there seemed to be no 
particular need for the three governments, who were 
already bound by treaties which covered exactly the 
same ground, to make new declarations in regard to 
the maintenance of the status quo in the Mediterranean. 
However, much water had gone through the mill 
since the treaties signed in 1904; the German Michel 
had put his foot on the shore of the Latin lake and 
seemed disposed to keep it there. He had forced the 
world to come to him at Algeciras, and had proved to 

4 British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. 99, p 486. 

5 Text of the Franco-Spanish Declaration, British and Foreign State 
Papers, Vol. 100, p. 933; the Anglo-Spanish Accord, Ibid., p. 570. M. 
Pichon speaking in the Chamber July 5, 1907, regarding the Franco- 
Spanish Accord declared: "Nothing is more clear and more pacific in 
the present and for the future than this accord. It is essentially con- 
servative of the status quo, that is to say of peace. It could only be 
disagreeable to those who dream of territorial conquests at the exjjense 
of the two contracting powers. But as all the Powers wish peace, as 
all say so, they must be reassured by the reciprocal guarantees that 
France and Spain on the one side and Spain and England on the other 
have given in identical termsi." Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 82ii, p. 
995. 



2M FRENCH FOEEIGN POLICY 

his own satisfaction that he must be considered in the 
making of international arrangements. France and 
Great Britain may well be excused for this bit of self- 
assertion, this salve to the wounds in their amour- 
propre left by Algeciras. They still considered Ger- 
many a quantite negligible in questions of the Medi- 
terranean and they took this means of showing it. 
Incidentally it also gave them another opportunity 
of proving that Germany had strengthened rather than 
weakened their mutual friendship. 

A month after the announcement of the Mediter- 
ranean understanding, France signed another accord 
of a more surprising nature — the Franco-Japanese Ac- 
cord of June 10, 1907. An agreement with Japan so 
soon after the Eusso-Japanese War was the more un- 
expected because of the bitter hostility aroused in 
Japan against the French, through numerous alleged 
breaches of neutrality on the part of France during the 
war. In fact Admiral Eojestvensky's fleet had coaled 
at Cherbourg, had anchored off the coast of Madagas- 
car for over two months obtaining both coal and sup- 
plies, and had made its final stop of ten days in 
Kamranh Bay in French Indo-China.^ The indigna- 
tion aroused in Japan was intense, and Count Hayashi 
conceded that if the Japanese had been defeated in the 
Battle of Tsushima Straights their hostility would have 
been permanent. But the Japanese won an over- 
whelming victory, and * ' the excitement and satisfaction 
of the Japanese nation entirely overshadowed any re- 
sentment they felt against France on account of 
the breaches of neutrality. In their triumph after the 

e Stowell and Munro, "International Cases," Vol. II, p. 295. 



EIVALRY IN MOROCCO 1907-1909 245 

war they entirely forgot the affair." '^ The Japanese 
were now very eager to float a loan on the Paris 
Bourse, and at the same time were negotiating with 
Russia for the modification of a few unsatisfactory 
clauses in the Treaty of Portsmouth. Therefore an 
understanding between France and Japan at this time 
would facilitate the Russo-Japanese negotiations, 
would be a new link of strength to the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance, and would further both French and Japanese 
interests in the Far East. 

The Franco-Japanese Accord consisted of two parts, 
a political arrangement and a commercial declaration. 
The first specified that both France and Japan agreed 
to respect the independence and integrity of China as 
well as the principle of the ''open door." The two 
nations also agreed to support each other in assuring 
the peace and security of those regions of the Chinese 
Empire adjacent to the territories where they have 
the rights of sovereignty, protection, or occupation, 
with a view to maintaining the respective situation and 
the territorial rights of the two parties in the continent 
of Asia. The second looked to the signing of a com- 
mercial treaty whereby the most favored nation treat- 
ment should be accorded to the Japanese in French 
Indo-China and to the proteges of French Indo-China 
in Japan.^ The following month a similar accord was 
signed between Russia and Japan, thus bringing to an 
end the dangerous rivalries between the four great 
nations particularly interested in the Far East.^ An- 
other stone in the protective wall against Germany had 

7 "The Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi." p. 214. 

8 For text see British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. 100, p. 913. 

9 Ibid., Vol. 101, p. 443 and p. 463. 



246 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

been laid, and again without her participation or per- 
mission. The culmination of the accords of 1907 was 
the Anglo-Russian treaty of August 30, 1907, by which 
the ally and the friend of France settled their out- 
standing differences in Persia, Afghanistan and Thibet 
and brought into being the Triple Entente.^** At last 
a counter-weight to the Triple Alliance had been formed 
which brought the European balance of power to a 
stable equilibrium whereby peace was assured so long 
as both sides willed it. M. Delcasse's policy had been 
crowned with success. Neither Germany nor France 
herself could withstand the forces which he had set 
in motion. Gambetta's dream had triumphed over 
Bismarck's purpose. ''To improve ceaselessly, to 
fortify ceaselessly, unceasingly to extend the inter- 
national situation of France ... to dissipate the at- 
mosphere of defiance and suspicion, to solve equitably 
the existing differences, to consolidate the work accom- 
plished. . . ."^^ Thus only could France rise from 
Sedan to make ready for the Marne. 

2. THE TWO SULTANS OP MOROCCO 

At the close of 1907, Sultan Abdul Aziz had come to) 
a realization of the fact that without the support of ' 
France his brother Mouley Hafid would soon be the 
real Sultan of the Shereefian Empire. Consequently 
when M. Regnault came on a mission to demand the 
immediate application of the reforms, and also recog- 
nition for the responsibility of the Moroccan Govern- 

10 Ibid., Vol. 100, p. 555. 

11 On January 24, 1908, M. Delcasse made a remarkable speech in the 
Chamber, the first since his fall in 1905, proving the wisdom and pa- 
cific nature of his policy. Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 84, p. 128. 



RIVALEY IN MOROCCO 1907-1909 247 

ment in the events of Casablanca, the Sultan yielded all 
along the line. The order for the immediate organiza- 
tion of the police in the towns still under his supervi- 
sion was given; France and Spain, in his name, were 
authorized to repress the trade in contraband, and 
permission was given to start on the progressive exe- 
cution of public work in the ports. ^^ But while Abdul 
Aziz was making up his mind in Rabat, his brother 
was having himself declared Sultan in Fez.^^ Being 
thus proclaimed Sultan even in his absence, with the 
adhesion of the notables, and in accordance with the 
Koran, Mouley Hafid was in an excellent strategic 
position to wrest the power from his brother, unless 
the French should come to the support of Abdul Aziz 
in a whole-hearted manner. As Mouley Hafid was 
making his reputation by his hostility to the French, 
and by the proclamation of a Holy War, but one course 
seemed left open to France, namely, to put Abdul 
Aziz back on the throne and, if need be, keep him 
there. The small French force in Morocco under the 
desultory leadership of General Drude, Fahius Drudus 
Cunctator, as he was called, was wholly unequal to any 
such program. 

But the Government neither wished nor dared to 
follow any such definite policy. M. Jaures and his 
cohorts were ever on hand with the cry pas d'aven- 
tures}^ M. Pichon could hardly do otherwise than re- 

12 Doc. Dip., "Affaires du Maroc," (1907-1908), No. 60. 

13 Ibid., No. 82. 

14 In his speech in the Chamber, January 24, 1908, M. Jaurfes vio- 
lently denounced any attempt of France to support Abdul Aziz: "It 
is ridiculous, it is humiliating for France to associate herself in the 

I discomfiture of this operatic Ismael, and I ask you why you lead around 
1 this shadow of tto Shereefian m&jority as if you yoiBrselves were no 



248 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

fuse to intervene between the rival sultans, he could 
only follow out a policy of "watchful waiting," while 
**the Chamber, resolved to apply the Act of Algeciras 
and to assure the defense of French rights and inter- 
ests in Morocco without intervention in the internal 
politics of the Shereefian Empire, . . . passes to the 
order of the day."^^ However, even to maintain a 
neutral policy required an increase in effectives and 
an increase in funds. General d'Amade was given the 
command in the place of General Drude, and early in 
March it was decided to send reinforcements to the 
number of three thousand men.^® More money also 
was required before the necessary contingents could 
be hired to police the ports, and the Conseil d' Adminis- 
tration of the State Bank authorized an advance of 
two and one-half million francs to be used exclusively 
for the payment of the coast garrisons.^'^ 

Mouley Hafid continued to make decisive gains, nor 
did he confine his operations to the battlefield. Real- 
izing the advantage that would accrue to him by play- 
ing off the Germans against the French, he carried 

more than a shadow of a government in Morocco. . . , Break this cap- 
tious net in which you struggle, in which you vainly exhaust yourself. 
Do not permit the great soul of France to remain longer captive of the 
Moroccan imbroglio." Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 84, p. 117. 

15 Ibid., p. 179. M, Robert de Caix commenting upon these inter- 
pellations declared that not only did it require "a certain effort to 
extract coherent and thought-out ideas, but any ideas at all in the 
parliamentary rubbish of the last Moroccan interpellations. . . . M. 
Jaures serves as a sounding-box for all the objections which can arise 
among foreigners to our Moroccan action. He does it with a constancy 
which would be revolting as treason, if one did not easily see in it the 
result of the enormous candor of a man in whom verbal virtuosity 
leaves no place for the exercise of any other faculty. . . ." Ques. Dip. 
et Col., Feb. 16, 1908. 

16 Doc. Dip., op. cit.. No. 177. 
IT Ibid., No. 162. 



I 



EIVALEY IN MOEOCCO 1907-1909 249 

on a constant intrigue with the former. He even con- 
ceded that the Germans were blood relatives of the 
Berbers through their common ancestors, the Vandals. 
He also sent a mission to Europe to plead his cause, 
and although assurances were given to the French 
Government that the envoys would not be received at 
either Rome or Vienna in case they should come, they 
were received in Berlin.^^ This, coming at a time 
when France was supporting Abdul Aziz with both 
forces and treasure to protect European interests in 
the coast towns, showed that Germany was still willing 
to make trouble for France. At the same time the 
German authorities maintained a continuous cam- 
paign of recriminations against French action in Mo- 
rocco. Exorbitant claims were made for alleged 
damages to German interests through the shelling of 
Casablanca, complaints were made that German steam- 
ships could not obtain tenders or docking facilities, 
numerous acts of violence towards German proteges 
were alleged against French troops, none of which 
withstood a searching investigation.^^ 

With the entrance of Mouley Hafid into the holy 
city of Fez on June 7, 1908, he ceased to be a pretender. 
His position was now stronger than that of his brother, 
and he demonstrated his cleverness by the methods 
which he employed to strengthen it. By immediately 
visiting the sacred mosque of Mouley-Idris, he ap- 
pealed to the religious devotion of the zealous Mo- 
hammedans; his next move was to consign to a huge 
bonfire all the European gew gaws and contraptions 

18 Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 279. 

19 Ibid., see especially Nos. 298, 306, including annexes I- VII and 
381. 



250 FEENCH FOEEIGN POLICY 

so dear to the heart of his brother, thus proving his 
antagonism to foreign influences; as a final proof of 
his political sagacity he revived the taxes upon goods 
entering the city, and the typically Berber custom of 
beheading those who did not promptly obey. Abdul 
Aziz could no longer afford to remain inactive at Eabat 
and allow his brother to get control of all his kingdom 
except the coast. Speedy action was imperative if he 
was to hold his throne. His best move was to get his 
forces together and march directly to Marrakesh, and 
from there extend his sovereignty over the southern 
part of Morocco. France now carried her neutrality 
to the point of preventing Abdul Aziz from crossing 
Chaouia, the district lying to the east and south of 
Casablanca which General d'Amade had pacified and 
was still holding under his control. The Sultan left 
Eabat with his mehalla on July 12 on his way to Mar- 
rakesh, and as new additions kept joining themselves 
under his banner, the journey seemed almost like a 
triumphal march. His uncle, however, seemed by no 
means so confident of victory, and early in August he 
sought a personal interview with General d'Amade and 
besought his support to assure the success of the ex- 
pedition, pointing out that Abdul Aziz had abandoned 
everything to follow the counsels and serve the inter- 
ests of France.^^ Arriving at the outskirts of Mer- 
rakesh, either through treachery or through a sudden 
panic, the Sultan's army suddenly changed into a dis- 
organized mob and fled without striking a blow.^^ The 
cause of Abdul Aziz was irrevocably lost, and before 

20 Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 372. 

21 Ibid., No. 385. 



RIVALRY IN MOROCCO 1907-1909 251 

the first of September Mouley Hafid had been recog- 
nized in practically all the towns along the coast. 

The question now came up as to the terms under 
which the Powers should recognize the new Sultan, and 
on August 26, M. Pichon consulted with the Spanish 
ambassador regarding the guarantees which should 
be demanded of Mouley Hafid.^^ On September 1, 
M. Pichon notified the diplomatic representatives of 
France in the various capitals, that France and Spain 
Were prepared to draw up a program of the guaran- 
tees considered essential, and submit it to the Cabinets 
of the various signatory Powers for their approval. ^^ 
On the same day Herr von Lanken, the German charge 
d'affaires at Paris, made the following verbal com- 
munication to the Quai d'Orsay: ''Considering the 
situation created by the recent events in Morocco, the 
Imperial Government believes it should call the atten- 
tion of the Powers to the necessity of proceeding to 
the recognition of Mouley Hafid, with the effect of 
leading finally to the pacification of the Shereefian 
Empire, of establishing peace in a definite manner, and 
returning to the obligations assumed at Algeciras," ^^ 
M. Pichon called the attention of the Imperial Govern- 
ment to the fact that the Powers had already been in- 
formed that France and Spain were at that very mo- 
ment formulating the terms of a note to be submitted 
to them in regard to the guarantees to be demanded 
from the new Sultan as a condition to his recognition, 
and as for ''returning to the obligations assumed at 
Algeciras" the Government of France was not aware 

22 Ibid., No. 403. 

23 Ibid., No. 418. 

24 Ibid., No. 419. 



252 FEENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

that any departure had been made from these obliga- 
tions.^^ The position of G-ermany was the more equi- 
vocal in that Dr. Vassal, the German consul, left Casa- 
blanca immediately for his post at Fez upon news of 
the disastrous defeat of the army of Abdul Aziz. The 
German press itseK recognized the ill-advised action 
of Germany in thus attempting to force recognition 
of Mouley Hafid by independent action : * ' We would 
prefer to assume that the action of the German Gov- 
ernment represents another of those sudden impulses 
of German policy, which make a terrific noise, but 
afterwards vanish, leaving not a wrack behind. The 
only harm they do is that German policy has once more 
shown itself to be incalculable, untrustworthy, and 
therefore disturbing. But this unfortunately is harm 
enough. ' ' ^® 

The joint note drawn up by France and Spain an- 
nouncing the terms upon which the new Sultan would 
be recognized by the Powers was issued on September 
14, 1908. The guarantees were as follows: confirma- 
tion of all former treaties and engagements entered 
into by the Maghzen with foreign states, including a 
general adherence to the Act of Algeciras ; acceptance 
of responsibility for all debts contracted by the former 
Sultan; payment of the Casablanca indemnities; 
formal and public disavowal of the Holy War ; and im- 
mediate adoption of measures necessary to assure se- 
curity in the ports and upon the principal routes of 
the interior. The note also called attention to the 
position of France and Spain, granting to them the 

25 Ibid., No. 422, 

26 Frankfurter Zeitung, Sept. 3, 1908. 



EIVALEY IN MOEOCCO 1907-1909 253 

surveillance of the sea to prevent the illicit importa- 
tion of arms, granting them reimbursement for their 
particular expenses caused by the recent expeditions, 
as well as payment of indemnities for the murder of 
their citizens. In conclusion the note asked that hon- 
orable treatment be accorded to Abdul Aziz and the 
functionaries who had served under him.^'^ The 
Powers, including Germany, accepted the principles of 
this note, the only suggestions made by Germany be- 
ing that the new Sultan should be given a certain free- 
dom of action to allay the fanaticism which had been 
aroused, and that France and Spain should take into 
consideration the financial condition of Morocco and 
not aggravate the situation by undue pressure. ^^ A 
new note was thereupon drawn up and this time no 
mention was made of disavowing the Holy War, the 
Sultan merely being asked to inform his subjects that 
he wished to maintain with all countries and their 
citizens relations in conformity with international 
law.^** This note was approved by the Powers and 
presented by the doyen of the Diplomatic Corps at 
Tangier to the representative of the Sultan on No- 
vember 19, 1908. An official acceptance from Mouley 
Hafid was received December 5, and one month later 
the Powers officially announced their acceptance of 
Mouley Hafid as Sultan of Morocco.*^ / 

3. THE DESERTERS OF CASxiBLANOA 

France had supported the wrong Sultan, or, to be 

27 Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 443, annexe. 

28 Ibid., No. 460, annexe. 

29 Ibid., No. 469, annexe. 

30 Doc. Dip., "Affaires du Maroc" (1908-1910) No. 81. 



254 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

more exact, she had failed to support the right one, and 
with the recognition of Mouley Hafid by the Powers 
she found herself in a very difficult position. The 
new Sultan was cruel, vindictive and subtle; he hated 
all Europeans and the French most of all.^^ Having 
made himself Sultan in spite of the benevolent atti- 
tude of France towards his brother, he was not only 
hostile but disdainful towards her representatives. 
Furthermore, and this was far more important, Mouley 
Hafid was the candidate of Germany, and his success 
was bruited about both in Europe and Morocco as a 
victory for Germany. France had found it hitherto 
impossible to put the Act of Algeciras into effect, 
chiefly through the weakness of the Sultan and the op- 
position of Germany. Was it going to be any easier 
with a strong Sultan on the throne, when that Sultan 
was tacitly pledged to support Germany? There 
seemed to be but one solution, — an agreement must be 
reached with Germany. Back in July, 1907, Baron 
von Langwerth, at that time charge at Tangier, had 
made a proposal for a Franco-German consortium of 
all the banks and establishments interested in Morocco 
and an accord to this effect was concluded at Tangier, 
August 22, 1907. France immediately approved and 
it was to be expected that Germany would agree, since 
the proposal had come from their side. But with the 
massacre of Casablanca and the consequent occupa- 

si To a representative of the Journal he declared : "I know nothing 
of your country save the sound of its guns. France has always been 
hostile to me in sustaining my brother. She has fought me with all her 
power, with her money which is abundant, with her soldiers who are 
brave and with her bullets which go far. ... I am mistrustful of 
France. . . ." Quoted in Ques, Dip. et Col., Nov. 1, 1908. 



EIVALRY IN MOROCCO 1907-1909 255 

tion of Chaouia Germany became hostile again and 
all immediate hopes of an accord disappeared.^^ How- 
ever, again in May, 1908, Dr. Rosen suggested that an 
arrangement be made whereby firms of the two na- 
tions might participate on an equal footing in the con- 
struction of the sewers at Tangier and the public works 
in the port of Larache. Again an agreement was 
reached only to fall through on a sudden and inex- 
plicable change of front shown by the German inter- 
ests.^^ 

Undoubtedly the real reason for the failure on both 
occasions was the futility of attempting to construct 
a commercial edifice without the foundation of a po- 
litical understanding. The financial interests of both 
parties wished to agree, and it was to their interests 
to do so. But the year 1908 was- an especially trouble- 
some one for the Wilhelmstrasse,^* and the Imperial 
Government may well be excused for being unable to 
maintain a consistent policy. The month of May, 
le mois de V Entente Cordiale, as it was called, was 
especially painful to those who saw in the friendly re- 
lations between Great Britain and France, strengthened 
by the adherence of Russia, the forging of an iron ring 
around Germany. M. Clemenceau visited London, on 
the occasion of the funeral of Sir Henry Campbell- 
Bannerman and he was followed shortly afterwards 
by M. Cruppi, Minister of Commerce, M. Ruau, Min- 

32Laloy, "La Diplomatie de Guillaume II," p. 80. 

S3 Doc. Dip., "Affaires du Maroe" (1907-1908), No. 442. 

34 David Jayne Hill in his "Impressions of the Kaiser" says: "The 
annus mirabilis of 1908 as it has been called, brought sore trials to the 
Kaiser. In the twenty years of his reign he had never attempted so 
much, never succeeded in so little, and was never so distrusted." 



256 FEENCH FOEEIGN POLICY 

ister of Agriculture, and M. Viviani, Minister of La- 
bor, in connection with the Franco-British Exposition. 
Finally President Fallieres visited London towards 
the end of the month, and in receiving him at Bucking- 
ham Palace, King Edward expressed the hope that 
the entente might prove permanent. At the same time 
it was announced that King Edward intended to visit 
the Czar at Eeval early in June. The simultaneous 
encounter of these three great ships of state produced 
a backwash of fury in the North Sea. The "Ham- 
burger Nachrichten" voiced the German sentiment: 
"The President's visit to London and the King's visit 
to St. Petersburg announce to the whole world that 
they have succeeded in uniting England, France, and 
Eussia into an entente directed against the Triplice, 
or more exactly against Germany. 

"Italy does not enter into the case and one cannot 
count upon her. It is the attitude of the Wilhelmstrasse 
during the Moroccan affair which has permitted Eng- 
land to awaken French suspicions against us. . . . King 
Edward knew how to profit by the occasion and he 
struck while the iron was hot. . . . Let us henceforth 
abstain from any further attempt at reconciliation with 
France, it is useless . . . but let us become strong 
enough to support a war, but upon two fronts ... let 
us put our hand on our sword and await confidently 
trusting in our good star the outcome of the situa- 
tion. "^^ 

The Kaiser became extremely restive during this 
period. In his famous letter to Lord Tweedmouth 
written in February, 1908, he criticized severely Eng- 

35 Quoted in Ques. Dip. et Col. June 1, 1908. 



EIVALRY IN MOEOCCO 1907-1909 257 

land's attitude toward the increase in the German 
navy ; he declared that Lord Esther, who had written a 
letter to the press advocating an increase in armament 
to meet the German increase, would do better to con- 
cern himself with the supervision of his drain pipes 
at Windsor than with battleships of which he knew 
nothing.^^ While King Edward VII was at Reval, 
the Kaiser at the conclusion of a cavalry inspection at 
Doberitz said to his officers: '*It seems in truth, that 
they wish to encircle and provoke us. We shall be able 
to support it. The German has never fought better 
than when he had to defend himself on all sides. Let 
them come against us, then. We shall be ready. ' ' ^'^ 
On September 11, the Kaiser came within one kilometer 
of the French frontier and proposed to the French 
that he be allowed to ascend the Hohneck from their 
territory. Instead of making difficulties about it and 
giving an opportunity for further rattling of the saber, 
the French officers consented willingly and even of- 
fered the Kaiser a bodyguard to ascend with him. An 
''incident" being prevented, the Kaiser changed his 
mind suddenly and left for Colmar.^^ 

If either nation was desirous of war, an excellent 
opportunity was given them by an incident in Morocco. 
On September 25, 1908, six members of the French 
Foreign Legion of whom three were Germans, deserted 
and attempted to take passage on a German vessel ly- 
ing in the harbor, bound for Hamburg. They were 
under the protection of an employee of the Germ'an 
consulate, and when they were recognized and seized 

36 London Times, March 6, 1908. 

37 David Jayne Hill, "Impressions of the Kaiser/' p. 108. 

38 Ibid., p. 109. 



258 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

by the French a scuffle ensued, blows were exchanged, 
and the German official was arrested with the men. 
The agent was released on giving proof of his identity, 
but the French refused to surrender the deserters at 
the demand of the German consul, who insisted that he 
had the right to give them safe conduct by virtue of 
his consular authority under the capitulations. There- 
upon the affair was taken up by the home governments 
and on October 10, Germany demanded the liberation 
of the deserters and an apology for injury to the con- 
sular prerogatives. Germany was wholly unjustified in 
her demands and France refused to discuss the mat- 
ter upon any such basis. Thereupon Herr von Schoen 
suggested to M. Jules Cambon, the French Ambassa- 
dor at Berlin, that the two governments have recourse 
to arbitration. France accepted this solution will- 
ingly enough until Germany demanded as a prelimin- 
ary step, that France express regret for the injury 
committed by French agents to the prerogatives of the 
German consul, and in return Germany would express 
regret for the incorrect attitude of her consul, and 
for giving passports to individuals who were not Ger- 
man citizens. Since three of the deserters were non- 
Germans it was conceded that the German official had 
been guilty of an abuse of power in extending his pro- 
tection to them. By accepting such a statement, 
France would be conceding in advance that the German 
consul did have the right to grant safe conduct to the 
three Germans, and France maintained that this con- 
tention was the very bone of the argument. Her posi- 
tion was that the incident should be considered as a 
whole, that no expression of regret fbr any part of it 



EIVALBY IN MOROCCO 1907-1909 259 

be made by either side which might. prejudice the ques- 
tion submitted to the arbitrators. 

The German Government, confident in its power to 
browbeat France into compliance with its wishes, was 
obdurate, but the French were no longer hampered by 
the temporizing Rouvier. M. Georges Clemenceau, the 
Tiger of France, was in power and the country was 
behind him. France had made every concession 
which she could honorably make; to concede further 
would be to yield once more to German might. Move- 
ments of troops were reported on both sides, and rela- 
tions daily became more strained. The Kaiser took 
advantage of the situation to permit the publication 
of his famous interview in the ''Daily Telegraph," 
thinking thus to crystallize English opinion in favor 
of Germany.^^ This startling example of personal 
diplomacy had the effect of crystallizing English 
opinion, but not in favor of the Kaiser. M. Clemen- 

39 In this interview the Kaiser admitted that during the Boer War 
German opinion had been hostile to Great Britain, "bitterly hostile," 
but not so official Germany. He had refused to receive the Boer dele- 
gates at Berlin, "where the German people would have crowned them 
with flowers." Being asked by France and Russia to join with them 
to call upon England to put an end to the war he had replied : "far from 
Germany joining in any concerted European action to put pressure 
upon England and bring about her downfall, Germany would always 
keep aloof from politics that could bring her into complications with 
a sea power like England. Englishmen who now insult me by doubt- 
ing my word should know what were my actions in the hour of their 
adversity." 

The Kaiser then went on to tell that in answer to a sorrowful let- 
ter from Queen Victoria written in December, 1899, when the situa- 
tion was very dark he worked out what he considered to be the best 
plan of campaign, submitted it to his General Staff for criticism and 
then despatched it to England. And it was a campaign formulated 
on these very lines which Lord Roberts had carried into successful 
operation. London Times, October 29, 1908, 



260 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

ceau, who had always been on extremely cordial terms 
with England, knew that he could count upon her as- 
sistance if it should be required; he also knew that 
Count von Aehrenthal after his audacious coup in de- 
claring the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to 
Austria, following King Ferdinand's proclamation of 
the independence of Bulgaria on October 5, 1908, would 
be in no position to support Germany in a war without 
justification. The time had come to call Germany's 
bluff, and M . Clemenceau did it most effectively. 
When the time had come for him to play his last card, 
the German ambassador presented himself to the 
President du Conseil and said: '' Monsieur le Presi- 
dent, if complete satisfaction is not given to my Gov- 
ernment, I am forced by order of his Majesty the Em- 
peror to ask for my passports. . . . " " The best train 
for Cologne leaves at nine o'clock," replied M. Clemen- 
ceau after consulting his watch. ''Monsieur I'Am- 
bassadeur, if you don't wish to miss your train you '11 
have to hurry. ' ' ^^ 

The German ambassador did not ask for his pass- 
ports, and on November 10, Germany accepted the 
French formula, which stated that "each of the two 
governments agree to express its regrets for the acts 
of its agents in accordance with the award to be ren- 
dered by the arbitrators upon the facts and upon the 
question of law."^^ A compromis was then signed 

40 Georges Lecomte "Clemenceau," p. 87. 

41 For an exhaustive and fully documented treatment of the affair 
giving the memoires of both sides, the debates of the tribunal and the 
award see Gilbert Gidel, *'L' Arbitrage de Casablanca," Rev. Gen. de 
Droit Int. Public, Vol. 17, pp. 326-407. See Stowell and Munro, "In- 
ternational Cases," Vol. I, p. 377 for an excellent summary. 



EIVALEY IN MOROCCO 1907-1909 261 

fixing the rules of the arbitral procedure and stating 
that the tribunal should consist of five arbitrators 
chosen from the Permanent Court of Arbitration at 
The Hague. The decision handed down May 22, 1909, 
although a compromise, was really a victory for 
France. She did not have to surrender the deserters, 
'Hhe German Consulate did not under the circum- 
stances have the right to grant its protection to the 
deserters of German nationality."*^ The press on 
both sides received the award favorably, and the 
''Temps" declared that it was a verdict acceptable to 
all, one ''which had furnished an honorable solution 
to a dispute which however trivial was its origin, had 
almost set Europe on fire. ' ' *^ 

4. THE FRANCO-GERMAN ACCORD OF 1909 

The storm of condemnation aroused in Germany at 
the publication of the Kaiser's Daily Telegraph inter- 
view had a moderating effect upon the over-aggressive 
foreign policy of the Imperial Government. The 
critical situation in the Near East resulting from the 
Young Turk Revolution, and the annexation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina by Austria in direct defiance to the 
clauses of the Treaty of Berlin, was even more condu- 
cive to a period of clear, calm thinking on the part of 
the Wilhelmstrasse. Not that Germany feared trouble 
from Russia. All Europe realized that protest as 
Russia might against the blow at the Pan-Slavic hopes 
she was nourishing, the war with Japan and the seri- 
ous internal troubles which had followed, had left her 

42 Gidel, op. cit., p. 400. 

43 Le Temps, May 24, 1909. 



262 FEENCH FOEEIGN POLICY 

in a hopeless position to make her protest effective. 
Germany's fear was rather for her relations with 
Turkey and the preservation of her Bagdad Eailway 
scheme. Turkey had even greater reason to resent 
the rape of Bosnia and Herzegovina than did Eussia. 
The problem which Germany had to face was: how 
could she support Austria as she must in her spoliation 
of Young Turkey, and yet prove to the Turks that she 
was backing the new regime just as strongly as she 
had formerly supported Abdul Hamid? Austria re- 
turned the Sandjak of Novi Bazar at her instigation 
but Turkey was still far from being placated. It still 
remained to be seen also to what extent France and 
Great Britain were prepared to back Eussia in any pro- 
test that she might make. The German Foreign Of- 
fice perceived very clearly that the time was not suit- 
able for a politique d'aventures in Morocco.** 

Germany gave the first indication of her apprecia- 
tion of the new situation in Europe by her concession 
in regard to the affair of Casablanca. In his speech 
before the Eeichstag, December 7, Prince von Biilow 
gave further indications of Germany's new policy of 
friendly understandings. . . . "Here as elsewhere 
there is an excessive estimation of what is called 
Prestige politik ... let us seek our advantage, let us 
seek our honor in the maintenance of the foundations 
of the German power, and in the preservation of the 

** Germany may also have been influenced by the friendly disposition 
towards France exhibited by Austria at this time. The Ballplatz had 
shown great willingness to accept the Franco-Spanish note in regard 
to the recognition of Mouley-Hafid, and in the Casablanca incident, al- 
though one of the deserters was an Austrian, the Austrian ambassador 
hastened to tell M. Pichon that he didn't claim his deserter — "je ne 
reclame pas mon deserteur." 



RIVALRY IN MOROCCO 1907-1909 263 

future of the German people, but not in vanity and 
glitter. ... In the examination of situations and in 
regard to several diplomatic demarches the German 
and French governments have shown that they know 
how to appreciate this favorable attitude. ' ' ^^ 

France had an opportunity to test out the sincerity 
of this new attitude early in January, 1909. The 
agreement which gave France and Spain the right to 
patrol for contraband expired at the close of 1908, and 
it was necessary to obtain the consent of the Powers to 
have it renewed for another year.^^ When the request 
was brought to the German government, instead of 
seizing the opportunity to make difficulties it raised no 
objection to the renewal.*"^ A few days later Herr von 
Kiderlen engaged in a long parley with M. Jules Cam- 
bon in regard to an arrangement between France and 
Germany in regard to Morocco. He assured M. Cam- 
bon that Germany's interests there were purely 
economic. M. Cambon replied that if Germany had 
no intention of interfering with the political interests 
of France and would recognize her special situation 
in Morocco, the two Governments might express their 
common intention of pursuing no economic privilege 
and the desire to see their nationals become associated 
in enterprises of an economic order.** Both M. Pichon 
and Herr von Schoen approved this statement as the 
basis of an accord, and a declaration to this effect was 
signed at Berlin on February 9, 1909. As this declara- 
tion was to remain the basis of all future Franco-Ger- 

45 "Fiirst Billows Reden," Vol. Ill, p. 160. 

4»Doc. Dip. "Affaires du Maroc" (190e-1910) No. $4. 

4T Ibid., No. 94, annexe. 

*8 Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 114, annfexe. 



264 FEENCH FOEEIGN POLICY 

man relations in Morocco it will be well to give the 
complete text : 

*'The Government of the French Eepublic and the 
Imperial German Government, animated by an equal 
desire to facilitate the execution of the Act of Alge- 
ciras, have agreed to define the meaning that they at- 
tach to its clauses, in order to avoid all cause of mis- 
understanding between them in the future. 

**In consequence, 

"the Government of the French Eepublic, entirely 
attached to the maintenance of the integrity and in- 
dependence of the Moorish Empire, resolved to safe- 
guard their economic equality and consequently not to 
hinder their German commercial and industrial inter- 
ests, 

**and the Imperial German Government pursuing 
only economic interests in Morocco, recognizing on the 
other hand that the particular political interests of 
France there are closely bound up with the consolida- 
tion of order and internal peace, and decided not to 
impede these interests, 

* ' declare that they will not pursue nor encourage any 
measure of a nature to create in their favor or in the 
favor of any other Power an economic privilege, and 
that they will endeavor to associate their citizens in the 
affairs for which they may obtain concessions."^^ 

A profound feeling of satisfaction was manifested 
on both sides of the frontier at this amicable solution 
of the Moroccan difficulty. The declaration seemed 
to cover every contingency. By recognizing the Act 
of Algeciras as the basis of the accord the other Powers 

49 Ibid., No. 114, annexe. 



EIVALEY IN MOROCCO 1907-1909 265 

could hardly object; it was a victory for France in 
that her particular political rights were recognized 
by the only power that had any interest in interfering 
with their maintenance, and who by her friendly rela- 
tions with the new Sultan was in a strategic position 
to make her interference most troublesome ; finally it 
was eminently satisfactory to Germany since she not 
only secured economic equality, but the privilege of 
associating with France in all the concessions which 
might be obtained. At the time France failed to real- 
ize fully the sinister possibilities of the last phrase.^** 
Neither did she appreciate the hostility that it was 
bound to provoke in Spain, who could not reconcile 
this Declaration with the secret agreements which 
France had already signed with her. France accepted 
the arrangement at its face value as ''one which dis- 
simulated nothing and which implied no clandestine 
concession, and which on the part of Germany was the 
abandonment of her policy of chicanery and the in- 
auguration of a policy of conciliation. ' ' ^^ The Kaiser 
telegraphed to Prince Eadolin, the German Ambassa- 
dor at Paris, his expressions of satisfaction, and the 
French Government conferred the Grand Cross of the 

50 That she did recognize to a certain extent that danger lurked 
under too broad an extension or interpretation of this phrase is shown 
by the fact that M. Cambon demanded that an explanatory letter 
should follow the declaration, but agreed to withhold its publication as 
a favor to the German Government, which was unwilling to appear 
before the German people as giving up too much. This letter stated 
first, that Germany was disinterested politically in Morocco, and sec- 
ondly, that "in the economic affairs which admitted an association of 
French and German interests, account should he taken as far as pos- 
sible of the fact that French interests in Morocco are superior to Ger- 
man interests." Andr6 Mevil in L'Echo de Paris, Dec. 8, 1911. 

51 Auguste Gauvain, "I'Accord Franco- Allemand sur le Maroc," 
Journal des Debats, Feb. 9, 1909. 



266 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

Legion of Honor upon Prince Radolin and Baron von 
Schoen. If France required any further proof of Ger- 
many 's changed attitude in the Moroccan question it 
was given by Chancellor von Biilow the day after the 
accord was signed. Receiving M. Cambon in a most 
gracious manner he said to him: ''Now, Morocco is 
a fruit which is ripening for you and you are sure of 
picking it ; we only ask one thing of you, that is to be 

patient and to have regard for German public opin- 
ion. "=2 

One of the chief advantages accruing to France from 
the accord was the immediate effect which it had in in- 
creasing the prestige of France in Morocco. In his 
exhaustive report before the Senate on the whole Mo- 
roccan question January 25, 1912, M. Pierre Baudin 
says: ''It proved to the Sultan and the chiefs of the 
tribes that they had nothing further to hope for from 
the antagonism between France and Germany. In 
every Mohammedan country in Africa it created a pro- 
found impression. It destroyed the effect of the 
propoganda cleverly organized, which since the events 
of Tangier in 1905 had been attempting to persuade 
the natives that France would soon cede her place to 
the German Empire." ^^ With the Kaiser appeased 
and the Sultan cowed, France saw the last of the ob- 
stacles in her Moroccan pathway removed. The sit- 
uation appeared so promising that one deputy was led 
to remark: ''Que va devenir M. Jaures?" The re- 
tort was exceedingly prescient: "Timeo Danaos dona 
ferentes." 

02 Ren6 Pinon, "France et Allemagne," p. 187. 
5» Annales du S6nat, Doc. Pari., Vol. 56, p. 263. 



CHAPTER X 
RESULTS OF THE ACCORD OF 1909 

THE BOSNIAN CRISIS AND THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 

ALTHOUGH the Quai d'Orsay played a very minor 
role in the crisis resulting from the seizure of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria, the whole Euro- 
pean situation Was so profoundly affected by this 
sequel to the Young Turk Revolution, that some atten- 
tion must be given to it. The mere annexation by 
Austria of the two provinces, which she had admin- 
istered for thirty years under a virtual mandate of 
the Powers, was of vital interest to none but Turkey 
and Serbia. Of the two, Serbia, who saw her long sus- 
tained hope of a free outlet to the sea dashed, had more 
reason to complain than Turkey, whose chief interest 
was the amount of compensation that she could obtain. 
If this had been the only side of the situation to be 
considered, no nation in Europe would have protested, 
save perhaps Russia as the protector of Slavic inter- 
ests in the Balkans. The serious side from the Euro- 
pean point of view was the fact that Austria had de- 
liberately torn up a pact concluded with the other 
Powers of Europe, although she had been one of the 
signatory Powers to the Declaration of London which 
stated specifically that ** contracting Powers could rid 
themselves of their treaty engagements only by an 
understanding with their co-signatories." Russia had 

267 



268 FEENCH FOEEIGN POLICY 

attempted to free herself from the Treaty of Paris 
during the Franco-Eussia War and had been forced 
to sign the Declaration of London as a result ; she now 
intended to see to it that the Powers should show no 
partiality to Austria. 

M. Isvolsky, Eussian Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 
who happened to be in Paris at the time, added his pro- 
test to those of Turkey, Italy, Serbia, and Montenegro, 
and demanded that a conference of the Powers signa- 
tory of the Treaty of Berlin be called to deliberate on 
the various questions involved. Proceeding to Lon- 
don, he drew up with Sir Edward Grey a program for 
the proposed conference in which a complete identity 
of views between the two powers was shown.^ Both 
France and Great Britain were ready to support Eus- 
sia vigorously in her just demands. A conference of 
the Powers was the last thing desired by Austria, and 
Baron von Aehrenthal showed himself to be a second 
Talleyrand in his method of procedure. His first move 
was to placate Turkey, and he attempted this by prom- 
ising to turn back to her immediately the Sandjak of 
Novi Bazar. This by no means satisfied the Turks but 
it opened the way to a solution. Austria's negotia- 
tions with Turkey were facilitated through the assist- 
ance of Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, the German 
ambassador at Constantinople, one of the most able 
members of the German diplomatic corps and ex- 
tremely popular with the Turks. Having paved the 
way for an understanding with Turkey, Austria now 
declared that the question was wholly between herself 
and the Porte, neither Servia nor Montenegro having 

1 For text of the Program see London Times, Oct. 16, 1908. 



EESULTS OF THE ACCORD OF 1909 269 

any right to object, since their legal or territorial rights 
had not been violated. 

Baron von Aehrenthal had informed both Germany 
and Italy of his annexation project, but without indi- 
cating the time or manner of the seizure,^ and although 
neither was in sympathy with it, he now looked for 
support to Germany. Von Biilow, although realizing 
Italy's hostility, did not dare refuse his support, and 
his first plan was to separate France and Great Britain 
from Russia. The interests of these two powers in 
the Balkans were negligible, and it was considered 
that France might be willing to withdraw her support 
from Russia for a free hand in Morocco. A sugges- 
tion was thereupon made to the Quai d'Orsay that the 
question of Morocco be joined to the Eastern question. 
M. Pichon, however, refused to be drawn into any 
such discussion.^ We have already seen the disastrous 
results of the Kaiser's attempt to win over the Brit- 
ish by the publication of the Daily Telegraph inter- 
view. He failed not only in improving the Anglo- 
German relations, but even more so in attempting to 
embroil England with France and Russia. The irri- 
tation produced by these two failures resulted in the 
short period of blustering bellicosity manifested in the 
Casablanca incident, but as has already been seen, this 

2 Von Reventlow, "Deutschlands Auswartige Politik," p. 326. 

s On this point M. Deschanel, Reporter of the Budget of Foreign Af- 
fairs, speaking in the Chamber Nov. 26 had this to say: "At no 
moment I am sure has our diplomacy linked the question of Morocco 
to the Eastern question. If it should have done so it will have com- 
mitted an irreparable blunder, it would risk being the dupe and victim 
of one of those illusions which have cost so dear to Napoleon III when 
he allowed himself to be drawn, with regard to Belgium and Luxem- 
bourg into those perilous bargainings which brought about for him 
such cruel results." Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 86ii, p. 1197. 



270 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

policy was very short lived. The increasing hostility 
manifested by Italy towards the Balkan policy of her 
ally may have helped to bring Germany to the realiza- 
tion that the position of the Triple Alliance was a deli- 
cate one.* Austria must be sustained at all hazards; 
and in concluding his speech before the Reichstag De- 
cember 10, 1908, the German Chancellor made Ger- 
many's position abundantly clear: **We stand be- 
side Austria-Hungary. And we believe also that the 
cause of peace is best served by allowing no doubt to 
arise concerning the stable character of our alliance 
and the seriousness with which we look upon our duty 
as ally.'"^ 

At the same time there is little doubt that Germany 
pointed out to her ally that certain concessions must 
be made if a conference was to be avoided. After Al- 
geciras, Germany had little more faith in conferences 
than her ally. The first indication of a more concili- 
atory policy on the part of Austria came a few days 
after the Chancellor's speech, when the Cabinet at 
Vienna put forth the tentative proposal that a conces- 
sion might be granted for a railway across Bosnia, join- 
ing Serbia with Montenegro, as a compensation to the 
two Balkan states. At the same time direct negotia- 
tions were entered into with Russia as a means of de- 
laying or avoiding a conference of the Powers. This 
was followed by the offer of an indemnity to Turkey 

4 Signor Fortis, former prime minister speaking in the Italian Cham- 
ber Dec. 3, 1908, declared: "There is only one power with whom Italy 
is accustomed to envisage the possibility of a conflict. This power, I 
regret to say, is our ally Austria." Quoted by Gauvain, "L'Europe au 
Jour le Jour," Vol. I, p. 199. 

6 "Flirst Btilows Eeden," Vol. HI, p. l«i. 



RESULTS OF THE ACCORD OF 1909 271 

for the two provinces she had lost. With the accept- 
ance of her offer by Turkey, Austria felt that she need 
fear no longer that the Powers would make the annexa- 
tion a casus belli. If Turkey were satisfied, the Powers 
had few further grounds for complaint. As for Ser- 
bia, Austria would welcome an opportunity to put her 
in her proper place if the conflict could be localized. 

In the meantime Germany was strengthening her 
position by friendly advances to both France and 
Great Britain. The Accord of February 8 with France 
in regard to Morocco, and the cordial reception given 
to King Edward VII on his visit to Berlin at almost 
the same time, were evidences of the new spirit of con- 
ciliation. Russia's motion for a conference of the 
Powers seemed to have been laid on the table, for the 
time being at least, and France and Great Britain were 
perfectly willing to subordinate their Balkan policy 
to that of Russia. Serbia alone was unwilling to al- 
low the matter to rest, and Austria appeared just as 
unwilling to grant her any compensation. The Aus- 
trian press seemed eager to force an immediate is- 
sue. The ''Neue Freie Presse" on February 13, so- 
licited for Austra-Hungary ''a mandate from Europe 
to occupy Serbia temporarily," and on February 26, 
the very day on which Turkey signed an accord ac- 
cepting an indemnity to the amount of fifty-seven mil- 
lion francs for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the "Dunzers 
Armee Zeitung" declared that Serbia was a virulent 
abscess which should be operated upon immediately; 
''we shall chastise Serbia, we shall conquer her, we 
shall keep her ; if this displeases any one let him come 



272 FEENCH FOEEIGN POLICY 

on. . . . " ® The Entente Powers, having thus far 
striven successfully to prevent v/ar, did not intend to 
surrender at this stage without a valiant effort. Sir 
Edward Grey and M. Pichon thought that the best 
way out of the situation was a direct appeal to the 
two Powers concerned to make a clear statement of 
their position. Austria, urged on in her course by a 
chauvinistic public opinion, curtly refused to consider 
such a proposal, demanding that the appeal be made to 
Serbia alone, since the latter alone was at fault. 
France and Great Britain were willing to go that far, 
providing they could associate Eussia with them in 
their demarche. Eussia expressed her mllingness, but 
immediately upon her assent being known, the Aus- 
trian press raised a shout of victory, claiming that 
** thanks to the Franco-German Accord, to the fidelity 
of Berlin and the complaisance of Paris, Serbia was 
at last going to be brought to reason. ' ' '' The Entente 
proposal went no farther, but Eussia, acting alone, 
seized the occasion to urge the Government at Bel- 
grade to maintain a pacific attitude, to cease demand- 
ing territorial compensation, and to put her case in 
the hands of the Powers.^ Serbia very wisely as- 
sented, and in a note dated March 10, 1909, replied: 
*'. . . Considering that the question of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is a European question . . . Serbia, con- 
fiding in the wisdom and justice of the Powers, places 
her case unreservedly in the hands of the Powers as 
being a competent tribunal, and consequently at this 

6 Quoted Debidour, "Histoire Diplomatique de I'Europe" (1904-1916), 
p. 121. 

7 Gauvain, "L'Europe au Jour le Jour," Vol. I, p. 394. 

8 Ibid., p. 398. 



EESULTS OF THE ACCORD OF 1909 273 

time demands from Austria-Hungary no compensation, 
neither territorial, political or economic." ® 

This might have been satisfactory to Austria if she 
had been willing to submit her case to a conference of 
the Powers. But she had no such intention. She had 
already partially mobilized, and she proposed to force 
Serbia to recognize the annexation unconditionally and 
without any recourse to the Powers. There were but 
two obstacles to a decisive victory on these lines: 
Russia and Italy. Russia might be willing to support 
the Serbs, even to the extent of going to war in their 
behalf; while Italy, who had looked askance at the 
whole proceeding, was now reiterating the suggestion 
of a general conference. ^° Once more the occasion was 
ripe for the entrance of the Deus ex macJiina in the per- 
son of the German war lord. On March 21, the Kaiser 
ordered the German ambassador at St. Petersburg to 
inform M. Isvolsky that if Russia should sustain 
Serbia, Germany would be back of Austria to the full 
extent of her forces.^^ The threat prevailed, and 
Serbia, forsaken by Russia, was obliged to renounce 
her attitude of protest and to promise to maintain 
more agreeable relations with her neighbor in the fu- 
ture. Serbia's humiliation was bitter, but scarcely 
less so than that of Russia. France and Great Britain, 

9 Ibid., p. 421. 

10 Since the war, Signer Tommaso Tittoni has shown how he pro- 
posed a conference upon a new program which was received as a satis- 
factory basis for negotiations by all the Powers, including Austria and 
Germany. But at the same time, without taking Italy into their con- 
fidence, Prince von Btilow and Baron von Aehrenthal had determined 
upon the coup which was to result in such a brilliant success for the 
Triple Alliance. Tittoni, "La Responsabilit^ de la Guerre," Pages 
Actuelles (1914-1916) No. 96, p. 87. 

11 Debidour, op. cit., p. 123. 



274 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

who had subordinated their policy to hers, were silent 
partners in her defeat. In spite of the recalcitrance 
of one of its members, the Triple Alliance had gained 
a brilliant diplomatic victory and had increased its 
prestige at the expense of the Entente. In Germany's 
eyes the iron ring of King Edward VII had been 
broken; **the group of Powers whose influence had 
been so much overestimated at Algeciras, fell to pieces 
when faced with the tough problems of Continental 
policy. . . . The ingenious encirclement of Germany, 
for some time the terror of timid souls, proved to be 
a diplomatic illusion devoid of political actuality. " ^^ 

2. THE FALL OF CLEMENCEAU AND FURTHER DIFFICULTIES IN 

MOROCCO 

With the passing of the Bosnian crisis there still re- 
mained a few vexatious questions for Europe to set- 
tle. The Armenian question seemed destined to en- 
dure as long as there were Turks and Armenians ; the 
recognition of Bulgaria by the Powers had not yet 
formally taken place, and hardly had the four Powers 
responsible for the maintenance of order in Crete 
withdrawn their last contingents before the Greek flag 
was raised again, and since the Cretan Government 
did not dare to pull it down, the Powers were forced 
to send another landing party to do it for them. As 
one of the French deputies remarked, it was impossible 
to prevent Crete and Greece making love to each other, 
but it would have to be amour libre, since the Powers 
refused to give their consent to their union.^^ But in 

12 Von Baiow, "Imperial Germany," p. 57. 

13 M. Denys Cochin, Speech of July 5, 1909, cm the Dretttn situation, 
Annates de la Ohaanbrte, Vol 88li, p. 8^79. 



RESULTS OF THE ACCORD OF 1909 275 

France all interest in foreign policy once more turned 
towards Morocco; and with Germany favorably dis- 
posed, and the strong Government of M. Clemenceau 
in office there was excellent reason to hope for a pro- 
gressive amelioration of the still chaotic situation in 
the Shereefian Empire. 

In any country save France such a hope might have 
been reasonable; but in the Third Republic any ex- 
pectation based upon the premise that a ministry will 
remain in office so long as its policy is satisfactory to the 
people is very liable to prove unfounded. The Clemen- 
ceau ministry had not been particularly successful in 
its handling of the labor uprisings, but in the Casa- 
blanca Affair it had taken a fearless stand which had 
gone far to restore the prestige compromised by Fa- 
shoda and Algeciras. Yet, paradoxical as it seems, the 
mention of this very fact caused the downfall of the 
ministry. The man who wanted to defy Germany 
but had failed, now brought down the minister who 
had defied Germany and succeeded. In a session when 
the discussion was completely divorced from foreign 
affairs, when M. Delcasse was making a report on the 
jcause of the explosion of the Jena, a thrust was made 
Ithat stirred the Tiger 's ire. Forgetting that in bring- 
ing up the humiliation of Algeciras he was striking at 
the pride of France as well as at M. Delcasse, M. Clem- 
enceau baited his own trap. *'I have never humiliated 
France and I say that M. Delcasse had done so." The 
allusion was unfair and wholly unworthy of M. Clemen- 
ceau. His only excuse was the bitter and unprovoked 
attack by M. Delcasse. But that a retort made in 
anger, and almost excusable under the circumstances, 



276 FEENCH FOEEIGN POLICY 

should have caused the downfall of the ministry, might 
well be considered ridiculous, if at the same time it 
were not so tragic. M. Delcasse had his revenge, the 
Chambre satisfied its amour propre, and France paid 
the penalty.^* 

M. Clemenceau's downfall did not elevate M. Del- 
casse. M. Briand, socialist, "an anarchist who had 
adapted himself" became the President du Conseil. 
From the point of view of domestic policy, M. Fal- 
lieres could not have made a happier choice ; responsi- 
bility made M. Briand a most conservative socialist. 
But from the point of view of foreign policy, espe- 
cially when France was about to enter into partnership 
with Germany in Morocco, the choice was hardly one 
that would discourage Germany from attempting to 
run the firm in the interest of the junior partner.^^ 
M. Pichon was retained at the Quai d'Orsay, but the 
Wilhelmstrasse was more interested in the fact that 
M. Briand had replaced M. Clemenceau. 

Before any hopes could be entertained by either 
France or Germany of profiting by economic conces- 
sions in Morocco, it was essential both that the country 
be pacified and that France and Spain come to some 

14 This memorable session occurred July 20, 1909. For the debate 
see Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 88ii, p. 1526. For a brilliant analysis 
of the psychology of the affair see Lawrence Jerrold, "The Real France," 
chap. IX. 

15 As an example of the German viewpoint towards French Social- 
ism the following quotation is interesting: "We shall perhaps think 
of making war upon you when your pacifists, your internationalists, 
your anti-militarists and other imbeciles of that sort will have suffi- 
ciently weakened you, and destroyed in your souls the idea of patrie 
which makes us so strong. . . . We shall merely wait — and we shall 
not have to wait long until your divisions and your anarchy have made 
you incapable of self-defence." Quoted by FuUerton, "Problems of 
Power," p. IIG, note. 



EESULTS OF THE ACCORD OF 1909 277 

sort of an agreement with Mouley Hafid. It was 
hoped that now that Europe presented a united front, 
the new Sultan would recognize that it was to his ad- 
vantage to cooperate with the European representa- 
tives. M. Regnault was sent as a special plenipoten- 
tiary to Fez at the end of January, 1909, with instruc- 
tions to arrange for putting into effect the terms of 
the Franco-Spanish note, and to assist in the reor- 
ganization of the Shereefian Empire.^^ The Sultan, 
however, was more interested in obtaining the with- 
drawal of French forces from Chaouia than in obtain- 
ing the cooperation of the French and Spanish police 
and in repaying the cost of the occupation. But when 
he learned of the Franco-German Accord he showed 
a much greater willingness to negotiate, and he also 
signified his desire to send a mission to Paris to con- 
sider the question of Moroccan finances.^'^ Even the 
bandit Raisuli who had only been persuaded to sur- 
render the Kaid McLean upon the payment of half a 
million francs, now visited the French charge d'affaires 
at Tangier and gave assurances of his good will. 

The Moroccan mission sent to Paris under the di- 
rection of El Mokri received a favorable reception, and 
in a statement given to a representative of the 
"Temps," El Mokri declared that the situation in 
Morocco was as satisfactory as could be expected, con- 
sidering the long period of anarchy. He claimed that 
Mouley Hafid was the only recognized Sultan, and if 
sufiicient financial backing could be secured, the Sul- 
tan could pay his troops, reestablish peace and secur- 

16 Doc. Dip., "Aflfaires du Maroc" (1908-1910) ZSTo. 112. 

17 Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 138, annexe. 



278 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

ity, collect the taxes, and enter upon a program of 
general economic development of the country. He as- 
sured the French that the Sultan was firmly decided to 
respect the Act of Algeciras and to do all in his power 
to strengthen the bonds of friendship now attaching 
Morocco to France.i^ But however willing El Mokri 
was to negotiate, he saw no need of haste, and not un- 
til the middle of August was a note finally signed stat- 
ing the conditions upon which France would withdraw 
from the Chouia, and the methods whereby Morocco 
could pay her debts and establish a sound financial 
foundation.^^ It still remained necessary to obtain 
the Sultan's signature to this agreement. 

While these negotiations were dragging along, Spain, 
whose resentment had been smoldering ever since she 
had been refused participation in the Franco-German 
Accord,^^ saw an opportunity to show that she still 
had important interests in Morocco and intended to 
protect them. Early in July several Spanish work- 
men on the outskirts of Melilla in the Riff were killed 
in a skirmish with the natives. Reinforcements were 
immediately sent and, being drawn into an ambush, a 
large number of Spanish soldiers were killed. Spain 
now determined to send over a large force; but in 
order to obtain the forty thousand troops considered 

18 Le Temps, May 26, 1909. 

19 Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 249, annexe. 

20 On February 9, the very day that the declaration was signed, the 
Spanish ambassador at Paris said: "The mandate that we hold in 
Morocco should allow us certainly to participate in a manner to be 
determined in the Franco-German conversation whose result M. Pichon 
has communicated to me." M, Tardieu asserts that it was at this time 
that Spain made her decision to follow out her own independent 
Moroccan policy. Tardieu, "France et Espagne," Kev. de Deux Mondes, 
Dec. 1, 1912. 



EESULTS OF THE ACCORD OF 1909 279 

necessary, she was compelled to call out her reservists, 
and as a result riots broke out in Barcelona and mar- 
tial law had to be declared throughout the country. 
The Sultan protested vigorously against this great 
expedition and notified the Powers that Morocco would 
not bear the expense.^^ As these warlike measures 
continued, France also commenced to look askance, 
and General d'Amade issued a statement in one of 
the French newspapers, in which he expressed the 
opinion that Spain was nourishing ambitious projects 
in Morocco, and if France did not intervene shortly 
she would find Spain firmly entrenched in her sphere 
of influence. 22 He was relieved of his command for his 
undiplomatic utterance, but when the Moroccan ques- 
tion came up in the Chamber the deputies were even 
more outspoken in their criticisms. M. Merle asserted 
the whole Spanish expedition to be a violation of the 
Act of Algeciras, and quoted a Spanish senator to the 
effect that Spain was not limiting her ambitions to 
Ceuta but would go to Taza and perhaps even to Fez. 
M. Merle gave it as his opinion that the Spanish were 
strengthened in their ambitious projects by the belief 
that they would have German support, since it was no- 
torious that Germany much preferred to see a weak 
nation like Spain the predominant power in Morocco.^^ 
M. Jaures in a long and brilliant speech, thereupon 
urged a complete and immediate withdrawal as the only 
satisfactory way out of the Moroccan wasps' nest.^* 
M. Pichon showed that the situation was not quite as 

21 Doc. Dip., op. cit.. No. 247. 

22 Le Matin, Oct. 7, 1909. 

23 Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 89i, p. ^88. 
2* Ibid., p. 695. 



280 FEENCH FOEEIGN POLICY 

hopeless as it was pictured, that France and Spain 
were still cooperating, that Spain had affirmed on 
numerous occasions that her expedition was only tem- 
porary, and that to withdraw from Morocco just at the 
time when conditions were commencing to improve was 
utterly preposterous.^^ 

Mouley Hafid was not slow to perceive that the 
European bogey was not so frightful after all, and he 
continued his dilatory tactics in coming to a final agree- 
ment with France. To impress his subjects with his 
independence of the Powers, he proceeded to torture 
the followers of the Pretender Bu Hamara whom he 
caught, in direct violation of the Powers' protests. 
He increased his prestige greatly by finally capturing 
Bu Hamara himself. As Bu Hamara had taken sanc- 
tuary, Mouley Hafid had him smoked out, put in an 
iron cage and led in triumph to Fez. The Pretender 
was then crucified, mutilated, and finally shot in ac- 
cordance with the directions given in the Koran for 
those! who wage war against Grod and his earthly repre- 
sentative. The Sultan then sent a long note to the 
representatives of the Powers extolling the benefits 
and sacredness of torture.^^ As his influence increased 
among the fanatical Berbers Mouley Hafid 's disdain 
for the Powers, and for France in particular, in- 
creased, and in a note to M. Pichon, October 23, 1909, 
he demanded immediate evacuation of Casablanca and 
Chaouia, complete control on the frontier, and refused 
the loan which was to pay the cost of the military ex- 
pedition.^'^ El Mokri, who remained in Paris, was 

25 Ibid., p. 735. 

26 Doc. Dip., op. cit., No, 300, annexe. 
37 Ibid., No. 333. 



EESULTS OF THE ACCORD OF 1909 281 

finally convinced of the necessity of coming to an agree- 
ment with France, and in December he arranged for 
a loan of eighty million francs, part to go for liquida- 
tion of the cost of the expedition, and part for the 
expenses of administration.^^ Although El Mokri 
signed this as a delegate with full powers, and un- 
doubtedly with the consent and approval of his master, 
when the arrangement was submitted to the Sultan 
he flew into a rage and would have none of it. M. 
Pichon thereupon sent an ultimatum giving the Sultan 
forty-eight hours to sign the agreement as concluded 
by his representative in Paris, covering the loan, the 
instruction to be given by French officers to Moroccan 
troops, and the naming of the high commissioner for the 
Algerian frontier.^^ He followed this by a demand 
that the murderers of M. Charbonnier and Dr. Mau- 
champ be punished and that the further reparation 
agreed upon be effected.^** If these demands were not 
met within the specified time, the French colony and 
officials would leave Fez, and the French government 
would immediately take such measures as it should 
deem necessary. The Sultan's representative realized 
that the time for speedy action had come, and on Feb- 
ruary 21, El Mokri announced to M. Pichon that 
Mouley Hafid had ratified the accords.^^ The ulti- 
matum, however, had already been sent, and it was 
not considered advisable to withdraw it without full 
concession on the part of Mouley Hafid himself. His 
first reply was equivocal, but he finally gave way on 

28 Ibid., No. 355, annexe. 

29 Ibid., No. 396, annexe I. 
80 Ibid., No. 399, annexe II. 
31 Ibid., No. 412. 



M 



282 FEENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

all points, and the accord was signed at Paris, March 
4, 1910. 

After fifteen months of straggle France had suc- 
ceeded in taking a first step, but her position was still 
far from encouraging. In the words of M. Tardieu: 
"France had granted to the Sultan a loan which would 
allow him to liquidate the past but not to organize the 
future. She had gained her points that the chief of the 
military mission should become the chief of all the in- 
structors; that a French engineer should be placed at 
the head of the Shereefian administration of public 
works. . . . But in order to translate into acts these 
promises, she had before her a Sultan of rebellious 
character and full of surprises, who saw in this accord 
neither the proof of power to injure him or to aid him. 
Our effort had been used up in obtaining his signature. . 
France was for him a convenient banker rather than 
an indispensable and redoubtable associate." ^^ The 
loan was not guaranteed by France, it created neither 
resources nor new income for Morocco, and it left the 
Sultan without means to create an army. But with- 
out an army there was no way to collect taxes ; so in 
November El Mokri reappeared in Paris seeking an- 
other loan, and this time it was to cover the organiza- 
tion of the army and police and the construction of 
public works, as well as for the payment of debts. He 
was able to obtain neither the full sum nor the guaran- 
tee of France; the Government seemed afraid to give 
the loan that political significance which the Accord of 
1909 with Germany expressly permitted. The result 

32 Tardieu, "Le Mystere d'Agadir," p. 100. This volume is the most 
complete and authoritative treatment of the subject, a worthy com- 
panion of the author's volume on the Conference of Algeciras. 



RESULTS OF THE ACCORD OF 1909 283 

was that the army was not organized, anarchy con- 
tinued, and France was finally forced once more to in- 
tervene with a military expedition. 

3. FAILURE OF THE ACCORD OF 1909 

With the signing of the Accord of April 8, 1909, gen- 
eral satisfaction was manifest in both France and 
Germany and there is little doubt that both countries, 
for the time being at least, intended to fulfill their en- 
gagements loyally. The unfortunate part of the ar- 
rangement lay in the fact that its vagueness allowed 
each side to interpret it to its own advantage. For 
Germany it was merely a quid pro quo arrangement, 
a sort of condominium whereby her commercial and 
industrial enterprises might profit in spite of the Act 
of Algeciras. The only clause of the arrangement to 
which she attached great importance was the last, 
which stated that the two nations would endeavor to 
associate their nationals on such concessions as might 
be obtained. This was the foundation — indeed, the 
raison d'etre, — of the accord. On the other hand, the 
French regarded this last clause as a polite formula, 
significant of the new amicable spirit which was to 
prevail between the two countries, but of no particular 
importance. Had not the Wilhelmstrasse declared in 
the confidential letter accompanying the declaration 
that it realized that French interests were superior, 
but that German public opinion must be considered? 
Therefore they fixed their attention on the clause recog- 
nizing the special political interests of France in Mo- 
rocco, which gave them the right to establish peace and 
order without further opposition on the part of Ger- 



284 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

many. They had found out by experience that the Act 
of Algeciras was an impossible program so long as 
Germany opposed its execution. The new agreement 
withdrew this opposition ; henceforth France was free 
to put the Act of Algeciras into effect.^^ 

If Germany was willing to interpret the accord in 
any such self-denying manner while the Bosnian crisis 
held the chancellories of Europe in suspense, the bril- 
liant diplomatic victory gained by the Triple Entente 
speedily brought about a change of intention. Lupus 
pilum mutat, non mentem, the wolf changes his coat 
but not his disposition. Immediately after the signing 
of the accord Germany suggested an exchange of views 
in regard to the economic questions at issue, and M. 
Guiot, member of the administrative council of the 
Moroccan State Bank, was sent to Berlin to discuss 
the situation.^* France was willing enough to discuss 
the financial and economic condition; a new loan had 
to be made, and this was a good time to settle some of 
the disputed points in regard to certain German con- 
cessions which had already solicited French financial 
cooperation. The result of the conferences, which be- 
gan March 24 and lasted a week, was a memorandum 
from the German government dated June 2.^^ Accord- 
ing to its clauses a veritable Franco-German condo- 
minium would be established in Morocco whereby all 
concessions, ''to avoid sterile and harmful competi- 

33 The first clause of the Accord of 1909, which explicitly stated that 
the basis of the agreement was the desire of the two Governments to 
facilitate the execution of the Act, surely gave ground for this in- 
terpretation. 

34 For a complete account of the Guiot mission see Eapport Baudin, 
op. cit., p. 263. 

35 Doc Dip., "Affairs du Maroc (1908-1910) No. 206 annexe I. 



EESULTS OF THE ACCORD OF 1909 285 

tion,'* were to be limited practically to groups repre- 
senting the financial interests of the two countries. 
In order that Article 107 of the Act of Algeciras, which 
definitely stated that the validity of concessions should 
be subject to the principle of public awards, should not 
be violated, France might share her half with Eng- 
land and Spain. Germany further stipulated that 
the two concessions already possessed by German 
firms, the mole and sewers of Tangier, and the harbor 
construction at Larache were to receive priority of 
payment. ''Germany had arrived late at the Moroc- 
can feast with a formidable appetite and without any 

regard for the guests who had been invited before 
her. "36 

The French Government found it very diflScult to 
frame a satisfactory reply to these most unsatisfactory 
proposals. To accede meant to disregard the Act of 
Algeciras, to the detriment of the very Powers which 
had supported her against Germany in the drawing 
up of the Act. Nor was a complete refusal possible 
under the circumstances without endangering the new 
rapprochement which seemingly promised such a satis- 
factory solution. Although an early reply was re- 
quested, it was not until four months later, October 
14, that M. Pichon sent his response, a masterpiece 
of ambiguity and circumlocution, which while conced- 
ing the principle of an association of French and Ger- 
man groups, did not fail to point out that Article 
107 of the Act must be taken into account. 
Where the German note specified French and Ger- 
man groups, the French reply spoke of entrepreneurs 

36 Tardieu, "Le Mysttre d'Agadir," p. 36. 



286 FEENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

of various nationalities. Thus at the first exchange 
of views a fundamental divergence of intention was 
evident. France still intended to associate with Ger- 
many only so far as was permissible under the Act of 
Algeciras, while Germany cast overboard all her much 
vaunted demands for economic liberty just as soon 
as she was in a position to profit by an opposite 
policy. 

Nevertheless, negotiations were continued, and a 
serious effort was made to come to an agreement in 
various enterprises. The Union des Mines, an inter- 
national mining concern of which France possessed 50 
per cent, of the stock, attempted to combine with the 
Mannesman Brothers, a Germ'an enterprise which 
claimed to have very important mining concessions. 
For the construction of public works it was proposed 
to form a large company in which France and Germany 
would have the most stock, but to which Great Britain, 
Spain, and Austria, and the smaller Powders were to be 
invited to participate.^^ As to railways, considering 
their strategic value, France thought that she should 
have complete control, but Germany asked that the con- 
struction be put in the hands of the same company 
that was to have charge of the public works, and she 
further demanded the right of appointing a certain 
number of the personnel. Innumerable proposals were 
made by both sides, and conferences were held, but 
on none of the three questions was a real accord 
reached. In the case of the mines the Mannesmans 

37 The shares were distributed as follows : France 50 per cent., 
Germany 26 per cent., England 6l^ per cent., Spain 5 per cent., Austria 
4 per cent., Italy, Belgium and Sweden each 2% per cent., Portugal 1% 
per cent. 






EESULTS OF THE ACCORD OF 1909 287 

would accept no proposals which were not overwhelm- 
ingly in their favor. For public works, a large com- 
pany was organized, the Societe marocaine des travaux 
publics, with a capital of two million francs, which 
made a number of proposals to the Moroccan Govern- 
ment for the construction of street car lines, water 
works, port improvements and other profitable public 
works; but it was prevented from accomplishing any- 
thing by the jealousy of the French and German inter- 
ests, by the hostility of the English (who felt that they 
had not received fair treatment in the percentage of 
stock offered them) and by the hopeless condition in 
which Morocco remained financially. As to the rail- 
ways, Great Britain did not look with favor upon giv- 
ing this enterprise to the company in charge of the pub- 
lic works, while France seriously objected to German 
station agents in Morocco. ^^ 

* ' The wind of concord blew even outside of the limits 
of Morocco," and the French Government decided to 
make a clean sweep of all the economic difficulties 
between the two countries while the occasion was so 
favorable. A dispute of long standing existed between 
the rival groups of concessionaires in the German 
Cameroons and the French Congo, a dispute which 
both the French Foreign Office and the Colonial Office 
had found extremely wearisome. An inquest con- 
ducted by Captain Cottes in 1906 showed conclusively 
that the French company, the Ngoko-Sangha, had well- 
founded claims for damages against the German 
Cameroon Company. M. Millies-Lacroix, French Min- 

38 The best discussion of the efforts to establish these joint enter- 
prises is found in Tardieu, op. cit., Chap. I. The "Eapport Baudin," 
op. cit., p. 264 gives a very complete summary. 



288 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

is'ter of the colonies during 1907 and 1908, was willing 
to support the French company in its claims, but M. 
Pichon was unwilling to introduce further causes of 
dispute into Franco-German relations at a time when 
the strain was already so great. Since the French 
Government refused to support them in their just 
claims for damages against Germany, the Ngoko- 
Sangha Company thereupon demanded an indemnity 
from France. Their request was laid before the Cham- 
ber, and the Committee of Foreign Affairs recom- 
mended that an equitable settlement be made, consider- 
ing that '' equity commanded an indemnification for 
the victim of the carelessness, apathy and weakness 
of the government. ' ' ^^ Neither the Colonial Minister 
nor the Foreign Minister was willing to act in accord- 
ance with this suggestion, but under the mellowing 
influence of the Accord of 1909 it was hoped that a 
settlement might be arrived at. M. Pichon therefore 
suggested to Berlin that a Franco-German consortium 
be constituted which should jointly exploit the conces- 
sions on the Congo-Cameroon frontier.*^ 

S9 This whole question was discussed in a very frank manner in the 
Chamber April 5 and 6, 1911. Annales de la Chambre, Vol 93ii, pp. 
2215 et seq. See also Tardieu op. cit,, Part 11, Chap. I, and Pierre 
Albin, "Le Coup d'Agadir," p. 131 ff. 

40 M. Pichon in testifying before the Budget Commission, Dec. 14, 
1910, thus outlined the need for such an agreement: "The troubles 
caused in this region by the prolonged struggle of rival colonists are 
still felt among the natives even after a definite accord has intervened 
between Trance and Germany; it has seemed opportune to the Ftench 
administration to assure completely the pacification, the calm and the 
security by realizing in a concrete manner in the eyes of the local 
tribes the union of these elements of civilization. 

"The formation of the Franco-German consortium which would put 
an end to the regrettable struggles between the South Cameroon Com- 
pany and the Ngoko-Sangha Company will have the double advantage 
of preventing the return of incidents whose diplomatic effects might 



RESULTS OF THE ACCORD OF 1909 289 

When the proposal was submitted to the two com- 
panies, the German group accepted without reserva- 
tions; the Ngoko-Sangha accepted, but on condition 
that they first receive the indemnity from the French 
government which had been fixed at something over 
two million francs. It was this indemnity that was 
to prove the stumbling-block. Although it had been 
awarded by an arbitration tribunal, and accepted by 
the government, the budget committee showed itself 
hostile to the idea and did all in its power to impede 
payment. As a result, although the basis for the new 
company was established by a convention in June, 
1910, it was not until December that the arrangements 
were definitely determined upon by the two govern- 
ments, and it remained to be seen whether the indem- 
nity would be paid. An opinion given by the eminent 
jurist, M. Renault, that the payment was illegal de- 
stroyed the last hope of a settlement, and the Briand 
cabinet, worn out with the constantly increasing oppo- 
sition, resigned.^^ 

The Monis cabinet was constituted March 3, 1911, 
with M. Cruppi, a man wholly inexperienced in foreign 
relations, as Minister of Foreign Affairs.*^ With M. 
Caillaux, Minister of Finances, one of the most ardent 
opponents of the consortium, and with M. Messimy, 
Minister of Colonies, who had also been unfavorably 

have grave consequences and to facilitate on the spot the civilizing work 
of our colonial administration." 

41 "They wish the power," he said to his friends, in speaking of the 
organizers of the campaign of violence against him, "well, let them 
have it. They will soon see the difficulties that they will run into." 
Albin, "Le Coup d'Agadir," p. 140. 

42 M. Monis had invited MM. Ribot, Deschanel, Cambon and Barrfere 
to take the portfolio of Foreign Affairs without success. 



290 FRENCH FOEEIGN POLICY 

disposed towards the project, the government was not 
slow in stating its position on this question. M. Mes- 
simy declared to the Budget Commission that the in- 
demnity would not be paid nor the consortium consti- 
tuted.*^ One more project of cooperation between the 
two countries had failed, and this time the blame 
rested wholly upon the French. Their policy in this 
project was a mixture of friendly advances and timid 
retreats, a policy of vacillation inexcusable in dealing 
with a distrustful and powerful neighbor, who knew 
what she wanted and was not particular over the means 
employed in getting it. A final effort was made to sub- 
stitute the idea of a Congo-Cameroon railway for the 
consortium scheme, but it fared no better than the other 
proposals. After two years of negotiations for par- 
ticipation in almost every sort of business enterprise, 
for the exploitation of mining interests, for the con- 
struction of railways, for a monopoly of tobacco, for 
engaging in all sorts of public utility projects, for the 
gathering of rubber and ivory, not a single enterprise 
had been satisfactorily established. In some instances, 
such as the Mannesman claims, and in the projects for 
military railways in Morocco, Germany's demands 
were wholly out of reason, but in the Ngoko-Sangha- 
Cameroon Company project the policy of France was 
both weak and reprehensible. The Senatorial Com- 
mission of Foreign Affairs had a very clear apprecia- 
tion of the situation: ''In a general fashion Germany 
seems disposed to conclude from these facts that a suc- 
cessful association of economic interests with France 
is impossible. " ** 

43Tardieu, op. cit., p. 346. 

44 Beni Pinon "France et Allemagne," p. 210. 



RESULTS OF THE ACCORD OF 1909 291 

The German Government had given numerous indi- 
cations that it was exceedingly desirous that success 
should crown these enterprises of economic coopera- 
tion. While M. Pichon was in London to attend the 
funeral of King Edward VIII in May, 1910, the Kaiser 
approached him and said: ''I should be very glad to 
see this Moroccan question finally settled. I should 
also be glad if you can come to an understanding with 
the Mannesman brothers." ^^ In a note dated Febru- 
ary 3, 1911, M. Jules Cambon, French ambassador at 
Berlin, declared that Germany was much interested in 
the project of the Moroccan railways and thought that 
in the future it would have a great importance.*® A 
month later he was more explicit in his opinion: ''It 
would be very inconvenient in my opinion if the accord 
relative to the Moroccan railways should not be signed. 
. . . Permit me to remark to Your Excellency that the 
object that was pursued in forming the Moroccan Com- 
pany Avas precisely to do away with German competi- 
tion in Morocco in the future by giving her a limited 
satisfaction.*'^ M. Conty, Under Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs, in a note to M. Cruppi, dated March 13, relat- 
ing to the Congo-Cameroon Consortium, was even more 
outspoken in his views : ''In the actual state of Franco- 
German relations, the abandonment of the Consortium 
will risk provoking at our expense another one of 
those disagreeable manifestations so habitual to Ger- 
many."*^ With the complete failure of the Consor- 
tium through the deliberate action of the Monis govern- 

45 Tardieu, op. cit., p. 48. 

46 Doe. Dip., "AflFaires du Maroc" (1910-1912) No. 57. 

47 Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 85. 

48 Pinon, "France et Allemagne," p, 209. 



292 FEENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

ment, Germany realized that France did not mean to 
spend her blood and treasure to police Morocco and 
then permit Germany to participate equally in any 
benefits which might be derived. When Baron von 
Schoen, the German ambassador, next saw M. Cruppi 
his remark was a covert threat: "You have put aside 
the Ngoko-Sangha. I understand perfectly, for you 
would not have had a half dozen votes in the Chamber, 
but we have from your predecessor an engagement 
which implies the carrying out of a project relating to 
the Ngoko-Sangha, so that to-day we have Herr Sem- 
ler on our back, which is very serious, for he has all 
Hamburg behind him. . . . You should try to show 
that you are not disposed to prevent all business ar- 
rangements between French and Germans. ' ^ *^ These 
were all straws indicating clearly enough the direction 
of the wind, but the cabinet in power was fitted neither 
to avoid difficulties nor to meet them when they came. 
Germany had only to await a suitable occasion and 
then force the issue. The internal situation of Mo- 
rocco gave indication that she would not have long to 
wait. 

4. THE FEZ EXPEDITION 

Although the Accord of 1909 had given France full 
opportunity to bolster up the authority of the Sultan 
with whatever forces should be deemed necessary to 
put an end to the recurrent tribal uprisings, at the 
beginning of 1911 the situation was practically as bad 
as ever. On November 20, 1910, Mouley Hafid had 
asked for new instructors for the police, and on De- 

*9 Tardieii, op. cit., p. 352, 



EESULTS OF THE ACCOED OF 1909 293 

cember 12 the French charge d'affaires sent an urgent 
request for at least thirty ofl&cers, and with the least 
possible delay. Two months later the Minister of War 
designated ten officers to carry out the mission l^*^ 
In the meantime the situation of Mouley Hafid was 
becoming more and more precarious. Insurrections 
became more prevalent and more serious. In January 
a small detachment of French troops was led into an 
ambush and massacred, and General Moinier, the head 
of the expeditionary force in the Chaouia, asked for 
reinforcements. The Briand Cabinet, ready to resign, 
took no action; but the Monis Cabinet, realizing the 
danger of allowing the situation to develop, granted a 
small increase.^^ Germany was immediately informed 
of the situation, and although Herr von Kiderlen- 
Waechter conceded that the guilty must be punished, 
he observed that it was very easy to be drawn on little 
by little by progressive military actions until the Act 
of Algeciras should be annulled.^^ 

Hardly had the Government decided to increase its 
forces before news of a new uprising reached Paris, 
and this time in the vicinity of Fez. More urgent 
measures were now demanded, and again M. Cambon 
outlined the situation to the German Foreign Secre- 
tary, and showed the responsibility of France to pro- 
tect the Europeans in Fez. Herr von Kiderlen seemed 
far more interested in the state of mind manifested 
bv the German people in regard to the expedition than 
he did in the situation of such Europeans as happened 

50 Rapport Baudin, op. cit., p. 266. 

51 See the speech of M. Cruppi, March 24, 1911, for a detailed ex- 
planation, Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 93ii, p. 1805. 

52 Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 102. 



294 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY* 

to be at Fez.^^ The instructions given to General 
Monier were such as to prevent any misconception of 
the purpose of the expedition. He was ordered not to 
lose sight of the fact that France intended to do noth- 
ing which might injure the independence of the Sultan 
or diminish the prestige of his sovereignty, that there 
was to be no new occupation of territory, and that the 
operations of the expeditionary force were to be as 
restricted as possible and terminated in the shortest 
possible time.'^^ That the French Government realized 
the delicacy of its situation, was shown by the debate 
in the Senate on April 6 and 7. M. Ribot pointed out 
that although France had assumed the positive charge 
of maintaining order in the ports where she had forces, 
she had not asked for the right to do so in every 
Moroccan city where Europeans were found. To do 
so implied a complete conquest of Morocco. After 
succoring the Europeans in Fez they could not be aban- 
doned, thus sufficient troops for their protection would 
have to be left and it was difficult to see just where the 
matter would end.^^ Yet the justice of M. Cruppi's 
attitude could not be gainsaid, ''if the security of 
foreigners, of the European colonies of Fez is menaced, 
it is our duty to try to aid them . . . this attitude is 
forced upon the government first by the most elemen- 
tary sentiment of humanity, and secondly by the special 
interest that we have in maintaining order in Mo- 
rocco. ' ' ^^ 
By the middle of April the tribal uprisings around 

53 Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 166 annexe II. 

54 Ibid., No. 292. 

55 Annales du S^nat Vol. 79i, p. 463. 
66 Ibid., p. 470. 



EESULTS OF THE ACCORD OF 1909 295 

Fez had become so general that the situation of the 
European colonies in the Moroccan capital had grown 
serious, and on April 17 the French Government de- 
cided to send further reinforcements. Once more the 
German Government was notified. This time the reply 
was even more reserved: ^'I do not say no, neither do 
I encourage you. You know the German opinion con- 
cerning Morocco. . . . You tell us : 4f we go to Fez it 
will only be temporarily to reestablish the authority of 
the Sultan and to prevent anarchy. ' But once at Fez, 
will you be able to withdraw? I can only advise the 
need for observing the Act of Algeciras, for once the 
French troops are at Fez the difficulties will com- 
mence. " ^'^ By the end of April the city was com- 
pletely blockaded ; the Sultan urged the French troops 
to advance, and on May 21 the French column arrived 
under the v/alls of Fez. By the end of June complete 
security was established in the immediate surround- 
ings of Fez ; but even before this time, on June 20, the 
order had been given to begin the retreat.^^ To pre- 
vent any complications, M. Cruppi was careful to keep 
the Powers informed of the progress made; and he 
promised that the French troops would withdraw just 
as soon as the Sultan's troops could be reorganized.^^ 
These assurances satisfied all the Powers except Ger- 
many. The German newspapers engaged in a cam- 
paign of threats and innuendoes,^" and Herr von Kider- 

57 Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 200. 

58 Tardieu, op. cit., pp. 365-377. 

59 Doc. Dip., op. cit., Nos. 219, 255, 308, 360. 

60 The Nord Deutche Gazette expressed the general attitude: "It 
is hoped that events will permit the French government to observe its 
program. If it should pass it, it would cease to be in accord with the 
Act of Algeciras of which one of the essential elemtents is an inde- 



296 FKENCH FOEEIGN POLICY 

len-Waechter became more and more dubious in Ms 
replies to M. Cambon. On April 28 he declared that 
if the French should be forced to remain at Fez it would 
be a complicated situation, for the whole Act of Alge- 
ciras would be at stake, each power regaining its 
liberty.^^ M. Cambon refused to subscribe to any such 
eventuality, but the German Foreign Secretary re- 
mained unconvinced. Eendered uneasy by this enig- 
matic attitude assumed by the Wilhelmstrasse, M. 
Cruppi ordered M. Cambon to find out definitely the 
attitude of the German Government upon the Fez ex- 
pedition. On June 10 M. Cambon had an interview 
with Herr Zimmerman, Under Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs, and the next day with Chancellor von Bethman- 
Hollweg, but in neither interview did he receive any 
satisfaction. The Chancellor finally advised him to 
see von Kiderlen at Kissingen.®^ 

The first clue to the German attitude came most 
unexpectedly. Meeting the Crown Prince at the races 
at Grunewald, June 12, M. Cambon was complimented 
on the progress of the French in Morocco: ''Well, my 
dear ambassador, here you are at Fez. Accept my 
compliments. Morocco is a fine bit of territory. We 
won't speak of it any more now, but you fix it up with 
us and it will be all right." ^^ The interview at Kis- 

pendent sovereign, in an independent Morocco. An infraction of one 
of the essential clauses of the Act of Algeciras, even if it should be 
provoked by force of circumstances and contrary to the wish of the 
power so acting, would give back to all the other powers their full 
liberty of action and might provoke consequences which cannot be 
foreseen for the moment." Quoted, Albin, "Le Coup d'Agadir," p. 156. 

61 Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 239. 

62 Doc. Dip., op. cit., Nos. 361, 366. 

63 Tardieu, op. cit., p. 385. 



EESULTS OF THE ACCOED OF 1909 297 

singen was even more enlightening. Herr von Kider- 
len detailed the various instances in which France had 
failed to act in the spirit of the Accord of 1909, — the 
Ngoko-Sangha Consortium, the Moroccan railways, 
and others — and asserted that the Fez expedition was 
a clear violation of the Act of Algeciras. M. Cambon 
pointed out the straightforward program of France, 
and Germany's promise of political disinterestedness. 
Herr Kiderlen refused to concede the need of the ex- 
pedition and finally declared that further plastering 
up in Morocco was impossible. When M. Cambon sug- 
gested that compensation be sought elsewhere, Herr 
von Kiderlen replied: *'Go to Paris and bring us back 
an offer. " ^* 

M. Cam,bon returned to Paris as was suggested, and 
found the political situation in hopeless confusion. 
The disorders in the Champagne vineyards had com- 
pletely unnerved the government : ' ' The Prime Minis- 
ter sat like Belshazzar at the feast, gazing with dismay 
at the awful lettering on the midnight sky, while the 
deputies wrung their hands like a Greek chorus." ^^ 
Nemesis seemed to dog the government's footsteps. 
At the occasion of the Paris-Madrid aeroplane race 
one of the machines got out of control, and from the 
great multitude assembled one person was killed and 
one seriously injured — M. Berteaux, Minister of War, 
was the one killed, and M. Monis, the Prime Minister, 
was the one injured. To make matters worse, Spain 
now decided to act in an unfriendly manner, and in 
direct opposition to a request from France that no 

64 Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 399. 
esFuUerton, "Problems of Power," p. 102. 



298 FRENCH FOEEIGN POLICY 

military action be taken, despatched troops to El Ksar 
and Larache. She claimed as justification, that such 
action was essential to protect those interests which 
had been granted to her by the secret agreement made 
in 1904 in connection with the Anglo-French Entente.^^ 
M. Jaures rose to the occasion by urging a complete 
withdrawal from Morocco, thus only, he declared, could 
France be assured of the sympathy of Spain and Ger- 
many.®'^ To the whole Chamber at this time the inde- 
pendent action of Spain seemed of much more impor- 
tance than the covert hostility of Germany. Even such 
a close student of foreign affairs as M. Gabriel Hano- 
taux, writing in June, 1911, on the diplomatic situation, 
said: "Germany after having shown her claws at the 
beginning of the affair has hidden them for the mo- 
ment; she waits, her eyes half closed, ready to profit 
by the slightest fault. Without believing that she has 
entirely renounced her ambitions I do not accuse her 
of evil designs. ... To push her demands to the ex- 
treme did not succeed at the Conference of Algeciras. 
She would find herself in an analogous position, if by 
a hazardous manoeuver she should try to force her 
fortune, and should put the other Powers on guard. 
Let us say that her diplomacy is keeping an eye upon 
us ; if she can slip into the play without compromising 

66 Tardieu, op. cit., p. 392. M. Cruppi authorized the French am- 
bassador to protest vigorously against this action. "Give notice to 
the Foreign Minister in a friendly but clear fashion that the measures 
taken by the Royal Government — measures which have not been the 
result of any preliminary accord between France and Spain, — and of 
which we have been informed only after their realization, cannot have 
our assent." Quoted Tardieu, p. 393. 

67 Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 94, p. 321. 



EESULTS OF THE ACCORD OF 1909 299 

herself too far, she will enter you may be sure of 
that."«8 

M. Hanotaux was only half right. Germany was 
watching, she was watching very closely; but her 
method was not to slip in ; if a suitable occasion should 
show itself she was ready to batter down the doors. 
If she had learned a lesson at Algeciras, it was to strike 
at France alone, rather than at all Europe. It was 
France that furnished the occasion. The Monis gov- 
ernment, weak at best, fell on a question of domestic 
policy, June 23, and M. Fallieres asked M. Caillaux, 
Minister of Finances in the former cabinet, to form the 
new ministry. Not as much was known concerning the 
character of M. Caillaux as is known to-day, but the 
little that was known was not such as to inspire much 
hope. He was a recognized authority on finances, 
author of an excellent treatise on the subject, Impots 
en France, and he had served as Minister of Finances 
in the Waldeck-Rousseau, Clemenceau, Briand, and 
Monis cabinets. But in a period when the storm 
clouds were everywhere visible on the horizon of 
foreign relations, the wisdom of his choice seemed 
problematical. It was at least hoped that M. Caillaux 
would choose an experienced statesman to take the all 
important position of Foreign Minister. He chose M. 
de Selves, for the past fifteen years Prefect of the 
Seine, and before that Director-General of Posts and 
Telegraphs. Even Germany manifested its surprise 
at the strange appointments which M. Caillaux made. 
The "Lokal Anzeiger" said: ''It is astonishing that M. 

88 Gabriel Hanotaux, "La Politique d'Equilibre," p. 385. 



300 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

Caillaux should have entrusted the portfolio of War 
to M. Messimy, whose competence appears doubtful, 
and that of Foreign Affairs to M. de Selves, at the 
very moment when his bad administration of Paris has 
brought down upon his head the censure of the munic- 
ipal council. M. de Selves, who during fifteen years 
has been unable to clean, pave, or light the capital, as 
a recompense is put at the head of Foreign Affairs of 
his country." ®^ To official Germany the time seemed 
suitable to reopen the Moroccan question, and four 
days after the formation of the Caillaux Cabinet the 
German gun-boat, Panther, appeared in the harbor of 
Agadir. 

69 Quoted Le Matin, June 29, 1911. Further light is thrown upon 
the Caillaux ministry by this extract from a despatch sent by Baron 
Guillaume, the Belgian Minister at Paris, to his chief the day after the 
despatch of the Panther: "When forming his Cabinet, M. Caillaux 
avoided offering a portfolio to M. Etienne, who is an interested par- 
tisan in the Moroccan adventure. He chose M. de Selves as Minister 
of Foreign Affaires who, I am told, wishes to put an end to that affair 
and wants the French to leave Fez. That is the moment which the 
German Government chose to gain a footing in Morocco! Was the 
German Government badly informed ... or did it fear lest France 
draw back and thus deprive it of a suitable pretext?" Belgian Doc, 
No. 73. 



CHAPTER XI 
AGADIR 

1. THE GEBMAN DEMANDS ' 

THE portfolio of Foreign Affairs is often a lourd 
heritage, and hardly had M. de Selves left the 
Hotel de Ville for the Quai d'Orsay before he realized 
this fact. Simultaneously with the sending of the 
Panther to Agadir, the German ambassador at Paris 
informed the new Foreign Secretary that certain Ger- 
man firms, alarmed at the troubled situation in Mo- 
rocco, had appealed to the Imperial Government for 
protection, and it was in pursuance of their request 
that Germany had dispatched a war-ship charged with 
the task of lending aid in case of need. As soon as 
peace should be reestablished in this region the gun- 
boat had orders to leave Agadir.^ Even the inex- 
perienced Foreign Secretary realized that the excuse 
for sending a war-ship to Agadir was a most palpable 
pretext. In the first place, Agadir was a closed port 
where no power had the right to exercise police duty, 
secondly there was practically no European commerce 
there, and Germany had none at all. Finally there 
had been no troubles recently in this particular region. 
Herr Zimmerman, in commenting on the affair to the 
French charge d'affaires at Berlin, was somewhat more 
frank. For his first reason he, too, mentioned the pro- 

iDoc. Dip., "Affaires du Maroc" (1910-1912) No. 418. 

301 



302 FEENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

tection of German interests, but his second was more 
truthful: '^ public opinion in Germany is such that the 
Imperial Government can no longer seem to disinterest 
itself in Moroccan affairs at a moment when France 
and Spain no longer seem willing to abide by the Act 
of Algeciras." ^ But considering the fact that the Fez 
expedition had already received orders to withdraw, 
that Herr von Kiderlen had invited M. Cambon to 
make an offer, and that the French ambassador was 
in Paris for that very purpose, it was not clear why 
Germany should seize this moment — when France had 
shown herself most willing to negotiate — to provoke 
an international crisis. In the words of M. Pierre 
Albin, "A conversation was being held. Bruskly dur- 
ing an interruption one of the two interlocutors placed 
a revolver upon the table, then invited the other to 
renew the discussion. ' ' ^ 

The answer was, after all, very simple. Under the 
Act of Algeciras it was clear that France and Spain 
would ultimately become masters of Morocco. Time 
was working for them, and the chaotic condition exist- 
ing there was bound to bring about a protectorate 
sooner or later. The Accord of 1909 was an attempt 
on the part of Germany to recoup commercially what 
she had lost politically. It is possible that at first 
she fully intended to disinterest herself gradually in 
Morocco, but I'appetit vient en mangeant, and as 
numerous profitable ventures suggested themselves 
her subjects became more insistent in their demands 
for equal participation with the French. When it was 

2 Ibid., No. 419. 

» "Le Coup d'Agadir," p. 28. 



AGADIB 303 

seen that cooperation was impossible, the idea of a 
partition or compensation took its place. The Pan- 
Germans had long been demanding an Atlantic port, 
and the idea finally developed into the desire for a 
stretch of the coast with the hinterland included.* The 
march to Fez had given the Wilhelmstrasse the ex- 
cuse to protest against a violation of the Act, and the 
weakened internal situation of France, which put the 
inexperienced Caillaux ministry in power, gave it the 
opportunity to make the protest effective. Herr von 
Kiderlen-Waechter gave a very frank outline of the 
situation to Baron Beyens, the Belgian ambassador : 

''When I first came to the Wilhelmstrasse I wit- 
nessed, without being able to raise any protests, the 
successive encroachments of France in Morocco, which 
assuredly were breaches of the Algeciras Act. ... If 
the Eepublican Government had continued to show 
prudence and to advance at a leisurely pace, we should 
have been compelled to put up with its pretensions 
and to champ our bit in silence. . . . The invasion 
would have crept on slowly like a sheet of oil. I 
thanked Heaven when I learnt of the march on Fez, 
a flagrant violation of the Algeciras Act. This drastic 
proceeding which the position of Europeans in the Mo- 
roccan capital did not justify, restored to us our free- 
dom of action. . . . We admitted that it was out of 
the question to make France draw back and conform 
to the Algeciras treaty. We consented to give up 
Morocco to her, but we demanded in return a cession 

4 Herr Theobald Fischer expressed the Pan-German view: "Ger- 
many's minimum demands should include the part of Morocco situated 
between the Atlas Mountains and the Atlantic, the territory south of 
Rabat including the Sous." Tardieu, op, cit., p. 428. 



304 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

of territory in Africa. Since this friendly conversa- 
tion led to no result, just as our proposals in accordance 
with the 1909 agreement ... we decided to send the 
Panther to Agadir. " ^ 

This was a sufficiently bald statement of the case 
from the German viewpoint. But inadvertently the 
Germans have given us a clearer and more brutal 
exposition of their intentions. In a political libel suit 
in which the editor of the "Rheinisch-Westfalische 
Zeitung" was implicated, he made the following declar- 
ations on oath in the court, January 9, 1912 : 

*'Herr Klass, the President of the Pan-Germanic 
League, is prepared to state upon oath before this 
Court that Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter, writing to him from 
Kissingen, requested Herr Klass to meet him at the 
Hotel Pfalzer Hof in Mannheim. During the inter- 
view, which occupied several hours, Herr von Kiderlen 
stated: **The Pan-Germanic demand for the posses- 
sion of Morocco is absolutely justified. You can abso- 
lutely rely upon it that the government will stick to 
Morocco. M. Cambon is wriggling before me like a 
worm. The German Government is in a splendid posi- 
tion. You can rely on me and you will be very pleased 
with our Morocco policy. ' ' 

Herr Klass called at the Wilhelmstrasse July 1, 
and as the Foreign Secretary was not in, he was re- 
ceived by Herr Zimmerman, the Under Secretary. 

6 Beyens, "Germany Before the War," p. 230. It is rather difficult 
to reconcile this statement with the actual facts. Not only do we 
find the French representative in Fez begging for aid, but the Sultan 
himself is equally insistent upon French intervention as the only pos- 
sible means of putting down the insurrection. See Doc. Dip., op. cit., 
paasim. for reports on the situation. 



AGADIR 305 

Herr Zimmerman was unable to restrain his enthusi- 
asm; ''You come at an historic hour. To-day the 
Panther appears before Agadir, and at this moment 
the Foreign Cabinets are being informed of its mission. 
The Grerman Government has sent two agents provo- 
cateurs to Agadir, and these have done their duty very 
well. German firms have been induced to make com- 
plaints and to call upon the government in Berlin for 
protection. It is the government's intention to seize 
the district, and it will not give it up again. . . . " ^ 

At first France seemed wholly unable to decide what 
action should be taken. M. de Selves thought that a 
French war-ship should be sent as an immediate riposte 
to the German thrust, after which further counsel could 
be taken. M. Jules Cambon supported the Foreign 
Secretary in his attitude, but M. Caillaux hesitated. 
The attitude of M. Caillaux in this whole affair is 
not yet entirely clear, but it was proved conclusively 
in the Senatorial inquest that while he was still Minis- 
ter of Finance in the Monis cabinet he was carrying 
on secret negotiations with Germany in regard to the 
Congo-Cameroon railroad, and that when he became 
Prime Minister, he continued these negotiations wholly 
without the knowledge of his Minister of Foreign 
Affairs.^ M. Caillaux suggested that M. Delcasse, now 
Minister of Marine, be asked to give his opinion and M. 
Delcasse advised that Great Britain be consulted first, 
in order that her attitude might be conformable to that 

6 J. Ellis Barker, "Anglo -German Differences and Sir Edward Grey," 
Fortnightly Review, March 1, 1912. 

7 For a scathing indictment of M. Caillaux's diplomatic methods see 
the speech of M. Jenouvrier in the Senate, February 5, 1912. M. Tar- 
dieu fails entirely to do justice to this phase of the affair. Aonales du 
Senat, Vol. 81i, p. 156. 



306 FRENCH FOEEIGN POLICY 

of France. His advice was taken and M. Paul Cam- 
bon, French ambassador at London, was asked to ob- 
tain the views of the British Foreign Office. In fact 
immediately npon learning of the dispatch of the 
Panther M, Paul Cambon had gone to see Sir Edward 
Grey without awaiting instructions, but in the absence 
of the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Arthur Mcolson, 
Under Secretary, assured him that the British Govern- 
ment would model its attitude and its decision upon 
the attitude and decision of the French Government.® 
It soon became evident that France once more in- 
tended to let Germany make her proposals. President 
Fallieres had made all arrangements to start on a trip 
to Holland July 3, and M. de Selves was to accompany 
him. It was decided that to change their plans at 
this late moment would be giving too much importance 
to this incident.^ This decision placed the manage- 
ment of the situation for the next few days entirely 
in the hands of M. Caillaux. He first authorized M. 
Jules Cambon to enter into discussion with Germany 
as to the significance and purpose of its act,^° and at 
the same time he telegraphed M. Paul Cambon to the 
effect that he need not ask the British Government to 
join with France in sending war-ships to Morocco, as 
France did not intend to make a naval demonstration.^^ 

8 Albin, "Le Coup d'Agadir," p. 31. 

9 Kaiser WAlhelm had also planned to leave Kiel for a cruise in the 
North Sea at this time, but he found it convenient to delay his trip un- 
til he learned how France would take the incident. 

10 Doc, Dip., op. cit., No. 425. 

11 Ibid., No. 427. It is interesting to note that M. de Selves pro- 
tested vigorously against this telegram when he received a copy of it 
and asked M. Bapst, Director of Political Affairs, to tell M. Caillaux 
that he thought it advisable that the French ambassador should re- 
frain from making any communication to the British Grovernment of 



AGADIB 307 

"Whether an interview which he was known to have had 
the same morning with Herr Gwinner of the Deutche 
Bank, who happened to be in Paris at the time, had 
any influence upon his decision remains to be proved. 
Sir Edward Grey, immediately upon his return, in- 
sisted that any change in the status quo of Morocco 
called for a diplomatic discussion among the four 
Powers principally interested, France, Spain, Great 
Britain and Germany; but first Great Britain desired 
to know the views of France, and after an agreement 
between them a conversation a quatre would be in 
order.^2 

The French press on the whole took the incident 
almost as calmly as did the President du Conseil, with 
the exception of newspapers notoriously anti-German 
such as the ''Eclair" and the "Echo de Paris." The 
conservative "Journal des Debats" declared that it 
was high time to examine the Moroccan question with 
sang froid and commonsense. However, on July 8 

such a sort as to dissuade her from a naval manifestation if the need 
should arise. Ibid., No. 429. 

12 Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 428. On July 4, after a cabinet meeting, 
Sir Edward Grey declared that the British attitude could not be a dis- 
interested one with regard to Morocco. She had to take into considera- 
tion both her treaty obligations to France and her own interests in 
Morocco; in her opinion a new situation had been created by the 
dispatch of a German warship to Agadir. He explained this position 
in Parliament Nov. 27, 1911, as follows: "I think in the German mind 
it has sometimes been assumed that our agreement made with France 
in 1904 entirely disinterested us with regard to Morocco. ... It is 
quite true we disinterested ourselves in Morocco politically but we did 
it on conditions laid down both strategic and economic. ... It is ob- 
vious, if the Moroccan question was to be reopened, and a new settle- 
ment made, unless we were consulted, unless we knew what was going 
on, unless we were in some way parties to the settlement, the strategic 
and economic conditions stipulated for between ourselves, France, and 
Spain in 1904 might be upset." Pari. Debates, Vol. 32, p. 43, 5th 
geries. 



308 FEENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

the "Matin" aroused public interest to a white heat 
by announcing that Germany wished a cession of the 
entire French Congo in return for a free hand in Mo- 
rocco. In fact it was on this day that Herr von Schoen, 
the German ambassador, declared that his government 
was willing to continue the conversations begun at 
Kissingen, declaring that his government cherished no 
pretensions of a territorial order in regard to Morocco, 
but that the Congo seemed to offer a ground for nego- 
tiation.^^ At the same time, M. Jules Cambon in- 
formed the German Foreign Secretary that the discus- 
sion could not be limited to Paris and Berlin, as had 
been suggested by Germany; France intended to keep 
her allies and her friends in touch with the course of 
events.^* On July 10, in the course of his first long 
conversation with M. Cambon, Herr von Kiderlen 
again reproached France for the present situation, 
harping ever upon the failure of the economic col- 
laboration. In conclusion he declared: ''You desire 
that we give up Morocco as entirely hopeless; well 
as far as I am concerned I would consent to it, but 
in order to have Germany accept it we must present 
ourselves to her as having served her interests ; satis- 
faction must be given on the colonial side, for example 
in the Congo. ' ^ ^^ 

France was to suffer now for lack of a real man at 
the head of the State. A Clemenceau, a Delcasse, a 

13 Doc. Dip., up. cit., No. 439. 

1* Ibid., No. 441. 

15 Ibid., No. 444. As far back as 1905 the Congo had been suggested 
as compensation by Herr von Kuhlmann, member of the German lega- 
tion at Tangier in conversations with M. de Chensey, the French rep- 
resentative. See Tardieu, "Coup d'Agadir," p. 438. 



AGADIB 309 

Millerand, a Poincare would have sent a war-ship to 
Agadir or some other Moroccan port, and would then 
have informed Germany that since she had torn up the 
Act of Algeciras she could state her claims to the sig- 
natory Powers. Another conference was the last thing 
that Germany wanted, yet if France had insisted, it is 
hard to see how Germany could have avoided it, after 
the Algeciras precedent that she herself had set. But 
M. de Selves, ignorant not only of diplomatic methods 
but also of the whole background of the affair, was 
wholly unable to cope with the situation. As a result 
he took his orders from M. Caillaux. There was no 
doubt as to the ability of the Prime Minister, but there 
was real cause to question his methods. Nor was this 
the only factor prejudicial to the French cause. The 
powerful influence of M. Jaures in the Chamber, who 
in his ardent pursuit of internationalism always saw 
his country's interests from the German point of view, 
the out and out pacifism of M. Sembat and M. d'Estour- 
nelles de Constant, who believed that the only way to 
live as a neighbor to Germany was to allow her to have 
her own way— she would have it ultimately, why bother 
to fight about it? — were influences which Germany 
counted upon in bargaining unsubstantial claims for 
very substantial territory. There were other influ- 
ences still more deadly which she knew about only too 
well — especially the sinister power wielded by men like 
Gustave Herve, anti-militarist, anti-patriot, anti- 
French, who dared to come out in his sheet, *'La Guerre 
Sociale," on July 10, with the following challenge: 
**"We shall wreck your mobilization if you commit the 
crime of not coming to an agreement with Germany 



310 FEENCH FOBEiaN POLICY 

regarding Morocco — and while waiting we will wreck 
(sahoterons) your diplomacy. " ^^ 

Under these circumstances it is not surprising that 
when Germany declared her terms to M. Cambon in the 
famous interview of July 15, they were found to be 
exorbitant in the extreme. They were nothing less 
than the cession of the whole French Congo between 
the Ocean and the Sangha Eiver. M. Cambon immedi- 
ately informed Herr von Kiderlen that although French 
opinion might consent to substantial compensations it 
would never submit to the loss of a colony. The Ger- 
man Foreign Minister then allowed that Germany 
might give in return the north of the Cameroon and 
perhaps even Togoland. He followed his concession 
with a veiled threat of war, declaring that such a con- 
tingency might be unavoidably forced upon Germany 
by the pressure of public opinion unless reasonable 
compensation were secured. *'You have purchased 
your liberty in Morocco from Spain, England, and even 
Italy, and you have thrust us aside. You should have 
negotiated with us before going to Fez. ' ^ Fortunately 
for France, she had in M. Jules Cambon a diplomat 
fully experienced in German methods. Eefusing flatly 
the German suggestion, he advised Herr Kiderlen to 
confer with the Minister of Colonies, and then if Ger- 
many really wanted to come to an agreement with 
France let her make a proposal.^'^ 

On the whole, it seemed as though Great Britain was 
more interested in the affair than was the French Gov- 
ernment. On July 21 Sir Edward Grey conferred with 

16 Cited in Le Matin, July 11, 1911. 

17 Doc. Dip., op. cit.. No. 455. 



AGADIR 311 

Count Wolff Mettemich, the German ambassador, and 
informed him of the interest which Great Britain had 
in the question, and as the German ambassador's reply- 
was most equivocal in its nature, it was felt necessary 
to give public notice of the British position. It was 
thought to be the more necessary as the ** London 
Times" had published on July 20 an account of the 
impossible terms demanded by Germany. Mr. Lloyd 
George was scheduled to speak for the Bankers ' Asso- 
ciation at the Mansion House, and here was an oppor- 
tunity for the government to go on record in a semi- 
official way. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had 
the reputation of being extremely pacific in his views, 
and an ardent supporter of a decrease in armaments, 
and as was expected his speech extolled the blessings 
of peace. Therefore his conclusion occasioned the 
greater surprise :^ 'But if a situation were to be forced 
upon us in which peace could only be preserved by the 
surrender of the great and beneficent position Britain 
has won by centuries of heroism and achievement, by 
allowing Britain to be treated where her interests were 
vitally affected as if she were of no account in the 
Cabinet of nations, then I say emphatically that peace 
at that price would be a humiliation intolerable for a 
great country like ours to endure." ^^ 

The "Times" comment the next day is especially 
pertinent : ' ' Mr. Lloyd George 's clear, decisive, states- 
manlike reference last night to the European situation 
created by the German demands in West Africa, will 
be endorsed without distinction of party by all his 
countrymen. The purport of such demands as were 

18 London Times, July 22, 1911, 



312 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

outlined in Berlin last week is nothing less than a claim 
for absolute predominance. Neither France nor Great 
Britain could have entertained them for a moment 
without confessing themselves overborne by German 
power. That is not the intention of our French neigh- 
bors, nor is it our own." 

The publication in the press of the German demands 
angered the Wilhelmstrasse exceedingly, and when Herr 
Kiderlen met M. Cambon on the 20th his tone was very 
aggressive. He declared that unless more discretion 
were observed, further conversation was impossible — 
that Germany would take her liberty of action, demand 
the full application of the Act of Algeciras, and if 
necessary push matters to the end. M. Cambon was 
not to be brov/beaten, and he declared that France was 
prepared to go just as far as Germany. Furthermore, 
when he learned that the German Secretary was not 
ready to make any further proposals, he informed him 
that unless Germany was prepared to disinterest her- 
self completely in Morocco, it was not worth while to 
continue the discussion.^*^ The Mansion House speech 
of Lloyd George changed the whole situation. At last 
it was brought to the German comprehension that the 
Triple Entente was not merely a paper agreement, but 
one which a great nation was willing to risk war to 
maintain. The German eagle paid little heed to the 
crowing of the Gallic cock, but when accompanied by 
the roar of the British lion it was time to take heed 
to the situation. A tense situation for some time was 
produced between Germany and Great Britain, but the 
beneficial effect of the Lloyd George speech was imme- 

19 Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 463. 



AGADIR 313 

diately noted by M. Cambon in his next interview with 
the German Foreign Minister : ' ' The conversation that 
I had with Herr Kiderlen last night was carried on 
in an entirely different tone from that which marked 
the two preceding. My interlocutor manifested to- 
wards me, as he has never done np to the present, his 
desire of an entente with us."^" However, Herr 
Kiderlen still insisted upon the whole of the French 
Congo from the Ngoko-Sangha to the sea, though he 
was now willing to offer definitely all of Togoland and 
the northern part of the Cameroons in return. M. 
Cambon took cognizance of the offer, but frankly re- 
fused to consider the abandonment of the French 
Congo. Another interview on July 28 did not advance 
the situation, and the following day Herr Kiderlen left 
for Swinemunde to consult with the Kaiser. 

Thus at the first of August, a month after the send- 
ing of the Panther to Agadir the negotiations seemed 
to have reached an impasse. France was willing to 
exchange some of her islands of Polynesia, or of the 
Indian Ocean, and some of her territory at the east of 
the Cameroons, for the Bee de Canard, and a free hand 
in Morocco. But she was unwilling to cede any of the 
coast line of the Congo. Germany, on the other hand, 
insisted upon having free access to the sea between 
Libreville and Spanish Guinea, thus completely en- 

20 Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 467. The best account of the Anglo-Ger- 
man situation arising out of the Agadir Affair is found in Bernadotte 
E. Schmitt, "England and Germany," Chap. XI. Mr. E. D. Morel in his 
highly colored expose which has been published under two titles, 
"Morocco in Diplomacy," and "Ten years of Secret Diplomacy," gives a 
graphic though lurid presentation of the same situation. Mr. Morel 
finds greater justification for the German aims than do the Germans 
themselves. 



314 FEENCH FOEEIGN POLICY 

circling this colony, and territorial access to the Congo 
Eiver, which meant that French Congo would be cut 
in two. "Upon this point," insisted Herr Kiderlen, 
"the resolution of the German Government is formal." 
In return Germany was willing to give France a free 
hand politically in Morocco.^^ In the interview of 
August 4, Herr Kiderlen eliminated the question of the 
South Sea Islands, renounced the demand for the access 
to the sea through the Congo, but still demanded half 
of the Gaboon and French Congo and the right of pre- 
emption of Spanish Guinea; he was no longer certain 
as to whether Germany would cede both Togo and the 
Bee du Canard. In fact, German public opinion 
showed itself so hostile to the cession of Togoland 
that in the next interview, August 9, Herr Kiderlen 
informed M. Cambon this offer would have to be with- 
drawn, although Germany was not willing to abate any 
of her demands.22 Other interviews on the 13th, 14th 
and 17th were equally unproductive of results. As 
France showed herself more and more willing to make 
concessions, Germany became more insistent in her 
demands. M. Cambon strove valiantly to hold his 
ground, but his position was the more difficult owing 
to the apparent willingness of the Quai d'Orsay to 
compromise on almost any basis.^^ It was also evident 
that while France was anxious to settle the Moroccan 
question once for all, Germany was inclined to disre- 
gard that phase of the matter, her whole interest was 

21 Doc. Dip., op. cit.. No. 480, 

22 Ibid., No. 494. 

23 M. Jules Cambon himself complained that he had to keep up the 
fight having behind him those who would not have been sorry to see 
him lose it. Tardieu, op. cit., p. 478. 



AGADIR 315 

centered in the amount of French territory she could 
obtain. 

The attitude of Germany had now become so intract- 
able that negotiations were broken off and M. Cambon 
returned to Paris. Whether the secret negotiations 
carried on by M. Caillaux, or the fact that a serious 
railway strike held the attention of the British Govern- 
ment, gave encouragement to the German pretentions, 
a new belligerency of attitude was apparent. In his 
last despatch before quitting the German capital, dated 
August 20, M. Cambon noted the increasing exaspera- 
tion of the German public. All the political parties at 
the approach of the elections had commenced to sing: 
Deutschland uber alles. He had evidence that if the 
negotiations should fail completely — and that seemed 
very possible — Germany would refuse to attend a con- 
ference, would maintain her hold on Agadir and await 
developments.^* French public opinion also showed 
itself weary of the interminable discussions and in- 
creasingly hostile to any cession of the valuable Congo 
territory. A pathetic letter to President Fallieres 
from the Countess de Brazza, widow of the explorer 
Savorgnan de Brazza, who had given his life to open 
the Congo region to the French, protesting in her dead 
husband's name at the cession of any part of the French 
Congo to Germany, added fuel to the flames of discon- 
tent.^^ The idea, that never could the difficulties with 
Germany be satisfactorily settled without an appeal to 
arms became prevalent. If war had to come, one 
might as well ^'en finir tout de suite." It was under 

24 Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 513. 

25 His last words were said to be: "When you bury me here, they will 
not dare to give this country to the Germans." 



316 FEENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

these inauspicious circumstances that M. Cambon re- 
turned to Paris August 21, to obtain further instruc- 
tions. 

2. THE FRENCH OFFERS AND THE FINAL SETTLEMENT 

If M. Joseph Caillaux should ever write his memoirs 
— confessions would be the better word — the historian 
will have a bird 's-eye view of a large part of the seamy- 
side of French politics in the period preceding the war, 
as well as the clue to many of the traitorous plans 
hatched after the war had begun. But even without 
this primary source of information, it is not difficult 
to prove that while M. Cambon was struggling vali- 
antly to serve his country in Berlin, and M. de Selves 
was doing his best in Paris, the Prime Minister was 
carrying on secret negotiations with German interests 
which were having a deadly influence upon the success 
of the French position. M. Jenouvrier, speaking in 
the Senate, February 5, 1912, went so far as to declare 
that M. Caillaux, in conference with Baron Gunzbourg, 
one of the directors of the Deutsche Bank, on July 26, 
1911, formulated the basis of a Franco-German entente 
for the settlement not only of African but also of Eu- 
ropean affairs. This program promised the assistance 
of France in the Bagdad Railway enterprise, permitted 
German railway stocks and German rents upon the 
Bourse, gave Germany the presidency of the surveil- 
lance of the Ottoman debt, offered to abandon almost 
all of French Congo to the Alima River, and established 
a general accord between France and Germany for 
their whole European policy. As proof of his asser- 
tions, the Senator declared that an aide-memoire to this 



AGADIE 317 

effect was at present in the archives of the Foreign 
Office. As additional proof, he stated that on August 
19, Baron Lancken presenting himself at the Quai 
d'Orsay, was much disappointed at the attitude of a 
high functionary who discussed the situation with him, 
and said : ''How is this ! What you say to me does not 
coincide with what has been offered. '^ When the 
French official declared that whoever had made any 
other offer was not in a position to do so, the German 
financier replied: '*It was the person the most highly 
qualified. ' ' ^^ 

M. Caillaux also attempted to discourage British co- 
operation immediately after the sending of the Panther. 
Baron Guillaume, the Belgian minister to Paris, writ- 
ing on August 10, 1911, made the following report: 
'*In my report of July 8th, I had the honor to tell you 
that according to my information at that time it seemed 
as if M. Caillaux were regretting that he had insisted 
so much on receiving 'the word of command' from 
London in order to determine the stand to be taken in 
face of the despatch of a German man-of-war to Agadir, 
and that he appeared not to agree with the attitude 
which the cabinet of St. James' took at that time. 
This information seems to be confirmed. I am told 
that at first England proposed to France that the two 
governments despatch without delay two men-of-war 
each to the waters of Agadir. The cabinet of Paris 
objected to this, and there the matter stands." ^^ 

However, in the conferences in Paris, August 22, in 
which M. Caillaux and M. de Selves thought it best to 

26 Annales du Sgnat, Vol. 81i, p. 164. 

27 Belgian Doc, No. 80. 



318 FEENCH FOEEIGN POLICY 

take counsel with their confreres, and in which both M. 
Jules and M. Paul Cambon, and M. Barrere, French 
ambassador to Italy, participated, it was thought best 
to establish first of all the situation of France in Mo- 
rocco as far as Germany was concerned, and only then 
to discuss the Congo. This situation must be a full 
diplomatic, military, and political protectorate, with 
the capitulations of 1880 abolished, the Accord of 1909 
discarded, and with the provision that Germany should 
intervene with the Powers signatory of the Act of 
Algeciras to obtain their adhesion to the new arrange- 
ments. In return France was willing to cut her equa- 
torial Congo territory so as to give Germany access to 
both the Ubangui and Congo Eivers, and to enlarge 
materially the hinterland of the Cameroons, also to 
give another strip running from the Ngoko to the 
coast. As a rectification of the frontier, the Bee du 
Canard was to go to France. The terms were given 
to M. Cambon in writing in the form of a projet de con- 
vention, and he was not to depart from them without 
authorization by the Cabinet.^^ 

The negotiations were resumed at Berlin September 
4, and Herr Kiderlen seemed disposed to consent to the 
French protectorate in principle ; but when a few days 
later he presented the German counter-project, it was 
found to contain, in the words of M. Cambon, ''every 
precaution against us." France could only intervene 
at the Sultan's request, mixed tribunals were de- 
manded, Germany should still be represented by a min- 
ister to Morocco, and along economic lines such a list of 
reservations and restrictions were included that the 

28 Doc. Dip., op. cit., No, 520 annexe. 



AGADIR 319 

result amounted to internationalization of all the re- 
sources and economic possibilities.^^ The French 
Cabinet discussed the project, but would have none of 
it. M. Caillaux attempted to concede on several points 
in opposition to M. de Selves, but the Conseil supported 
the Foreign Minister in his contentions. The French 
reply was very little different from the original proj- 
ect. The unsatisfactory nature of the proceedings now 
began to have a serious effect upon the financial situa- 
tion in Germany, and the 10th of September was a 
''sinister Saturday" for the Berlin banks. Herr 
Kiderlen finally began to make some concessions, and 
by September 20, an agreement was virtually reached 
as regards the basis of settlement for Morocco; but 
not until October 11, after five successive French texts 
were submitted were the details finally agreed upon. 
The interpretative letters on the text consumed three 
days more. 

The Moroccan question was finally liquidated; the 
question of the territorial compensation to be sur- 
rendered to Germany as the price of her political dis- 
interestedness in Morocco remained. The latter was 
bound to be a delicate problem, owing to the highly 
excited state of public opinion in both countries. In 
addition, there was a strongly organized propaganda 
in Germany against allowing France a free hand in 
Morocco, and an equally strong feeling in France 
against giving up any territory in the French Congo 
as compensation to Germany for her unsubstantial 
claims in Morocco. M. Jules Cambon wrote from Ber- 
lin, October 18, that a campaign against the cession of 

28 Ibid., No. 539, annexe. 



320 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

German rights in Morocco for the Congo was being 
carried on in the Reichstag and regret was already 
being felt at the concessions made. The next day he 
believed that public opinion would willingly accept a 
rupture of negotiations in order to return to the idea 
of a partition in Morocco.^^ Opinion in France had 
become so opposed to the coupure of the Congo that 
even the Radical-Socialist Congress, held early in 
October, demanded that the government maintain the 
continuity of the French colonies of Gaboon and Cen- 
tral Af rica.^^ 

At first no progress was made. Germany insisted 
on an outlet to the sea and a territorial approach to the 
Ubangui and Congo Rivers, while France refused to 
consider this cutting in two of her Congo territory. 
A compromise was finally reached whereby, instead 
of a solid stretch of territory along the Ubangui down 
to the Congo, a stretch of territory in the shape of a 
lady's high-heeled boot was blocked out, with the toe 
on the Congo and the heel on the Ubangui — a piqure 
instead of a coupure. On October 26 it appeared as 
though a satisfactory solution had been reached on all 
questions at issue. But Germany still had a last card 
to play. On October 27 Herr Kiderlen raised the ques- 
tion of the French right of preemption over the Belgian 
Congo, which had existed ever since the formation of 
the Congo Free State.'^ Tj^g French Government 

30 Doc Dip., op. cit., Nos. 593, 596. 

SI Albin, "Le Coup d'Agadir," p. 298. 

32 Doc. Dip., op. cit.. No. 611. Here again M. Caillaux without con- 
sulting M. de Selves had attempted to enter into negotiations with the 
Belgian Foreign Minister to obtain enough territory on the left bank 
of the Congo to assure France a right of way by land in case she sur- 
rendered all the right bank to Germany. M. Fondere, M. Caillaux's 



AGADIR 321 

could not accept German interference with this right, 
but the attack was cleverly met by a promise that if 
any changes should occur in the Congo Basin as defined 
by the Act of Berlin of 1885, the Powers signatory of 
the treaty should be notified. Germany could not do 
otherwise than accept, and on November 4, the accords, 
their annexes and the explanatory letters were signed.^' 
It seems unnecessary to give a detailed analysis of 
these conventions, which finally settled the Moroccan 
question between France and Germany, but a statement 
of the most essential features is desirable. In the con- 
vention concerning Morocco, France was granted com- 
plete freedom of action to introduce such administra- 
tive, judicial, economic, financial, and military reforms 
as should be deemed essential for the good government 
of the empire, after obtaining the consent of the Moor- 
ish Government. France was to have control of the 
diplomatic and consular service of the empire, and to 
represent the Sultan in all his dealings with foreign 
powers. The note accompanying this convention went 
so far as to state that "in the event of the French 
Government deeming it necessary to assume the pro- 
tectorate of Morocco the Imperial Government would 
place no obstacle in the way." On the other hand, in 
the economic clauses France was bound to maintain the 
principle of commercial liberty in Morocco ; and no in- 
equality as regards customs' duties, taxes, or other con- 
tributions was to be permitted. No export duty should 
be levied on iron ore exported from the Moorish ports, 

emissary, was informed that if France wished to discuss the question, 
Belgium maintained an ambassador at Paris for that purpose. Albin, 
"Le Coup d'Agadir," p. 314. 
S3 Doc. Dip.j op. cit., No. 644. 



322 FEENCH FOEEIGN POLICY 

and all contracts for works and materials needed in 
connection with any future concessions for roads, rail- 
ways, harbors, telegraphs, etc, were to be alloted by 
the Moorish Government in accordance with the rules 
of adjudication. It was further agreed that the rights 
and proceedings of the Morocco State Bank, as defined 
in the Algeciras Act, should be in no way impeded.^* 
To sum up the Moroccan situation: although France 
did not succeed in obtaining a free hand in Morocco 
economically, she did have in her hands the direction 
and control of the exploitation and concession of the 
great enterprises; while from the political standpoint 
*'it is a real protectorate that we obtain and not a 
phantom protectorate." ^^ 

The convention in regard to the Congo was not so 
satisfactory to France. She had been forced to cede a 
tract of territory comprising over 100,000 square miles, 
almost one half of her Congo colony. Besides, by 
granting to Germany an outlet upon the Ubangui and 
the Congo Eivers, she had created an almost impos- 
sible frontier. The great stretch of territory extend- 
ing south from Lake Chad to the Belgian Congo, and 
thence west to the Atlantic was now cut by two huge 
German tentacles, which by a slow advance would be 
able to strangle the French colony. The small tri- 
angle of swampy land south of Lake Chad, known as 
the Bee du Canard, ceded by Germany, was a mere 
rectification of frontier. In the words of M. Hanotaux : 
''We had an empire, they have left us corridors." ^^ 

Now that the conventions had been signed by the rep- 

34 Doc. Dip., op, cit.. No. 644, annexe I. 

35 Tardieu, "Le mystfere d'Agadir," p. 564. 

36 Hanotaux, "La Politique d'Equilibre," p. 391. 



AGADIR 323 

resentatives of the two Powers, in what spirit would 
they be ratified, and would public opinion be satisfied! 
The Pan-Germans had looked for Morocco and had re- 
ceived land in Equatorial Africa where a white man 
could scarcely live. They had looked for an open port 
on the Atlantic and had received a river side village on 
the Congo. France had lost almost half of the colony 
which the valiant de Brazza had given her in return 
for the right to pacify the savage Berbers and open 
Morocco to the world's commerce. 

The Eeichstag had an opportunity to express its 
opinion before the Chamhre des Deputes. In the ses- 
sion of November 9, Herr von Bethman-Hollweg tried 
valiantly to prove that the arrangement was satisfac- 
tory to Germany and safeguarded her interests: ''I 
believe that by thus multiplying the regulations we 
have rendered a good service to the German economic 
interests in Morocco. . . . Before Fez and Agadir, 
Morocco was nominally independent, but in fact already 
in the power of France. But what is the actual situa- 
tion? We have given nothing in Morocco which we 
had not already given and we have gained a great in- 
crease in our colonial domain. ' ' ^'^ The members re- 
ceived his assurances with mocking laughter, and the 
Crown Prince manifested his displeasure openly. 
Herr von Heydebrand, the leader of the Conservatives, 
declared that Germany ought not to be satisfied with 
an arrangement which imposed upon her considerable 
sacrifices without giving her in return sufficient com- 
pensation. France had come off well. But it was not 
by concessions that peace would be assured but by the 

37 Le Temps, Nov. 10, 1911, 



324 FEENCH FOEEIGN POLICY 

German sword. Then, referring to Great Britain, he 
continued: ''Like a flash of light all this has shown to 
the German people where the enemy is. Now we know 
when we wish to expand in the world and have our 
place in the sun who it is that pretends to universal 
domination. . . . Under these conditions the German 
people will know how to give a German reply. ' ' ^^ 

When the treaty came up before the Chamber for 
ratification, December 14, the reception was equally 
hostile. Here, however, the diplomatic methods of M. 
Caillaux were even more harshly criticised than the 
conventions themselves. M. Jules Delahaye declared 
that M. Caillaux gave evidence of a more open spirit 
towards the conquerors of 1870 than towards the con- 
quered, "M. Caillaux, who was too completely involved 
in the questions of international finance which were for 
the moment dominated by German interests." ^^ M. 
Denys Cochin gave as his reasons for refusing to sign, 
the three reasons that Herr von Bethman-Hollweg gave 
in the Eeichstag: Germany abandoned nothing, ob- 
tained a large French territory, and signed a treaty 
with France for the first time in forty years.*® M. 
Caillaux made a specious plea in defense of his work 
and he was ably supported by MM. Sembat and Jaures, 
who, as usual, found valid reasons for the German 
policy. After spending a week criticising the arrange- 
ment, the Chamber ratified it as was expected from the 
beginning, and by a vote of three hundred and ninety- 
three to thirty-six. 

The Senate, however, was not so easily satisfied. A 

ssQues. Dip. et Col., Dec. 1, 1911. 

39 Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 95ii, p. 1401. 

40 Ibid., p. 1455, 



AGADIR 325 

special commission consisting of all the former prime 
ministers and former ministers of foreign affairs was 
appointed to investigate the underlying causes of the 
crisis. M. Caillaux was called before the commission, 
and as he completed his testimony by swearing upon 
his honor that he had never carried on any political 
or financial transactions of any sort outside of the 
official diplomatic negotiations, M. Clemenceau got up 
and addressing himself to M. de Selves: ''Is M. le 
ministre des Affaires etrangeres able to confirm this 
declaration ? Can he tell us whether certain documents 
do not exist establishing the fact that our representa- 
tive at Berlin complained of the intrusion of certain 
persons in the Franco-German diplomatic relations?" 
^'Messieurs/' replied M. de Selves, ''I have always had 
a double care: the truth on one side and on the other 
the duty that my position imposed upon me. I ask per- 
mission not to reply to the question which M. Clemen- 
ceau has just addressed to me." ^^ 

That same day M. de Selves handed in his resigna- 
tion to the President and two days later M. Caillaux 
was forced to follow suit. He had tried in vain to ob- 
tain any one to serve in his ministry as minister of 
foreign affairs. It was with a feeling of intense relief 
that the press hailed his fall: *'The occult negotia- 
tions of M. Caillaux would have resulted in the dis- 
memberment of the French African Empire without 
visible compensation, the ruin of our influence in the 
Levant, a rupture with Spain, a falling out with Eng- 
land, and the subordination of French policy in Europe 
to Austro-German interests. We can understand the 

41 Albin, "Le Coup d'Agadir," p. 327. 



326 FEENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

regret manifested this morning by the newspapers of 
Berlin and Vienna at the fall of their great French 
Minister. For France this fall is the end of a night- 
mare." *2 

In its report the Senatorial commission severely 
criticised the methods employed by the Government. 
Two of the members, MM. Clemencean and de Lamar- 
zelle voted to reject the agreement entirely; but the 
majority, against their personal wishes, voted to ac- 
cept it as the only way to terminate the Moroccan 
quarrel. The accord came up for discussion in the 
Senate early in February, and the senators expressed 
in no uncertain terms their feelings on the whole 
transaction. M. Jenouvrier scathingly denounced the 
Caillaux methods of private diplomacy; M. Pichon 
pointed out how carefully Germany's economic inter- 
ests were protected in Morocco — she took back with 
one hand what she gave with the other ; M. Clemencean, 
remained bitterly opposed to the very end. "These 
obscure negotiations," declared the Tiger, "have led 
by mysterious phases to the birth of a sort of diplo- 
matic monster which is not without likeness to that 
famous Trojan horse, which was an offering to peace, 
but which resounded with the sound of arms. ' ' ^^ 

On the other side M. Ribot, although condemning 
with equal force the methods employed, pointed out 
that Europe was weary of the whole affair, and it was 
to the ultimate interest of France to come to an im- 
mediate settlement. M. Poincare, in a brilliant speech, 
took the same position; and as there was really noth- 

*2 Auguste Gauvain in Le Journal des D^bats, Jan. 11, 1912. 
48 Annalea du Senat, Vol. 81i, p. 272. 



AGADIR 327 

ing left to do, the Senate finally approved by a vote 
of two hundred and twenty- two to forty-eight, '^avec 
une repugnance publique et la mort dans I'dme." 

3. THE SETTLEMENT WITH SPAIN 

It will be remembered that early in June, 1911, the 
Spaniards had taken possession of both El Ksar and 
Larache in flat violation of the secret accord of 1904, 
which specified that Spain would only undertake mili- 
tary measures in Morocco after having first come to 
an agreement upon the subject with France. In this 
case the disembarkment had taken place first and 
then M. Cruppi was notified. M. Cruppi protested in 
a friendly but vigorous fashion on June 8 and again 
on June 11.^* but he was out of power before the end 
of the month and on July 1, the sending of the Panther 
brought on the crisis with Germany. France was not 
equal to a struggle on two sides at the same time, and 
no attempt was made to come to a definite settlement 
with Spain until after an arrangement had been made 
with Germany. Hardly, however, had the treaty of 
November 4, 1911, been signed, before the ''Matin" 
published the secret treaty of 1904 between France and 
Spain. The realization that, after a four months' 
struggle with Germany to obtain a free hand in Mo- 
rocco, whose successful outcome had only been 
achieved by the surrender of a large stretch of French 
territory in the Congo, France now had to share her 
newly acquired territory with Spain, who had done 
nothing to assist her throughout the crisis, provoked 
a serious outburst of public opinion against submit- 

44 Doc. Dip., "Aifaires du Maroc" (1910-1912), Nos. 351, 364. 



328 FEENCH FOEEIGN POLICY 

ting to the treaty. Secret diplomacy and its dis- 
astrous results came in for a bitter arraignment at 
the hands of French editors and publicists. At the 
same time, public opinion demanded that since France 
had made all the sacrifices to secure a free hand in 
Morocco, Spain should now make certain concessions 
to France as her share in the payment. 

The Cabinet of Madrid saw the matter from an en- 
tirely different standpoint. In their eyes it was 
France that modified the status quo in Morocco by her 
march on Fez, and by so doing gave Spain the same 
freedom of action in her sphere of influence as France 
possessed in hers. If France got into difficulties with 
other nations, that did not concern Spain ; ' ' Spain only 
recognized the treaty of 1904. This treaty by which 
she renounced to the profit of France a part of her 
historic pretensions created for her a right. She had 
nothing further to pay because she made use of this 
right." *^ 

Other more concrete difficulties also arose to inter- 
fere with a speedy and satisfactory settlement. The 
lines of demarcation traced in 1904 were now found 
to be unsatisfactory from both a geographic and ethno- 
graphic standpoint. The policing under this arrange- 
ment was made exceedingly difficult. Furthermore, 
the terms of the agreement did not specify what rela- 
tions should exist between the two protected areas; 
the Sultan's sovereignty and the territorial integrity 
of Morocco must be respected and Spain had no in- 
tention of looking up to France as the Sultan's prin- 
cipal adviser in questions pertaining to her own sphere 

« Tardieu, "France et Espagne," Rev. de Deux Mondes, Dec. 1, 1912. 



AGADIE 329 

of influence. Nor could Spain expect to have full sov- 
ereignty within her sphere of action while France had 
only a protectorate in hers. 

The French opened their negotiations with Spain 
early in December, 1911. The principal questions to 
be settled were: the administration of the Spanish 
zone, especially regarding the nature and extent of the 
Sultan's control over this region; the construction and 
control of the Tangier-Fez railway, a part of which 
must pass through the Spanish zone; finally, certain 
rectifications of frontier which would enable both 
countries to administer their zones with less friction 
and in a more efficient manner. It is not necessary 
to go into the long and arduous negotiations which fol- 
lowed. New difficulties constantly arose, the political 
status of Tangier and the collection of customs in the 
Spanish zone proving particularly thorny questions. 
The Poincare ministry must constantly suffer through 
the latent suspicion inspired in the Spanish govern- 
ment by the remembrance of the French diplomatic 
methods as exhibited by M. Caillaux. Not until No- 
vember 27, 1912, was the treaty finally signed. It was 
of considerable length and very exact in its details.*® 

The boundary question was settled by certain recti- 
fications of frontier ; in return for a portion of the Eiff 
country Spain was given a considerable piece of terri- 
tory adjoining her colony Rio de Oro on the north. 
France tried hard to keep one suitable seaport on the 
northern coast, the Cap de I'Eau in particular, and as 
Spain had two others, the desire seemed legitimate; 

46 Text in Ques. Dip. et Col., Dec. 16, 1912; also in Rev, Pol. et Pari,, 
Feb. 1913, and Martens, "Recueil," 3d series, Vol. VII, p, 323. 



330 FEENCH FOKEIGN POLICY 

but Spain refused to make this concession. On the 
political side, the Sultan maintained his civil and re- 
ligious authority over all Morocco. However, in the 
Spanish zone the Sultan's sovereignty was to be ex- 
ercised by a Khalifa appointed by the Sultan from two 
candidates named by Spain. France and Spain were 
to organize the courts, which would thus do away with 
exterritoriality jurisdiction. On the economic side, 
the collection of the customs was the most difficult to 
adjust; but it was finally arranged that Spain should 
administer the customs in her zone, but each year 
should pay over to the Moroccan Government a sum 
equivalent to the receipts obtained the preceding year 
in the ports of the Spanish zone. Provision was made 
for the settlement of the position of Tangier by a spe- 
cial commission, and a protocol provided for the con- 
struction of a railway from Tangier to Fez, sixty per 
cent, of the capital to be subscribed by French inter- 
ests, forty per cent, by Spain, and nine of the fifteen 
members of the Council of Administration were to be 
French. 

The chief objection raised to the treaty was that 
it gave full liberty to the Spaniards without demand- 
ing from them corresponding sacrifices; also that it 
consecrated the principle of the separation of Morocco 
into two distinct states, each administering affairs in 
a wholly independent fashion and attempting to main- 
tain artificial frontiers which the tribes would never 
respect. Finally, France could not forget that Spain 
with little and no cession of territory, had gained the 
same control over her sphere of influence as France 
had gained by the cession of over a hundred thousand 



AGADIR 331 

square miles in the Congo, and only after a war scare 
that might well have developed into a death struggle. 

Both the Chamber and the Senate passed the treaty 
with very little discussion. The Moroccan question, 
primarily one of colonial policy, had already for too 
long a time thrust itself forward as the chief stumbling 
block to the foreign policy of the Quai d'Orsay. After 
paying Germany an extortionate price, after settling 
with England at almost her o^vn terms, after even con- 
ceding to Italy a free hand in Tripoli as the price of 
her withdrawal from the field, France could hardly 
refuse to give a suitable compensation to Spain, who 
both geographically and historically possessed the most 
legitimate claims of all. Besides, the two nations still 
had a difficult task before them; the Moroccan ques- 
tion, within Morocco itself, was far from settled, and 
a friendly cooperation was the only possible basis of 
a successful solution. M. Pichon, once more Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, happily described the situation 
when the treaty came before the Senate, March 29, 
1913: *Hhe satisfactory conclusion of the negotiations 
have resulted in assuring the collaboration of two 
governments and two peoples who have already had 
so many reasons to come to an understanding, and who 
have henceforth one reason more to unite for the daily 
practice of a policy destined to guarantee upon the 
African shore, the security, the well-being, and the 
prosperity of an empire of the future in which they are 
henceforth equally interested.'**'^ 

47 Annalea de S6nat, Vol. 83i, p. 484, 



CHAPTEE Xn 
TOWARDS THE WORLD WAR 

1. THE MINISTRY OF M. POINCAR]E m 

WITH the downfall of the dangerous Caillaux 
ministry early in January, 1912, came a 
strong revulsion of feeling in France against all anti- 
patriotic, anti-militarist, and defeatist parties and pro- 
grams. A political house-cleaning was in order, and 
public opinion demanded that it be thorough. Presi- 
dent Fallieres invited M. Raymond Poincare to form 
the new ministry, and a glance at the names of those 
who agreed to associate themselves with the new 
premier will indicate why it was immediately termed 
le grand ministere. With M. Briand as minister of 
justice, M. Millerand, minister of war, M. Delcasse, 
minister of marine, and M. Bourgeois, minister of la- 
bor, M. Poincare had a nucleus of men who would rank 
favorably with any cabinet which has directed the af- 
fairs of tlie Third Eepublic. M. Poincare himself was 
a type of man whom the French admire, a man of keen 
intellect, highly cultured, a member of the French 
Academy, of rather distant bearing, and a statesman 
rather than a politician. The country was weary of 
socialism and pacifism and was prepared to return to 
a regime of nationalism. The Poincare ministry was 
eminently fitted to furnish the right leadership. Eng- 
land, which had viewed with much misgiving the at- 

332 



TOWARDS THE WORLD WAR 333 

titude of the Caillaux government, noted the character 
of the new cabinet with a feeling of keen satisfaction. 
The ''Daily Chronicle" declared that the formation 
of the Poincare cabinet was one of the most reassur- 
ing manifestations which the history of contempo- 
raneous France had shown.^ 

M. Poincare retained the portfolio of foreign af- 
fairs in the new ministry, and his speech to the Cham- 
ber was eagerly awaited as an indication of his atti- 
tude towards the recent agreement with Germany. 
His ministerial declaration did not disappoint. 
''This treaty permits the maintenance between a great 
neighboring nation and France, in a spirit sincerely 
pacific, of relations of courtesy and frankness, inspired 
by the mutual respect of their interests and their 
dignity. As ever, we intend to remain faithful to our 
alliances and to our friendships. We shall strive to 
strengthen them with that perseverance and that con- 
tinuity which are in diplomatic action the best pledge 
of uprightness and probity. "^ 

Now that France had a ministry well fitted to deal 
with any emergency that might arise, she was destined 
to have a rather uneventful year. The Italians were 
still waging a desultory contest with Turkey for the 
possession of Tripoli, and immediately after the new 
cabinet was installed several minor disputes arose re- 
garding questions of international law. The Italians 
had seized an aeroplane on its way to Tunis claiming 
that it was contraband of war; they had also stopped 
the French steamer Manouba, transporting a Turkish 

1 Daily Chronicle, Jan. 15, 1912. 

2 Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 96i, p. 22. 



334 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

sanitary commission to Tunis, taken her into port and 
seized the Turkish subjects. In both cases Italy 
promptly agreed to allow the Hague tribunal to settle 
the damages.^ With Austria openly hostile towards 
her ally's Libyan venture and Germany decidedly an- 
tagonistic, Italy could not afford to lose the good will 
of France. 

An event in the year 1912 which should have aroused 
France far more than it did was the enormous increase 
in the German budget for both army and navy. 
France had dared to stand up for her rights at Agadir ; 
Germany immediately decided that her forces needed 
to be increased.* France did not yet seem to realize 
the urgent need of protection. The reduction of mili- 
tary service from three years to two, one of the fruits 
of Combism which had been carefully preserved by 
Jaures, Sembat, de Constant and their followers, had 
placed France with her almost stationary population 
at a decided disadvantage as compared with Ger- 
many.^ Yet as one living on the side of a volcano 
grows accustomed to the constant eruptions of smoke 
and fire and often forgets the lava beneath, France had 
become accustomed to the military preparations and 
rattling of the saber of her neighbor across the Vosges. 
She failed to realize that nations need insurance as 

3 Stowell and Munro, "International Cases," Vol. I, pp. 414, 453. 

4 A law of 1911 in accordance with Germany's regular plan of in- 
creasing her army every six years had made notable increases, but this 
was followed by the law of May 10, 1912, which brought her efTectives 
to the greatest strength since 1871. See Le Temps, May 12, 1912. 

6 M. Driant speaking in the Chamber, June 18, 1912, pointed out that 
by Oct. 1, 1912, Germany would have 200,000 more men under arms 
than France. The two year law gave France 505,000 as opposed to 
Germany's 705,000. Mnaleg de la CJiambre, Vol. 97, p. 535, 



TOWARDS THE WORLD WAR 335 

well as individuals. Individual economy had made 
her one of the most wealthy nations of Europe, but 
national economy on the war and naval budgets was 
not the best means to guarantee the retention of that 
position. Fortunately, M. Millerand in his quiet, ef- 
fective way, was bringing the forces that France pos- 
sessed to a very high point of efficiency. But he could 
not remedy the fatal defect that France did not have 
enough forces. 

An incident occurred in connection with the visit 
which M. Poincare made to St. Petersburg in August 
of this year which might well have been recognized as 
a sinister portent. Both in going and returning he 
encountered German cruisers at the entrance of the 
Baltic, and they ostentatiously saluted him. If the 
French did not see the omen in it, the Germans were 
willing to interpret it for them. The *'Lokal An- 
zeiger" said on the subject: "The French will be 
perspicacious enough to see in this salute a warning 
which should resound in their ears. You see the Ger- 
man fleet at its port in the Baltic. It rules over this 
sea and is ready for any contingency, in times of peace 
as in times of war. The Franco-Russian Convention, 
whether it exists in actuality or whether it is merely 
a fantasy, will make no change in this state of affairs. 
We, too, have an important word to say in the world's 
politics. And now, bon votfage." ^ 

Russia, as well as Great Britain, had looked with a 
satisfied eye upon the apparent change in French 
policy, and to show that she was prepared to hold up 

6 Quoted, Debidour, "Histoire Diplomatique de I'Europe," (1904- 
1916), p. 189. 



336 FEENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

her end in the Triple Entente, she had made a very 
substantial increase in her naval budget for 1912. 
The reception of M. Poinoare was rendered even the 
more cordial, if possible, by the announcement just 
previous to his arrival of a new naval convention be- 
tween the two Powers. Apparently all lingering 
traces of the coolness which had developed after the 
famous interview of Potsdam between the Czar and 
the Kaiser in 1910 had completely disappeared. 

Upon his return M. Poincare learned that the peace 
of Europe was not destined to live out the year. The 
Balkan cauldron, eternally seething, was about to 
boil over again. Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece, dis- 
appointed at obtaining no improvement in their con- 
dition under the Young Turk regime, and seeing 
Turkey barely holding her own with Italy, quickly 
patched up their differences and brought on war be- 
fore the European Powers could attempt to settle their 
demands once more at the council board. They were 
Weary of these settlements, which with the Turk meant 
no settlement at all. The ''sick man of Europe," in- 
stead of a rejuvenation at the hands of the Young 
Turks, had, as it appeared, received a coup de grace, 
and the Balkan states had a definite opinion as to the 
division of his property. The Turks appreciating the 
danger of their position, quickly signed the Treaty of 
Ouchy with Italy conceding to her a free hand in Tri- 
poli. The last of the Barbary states had come under 
European control, and Italy took her place with France 
and Spain on the Mediterranean shore of Africa. To 
eliminate any possibility of future difficulties, Italy 
signed an agreement of friendly accord with France, 



TOWAEDS THE WOELD WAE 337 

October 28, confirming their agreements of 1902, out- 
lining their mutual spheres of influence in Morocco 
and Tripoli, and granting to each other the most 
favored nation clause in all commercial enterprises J 

The Balkan situation now held the attention of the 
Powers, and in a speech made at Nantes, October 27, 
M. Poincare expressed the hope that an accord of the 
great Powers in regard to the conflict in the Balkans 
would succeed in localizing the conflict and perhaps 
hasten the conclusion of peace. Incidentally, while 
again affirming the pacific sentiments of France, he in- 
sisted upon the need of a strong and well trained army 
and a powerful fleet, that they might face calmly any 
eventuality which might arise. ^ In November, at the 
the request of Russia, M. Poincare sounded the Powers 
regarding an expression of territorial disinterested- 
ness which might eventually serve as a basis for col- 
lective action. The plan received a very cold recep- 
tion at Vienna.® Austria insisted that she desired 
no territorial aggrandizement through the war, but 
absolutely refused to be bound by any official agree- 
ment. She continued to maintain her harsh attitude 
towards Serbia by demanding the creation of an au- 
tonomous Albania, thus shutting off the Slavic state 
from an outlet upon the Adriatic. 

Nor was this plan of M. Poincare received with 
unanimous acclaim at home. The President of the 
Council had made his proposal of mediation in the 

7 Martens, "Recueil," 3d Series, Vol. VIII, p. 144. 

8 Rev. Pol. et Pari., Nov. 1912. 

9 For an excellent and detailed treatment of the Balkan diplomacy 
of this period see Larmeroux, "La Politique Ext^rieure de I'Autriche- 
Hongrie (1875-1914), Vol. II, pp. 234, et seq. 



338 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

closest cooperation with Russia and Great Britain; 
the Balkan states were unanimously grateful to France 
for taking this stand; and public opinion throughout 
France approved of the demarche; yet in the Palais 
Bourhon there was a strong note of criticism. The 
politicians could not forget that a presidential elec- 
tion was at hand and that M. Poincare was the strong- 
est candidate. His proposal of territorial disinter- 
estedness was claimed to be a personal policy to thrust 
himself forward as an arbiter in the destiny of Europe. 
* ' That he failed to prevent the outbreak of war in the 
Balkans was a personal check. His diplomatic suc- 
cesses are pitilessly changed into failures. And why 
all this if you please? Simply to weaken the person- 
ality of M. Poincare on the eve of the presidential elec- 
tion. " ^'^ It seems to be one of the greatest weak- 
nesses of democracies that except in periods of crisis 
or danger, foreign policy is ever subject to the control 
of the petty politicians who measure its value in rela- 
tion to the votes of their constituents. 

Even secret diplomacy has its advantages at times, 
and while M. Poincare was fighting the selfish political 
interests at home, M. Paul Cambon, ambassador to 
England, was exchanging identic notes with Sir Ed-" 
ward Grey, the purport of which was to define more 
accurately the scope of the Entente Cordiale in case 
of attack by a third power. Sir Edward Grey's note 
in substance declared that if one of the two Govern- 
ments had reason to fear an unprovoked attack, this 
Government ought to discuss immediately with the 
other Government whether they should act together 

10 Cagniard, "Politique Nationale," p. 152. 



TOWARDS THE WORLD WAR 339 

to prevent the agression and maintain peace, and to 
consider measures which they might take in common. 
If military action were necessary, the plans of the gen- 
eral staffs of each country should be taken into con- 
sideration and the Governments would then decide what 
effect should be given to them. M. Cambon accepted 
the suggestion in toto and replied immediately to this 
effect." 

An armistice had been signed late in November be- 
tween Turkey and the Balkan states, and the terms 
of the peace were to be settled by a conference in Lon- 
don under the auspices of Great Britain. Both Sir 
Edward Grey and M. Paul Cambon did all in their 
power to moderate the exorbitant demands of Turkey, 
and early in January, M. Poincare telegraphed to the 
French ambassador proposing European mediation. 
By a collective note to the Ottoman Government the 
Great Powers threatened to withdraw all moral and 
financial support if their advice was not taken.^^ At 
the same time that the representatives of the Balkan 
states and Turkey were attempting to arrive at a sat- 
isfactory basis of peace, the ambassadors of the Pow- 
ers signatory of the Treaty of Berlin were engaged in 
an unofficial reunion at London to obtain the various 
|)oints of view with the idea of arriving at a satisfac- 
tory and permanent solution of the Balkan problem. 
All finally agreed upon an autonomous Albania which 
should allow Serbia commercial access to the Adriatic. 
Austria wished Albania to be as large as possible, and 

iiAnnales de la Chambre, Vol. 103, p. 908, or British Blue Book 
(1914), No. 105, inclosures. 
12 Larmeroux, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 287. 



340 FEENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

having already mobolized almost three-fourths of her 
armies, was inclined to be arbitrary. The negotia- 
tions were rendered the more difficult by the fact that 
Austria was so harassed by internal troubles and by 
her great debt, that she seemed almost willing to settle 
her domestic troubles by a war abroad. Attempts were 
made by the German and Austrian press to weaken the 
friendship of France and Great Britain by recalling 
the methods of the Caillaux ministry, but M. Poincare 
in his speech before the Chamber, December 21, was 
able to assure the deputies that never had the relations 
between France and England been closer and more 
confident. He did not deign to reply to the intrigu- 
ing politicians who were attempting to weaken their 
country by a campaign against Great Britain with the 
underlying purpose of injuring him.^^ The Chamber 
received his speech with great applause, and in its edi- 
torial the next day the "Journal des Debats" expressed 
the popular sentiment: *'At the moment when the 
year ends France can render this homage to M. Poin- 
care, that always in accord with our allies and friends 
and without giving cause of provocation to any one 
he has consecrated himself within the limit of human 
forces to the maintenance of general peace and the 
grandeur of France. ' ' ^* 

With M. Poincare as the leading candidate, for the 
presidency in January, 1913, it was not surprising 
that more than usual interest was manifested. Or- 
dinarily a presidential election in France causes very 
little excitement. The fact that the chief executive 

IS Annales de la Ohambre, Vol. 98ii, p. 1340. 

14 Gauvain, "L'Europe au Jour le Jour," Vol. IV, p. 364. 



TOWAEDS THE WORLD WAE 341 

is elected by parliament rather than by a popular vote, 
and because of the almost negligible power left in the 
president's hands by the constitution of 1875, the 
French presidential election is of far less interest and 
importance than a presidential campaign in the United 
States. At the time of this election, however, it was 
hoped that M. Poincare might raise the office of Presi- 
dent of the Eepublic into a position of real power and 
influence. The fear that he might do this very thing 
lent strength to the Eadical opposition, and it seemed 
willing to go to any lengths to prevent his election. 
The difference between M. Pams, to whom the Ead- 
icals finally threw their support, and whose negative 
qualities were his sole recommendation for the presi- 
dential office, and M. Poincare, universally conceded 
to be one of the few great Frenchmen in the political 
arena of the day, showed to what lengths politics were 
permitted to take precedence over patriotism. After 
a bitter struggle M. Poincare won on the fifth ballot 
with a substantial majority, and the country weary of 
the politics of the arrondissementiers , as they were 
called, was well satisfied with the result; although as 
one of the Poincare adherents said, ''On ne pent con- 
tenter tout le monde — et M. Clemenceau." 

It was during the presidential campaign, and while 
the Powers were at a deadlock in London concerning 
the cession of Adrianople and the final disposal of the 
islands of the Aegean, that the French legislative as- 
sembly showed its utter disregard for truly efficient 
and patriotic service by forcing the resignation of M. 
Millerand, one of the ablest ministers of war who had 
served the Third Republic. The Eadicals of the Ex- 



342 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

treme Left made a violent attack upon him for re- 
instating Lieutenant Colonel du Paty de Clam, one of 
the officers who had played a leading role in the con- 
demnation of Captain Dreyfus for treason. A purely 
petty internal issue completely overshadowed the na- 
tional welfare, though France little realized at this 
time the need that she had for the services of a Mil- 
lerand. It was realized across the Rhine, and a French 
ambassador wrote : ' * The day that M. Millerand gives 
up his portfolio of war there will be bonfires in Ber- 
lin. '^ 

His one year's service, however, had brought about 
the reveil de I'armee francaise; its progress had been 
wonderful because its chief had set it a wonderful ex- 
ample. His greatest service was in completely wiping 
out the misunderstanding which had existed between 
France and her army ever since the scandal of the 
Dreyfus trial. His watchword was that an army was 
an implement of war, and as such should always be on 
a war footing, and in spite of constant opposition he 
had practically remade the French army. The whole 
situation is well stated by Gaston Cagniard : 

"When I see the Radicals attacking the Poincare 
Cabinet at the very hour when it was making every ef- 
fort to preserve the delicate balance of European peace, 
when I hear them disparage the work of military re- 
organization to which the Minister of War has devoted 
himself, simply because M. Millerand has resisted in- 
admissible political interference, I recall an occur- 
rence of forty-five years ago. Marshal Niel was speak- 
ing of reorganizing the French army and demanded 
obligatory military service for all. As he was de- 



TOWAEDS THE WORLD WAR 343 

fending his program in the tribune of the Legislative 
Assembly, Jules Favre cried to him from his bench: 
'Are you going to turn France into a barracks?' 

''The Marshal replied with these words: 'Beware 
lest you turn it into a cemetery. ' 

"Three years later human hetacombs confirmed the 
prophecy, and our country paid for its generous illu- 
sions with a terrible mutilation. ' ' ^^ 

Even though M. Millerand's resignation was a ter- 
rible blow to the patriots who felt so keenly the need 
of national defence, his work was not in vain, and the 
return to the three years' service which was to come 
the following year, may be traced back to the affection 
for their army which he caused to glow once more in 
the hearts of the French people. 

2. THE AWAKENING 

A glance across the Rhine was all that was necessary 
to make France realize the dangerous situation in 
which she was allowing herself to be placed. Every 
six years Germany had been increasing her army by 
at least 20,000 men, and at the conclusion of the Franco- 
Russian Alliance she had made an increase of 60,000. 
In 1905 there was an increase of 38,000 ; an increase of 
11,000 in 1911 was followed the very next year by an 
increase of 29,000 men and 8,000 ofScers.^^ Greneral 
Heeringen, minister of war, explaining the law before 
the Reichstag, April 22, 1912, gave the reasons: "Be- 
tween last year's law and that of this has been the ex- 

15 "Politique Nationale," p. 196. 

i« For a complete discussion of the German effectives as increased by 
the laws of 1911 and 1912 see Bourdon, "The German Enigma," Chap. 
XII. 



344 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

perience of Agadir, which proved our increases insuf- 
ficient. . . . We wish to fortify our national defence 
and above all to acquire a greater rapidity in the 
preparation of war. " ^^ In 1913 the increase of 1912 
was doubled, which put approximately 850,000 into 
actual service to France's 531,000. After 1913 there 
was to be an annual increase of 63,000 men.^^ For 
France there was but one solution, and that was the 
return to the three years' service. 

President Poincare realized the situation, and in 
his message to the Chamber, February 20, 1913, he 
made a powerful plea for preparedness: '* Peace is 
not decreed by the desire of a single power. It is pos- 
sible for a people to be pacific in an efficacious way only 
on condition that they be ever prepared for war. A 
France denuded, exposed by its o^ti fault to challenges 
or to humiliations, would be France no longer. It 
would be committing a crime against civilization to al- 
low our country to fall behind in the midst of so many 
nations developing ceaselessly their military forces. 
Our army and navy are the most useful auxiliaries of 
our diplomacy. Let us not recoil before any effort, 
before any sacrifice to consolidate them and strengthen 
them."i» 

One of the first official acts of President Poincare 
was the appointment of M. Delcasse as ambassador to 
St. Petersburg. Although he had been Minister of 
Marine in the Monis, Caillaux, and Poincare cabinets, 
M. Delcasse 's forte lay in foreign affairs, and now 
after almost eight years he was given a post where his 

17 Albin, "D'Agadir a Serajevo," p. 16. 

18 Ibid., p. 25. 

19 Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 99i, p. 601. 



TOWAEDS THE WORLD WAR 345 

ability would have ample expression. Ever since the 
Potsdam interview in 1910 there had been a slacken- 
ing of the bonds of the Dual Alliance, and it was felt 
that no one was better able to strengthen them than 
M. Delcasse. Althougji in some circles the appoint- 
ment was looked upon as an act of bravado, of defiance 
to Germany, wiser minds saw in it merely a part of 
M. Poincare's program to strengthen France.^" '*It 
is not the politician, not the parlementarian who has 
been appointed, it is the former minister of foreign 
affairs, the statesman who for seven years has main- 
tained the alliance in intimate community of sentiments 
with the Czar and his ministers, who accompanied M. 
Loubet to St. Petersberg in 1902, who has been there 
twice as minister, and who has been one of the princi- 
pal authors of the Anglo-Russian rapprochement." ^'^ 
Facing the enlargement and improvement of the Ger- 
man military machine, and the troubled European situ- 
ation which furnished an ever ready excuse for its go- 
ing into action, France had good reason for a program 
of national defence. 

With the resignation of the Poincare cabinet owing 
to the elevation of the Prime Minister to the presi- 
dency, M. Aristide Briand was asked to form the new 
ministry. One of the first tasks presented was to de- 
termine the best method of increasing the French army 
to meet the new German program. The Superior 

20 Baroa Guillaume, the Belgian minister at Paris, commenting on 
this appointment, wrote: "I believe that M. Poincar6, the Lorrainer, 
has taken pleasure in asserting from the first day of his high office 
his strong desire to take a firm stand and to upraise the flag of his 
country." Belgian Documents (1905-1914) No. 99. 

21 Gauvain, "L'Europe au Jour le Jour," Vol. V, p. 37. 



346 FEENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

Council of War discussed the problem early in March 
and finally came to a unanimous conclusion that the 
only solution was the immediate return to the three 
years' service.^^ Two days later M. Briand laid be- 
fore the Chamber the project of a law based on these 
recommendations. France must be protected what- 
ever the cost. However, the question of electoral 
reform — ^the change from the scrutin d'arrondisse- 
ment or election on a small district basis, to the scrutin 
de liste with the department as the unit, combined with 
a system of proportional representation — still held 
over from the Poincare ministry. In attempting to 
put the law which the Chamber had already adopted 
through the Senate, the Briand ministry failed to se- 
cure a majority and was forced to resign. The Ger- 
man press, which had attributed the reawakened spirit 
of the French people in their desire to prepare them- 
selves in case of a German attack, to the chauvinistic 
tendencies of the Government, noted the downfall of 
the Briand ministry with unconcealed satisfaction. 
Fortunately for France, the new Barthou cabinet was 
equally Well fitted to carry out the excellent policies 
of MM. Poincare and Briand. M. Etienne, who had 
drawn up the pro jet for the three years' law, retained 
the portfolio of Minister of War, and M. Pichon once 
more took charge of the Quai d'Orsay. In his minis- 
terial declaration made before the Chamber, March 
25, M. Barthou declared: ''The recent increase of 
the military forces of other peoples imposed upon the 
preceding cabinet the duty of submitting to you the 
project of a law raising to three years the duration of 

22Albin, "D'Agadir a Serajevo," p. 45. 



TOWAEDS THE WORLD WAR 347 

service, equal for all. Both this duty and this project 
we make our own. ' ' ^^ 

It was just at this time that the attention of Europe 
was once more directed to the Balkan imbroglio. The 
representatives of the great Powers in London had 
caught a Tartar in the person of King Nicholas of Mon- 
tenegro. He was especially set on capturing Scutari 
and had been besieging it since the beginning of the 
war. Owing to the bombardment which had damaged 
her consulate at Scutari, Austria demanded the right 
for the civil population to withdraw, and the Powers 
were forced to ratify the demand. Nicholas granted 
an armistice of fifty hours; but the Turkish general, 
having received no official order, refused to allow the 
withdrawal, and the Serbs and Montenegrins resumed 
the bombardment. Austria was ready to take violent 
measures, and if Austria went to war it was almost 
certain to embroil Europe. King Nicholas might have 
thoroughly enjoyed the situation if the fate of his 
kingdom had not been hanging by sucli a slender 
thread. When finally, the Montenegrins captured 
Scutari and seemed ready to hold it, Austria insisted 
upon a naval demonstration. Russia, whose hostility 
to Austria had been fanned to a fever heat, refused to 
participate; England and France did not dare allow 
Austria to go in alone. Fortunately for all concerned, 
Nicholas himself cut the Gordian knot by withdrawing. 
The Treaty of London, signed May 30, 1913, arranged 
the situation temporarily, and Sir Edward Grey felici- 
tated the representatives of the Balkan states in his 
best diplomatic French upon the happy result. Turkey 

83 Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 99ii, p. 1493, 



348 FEENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

wisely left the Albanian question for Europe to set- 
tle. 

If the disturbed condition of Europe was not enough 
to make the French realize that it was time to put 
their house in order, the series of troublesome inci- 
dents on the German frontier ought to have awakened 
them to action — a frontier which since 1870 has been 
the Achilles heel of France with the Prussian sword 
of Damocles ever suspended. In the words of a bril- 
liant French publicist: ''England has her empire of 
the sea, the United States her Monroe Doctrine, and 
France her Eastern frontier." On April 3, a Zeppe- 
lin landed on French territory at Luneville, and al- 
though the French government allowed the occupants 
to depart after an examination, the German govern- 
ment complained that the French authorities had acted 
in a suspicious and unfriendly manner. On April 14, 
three German soldiers from Metz, who were passing 
the day at Nancy, got into trouble with some students 
in a wine shop, and were handled rather roughly. It 
was afterwards proved that the Germans had pro- 
voked the quarrel, but Herr von Jagow, speaking in 
the Reichstag, took the opportunity of painting a vivid 
picture of French chauvinism. A week later a Ger- 
man military biplane from Darmstadt descended at 
Arracourt, five miles from the frontier. The aviators 
claimed that they had lost their way, and were allowed 
to return. This time M. Jules Cambon called the at- 
tention of the German government to the provocative 
nature of such incidents.'^* 

24Viallate et Caudel, "La Vie Politique dans les Deux Mondes" 
(1912-1913), p. 50. 



TOWARDS THE WOELD WAR 349 

These occurrences might have been accidents, but 
the French Government had been receiving secret re- 
ports from the embassy, the consular service, and other 
sources in Germany of a more serious nature. In 
every possible manner the Imperial Government was 
seeking to arouse patriotic sentiment by revising 
memories of the victories of 1813.^^ The mere rumor 
that the French were contemplating a return to the 
three years' military service caused one of the mem- 
bers of the Reichstag to say: *'It is a provocation; 
we shall not allow it." Lieutenant Colonel Serret re- 
ported that people were exceedingly angry that France 
would not allow herself to be outdistanced. This sec- 
ond-rate power had withstood them in 1911 and the 
Government and the Emperor gave way. ''People are 
determined that such a thing shall never happen 
again. "^° The German press did all in its power to 
stir up ill-feeling between the two countries, the 
*'Kolnische Zeitung" in its issue of March 10 predicted 
a war of the revanche just as soon as France felt her- 
self able to force it.^'^ In his speech before the Reichs- 

25 Doc. Dip., "La Guerre Europeenne" (1914), No. 1. 

26 Ibid., Enc. 1. 

27 In its mucli talked of article entitled : "The Enemy of Peace," this 
newspaper declared: "It would not be difficult for the German Govern- 
ment to justify the necessity of the new law if it should merely draw 
the country's attention upon the nation whence the peril comes, that is 
to say France. . . . 

"Never have relations with our Western neighbors been so tense as 
to-day, never has the thought of vengeance shown itself in so undis- 
guised a form, and never has it been so obvious that the Russian 
Alliance and the friendship of England have been claimed only for the 
purpose of regaining Alsace-Lorraine, 

"Wherever the storm may break, one thing is certain and sure — 
we shall have to cross swords with France. . . . We must not seek 
too far for the reasons of the increase of our army ... we should 



350 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

tag April 7, Chancellor von Bethman-HoUweg, in or- 
der to show the need of the new increase in the army, 
painted a vivid picture of the Balkan upheaval and the 
critical state of European peace. He showed that 
although the relations between Germany and Russia 
were still friendly the Pan- Slavic movement which 
Bismarck feared had been strengthened by the vic- 
tories in the Balkans. Then speaking of the chauvinis- 
tic tendencies exhibited by the French he declared : 

. . . '* Across the Vosges they are eulogizing the 
French army in comparison with ours. They boast of 
the superiority of the French artillery, of the advance 
of French aviation, of the better education of the 
French soldier. . . . With their ardent temperaments 
the French have seen in the Turkish defeats of Kirk- 
Kilisse and Lule-Burgas, German defeats, victories of 
French instructors over German instructors. Already 
they count on the support of the Balkan states and on 
Alsace-Lorraine. In her illusion France has already 
won the war. ' ' ^^ 

Considering the fact that the French increases for 
their army were not even proposed until Germany had 
made hers an accomplished fact, this criticism of the 
German Chancellor directed at French chauvinism 
seemed far fetched; and considering that it was an 
official utterance, it was decidedly unfriendly. One 
searches in vain among French official utterances at 
this time for the expression of similar sentiments. 
However, the French Government was receiving secret 

plainly point to the West and with outstretched finger indicate where 
the enemy of peace sits — in France." Quoted Ques. Dip. et Col., April 1, 
1913. 
28 Ibid., April 16, 1913. 



TOWAEDS THE WORLD WAR 351 

reports of a far more alarming nature concerning the 
German intentions. One in particular, dated April 2, 
and received by M. Etienne, minister of war, not only 
gave in detail the various methods being employed to 
strengthen the German army as rapidly as possible, 
but also included a statement of the aims of the Im- 
perial national policy which was extremely enlighten- 
ing to the French. A few excerpts testify to the real 
desire of official Germany for peace : 

''We must allow the idea to sink into the minds of 
our people that our armaments are an answer to the 
armaments and policy of the French.^^ We must so 
manage matters that under the weight of powerful 
armaments, considerable sacrifices, and strained polit- 
ical relations, an outbreak should be considered as a 
relief. . . . We must not be anxious about the fate of 
our colonies. The final result in Europe will settle 
their position. On the other hand we must stir up 
trouble in the north of Africa and in Russia. ... In 
the next European war it will also be necessary that 
the small states should be forced to follow us or be 
subdued. In certain conditions their armies and their 
strong positions can be rapidly conquered or neu- 
tralized ; this would probably be the case with Belgium 

29 Baron Beyens substantiates this statement as follows : "A pass- 
word went the round of the newspapers: dates were to be confused, 
and the French bill was to be represented as earlier than the German. 
This flagrant lie was blazoned abroad by the whole Press, with the 
exception of the Socialist organs, as a damning accusation against 
France. Dr. Schieman in the Kreuz Zeitung went so far as to maintain 
that the three years' term had been forced upon M. Poincar6 by the 
Czar, during the visit of the President (then Foreign Minister) to St. 
Petersburg in the previous year. It was the price exacted by Russia 
for her military aid and for the upkeep of the alliance." "Germany 
Before the War," p. 260. 



352 FEENCH FOEEIGN POLICY 

and Holland. . . . Our aim must he to take the offen- 
sive from the first days. . . ." ^^ 

With such documents in its possession, it is hardly 
strange that the Barthou government urged the legis- 
lators to pass immediately the law for a return to the 
three years' service. There was violent opposition 
from both the Radicals and the Socialists. M. Jaures 
fought the proposal in the Chamber, and his organ, 
''L'Humanite," and the anarchistic sheet of M. Gus- 
tave Herve, "La Guerre Sociale," undoubtedly did 
much to provoke the various manifestations which oc- 
curred in the garrisons of Toul, Belfort, Macon, and 
other towns, when the government wisely decided to 
keep under colors the class which normally would be 
freed in the autumn.^^ M. Caillaux attacked the law 
savagely at a Eadical Socialist banquet. But the most 
pitiable sight of all was the misguided effort of the 
pacifist Senator, M. d'Estournelles de Constant, to 
tame Prussian militarism by international idealism and 
pacifism. 

The National Council of Switzerland had invited the 
representatives of the parliaments of France and Ger- 
many to an interparliamentary conference at Berne 
"to discuss together upon the neutral soil of the Hel- 
vetic Confederation the question of armaments, and 
to examine by what ways and means it would be pos- 
sible to bring about a rapprochement between France 
and Germany. "^^ M. d'Estournelles was very suc- 

30 Doc Dip., op. cit., No. 2, enc. II. 

31 The law of 1905 gave the government this power ; see speech of M. 
Barthou in the Chamber, May 15, 1913. Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 
lOOi, p. 106. 

32Albin, "D'Agadir a Serajevo," p. 50. 



TOWAEDS THE WORLD WAR 353 

cessful at recruiting in France for this meeting, and 
when the conference opened, May 11, 1913, there were 
191 members of the French legislative body present, 
167 deputies and 24 senators. M. Bebel apparently 
had not been so persuasive, as he had succeeded in 
rounding up only 37 members of the Reichstag. This 
disparity, however, by no means indicated the differ- 
ence or relative importance of the representation of 
the two countries ; for it must be remembered that the 
French delegates were men who held the destinies of 
France in their hands, while the representatives from 
the Reichstag had no more power or influence over the 
Imperial Government, especially in its conduct of 
foreign affairs, than the humblest burgher of the 
realm. They were simply members of the official Ger- 
man Debating Society, allowed to discuss and give 
their opinion on the affairs of the empire, but their 
opinions had little weight if they conflicted with those 
of the Bundesrat or the Imperial Chancellor. 

The Conference heartily approved Mr. Bryan's pro- 
posals for arbitration treaties, demanded that all diffi- 
culties which could not be settled by diplomacy be re- 
ferred to the Hague, and expressed the hope that a 
rapprochement between France and Germany would 
facilitate an entente between the two European groups. 
M. Vazeille, one of the French Socialist deputies, whose 
views on internationalism received a very decided set- 
back as a result of his attendance, thus described his 
impressions: *'It was a day of miracles. You saw an 
assembly conducted in German in which about 150 
Frenchmen and 40 Germans participated ; you saw the 
French who are usually considered loquacious make 



354 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

one speech to the seven or eight made by the Germans; 
you saw the French Socialists entrusting to M. Ricklin, 
President of the Alsatian Landtag, the burden of con- 
verting William II to disarmament. ' ' ^* Looking 
backwards their ideal might be paraphrased: "L'utopie 
est le reve d'aujourd'hui et le cauchemar de demain.'\ 
France, at last aroused, determined to prepare, and 
the only feasible, sane, or even possible way, was to go 
back to the three years' military service. The law 
came before the Chamber on June 2, and on the very 
first day the discussion became so bitter that General 
Pau threatened to leave the Chamber. M. Chautemps 
proved that a sudden attack against France by Ger- 
many was impossible ; ^* M. Thalamas, who was to gain 
everlasting opprobrium in connection with the Caillaux 
Affair, declared that France might as well not try — 
she could never hope to rival Germany in point of 
numbers ; ^^ when he saw the current had set against 
anti-militarism, M. Jaures was ready with a counter- 
proposal — to substitute a militia for an army.^^ The 
law was brilliantly defended by MM. Reinach, Lef evre, 
and Benoist, and on June 26, M. Barthou intervened 
and made a stirring speech to the Chamber, urging 
them to forget politics and think of national duty — the 
time demanded it.^^ After almost a month of acrimo- 
nious debate, the measure passed the Chamber, July 19, 
by a vote of 358 to 204, and M. Caillaux had the doubt- 
ful honor of delivering the last attack.^^ The Senate 

33Debidour, "Histoire Diplomatique de I'Europe" (1904-1916), p. 218. 
34Annales de la Chambre, Vol. lOOi, p. 427. 

35 Ibid,, p. 466. 

36 Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 1001, p. 836. 
87 Ibid., p. 1139. 

38 Ibid., Vol. lOOii, p. 1859. 



TOWAEDS THE WOELD WAB 355 

was more awake to the situation; and although M. 
d 'Estournelles proclaimed his confidence in the pacific 
solution of all international difficulties,^^ the law passed 
on August 7, after about a week's discussion, by a vote 
of 254 to 37.4» 

In the summer of 1913 the attention of Europe was 
turned once more to the Balkans, where the autono- 
mous Albania and the sharing of Macedonia had taxed 
the rivalries too greatly. Bulgaria, drunk with the 
pride of conquest and confident of her ability to de- 
feat all rivals, suddenly attacked her erstwhile allies. 
She soon found the armies of the Greeks and the 
Serbs far different from those of the Turks, and 
when Eoumania also came in against her she was 
forced to sue for peace. Turkey, now seeing an oppor- 
tunity for a share in the booty which she had lost, 
seized Adrianople. The Powers once more intervened. 
Eussia seemed willing that Bulgaria should retain 
Kavala, but France sustained the claims of Greece; 
Austria again showed herself hostile towards Serbia 
and insisted upon the continuation of an autonomous 
Albania. The Treaty of Bucharest, signed August 10, 
satisfied nobody. Bulgaria, stripped of her former 
gains, nursed a bitter resentment which needed only 
the slightest opportunity to arouse her to a new strug- 
gle. Austria had gone so far as to propose action 
against Serbia and asked the assistance of Italy, but 
the latter, declaring that a casus foederis could not be 

39Annales du Senat, Vol. 83ii, p. 1560. 

*o The law provided that every Frenchman physically able must serve 
in the active army 3 years and in the reserve 11 years, or in the terri- 
torial army 7 years and in the territorial reserve 7 years. He enters 
the service at the age of 20. 



356 FEENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

established, refused.^^ It is very probable that Ger- 
many, who was not yet fully prepared, also refused to 
sustain Austria at this time.'*^ Again in October Aus- 
tria attempted to force the issue by a virtual ultimatum 
to Serbia, demanding the withdrawal of her troops 
from the Albanian frontier, and once more peace was 
purchased at the price of Serbian submission. 

With the end of the second Balkan war the inter- 
national situation became somewhat less strained, but 
the tension in the relations between France and Ger- 
many was but slightly relaxed. An incident which 
occurred towards the close of 1913 in the little Alsatian 
town of Saverne aroused public sentiment in France 
to the highest pitch, and proved that although the spirit 
of the revanche had died down, so long as Prussian 
methods were employed in the lost provinces, the 
wrong could not be forgotten. It also showed how the 
militarist element in Germany was gaining in strength, 
how futile were the efforts of the Reichstag to combat 
it, and how utterly impotent that body was when it 
came into direct opposition to the military party. 

A young German lieutenant,, Baron von Forstner, 
quartered at Saverne, angered at the covert hostility 
shown by the Alsatian population, thus expressed him- 
self to his soldiers : " If you should be attacked by one 
of the Alsatian dogs (wackes) I hope you will not 
hesitate to cut open his hide. I myself will give you 
ten marks for every one that you stick." ^^ When his 

41 M. Giolitti brought this affair to light in his declarations before 
the Italian Chamber Dec. 5, 1914. For the text see Larmeroux, "Pol. 
Exter. de I'Autriche-Hongrig," Vol. II, p. 372. 

42 Headlam, '"History of Twelve Days," p. 5. 

43 Le Temps, Nov. 10, 1913. 



TOWARDS THE WORLD WAR 357 

statement was noised abroad, he was hooted at in the 
streets and did not dare to go about unattended. On 
one occasion when a crowd had congregated, his su- 
perior oJBQcer, Colonel von Renter, ordered the soldiers 
to arrest everyone they found in the streets, and among 
those arrested were several German judges coming 
from a court session. On another occasion von Forst- 
ner struck with his sword a lame shoemaker who, he 
claimed, had threatened him. The inquest showed that 
the man was unarmed and was held by two German 
soldiers when he threatened the German officer. For 
once the Reichstag was aroused and demanded punish- 
ment. When the Chancellor refused, a vote of censure 
was passed by a. majority of more than two hundred. 
In direct defiance of their attitude, the lieutenant who 
had been given forty-three days in prison for wanton 
attack on the shoemaker, was acquitted on appeal, and 
Colonel von Renter, who had upheld his actions, was 
not only absolved from blame but received a per- 
sonal letter of commendation from the Crown 
Prince.** 

A final example showing the change in the attitude 
of the Kaiser himself, who as an ardent lover of peace 
had for his valiant efforts in that direction been 
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, is given in a despatch 
from M. Jules Cambon to M. Stephen Pichon, minister 
for foreign affairs, November 22, 1913. In a conver- 
sation between King Albert of Belgium and the Kaiser, 
King Albert was greatly surprised to learn that Em- 
peror William had come to believe that war with 

4*Le Temps, Nov. 30, Dec. 23, 1913. See also Hazen, "Alsace-Lorraine 
Under German Rule." 



358 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

France was inevitable, and in sucli a contingency tHe 
Kaiser intimated that King Albert would do well to 
remember that he was a Colburg. King Albert 's reply 
does him credit: ''I shall remember above all that I 
am a Belgian." ''"What would you do," the Kaiser 
then asked, ''if my troops should enter Belgium?" 
The reply again was straightforward, "I should do 
my duty."^^ 

All indications pointed the same way. Europe was 
not large enough for an awakened, patriotic France, 
who would not be browbeaten with impunity, and a 
powerful, imperialistic Germany, whose needs were 
outstripping her resources, and who felt that she had 
the strength to obtain what she wanted. In Germany's 
eyes, France had ceased to be a world power, and if she 
didn't realize the fact it was time that Germany 
brought it home to her. An Austrian diplomat speak- 
ing to Prince Lichnowsky, aptly summed up the situa- 
tion: "Whenever the French begin to forget about 
revanche, you always remind them of it with a jack- 
boot. "^^ 

3. RADICALISM VS. PATRIOTISM. 

Now that the three years' service law had been 
passed and the crying need for the reorganization of 
the army in accordance with the new regime shown in 
so many ways, one might have supposed that the 
Barthou Cabinet, which had supported the change and 
was striving valiantly to put it into effect, would be 
retained. But the two deadly inj3uences in French 

*5 Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 6 ; Debidour, "Histoire Diplomatique de 
I'Europe" (1904-1916), p. 227. 

46 Lichnowsky, "My Mission to London," 1911-1914, p. 2. 



TOWARDS THE WORLD WAR 359 

politics now combined — M. Jaures, *'who divided Par- 
liament in front of the foreigner," and M. Caillaux, 
''who almost wrecked French foreign policy," — and 
caused the downfall of the Barthou ministry upon a 
question of taxation to increase the budget for national 
defence. The editorial in the ' ' Temps ' ' well expressed 
the feeling in the capital: ''Yesterday will count among 
the most deplorable and most nefarious that we have 
known ; they could not overthrow the Barthou ministry 
while it was endowing France with a stronger army, 
but they have caused its downfall while it was defend- 
ing with a noble ardor and an admirable courage our 
national credit. " ^^ 

The vote was not in reality upon a financial ques- 
tion, but an insidious revenge against those who were 
supporting the law of national dignity and defence. 
The headlines of ''L'Humanite" clearly indicated the 
real issue : La Chute du ministere des trois ans. More 
illuminating than a complete perusal of the 'Mournal 
Officiel" was the cry of the Socialist, M. Vaillant, at 
the fall of the ministry: "A has les trois ans." 

President Poincare first called upon M. Ribot t(g' 
form a ministry, and then upon M. Dupuy, but both 
failed owing to strong Radical opposition. Being 
forced to go to the Radicals, he asked M. Doumergue, 
the Radical-Socialist, who succeeded in forming a min- 
istry December 8. The new premier took the portfolio 
of Foreign Affairs; M. Caillaux that of Finance; M. 
Moulens, that of War; and M. Monis, that of Navy. 
It was suggested by M. Viviani that M. Pichon be re- 
tained as Minister of Foreign Affairs, as he had both 

47 Le Temps, Dec. 4, 1913. 



360 FEENCH FOEEIGN POLICY 

experience and ability, but M. Caillaux could not forget 
M. Pichon's speech in the Senate after the crisis of 
Agadir, and M. Caillaux was the predominating influ- 
ence in the new cabinet. M. Eaymond Eecouly per- 
tinently remarked that it might be possible to live under 
such constant changes of government in an isolated 
planet or a separate continent, but not in the Europe 
of to-day.*^ 

M. Doumergue, in his speech to the Chamber, prom- 
ised that as the three years ' service had been voted, it 
would be loyally applied.*^ Considering that his party 
had always disapproved of the law, regarding it as a 
purely provisional measure, and intended to make it 
an issue in the coming elections, it was difficult to see 
how a loyal application was possible. M. Briand in his 
speech at St. Etienne, which was widely commented 
upon, declared that among the very people who fought 
against the law, were the majority of those whose 
politics were responsible for it. 

However, to prove that all thought of ** peace on 
earth and good will toward men" had not disappeared, 
M. d'Estournelles de Constant came out in the Christ- 
mas number of the ** Frankfort Gazette," declaring that 

48 Rev. Pol. et Pari., Jan. 1914, p. 154. Commandant de Thomasson, 
editor of Questions Diplomatique et Coloniales, was more outspoken 
in his condemnation: "One would say that our fatal parliamentarians 
always choose the moment when the international situation is par- 
ticularly troubled to overturn ministries. To-day the Barthou ministry, 
the fifty-fourth that the Third Republic, more famished than Saturn, 
has devoured in forty-three years, falls when we are engaged in difficult 
negotiations with Germany and Italy, when Turkish affairs must be 
followed with more attention than ever, and when the incidents of 
Alsace-Lorraine give evidence of a danger that the blind alone do not 
see." Ques. Dip. et Col., Dec. 16, 1913. 

*9 Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 101, p. 696. 



TOWARDS THE WORLD WAR 361 

while two former presidents of France, M. Loubet and 
M. Fallieres had each in his turn been named ''le pere 
de la paix, ' ' M. Poincare passed in Grermany for a parti- 
san of the revanche, a dictator, the creator of poincar- 
ism, more enlightened but more dangerous than bou- 
langism. He explained this fact by pointing out that 
M. Poincare, being a native of Lorraine, and a neighbor 
of the frontier, could not help urging France to be on 
guard. But M. Poincare was too intelligent not to 
know that the revanche, even if victorious, was a leap 
in the dark for all concerned. In conclusion he de- 
clared that his formula had long been — "ni revanche ni 
ouhli," and M. Poincare might well adopt it.^'' 

At the beginning of the year 1914 two influences 
were becoming more and more evident, the one tending 
to weaken the Entente, the other to strengthen the 
Triplice. Although it was the treacherous calm which 
precedes the storm, very few of the officials of the 
foreign offices or publicists in the nations of the En- 
tente seemed to recognize the fact, and a dangerous 
weakening of the rather lax bands of the Entente pro- 
voked little uneasiness. Russia, offended at the 
quiescent attitude of France and England over the Ger- 
man military mission to Turkey seemed disinclined to 
back up her allies in the Albanian question or on the 
return of the Aegean islands. France found that her 
relations with Italy were less friendly because of her 
support of Greece in the question of the Aegean islands. 
Nor had Greece seemed over grateful. Eang Con- 
stantine, while visiting in Berlin in the fall of 1913, 
declared that the victories of the Greek army were to a 

60 Le Temps, Dec. 22, 1913. 



36^' FRENCH i^ORElGN POLICY 

great extent due to the excellent training which the 
King and his officers had received in Germany. 

On the other hand Lloyd George declared that Anglo- 
German relations were never better and the Liberal 
party must put a limit to the '* organized insanity of 
armaments." Lord Haldane had been sent over in 
1912 at the request of the Imperial Government to dis- 
cuss a closer relation between Great Britain and Ger- 
many. When, however, he proposed a mutual reduc- 
tion of the naval budgets he was met by a counter 
proposal of absolute neutrality in case either power be- 
came engaged in war with a third party. The proposi- 
tion was so drawn as to nullify Great Britain's agree- 
ment with France and Russia while it in no way af- 
fected the treaties of the Triple Alliance. Although an 
agreement in this form was impossible, throughout the 
following year and a half, a rapprochement was a lead- 
ing topic of discussion in both Chancellories.®^ 

The internal affairs of both France and Great Britain 
were anything but favorable to a successful foreign 
policy. The Home Rule question in Great Britain was 
rapidly approaching a crisis, which might even lead 
to civil war. The Ulsterites openly declared them- 
selves ready to resist the BiU by armed force if neces- 
sary, and they were preparing themselves so that their 
resistance would not be futile. France was wholly 
engrossed in the strenuous debates on the income tax, 
for although the Prime Minister, M. Doumergue, was 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, everyone knew that 

51 For an account of 1)he Haldane missions from an English point of 
view see Harold Begbie, "The Vindication of Great Britain," Chap. 
Ill; for the German viewpoint, see von Keventlow, "Deutschland's 
Auswartige Politik," 3d ed. 



TOWARDS THE WORLD WAR 363 

he was merely the presiding officer, and M. Caillaux, 
Minister of Finances, was the actual director of the 
cabinet. And so long as M. Caillaux was the real 
power in France, a loyal application of the three years ' 
service law or any other protective measures against 
Germany were not to be hoped for.^^ Well might it be 
declared that the Triple Entente, "this magnificent in- 
strument of diplomatic action, presented a veritable 
appearance of ataxia. ' ^ ^^ 

On January 25, 1914, the ''Echo de Paris" appeared 
with the sensational report that the great Russian 
foundry, Poutilotf, which manufactured heavy ord- 
nance in accordance with designs and plans from the 
Creusot factories of France, had arranged with the 
bankers of the Krupp establishments for a loan of 
twenty million roubles. Such a report galvanized into 
action even the Doumergue-Caillaux cabinet. It soon 
developed that the Russian Government knew no more 
about the affair than did the French, and the officials of 
the two governments were uncomfortably busy during 
the next few days. Finally, on March 19, M. 
Doumergue attempted to explain the whole affair to 
the Chamber. The Poutiloff plant was in urgent need 
of a loan for new equipment, and a representative of 
the Creusot establishment was conducting the negotia- 

52 Baron Guillaume, the Belgian ambassador, wrote his government as 
follows: "M, Caillaux, who is the real Prime Minister, is knowTi for 
his sentiments in favor of a rapprochement with Germany. . . . This 
statesman may be dangerous for the finances of the country; he may 
cause divisions which are unhealthy and regrettable for the internal 
policy of France, but I consider that his stay in power will diminish 
the acuteness of international rivalries and will furnish a better basis 
for the relations between France and Germa.ny." Belgian Doc. (1905- 
1914), No. 110. 

ee Le Temps, May 1, 1914. 



364 FEENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

tions at St. Petersburg when he was suddenly recalled 
by the death of his mother. In his absence thel Krupp 
bankers made an offer in a private capacity. Both 
Creusot and M. Doumergue had been notified (his nego- 
tiation had come two days after the article had ap- 
peared in the press and then not through official chan- 
nels), and upon receipt of a communication from the 
Quai d'Orsay, the Russian Government had stepped 
in and had so arranged the situation that the French 
need fear no further competition of this kind on the 
part of German bankers. The newspapers delved a 
little more deeply and brought to light the fact that 
the director of the Poutiloff establishment and prac- 
tically the whole governing personnel were Germans — 
a new phrase of pacific penetration.^* 

The other influence becoming more and more evident 
was the chauvinistic campaign against both France and 
Russia waged by the German press. To furnish addi- 
tional material the various organizations of the mili- 
tarist party, the Military League, the Naval League, 
and the Pan-German Association, sent generals and 
admirals through the German states to arouse the peo- 
ple to the necessity for more heavy military and naval 
expenditures, that they might be better prepared for 
the war which was sure to come. The return to the 
three years' service in France was constantly brought 
forward to prove that France was preparing for the 
revanche, and if Germany realized that war was neces- 
sary, it would be foolhardy not to strike before the new 
regime could be put into smooth operation, and before 

54 Cf. version given in Ques. Dip. et Col,, Feb. 16, 1914, with the 
speeches of M. Thomas and M. Doumergue in the Chamber, March 19, 
Annales, Vol. 102iii, p. 2039 ff. 



TOWARDS THE WORLD WAR 365 

the extra equipment could be procured. At the same 
time that the newspapers tried to arouse the German 
people to the chauvinistic attitude of the French, they 
attempted to disparage the possible effect of the law. 
With Jaures and Augagneur to attack openly, with 
Caillaux to undermine secretly, and with the Radical 
Socialists in power, an easy German victory was as- 
sured. As the ' ' Lokal Anzeiger ' ' declared : 

''The spontaneous, the heroic movement which 
caused the adoption of the three years' law was in 
reality mere words. Doubtless the majority of the 
deputies believed in it at the time, but to-day more 
than one deputy has forgotten his own language. It 's 
a question for each one of being re-elected before any- 
thing else — ^it 's a beautiful subject, politics." ^^ 

The French Foreign Legion seemed to be the object 
of particular hatred, and the attacks directed against 
it were most venomous. A League against the Foreign 
Legion was formed and at a great meeting in Berlin 
both the war and navy departments were officially rep- 
resented. A pantomime was given, called *'Die Wacht 
am Rhein" in which the effigy of a French uniformed 
soldier was shot by German sentries, and it was known 
to the audience that the actors were in reality soldiers 
of the German army. The scandal was so great that 
the matter was brought up in the Reichstag; but no 
action was taken.^^ 

Certain Frenchmen were not blind to the seriousness 
of the situation, but they were voices crying in the 
wilderness. The Commandant de Thomasson, editor 

55 Quoted by Le Temps, Feb. 26, 1914. 
66 Le Temps, May 1, 1914. 



366 FEENCH FOEEIGN POLICY 

of one of the sanest and best informed periodicals 
devoted to politics in Europe, insistently called the 
attention of Ms readers to the feverish condition of 
Germany, and the dangerous influence which it was 
exerting on the peace of Europe.^'^ President Poincare 
preached preparedness upon all occasions, but unfor- 
tunately, now that he held the first office in the Eepub- 
lic, his words lacked the force which they had when 
he was prime minister. M. Andre Cheradame and M. 
Victor Berard had long been striving valiantly to show 
the danger of the Pan-German scheme especially in its 
relation to Turkey and the Bagdad Eailway. Now 
after many years of earnest effort to preserve French 
interests in Asia Minor, they saw the complete an- 
nihilation of their hopes in the Franco-German ar- 
rangement of February 15, 1914. The Doumergue- 
Caillaux government had made one more vain conces- 
sion to satisfy the insatiable Welt-politik of their 
jealous neighbors. For the right to construct public 
works and to control the railways and ports of Syria 
and Northern Anatolia, a right which had to be pur- 
chased again from the Turkish Government by a loan 
of eight hundred million francs, France gave up all 
her interests in the Bagdad Eailway and allowed her 
other three railways in Asia Minor to be completely 
isolated.^^ 

57 See especially his excellent editorial on the currents of public 
opinion in Germany and his deductions from them in Ques. Dip. et Col., 
Feb. 1, 1914. 

58 Le Temps, Feb. 17, April 12; see also Guyot, "Causes and Conse- 
quences of the War," p. 177. Baron Beyens ■nrriting from Berlin to the 
Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs had this to say of the situation: 
"Doubtless France has been excluded for all time from the great enter- 
prise of the Bagdad Railway, the principal line which will traverse 



TOWARDS THE WORLD WAR 367 

The unfortunate feature of this policy of peace at 
any price was its utter futility ; it was positively per- 
nicious in its tendency to inspire false hopes of secur- 
ity. Never did a nation give clearer evidences of its 
desire to live at peace with its neighbors than did 
France in the early months of 1914. She was so will- 
ing to live and let live that she unwisely attributed 
the same kindly sentiments to the rest of Europe. M. 
Doumergue in his speech on French foreign relations 
made in the Chamber March 10, 1914, showed clearly 
this naive confidence: ''We cannot close our eyes to 
this reality that everywhere a desire and need for peace 
is shown, and we can well hope that this common desire 
of eliminating the causes of conflicts will end by pre- 
vailing over the elements of disorder. France had 
proved her sincere desire for peace — she nourishes no 
hidden designs — she needs peace to accomplish her 
social and economic reforms. . . . " ^^ In a world un- 
inhabited by nations seeking a place in the sun, where 
economic and racial rivalries did not exist, his ideal 
might have proved a valuable foreign policy, but not 
in Europe in the year of our Lord, 1914. 

The Caillaux controlled ministry from its very in- 
ception had been much criticised in the press, but M. 
Gaston Calmette of the ''Figaro" now began to assail 
M. Caillaux in a continuous campaign of carefully docu- 
mented and utterly damning evidences of political 
turpiture, with the avowed intention of forcing his 
resignation. When he gave conclusive evidence that 

Asia Minor draining it of its products. But as you know the fault is 
due to the short-sighted diplomacy of the Quai d'Orsay. . . ." Belgian 
Doc, No. 111. 

59Annale8 de la Chambre, Vol. 102ii, p. 1679. 



368 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

M. Caillaux had used his official position to put off the 
trial of a swindler, Eochette, against whom there was 
a complete case, the question was brought up in the 
Chamber, and both M. Doumergue and M. Jaures were 
hard pressed to defend their colleague. When M. Cal- 
mette promised even more sensational disclosures 
Mme. Caillaux went to the editorial rooms of the 
"Figaro" and shot down the editor in cold blood. Not 
even the affair of Madame Stendhal had aroused such 
intense interest in the capital. M. Caillaux was forced 
to resign immediately and a commission of investiga- 
tion was appointed to go to the bottom of the whole 
affair and report its findings. The English news- 
papers deplored the affair but were very guarded in 
their comments. The German press seemed much per- 
turbed lest M. Caillaux might lose his influence and 
completely disappear from the political arena at this 
most inopportune time, with the elections almost at 
hand and the fate of the proper enforcement of the 
three years' service law dependent upon them. 

The report of the investigating commission proved 
the truth of M. Calmette 's allegations, but when it came 
to adopting the report, the Chamber had one of the 
stormiest scenes in its history. The order of the day 
which was finally passed showed that the influence of 
Caillaux was almost as strong as ever. Instead of a 
stinging rebuke, the order simply declared that the 
Chamber taking note of the report of the investigating 
committee reproved the abusive interventions of 
finance into politics and politics into the administration 
of justice. To some of the most eminent men in the 
Chamber such action was a mere travesty of justice. 



TOWAEDS THE WORLD WAR 369 

M. Briand deplored the conditions of parliamentary 
practice which had so degraded French public life, and 
M. Maurice Barres declared that only a ministerial 
operation could cure the pourriture parlementaire.^^ 
One of the inexplicable phases of the whole situation 
was the fact that when M. Caillaux decided to stand 
once more before his constituents of Mamers, upon a 
record which had been the gossip of every nook and 
cranny in Europe, he was reelected. Well might a 
leading French publicist write: "It is especially these 
detestable internal politics forever brewing in France, 
England and Russia which tempts Germany to be arro- 
gant." " 

The French had barely time to complete their gov- 
ernmental housecleaning before eminent guests were 
upon them in the persons of the King and Queen of 
England. The occasion was the tenth anniversary of 
the Entente Cordiale, and a retrospective glance at the 
results tended to increase its popularity. France, 
with her exposed frontier, well realized that her safety 
was bound up with the Entente. The remembrance 
of England's backing at Algeciras, Casablanca, and 
Agadir was still fresh. But with the phenomenal 
increase of the German fleet, England, too, had cause 
to be thankful that she no longer stood isolated on her 
sea-girt isle ; she, too, could remember the aid of France 
both in forming and preserving the accord with Russia. 
She felt that as the Italian and Austrian fleets were 
increased in the Meriterranean, an even closer agree- 
ment might be advantageous. Great Britain might 

60 Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 102ii, p. 2646, et seq. 

61 De Thomasson, Ques. Dip. et Col., June 1, 1914. 



370 FEENOH FOREIGN POLICY 

soon need the larger part of her fleet in the North Sea 
if the Kaiser continued to think that Germany's future 
lay upon the ocean. 

The wild enthusiasm displayed in Paris at the arrival 
of the sovereigns was unique, even in that foyer of 
excitement. As they drove into the city under the Arc 
de Triomphe, and passed down the Champs Elysees, 
they found almost the entire population waiting to bid 
them welcome. The warmth of the reception, and the 
marked friendliness and desire to please shown by the 
whole nation must have warmed the heart of Queen 
Mary herself. The German press did not allow the 
event to pass without a few covert sneers. The 
''Kolnische Zeitung" thus expressed the German senti- 
ment: *'We hardly expected that the toasts would be 
so insignificant, composed of such stereotyped banali- 
ties upon the pacific influence of the Entente Cordiale. 
This insignificance is the more surprising after the 
floods of ink spilt in the recent press campaign favoring 
a strengthening of the alliance. "We may say like 
Cholchas in 'la Belle Helene': 'Des fleurs, rien que les 
fleurs/ and yet we must add that they are faded flowers 
which have served already many times before. ' ' ®^ 

The Kaiser could comfort himself with the knowl- 
edge that the internal policy of a state always reacts 
powerfully upon its foreign policy. While he held the 
internal policy of Germany in his mailed fist, both 
France and Great Britain were struggling in the throes 
of domestic ailments which were bound to weaken them 
to his advantage. In fact the interest in the spring 
elections in France was so great that even the Caillaux 

62 Quoted by Le Temps, Apr. 24, 1914. 



TOWARDS THE WORLD WAR 371 

affair had lost its hold on the public. Three mooted 
questions were to be decided: the maintenance of the 
three years' service law, electoral reform, and the in- 
come tax. When the results were in, no one was en- 
tirely satisfied; the three years' law had a slight ma- 
jority, the electoral reform a substantial majority, 
while the deputies were about evenly divided on the 
income tax. ' * The only inference that could be drawn 
from the election of 1914 was that under the present 
electoral system, Radical prefects, guided by a Radical 
cabinet, were seen to return a Radical majority." ^^ 

The Radicals were clearly in the majority and the 
Socialists had increased their number. The Caillaux- 
Jaures bloc was still powerful, but hardly strong 
enough to prevent the application of the three years' 
service law. The opinion of Great Britain and Russia 
as shown in the press was that France was playing 
with fire, and that it was a dangerous game. The 
German press seemed confident that from a financial 
and political standpoint a r^urn to the service of two 
years was essential. President Poincare, in a speech 
at Rennes, on the last day of May, declared that France 
must have a large army well prepared, or be exposed 
to accept foreign domination. There was no middle 
ground.^* 

But before the Chamber could finally settle down to 
sane and patriotic service it had to give a final exhibi- 
tion of ridiculous and criminal perversity. At the 
resignation of M. Doumergue, President Poincare 
called upon M. Viviani to form a cabinet. But at the 

esDimmet, "France Herself Again," p. 167. 
6*Le Temps, June 1, 1914. 



372 FEENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

first meeting the Eadical-Socialist element protested 
so strongly against the maintenance of the three years * 
service law which he insisted upon putting in his pro- 
gram, that he gave up the attempt. MM. Deschanel, 
Delcasse, Dupuy, and Petral refused to try. M. Ribot 
finally formed a cabinet, but the hostility of the Cham- 
ber was evident and the very first vote of confidence 
was lost. The German press openly exulted at the 
situation, predicting an utter failure of the three years ' 
law. The Paris press bombarded the deputies with 
denunciation and satire. It finally seemed to seep into 
the minds of these representatives of France that they 
were losing both the confidence and respect of their 
allies and were playing directly into Germany's hands. 
When M. Viviani was again called in he had little 
difficulty in forming the cabinet or in carrying through 
his plan for the loan and income tax, and giving a loyal 
application to the three years' service law. 

Fortunate it was that a realization of the situation 
had at last come, for evenis which were to involve all 
Europe in their train were shaping themselves with in- 
creasing rapidity. While Sazanotf was declaring to 
the Douma that ''the Triple Entente is entirely free 
from any spirit of aggression, and its end is solely to 
contribute to the conservation of the European balance 
of power and is always ready to cooperate with the 
Triple Alliance to preserve peace, ' ' the Kaiser was pre- 
paring to open the Kiel Canal, enlarged for the passage 
of his largest cruisers, — the final event which completed 
his preparations for der Tag. Less than a week later 
the murder of Archduke Ferdinand raised the curtain 
on the bloody drama for which the whole world has be- 



TOWARDS THE WORLD WAR 373 

come the stage. The drama is not yet played out. To 
satisfy the imperialistic ambitions of a Caesar and the 
vainglorious dreams of a deluded people, whole nations 
have had their Calvary, and a century will hardly suf- 
fice to heal the wounds of a stricken world. 

4. CONCLUSION 

With the crime at Serajevo a new period of French 
foreign policy began — a period in which the nations of 
Europe seemed to lose their individual liberty and be- 
come mere pawns on the chess-board of Fate. Drawn 
up in two great armed camps, the time to play for world 
dominion had come, and Germany intended that the 
game should be played through to the end. France 
did not want war ; she was willing to make almost any 
sacrifice to avert it. Great Britain desired peace and 
was ready to do all in her power to maintain it. But 
in a balance of power one group is helpless to maintain 
the equilibrium. The foreign ministers of the nations 
desirous of peace had become mere puppets, forced to 
perform in the dance of death when the Kaiser pulled 
the strings. French diplomacy was an integral part of 
the diplomacy of the Entente, and the diplomacy of the 
Entente could but react to the diplomacy of the Triple 
Alliance. Therefore in attempting to form any con- 
clusions upon the subject of contemporaneous French 
foreign policy, it seems more essential to consider the 
vital period preceding the assassination of Duke Ferdi- 
nand when the policy of France was clearly distinctive, 
than the period when the Third Republic was striving 
courageously but vainly in conjunction with her allies 
to avert the struggle which Germany was determined to 



374 FRENCH FOEBIGN POLICY 

precipitate. It is this period, extending from the en- 
trance of M. Delcasse at the Quai d'Orsay in June, 1898, 
when the new orientation of French foreign policy in 
the direction of Great Britain began, up to the murder 
of the Austrian Archduke in June, 1914, when the result 
of this policy was the immediate and effective support 
of France by Great Britain and Eussia, enabling her 
to stem the onrush of the Teuton host and to emerge 
finally victorious, which we have attempted to portray. 
France undoubtedly owes her present paramount po- 
sition in Europe, as established by the Treaty of Ver- 
sailles, in a great measure to the strong friendships 
which she made and retained in the decade immediately 
preceding the Great War, and to that extent her foreign 
policy may be regarded as brilliantly successful. On 
the other hand it must be conceded that this result was 
obtained in spite of the wishes of many representative 
French politicians rather than by the consistent efforts 
of a united majority. The two greatest faults of 
French foreign policy seem to be the inability of the 
French Foreign Office to divorce itself from the influ- 
ence of purely domestic questions, and the complete 
impotence of the President in matters of foreign policy, 
although his position is particularly suited to exercise 
a beneficial influence in matter of diplomacy and 
foreign relations. As an instance of the first, we need 
only recall the unfortunate influence which the contro- 
versies over the relations of the church and the state 
have had on the foreign policy of France; a striking 
example of the second, was the unimportant part which 
President Poincare was forced to play in the greatest 
crisis of French history. 



TOWAEDS THE WORLD WAR 375 

But in contrast with these weaknesses it must be 
noted that the Third Republic has for the most part 
been very careful in the choice of her ministers of 
foreign affairs. With such statesmen as Hanotaux, 
Delcasse, Bourgeois, Poincare and Pichon in charge of 
the Quai d'Orsay, it is not surprising that results have 
been extremely satisfactory. Furthermore, although 
it seems as though Frenchmen will not unite under the 
flag until it is threatened, when a realization of the 
menace comes, factional interests are forgotten and all 
parties and groups unite unreservedly in a union 
sacree. But for all its apparent inconsistencies and 
instability French foreign policy is like the French 
Government — ''plus ga change plus c'est la meme 
chose" — it is rooted in right and faces the stars, often 
an opportunist on the surface it is ever a knight errant 
in its soul, and ultimately proves itself worthy of 
la France eternelle. 



BIBLIOGEAPHYl 

French Documents 

Annales de la Chambre : 

Debats Parlementaires, Vols. 54-103 

Documents Parlementaires, Vols. 54-87 
Annales du Senat: 

Debats Parlementaires, Vols. 42-85 

Documents Parlementaires, Vols. 37-60 
Archives Diplomatiques, Vols. 68-97 
Documents Diplomatiques : 

Afrique Arrangements, Actes et Conventions, 1881-1898 

Haut Nil et Bahr-et-Ghazal 

La Convention Franco-Anglais du 14 Juin 1898 et la 
Declaration Additionelle du 21 Mars, 1899 

Affaires d 'Orient (Mai-Decembre, 1897) 

Affaires d 'Orient, autonomic Cretoise (Janvier-Octobre, 
1898) 

Affaires de Turquie, 1900-1901 
. Chine: (1898-1899) 
" Chine: (1899-1900) Rapport de M. Pichon 

Chine: Protocol Final (Juin-Octobre, 1901) 

Affaires de Siam : 1893-1902 

Saint Siege: (1899-1903) 

Convention d 'Arbitrage avec TAngleterre, 1903 

Accords entre la France et I'Angleterre, No. I 

Accords entre la France et I'Angleterre, No. II 

Affaires du Maroc (1901-1905) 

Protocoles et Comptes Rendues de la Conference d Algeciras 

Affaires du Maroc (1906-1907) 

877 



378 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Affaires du Maroc (1907-1908) 
Affaires du Maroc (1908-1910) 
Affaires du Maroc (1910-1912) 
La Guerre Europeenne (1914) 

Other Documents 

Foreign Eelations of the United States, 1899-1906 
Annual Register, 1898-1914 
British, and Foreign State Papers, Vols. 90-107 
Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) 4th and 5th Series 
Parliamentary Papers : 

Egypt, Upper Nile, 1899, Vol. 112 [c9054] 

Madagascar, 1899, Vol. 109 [c9091] 

China, 1901, Vol. 91 [c436] 

China, 1900, Vol. 105 [c365] 

Agreements between the United Kingdom and Japan, 1902, 

Vol. 130 [c911] 
Turkey, Report by Major Law, 1896, Vol. 96 [c8019] 
Declaration respecting Egypt and Morocco, 1905, Vol. 103 

[c2384] 
Declaration respecting Egypt and Morocco with Secret 
Articles, 1911, Vol. 103 [c5969] 
European Politics by Belgian Diplomatists, Imperial German 

Foreign Office, 1915. 
Stenographische Berichte von den Verhandlungen des Reichs- 
tags, 1905-1912 
Albin Pierre, Les Grandes Traites Politiques Depuis 1815 

jusqu'a nos jours 
Martens Recueil, 2d and 3d series 
Pribram, A. F,, The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, 

1879-1914 
Scott, James Brown, Diplomatic Documents relating to the 
Outbreak of the European War, Parts I and II 



BIBLIOGEAPHY 379 

Books 

Albin, Pierre, D'Agadir a Serajevo (Paris, 1915) 

Le Coup dAgadir (Paris, 1912) 
Andrillon, H., L 'Expansion de lAllegmagne (Paris, 1914) 
Bainville, Jacques, Italy and the War (New York, 1918) 
Barclay, Thomas, Thirty Years' Anglo-French Reminiscences, 

1876-1906 (London, 1914) 
Barker, J. Ellis, Foundations of Germany (New York, 1916) 
Begbie, Harold, The Vindication of Great Britain (London, 

1916) 
Berard, Victor, L 'Affaire Maroeaine (Paris, 1906) 
Bernstein, Herman (ed.), Willy-Nicky Correspondence (New 

York, 1918) 
Beyens, Baron, Germany before the War (London, 1916) 
Billot, A., La France et I'ltalie, 2 Vols. (Paris, 1905) 
Bourdon, Georges, L'Enigme allemand (Paris and London, 

1913) 
Bullard, Arthur, Diplomacy of the Great War (New York, 

1916) 
Cagniard, Gaston, La Politique Nationale (Paris, 1914) 
Carter, W. H., Life of Lieutenant General Chaffee (Chi- 
cago, 1917) 
Cheradame, Andre, Douze Ans de Propagande (Paris, 1913) 
Le Chemin de Fer de Bagdad (Paris, 1913) 
La Crise Francaise (Paris, 1912) 

L'Allemagne, la France et la Question d'Autriche (Paris, 
1914) 
Crispi, Francesco, Memoirs of Francesco Crispi, 3 Vols. (Lon- 
don, 1914) 
Darcy, Jean, Cent Annees de Rivalite Colonial (Paris, 1904) 
Debidour, A., Histoire Diplomatique de I'Europe (1878-1904), 
(Paris, 1916) 
Histoire Diplomatique de I'Europe (1904-1916), (Paris, 
1916) 



380 BIBLIOGEAPHY 

Dillon, Dr. B. J., From Triple to Quadruple Entente (Lon- 
don, 1915) 
Dimnet, E., France Herself Again (Paris, 1914) 
Fournier, Vice-Admiral, La Politique Navale (Paris, 1910) 
FuUerton, W. M., Problems of Power (London, 1913) 
Gauss, Christian, The German Emperor (New York, 1915) 
Gauvain, Auguste, L 'Europe au Jour le Jour, 5 vols. (Paris, 

1917-18) 
Les Origines de la Guerre Europeenne (Paris, 1918) 
L 'Europe avant la Guerre (Paris, 1917) 
Gibbons, H. A., The New Map of Europe (New York, 1915) 
The New Map of Africa (New York, 1916) 
The New Map of Asia (New York, 1919) 
Guibert et Ferrette, Le Conflit Franco-allemand en 1905 

(Paris, 1905) 
Guyot, Yves, The Causes and Consequences of the War (New 

York, 1916) 
Hanotaux, Gabriel, La Politique d'Equilibre (Paris, 1914) 

Fachoda, Le Partage de I'Afrique (Paris, 1909) 
Hazen, C. D., Alsace-Lorraine under German Rule (New 

York, 1917) 
Headlam, J. W., History of Twelve Days (London, 1915) 
Hershey, A. S., The International Law and Diplomacy of the 

Russo-Japanese War (New York, 1906) 
Hill, D. J., Impressions of the Kaiser (New York, 1918) 
Jerrold, Lawrence, The Real France (London, 1911) 
Johnson, Willis Fletcher, America 's Foreign Relations, 2 Vols. 

(New York, 1916) 
Klausman (editor), Kaiserreden (Leipsig, 1902) 
Laloy, Emile, La Diplomatic de Guillaume II (Paris, 1917) 
Lanessan, J, L. de, Histoire de 1 'Entente Cordiale (Paris, 

1916) 
Larmeroux, Jean, La Politique Exterieure de I'Austriehe- 

Hongrie (1875-1914), 2 Vol. (Paris, 1918) 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 381 

Lecomte, Georges, Clemenceau (Paris, 1918) 

Lemonon, Ernest, L 'Europe et la Politique Britannique 

(Paris, 1910) 
Maurel, Gabriel, Histoire des Relations de la France et du 

Siam (Paris, 1906) 
Mevil, Andre, De la Paix de Frankfort a la Conference d'Alge- 

siras (Paris, 1909) 
Morel, E, D., Morocco in Diplomacy (London, 1912) 
Moulin, Eene, Une Annee de Politique Exterieure (Paris, 

1905) 
Muratet, Abel, Le Chemin de Fer de Bagdad (Aurillac, 1914) 
Penzler, J., Fiirst Billows Reden, 3 Vols. (Berlin, 1907) 
Pinon, Rene, France et Allemagne (Paris, 1913) 
L 'Empire de la Mediterranee (Paris, 1904) 
L 'Europe et 1 'Empire Ottomane (Paris, 1908) 
Pooley, A. M. (editor), The Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

(New York, 1915) 
Pott, F. L. H., A Sketch of Chinese History (Shanghai, 1908) 
Reventlow, E. von, Deutschlands Auswartige Politique (Ber- 
lin, 1915) 
Reynald, Georges, La Diplomatic Francaise, L'Oeuvre de M. 

Delcasse (Paris, 1915) 
Eohrbach, Paul, Germany's Isolation (Chicago, 1915) 
Saint Cyr, Charles de, Pourquoi 1 'Italic est notre alliee? 

(Paris, 1916) 
Schiemann, Th., Deutschland und die Grosse Politik (Berlin, 

1900-1914) 
Schmitt, Bernadotte, England and Germany (Princeton, 1916) 
Seymour, C, Diplomatic Background of the War (New Haven, 

1916) 
Stowell and Munro, International Cases (Boston, 1916) 
Tardieu, Andre, Questions Diplomatiques (Paris, 1905) 
La Conference d'Algesiras (Paris, 1907) 
France and the Alliances (New York, 1908) 



382 BlBLIOGEAPSY 

Le Prince de Biilow (Paris, 1909) 
Le Mystere d'Agadir (Paris, 1912) 
Tittoni, Tommaso, La Responsabilite de la Guerre, Pages 

Actuelles (1914-1916), (Paris, 1916) 
Thayer, W. R., Life and Letters of John Hay, 2 Vols. (Bos- 
ton, 1915) 
Vergnet, Paul, France in Danger (Paris, 1915) 
Viallate et Caudel, La Vie Politique dans les Deux Mondes, 

6 Vols. (Paris, 1908-1914) 
Vizetelly, E. A., Republican France (Boston, 1912) 
Von Biilow, Prince, Imperial Germany (New York, 1917) 
Weale, B. L. Putnam, Indiscreet Letters from Peking (New 
York, 1907) 

Periodicals 

Augiers, E., La France et TAngleterre en Extreme Orient, 
Revue Politique et Parlementaire, April 1, 1904 

Barker, J. Ellis, Anglo-German Differences and Sir Edward 
Grey, Fortnightly Review, March 1, 1912 

Bensusan, S. L., Great Britain, France and the Moorish Em- 
pire, Contemporary Review, Nov. 1913 

Berard, Victor, La Politique Francaise, Revue de Paris, July 
1, 1905 
Le Discours du Chancelier, Revue de Paris, Dec. 15, 1906 

Berthelemy, H., Convention Franco-Anglais relative aux 
Nouvelles Hebrides, Revue Politique et Parlementaire, 
Feb. 1907 

Bushby, H. N. G., The Anglo-Japanese Treaty, Nineteenth 
Century, March, 1902 

Caix, M. Robert de, Question des Nouvelles Hebrides, Ques- 
tions Diplomatiques et Coloniales, June 16, 1914 

Doutte, Edmond, Le Sultanat Marocain, Revue Politique et 
Parlementaire, September, 1909 

Etienne, Eugene, L Accord Franco-Italien et le Maroc, Ques- 



BIBLIOGEAPHY S83 

tions Diplomatiques et Coloniales, January 15, 1902 
Notre Politique Africaine-Algerie et Maroc, Questions Dip- 
lomatiques et Coloniales, June 15, 1903 
Colonial Litigations between France and England, National 
Review, July 1, 1903 

Geraud, A., The Story of the Bagdad Railway, Nineteenth 
Century, May, June, 1914 

Gidel, Gilbert, L 'Arbitrage de Casablanca, Revue Generale 
de Droit International Public, 1910 

Goblet, Rene, L 'Arrangement Franco-Anglais, Revue Politique 
et Parlementaire, May, 1904 

Gwinner, A. von. The Bagdad Railway and the Question of 
British Cooperation, Nineteenth Century, June, 1909 

Harris, W. B., England, France and Morocco, National Re- 
view, November, 1903 

Henry, Rene, Accord Anglo-allemand, Revue Politique et Par- 
lementaire, January, 1901 

Jaray, M. G. L., L 'Accord entre la France et I'Angleterre, 
Questions Diplomatiques et Coloniales, November 16, 
1904 

Lavisse, Ernest, Precautions contre I'Angleterre, Revue de 
Paris, January 1, 1900 
France et Angleterre, Revue de Paris, February 1, 1899 

Lebon, Andre, La Mission Marchand et le Cabinet Meline, 
Revue de deux Mondes, March 15, 1900 

Lorin, Henri, La Question du Maroc, Revue Politique et Par- 
lementaire, July, 1901 

Millet, Rene, Quatre Ans de Politique Exterieure, Revue 
Politique et Parlementaire, October, 1902 

Millet, Rene, L 'Affaire du Siam, Revue Politique et Parle- 
mentaire, December, 1902 
La Lutte Pacifique entre la France et L 'Angleterre, Revue 

de Deux Mondes, June 15, 1904 
L 'Accord Franco-Espangnol, Revue Politique et Parlemen- 
taire, November, 1904 



384 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

La Conscience Nationale, Revue Politique et Parlementaire, 

March, 1905 
Peril National, Revue Politique et Parlementaire, June, 

1905 
Maroc devant I'Europe, Revue Politique et Parlementaire, 
November, 1907 
Mury, Francis, Nouvelle Traite avec le Siam, Questions Diplo- 

matiques et Coloniales, February 16, 1904 
Peyerimhoff, Henri de, Le Conflit Franc-Turc, Questions Dip- 

lomatiques et Coloniales, November 15, 1901 
Recouly, Raymond, Le Septenat de M, Delcasse, Revue Poli- 
tique et Parlementaire, June, 1905 
La Conference d'Algeciras, Revue Politique et Parlemen- 
taire, February, 1906 
Rivet, Gustave, La France et 1 'Italic, Revue Politique et Par- 
lementaire, June, 1904 
Sabatier, Camilla, L'Erreur d'Algeciras, Revue Politique et 

Parlementaire, November, 1907 
Tardieu, Andre, France et Espangne, Revue de deux Mondes, 

December 1, 1912 
Zeta, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and After, Fortnightly 
Review, March 1, 1902 
Extended use has been made of the monthly summaries 
of diplomatic event given by MM. Alcide Ebray, Rene Millet 
and Raymond Recouly in the ''Revue Politique et Parlemen- 
taire" (1898-1914) in the department entitled "La Politique 
Exterieure du Mois. ' ' 

The Temps and the London Times have also been used ex- 
tensively. Incidental use has been made of the following 
newspapers: Matin, Echo de Paris, Journal des Debats, 
Journal, Eclair, Figaro, Humanite, Kolnische Zeitung, West- 
falische Zeitung, Berliner Tageblatt, Hamburger Nachriehten. 



INDEX 



Abdul Aziz, becomes Sultan of terest in, 101; French attitude 



Morocco, 139-141; aids German 
interests, 196; indifferent to 
France, 233, removes court, 237; 
seeks French aid, 239; struggle 
with Mouley-Hafid, 246-253 

Abdul Hamid, 46; attitude to- 
wards Lorando-Tubini claims, 
47-51 

Abyssinia, convention concerning, 
242-243 

Adowa, disaster of, 7, 78 

Aehrenthal Count von, 260, 268- 
269 

Africa, British concessions to 
France in, 125-127 

Agadir, affair of, 301-331 

Albert, King of Belgium, 357- 
358 

Albin, Pierre, quoted, 302 

Algeciras, 197, 204; Conference of, 
206-239; General Act, 220-221; 
application of act, 227-239 

Almodovar, Duke d', 207 

Amade, General d', 248, 250, 279 

Andrg, General, 176 

Anglo-French Accord of 1904, 116- 
127; ratification of, 127-132 

Anglo-French Convention, concern- 
ing Niger, 27 

Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 69 

Armenia, massacres, 50, 51 

Associations Bill, 90 

Austria, and Young Turks, 261- 
262; and Bosnia, 267-274; at- 
titude towards Serbia, 337; 356 



Bacheract, M., 213, 220 

Bagdad Railway, 50; British in- 



towards, 102-106; Russian at- 
titude towards, 103-104; France 
gives up interests in, 366 

Bahr-el-Gahzal, French possession 
of, 25-27; 30, 31 

Balfour, Mr., 28; on Bagdad Rail- 
way, 105 

Bandar-Jisseh, 32 

Barclay, Sir Thomas, quoted, 26; 
aids approach to France, 108- 
111 

Barrfere, M., 79, 82, 84, 85, 187, 318 

Barres, M. Maurice, 369 

Barthou, M., ministerial declara- 
tion, 346; ministry falls, 359 

Basserman, Herr, 223 

Baudin, M., quoted, 266 

Bebel, Herr, 353 

Berard, Victor, quoted, 149, 366 

Bethman-Hollweg, Herr von, 
quoted, 323, 350 

Beyens, Baron, quoted, 303-304; 
351 

Bieberstein, Baron Marshall, sug- 
gests Franco-German entente, 
10; at Constantinople, 268 

Bihourd, M., on Moroccan situa- 
tion, 161-164; 181; sums up 
German attitude, 183-184; con- 
fers with von Biilow, 194, 197 

Boer War, 37; French attitude 
towards, '38-43; German atti- 
tude, 100 

Bosnian Crisis, 267-274 

Bourgeois, M. Leon, 35, 217, 219; 
in Algeciras, 227; at Hague, 
242; minister of labor, 332 

Boxer RebeiMxnis, 52-67 



d^ 



380 



INDEX 



Brazza, Savorgnan de, 315, 323 

Briand, M., becomes minister, 276; 
resigns, 289; in Poincare minis- 
try, 332; forms ministry, 345; 
quoted, 360 

Bu-Hamara, 141, 145, 148, 229, 
280 

Bulgaria, 355 

Biilow, Herr von, visits Mr. Cham- 
berlain, 38; German attitude in 
Boer War, 42; Far-Eastern Pol- 
icy, 67; and Italy, 78, 86; 
Moroccan Policy, 147-148; 163, 
165, 168-169; sums up German 
Policy, 170-173; quoted, 179; 
note to Prince Radolin, 184, 
186; demands conference, 188; 
made prince, 191; on Rouviers 
Policy, 194; confers with M. 
Bihourd, 197; with Baron Cour- 
cel, 212; telegram to Count 
Witte, 216; on Conference of 
Algeciras, 223-225 ; reproaches 
France, 237; outlines new Ger- 
man Policy, 262; in Morocco, 
266; on relations with Austria, 
270; quoted, 274. 

Cagniard, Gaston, quoted, 342-343 

Caillard, Admiral, 49 

Caillaux, M., 289, character of, 
299-300; attitude in Moroccan 
Affair, 305-325; opposes three 
year service, 352, 354; influence 
of, 359-360; minister of finance, 
359; director of cabinet, 363; 
scandal of 367-368; re-elected, 
369 

Caix, Robert de, quoted, 248, 
note 

Calmette, M., assails M. Caillaux, 
367-368 

Cambon, Jules, 19, 60, 258, 263; 
demands explanatory letter from 
Germany, 265, note; 266; 
quoted, 291; learns German at- 



titude, 296-297; in Agadir 
crisis, 305-320; on German in- 
cidents, 348 

Cambon, M. Paul, 56; aids rap- 
prochement with England, 109, 
112; treaty of arbitration, 115; 
in Moroccan affair, 306; replies 
to Sir Edward Grey, 338-339 

Cameroon, 310, 313 

Campbell-Bannerman, Sir Henry, 
favors better relations with 
France, 28 

Casablanca, 218, 219; massacre 
in, 236; deserters of, 257-261 

Castellane, Count de, quoted, 93 

Cavour, 77 

Chaffee, General, 62 

Chamberlain, Joseph, provocative 
attitude towards France, 28; 
favors alliance with Germany, 
38, 39; on British Policy in 
China, 56; on Germany, 87 

Charbonnier, M., 228, 232, 281 

Cheradame, M., quoted, 106, 366 

China, foreign exploration of, 52- 
57; Boxer rebellion, 57-67 

Clemenceau, M., 208, 217; forms 
cabinet, 229; attitude, 230; 
difficulties of, 239; visits Lon- 
don, 255; in Casablanca affair, 
259-260; ministry falls, 275- 
276; in Agadir Affair, 325, 326 

Cochin Denys, 50; speech in Cham- 
ber, 70; on Franco-British ac- 
cord, 130; criticises M. Rouvier, 
210; quoted, 274, 324 

Combes, M., 90, 96, 175, 177 

Constans, M., 47, 106 

Constant, M. d'Estournelles de, 
urges accord with England, 29 ; 
delegate at Hague, 35; favors 
arbitration, 110; at Hague, 242; 
favors understanding with Ger- 
many, 352; quoted, 360-361 

Conty, M., quoted, 291 

Cretan Affair, 44, 45, 274 



M* 



INDEX 



38V 



Crispi, fall of, 7; foreign policy, 

78, 79 
Cruppi, M., 255, 289, quoted, 294; 

protests action of Spain, 327 



Debidour, quoted, 6, 45, 53, 335 

Delahaye, M. Jules, 324 

Delcass6, M., becomes minister of 
foreign affairs, 3-5; relations 
with Italy, 8; the Portuguese 
affair, 11; attitude towards Gt. 
Britain, 12; mediation in Span- 
ish-American War, 18; colonial 
secretary, 20; settles Fashoda 
affair, 23-31; on Madagascar, 
33; favors Hague Conference, 
34; strengthens Russian Alli- 
ance, 36; on Boer War, 38-43; 
Cretan affair, 44-45; Lorando- 
Tubini claims, 46-51; diplomacy 
in Far-East, 52-76; draws close 
to Italy, 79-89; relations with 
Vatican, 89-97; attitude towards 
Bagdad Railway, 103-106; 
brings about rapprochement 
with. Great Britain, 107-132; 
gains Kaiser's hostility, 135- 
136; Moroccan policy, 142-179; 
forced to resign, 179-192; 
speech in Chamber, 246; causes 
downfall of Clemenceau, 275- 
276; on Morocco, 305; becomes 
minister of marine, 332; ap- 
pointed ambassador, 344 

Deroulede, Paul, 113 

Deschanel, M. Paul, quoted, 97, 
106, 115; on Algeciras, 232; on 
Eastern question, 269, note 

Dilke, Sir Charles, 87 

Dillon, Dr. E. J., quoted, 81, 128 

Dogger Bank, incident, 35 

Donnersmarck, Prince, visit to 
Paris, 185 

Domner, M., 72 

Doumergue, M., forms ministry, 
359, 300; explains Poutilo'ff af- 



fair, 363-364; quoted, 367; re- 
signs, 371 

Dreyfus, Affair, 16, 17, 90, 176, 
342 

Drude, General, 236, 239, 247 

Edward VII, 70, 107, 108; visits 
Paris, 112; attitude towards 
France, 113; influence, 114, 
note; visits Paris, 213, note; 
friendly towards France and 
Russia, 256 

Egypt, French interests in, 15; 
British opposition, 20; Anglo- 
French agreement concerning, 
117-121 

Entente Cordiale, 107-132; at Al- 
geciras, 223; defined, 338; anni- 
versary of, 369-370 

Etienne, M., on Franco-British ac- 
cord, 129-130; quoted, 142 

Falliferes, M., 209, 256, 299, 306, 
332 

Fashoda, 16, 20-33 

Fez Expedition, 292-300; 302 

Foreign Legion, deserters of, 257- 
261; attacked in Germany, 365 

Forstner, Baron von, 356 

Franco-German Accord, 263-266 ; 
failure of, 283-292 

Franco-Russian Alliance, forma- 
tion, 5; Millerand's opinion of, 
6; Jaur6's opinion of, 6; at Al- 
geciras, 223 

Frederica, Empress, visit to Paris, 
9 

Fullerton, W. M., quoted, 7, 12, 
17, 91, 276, note, 297 

Gambetta, 4, 5 

George, Mr. Lloyd, 311-312; 362 
Germany, relations with France, 
9; during Boer War, 37^3; in 
Orient, 53-71, accord with Great 
Britain, 64-67; situation in 
MbrocCO, 139, 147-148; policy in 



388 



INDEX 



Morocco, 170-179; forces the 
issue, 179-192; action in Mo- 
rocco, 195-205; at Algeciras, 
221-226; new attitude, 261-263; 
accord with France, 263-266; 
and Near East, 269-274; in Mo- 
rocco, 283-292; Agadir Affair, 
301-327 

Great Britain, Delcass^'s attitude 
towards, 3-5; Portuguese loan, 
10, 11; relations with France, 
12-16; in Egypt, 20-30; agree- 
ment with France, 30-33; in 
Boer War, 37-43 ; in Orient, 53- 
76; accord with Germany, 64- 
67; alliance with Japan, 69; re- 
lations with Italy, 80^81; 
Treaty of March 21, 1899, with 
France, 81; entente with France, 
107-132; situation in Morocco, 
138-139; attitude towards 
France, 203 ; Mediterranean 
agreement, 243; accord with 
Russia, 246; in Morocco, 287; 
internal situation, 362; renews 
entente, 369-370 

Greindl, Baron, quoted, 60 

Grey, Sir Edward, speech on 
Egypt, 21; on Franco^British 
accord, 127; gives assurances to 
France, 203; and Balkan situa- 
tion, 268, 272; on Moroccan 
situation, 307; note to M. Cam- 
bon, 338-339; on Balkan situa- 
tion, 347 

Guebbas, Sidi Mohammed, 149, 
232, 230^ 

Guiot M., 284 

Gwinner, Herr, 307 



Hague Peace Conference, 33-36; 
second, 240-242 

Haldane, Lord, 362 

Hanotaux, Gabriel, 4, 13; answers 
Sir Edward Grey, 22; Cretan 
solution, 44; treaty with Italy, 



79; quoted, 90, 92; as foreign 

minister, 108; quoted, 298-299; 

322 
Harris, W,. B. H., 13, 150 
Hay, John, quoted, 66; on Del- 

cass6's resignation, 192 
Heeringen, General, 343 
Henry, M. Rene, quoted, 65 
Herve, Gustave, quoted, 309; 352 
Heydebrand, Herr von, 323 
Hugo, Victor, on world peace, 240, 

note 

Indo-China, French, 15 

Isvolsky, M., 268, 273 

Italy, relation to Triple Alliance, 
7; in Cretan Affair, 45; in 
China, 53; rapprochement with 
France, 77- 89; relations with 
England, 80-81 ; and Austria, 
269-270; diplomatic difficulties 
with France, 333-334; signs 
agreement, 336-337 

Jagow, Herr von, 348 

Japan, alliance with England, 69; 
accord with France, 245-246; 
accord with Russia, 245 

Jaures, M., on Russian Alliance, 
6; on Franco- Italian relations, 
95; attitude towards England, 
110; approves Triple Alliance, 
132-133; Moroccan policy, 151; 
influence, 176-177; 225; 232; 
speech of, 247, note, on Moroc- 
co, 279, 298; influence in Cham- 
ber, 309; supports M. Caillaux, 
324; opposes three year service, 
352, 354; influence of, 358. 

Jenouvrier, M., 316, 326 

Jonnart, M., 149, 150 

Kaiser, see William II 
Kassar-Said, Treaty of, 13, 79 
Kiderlen, Herr von, outlines new 
German policy, 263; 29-3; dubi- 
ous attitude, 295-297; outlines 



INDEX 



389 



situation, 303-304; in Agadir 
affair, 308-320 

Kitchener, Lord, at Fashoda, 21, 
23, 24 

Klass, Herr, 304 

Koweit, 50, 102, 103 

Kuhlmann, Herr von, declarations 
on Morocco, 159-160; quoted, 
178 

Kwang-Chou-Wan, French lease 
on, 15, 53 

Labouchere, H., speech in House 
of Commons on Egypt, 22, note 

Lalla-Marnia, Treaty of, 141 

Lamarzelle, M. de, objects to 
Franco-English accord, 30; re- 
jects Moroccan agreement, 326 

Langwerth, Baron von, 254 

Lanken, Herr von, on situation in 
Morocco, 251 

Lansdowne, Lord, Far Eastern pol- 
icy, 67-68; foreign minister, 70; 
on Franco-Italian relations, 87; 
on Bagdad Railway, 105; for- 
eign minister, 108; agrees to ar- 
bitration treaty, 115 

Larache, public works in, 255 

Lavisse, M., quoted, 38, 42 

Law, Major, report on railways in 
Asia Minor. 101 

Leghait, M., despatch of, 186, note; 
213, note 

L6monon, Ernest, quoted, 11, 38, 
109 

Leo XIII, 92 

Liotard, M., 20, 21 

London, Convention of, 15 

Lorando, claims against Turkey, 
46-51 

Loubet, President, 83, 92-94; visit 
to England, 114-115; refuses 
Delcass^'s resignation, 183 

Lyautey, General, 239 

MacLe'an, Mr., 13, 150, 236, 277 
Madagascar, French protectorate 
in, 14; annexation, 32; Ftanco- 



British agreement concerning, 
122-123 
Mannesman Brothers, 286, 290 
Marchand, Expedition, 21-27 
Mauchamp, Dr., 234, 235, 281 
Maura, Sefior, speaks on Morocco, 

153 
Mazzini, 8 

Merle, M., quoted, 279 
Mevil, Andr6, quoted, 10, 11, 41, 

175, 183, 190, 265 
Messimy, M., 290, 300 
Metternich, Count Wolff, 311 
Millerand, M., on Russian Alliance, 
6; becomes minister of war, 
332, 335; resignation, 341-343 
Millet, Rene, quoted, 74, 121, 128, 

152, 202, 238 
Millevoye, M. Lucien, 177 
Moinier, General, 293, 294 
Mokri, El, Envoy to Paris, 277- 

278; 280-282 
Monis, M., forms cabinet, 289; in- 
jured, 297; minister of marine, 
359 
Monson, Sir Edward, speech on 

France, 28 
Morocco, English attitude towards, 
13, 14; Franco-British agree- 
ment regarding, 117-121; in- 
ternal condition of, 137-145; 
Franco-German program for, 
197; two Sultans of, 246-253; 
new attitude towards France, 
266; conditions in, 292-297 
Mouley-Hafid, proclaimed sultan, 
237; struggle for control, 246- 
250; recognition, 251-253; 
character of, 254; makes agree- 
ment with France, 277; protests 
against Spain, 279; opposes 
France, 280-281; critical situa- 
tion of, 292-293 
Mouravieff, Count, 34, 36; 40, 41 

Newfoundland, French fishing 
rights in, 16; Franco-British 



390 



INDEX 



agreement concerning, 122-125; 

130 
JSTew Hebrides, Franco-British 

agreement concerning, 122-123 
Ngoko-Sangha Co., 287, 289-292, 

297 
Nicholas II, relations with Kaiser, 

135; 199-201 
Nicholas, King of Montenegro, 347 
Nicholson, Sir Arthur, 206, 219, 

306 

O'Connor, General, 149-150 

Panther, the, 300, 301, 304, 305 

Pelletan, M., 176 

Pichon, M. Stephen, 54, 58, 59; 
conditions imposed upon China, 
67; favors English rapproche- 
ment, 109; foreign minister, 
230; on Morocco, 231, 232; sends 
cruiser, 234; quoted, 235, 241, 
243, note; French program, 251; 
signs accord with Germany, 
263; on Eastern question, 269, 
272; remains foreign minister, 
276; sends ultimatum to Sultan, 
281; note to Germany, 285; in 
Ngoko-Sangha, 288; on Moroc- 
can solution, 326, 331; foreign 
minister, 346 

Pinon, Rene, quoted, 79, 86, 290 

Pius X, 92 

Pressense, M. de, 110; on Franco- 
British accord, 130; on disarm- 
ament, 241 

Prinetti, M., speech on Italian pol- 
icy, 83-84 

Poincare, M., on Agadir Affair, 
326; forms ministry, 332-333; 
visits Russia, 335; on Balkan 
situation, 337-339; on relations 
with Great Britain, 340; elected 
president, 341 ; plea for pre- 
paredness, 344 ; characterized, 
360-361 ; urges preparedness, 
366; quoted, 371 



Portugal, question of loan, 10-12 
Poutiloff Affair, 363-364 

Radolin, Prince, 148, 162, 180, 181, 
193, 265-266 

Radowitz, Herr von, delegate to 
Algeciras, 207; confers with M. 
Revoil, 208; opposes M. Revoil. 
211, 215 

Raisuli, 156, 157, 210, 228, 229, 
232, 236, 277 

Regnault, M., delegate to Alge- 
ciras, 206, 207, 208 ; on Moroccan 
situation, 229; envoy to Fez, 
277 

Renschausen, firm of, 235 

Renter, Colonel von, 357 

R6voil, M., warns Shereefian gov- 
ernment, 142; resigns, 149; del- 
egate to Algeciras, 206; brings 
up question of police, 211; 214 

Reynald, Georges, quoted, 8, 176, 
188 

Ribot, M., 5; favors accord with 
England, 29; quoted, 112; sup- 
ports government, 234-235 ; 
quoted, 294, 326 

Roosevelt, President, attempts to 
influence Germany at Algeciras, 
212; hears from Kaiser, 216 

Root, Mr. Elihu, communicates 
with Kaiser, 217 

Rosen, Dr., 255 

Rouvier, M., supports Bagdad 
Railway, 106; forms cabinet, 
175; supports Delcass6, 182; ne- 
gotiates secretly with Germany, 
184, 186; forces Delcasse's res- 
ignation, 189, 190; at Quai 
D'Orsay, 192-205 ; remains, 209 ; 
overthrown, 215 

Rudini, Marquis de, 80, 82, 84 

Russia, Alliance with- France, 5, 
6 ; suggests peace conference, 33- 
35; M. Delcasse's visit to, 36; 
attitude in Boer War, 41; in 
Cretan Affair, 44; in Orient, 69; 



INDEX 



391 



agreement with France, 69-70; 
war with Japan, 132-136; after 
the war, 200 ; accord with Japan, 
245; accord with Great Britain. 
246; and Near East, 268-274; 
relations with France, 335 



Salisbury, Lord, protests on Eng- 
lish treatment in Madagascar, 
33; on Boer War, 39; on French 
concession in China, 55; 57; 
favors German command in 
China, 61 ; accord with Germany, 
65; Anglo-Italian relations, 80 

Sarrien, M., ministry, 215, 217; 
French attitude expressed, 218; 
resignation, 229 

Saverne, incident of, 356-357 

Schoen, Herr von, 258, 263, 266; 
quoted, 292 

Selves, M. de, becomes foreign min- 
ister, 300, 301 ; policy in Agadir 
affair, 305-325 

Sembat, Marcel, 62, 69, 91, 309 

Serbia, 267, 271-273 

Serret, Lieut. Col., 349 

Shanghai, concession of, 55 

Shimonoseki Treaty, 9, 52 

Siam, British attitude towards, 
15; relations with France, 71- 
76; Franco-British agreement 
concerning, 121-122 

Spain, situation in Morocco, 138; 
Moroccan policy of, 145-146; 
153-156; secret agreement with 
France, 201; at Algeciras, 209, 
219; Mediterranean agreement 
243; issues joint note with 
France, 252-253 ; opposes France, 
278-280, 297-298; settles with 
France, 327-331 

Spanish-American War, French 
mediation in, 19 

Taillandier, M. Saint-Reng, 157, 
158; difficulties at Fez, 166-167; 



states French position in Moroc- 
co, 180, 181, 186 

Tangier, outbreak in, 228, 231, 
232; constructions in, 235, 255 

Tardieu, Andr6, quoted, 80, 114, 
178, 206, 278, 282, 285, 322 

Tattenbach, Count von, interviews 
Sultan, 187; at Algeciras, 207, 
208, 209; proposal for State 
Bank, 210, 215 

Thalamas, M., 354 

Thomasson, Commandant de, 
quoted, 360, note; 365-366 

Three years service law, 346, 352, 
354-355, 371 

Togoland, 310, 313 

Triple Alliance, treaties of, 88-89 

Tripoli, 79-86 

Tshudi, Captain von, 233 

Tubini, claims against Turkey. 
46-51 

Turkey, relations with Crete, 44- 
45; Turbini claims, 46-51; 
Yovmg Turk Revolution, 261- 
262; relations with Austria, 
267-268; in the Balkans, 336, 
339 

United States, war with Spain, 19; 
note to China, 57, 58; settle- 
ment with China, 64; sends 
squadron to Morocco, 157; at Al- 
geciras, 216-217 

Vassel, Dr., 252 

Vatican, French relations with, 

89-97 
Vazeille, M., 353 
Victor Emmanuel III, 82, 92 
Visconti-Venosta, Marquis, 78, 82, 

84, 208 
Viviani, M., 256; forms cabinet, 

372 
Voyron, General, 62 

Waldeck-Rousseau, ministry, 37, 
79, 90; speech of, 91 



392 



INDEX 



Walderse«, Marshal von, 61, 62 

War, World, its approach, 332-375 

Wei-hai-Wei, 53 

White, Henry, 208, 212 

William II, early relations with 
France, 9, 35; on Boer War, 41; 
'TDaily Telegraph" interview, 41 j 
desires German command for al- 
lied troops in China, 61; ad- 
dresses troops, 63; Bagdad Rail- 
way, 100; attitude during 
Eusso-Japanese war, 135-136; 
speech to Sultan of Morocco, 
167; informs U. S. in regard to 
China, 174; visit to Tangier, 



179; meets Czar at Bjorko, 199; 
attitude on Algeciras, 212; tel- 
egraphs President Roosevelt, 
216; quoted, 241; letter to Lord 
Tweedmouth, 256; quoted, 257; 
"Daily Telegraph" interview, 
259; approves accord with 
France, 265; threatens Russia, 
273; on Morocco, 291; sounds 
King Albert, 357-358 

Witte, M., 199, 212, 216 

WolflF, Lieutenant, 233 

Zimmerman, Herr, 296; quoted, 
301-302; 305 



Am±8B^ 



/ 



v^ 



cr^i 






Ci- 






9? "'..s^ # 















o5 Q. 






.N^ 





















"^AO^ 







■!- iO Si *^ H^ 



v^ . 



,.. ._ _ _ "^ .^^' */r 












i^il ^^ 



V ^ «=■ 59 



^(^ =*#K%': "^^ 









4 s 



'%.o^ 



^ - 






Q> 




.^^ 



t "^ c 



,-.# ^^. ^^ML 






.-fh'' 



•-^m 



iiiiliiffii!, 

019 6449115^ 



ri' ' , 






;!;.;o;,<;'|. 

"-v-'H! 



A, , . .1 ■ I- 

■ ''^J •'■; ■'■:■'-'! 









t< v> 



J^•^.■';^^^1 






m^'^ 



'AJI'y.'laAwk^'i- 



